Through Veterans' Eyes

by Larry Minear

  Some soldiers observed differences between the Soviet Union’s conquest of Afghanistan during the Cold War and U.S. involvement in the current conflict. “Afghanistan historically is the number one most-invaded country in the history of all time,” noted Marinich. “It’s very tribal.” As he saw U.S. involvement, however, “we are doing the most right thing that can be done. We are succeeding where just about every other sovereignty from the outside has failed. We have a different mindset. We are enabling. We are not taking anything.”21

  With the Cold War past, classical confrontations in which military formations face off against each other have given way to smaller scale conflicts, often needing a lithe fire brigade rather than a buxom heavy-artillery-centered army. As noted earlier, holding forward operating bases (FOBs) rather than large swathes of territory has often exposed supply troops to combat.

  As a result, traditional distinctions between combat and support functions—and thus the traditional division of labor between active-duty and support soldiers—have been overtaken by events. The skill sets and training needed differ from what was required when logistics and administrative backup could be provided in relative safety away from the front. “Some units will go out and be the ones that kick down doors, do raids that go out looking for bad guys so they can kill them,” a National Guard officer observed. “And there are some people whose jobs are to move equipment around to feed those troops and provide other support roles. But we’re all right in the same area all the time…. We all have to train to be warriors.”22 Indeed, many soldiers—both active duty and National Guard—expressed their views, for the most part more positive than negative, on how well the citizen-soldiers who make up the Guard acquitted themselves under fire.23

  Some soldiers perceived an evolution in warfare during the course of the Iraq conflict itself. At the outset, observed Col. Mark Warnecke of the New York National Guard, the enemy’s tactics involved complex and coordinated military operations by substantial numbers of soldiers designed to take and hold territory. Over time, however, hit-and-run guerrilla operations designed to intimidate coalition forces came to predominate. With the defeat of the Iraqi army and the ascendancy of an insurgency that relied on ambush tactics and low-tech munitions such as IEDs, Warmecke observed, military strategy and tactics began to look more and more like those used in the Indochina war.24

  A fourth major difference between the two current conflicts and earlier American wars drew constant comment: the difficulty of identifying the enemy, now no longer wearing uniforms or bearing weapons in the open. In this respect, the battlefields of the global war on terror were more like those of Indochina than the World Wars or Korea. There were evident parallels with Vietnam, where combatants were often difficult to distinguish from noncombatants and the proximity of combat to civilian populations and infrastructure created difficulties for the use of high-tech weaponry.

  “We soldiers operating in Iraq, we can’t tell who are insurgents and who are civilians,” says Aric Arnold, an Army major who spent nine months there beginning in August 2003. “It makes it extremely difficult to pick the right from the wrong. It is difficult for soldiers trying to do the right thing. We have never been in this kind of environment. It is unlike anywhere except Vietnam, but even in Vietnam, there was a discernible enemy.”25

  A fifth difference involved major advances in battlefield medicine and in rescuing and treating soldiers wounded in combat. During the first year of the Iraq war, the Pentagon tallied 18,000 medical evacuations (with 11,700 individual soldiers transported). Thanks to “far-forward surgical and medical teams and technologies to care for casualties within minutes of injury, 98 percent of those wounded who reached medical treatment survived their injuries.”26 “Never has military medicine been able to save so many as they can now,” notes Maj. David Ball, Germany-based U.S. medevac flight coordinator.27 Interviews with individual veterans provide firsthand accounts of various stages in the process, from treatment on the spot to more specialized care elsewhere in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Germany, and back in the United States.

  Improvements in battlefield medicine resulted in a far higher survival rate among those wounded in action. Medics in particular noted the speed with which medical evacuations could be mounted and the effectiveness of the network of emergency treatment facilities arrayed near combat zones, in neighboring countries, in Germany and the United States. “We’re saving a much higher percentage of wounded than we did in Vietnam,” noted Army Lt. Col. Maria Teresa Cochran, who described an all-hands-on-deck scene at Camp Balad in Iraq following a mass-casualty incident. “But we must provide the quality of life afterwards. I think America has to get used to seeing guys on crutches, in wheelchairs, and without legs. We have to build the means to support these guys and get them self-sustaining and back into society. We’re going to see a lot more of them.”28

  There were indications, too, especially in Iraq, of progress in addressing the in-theater psychological needs of veterans more seriously. First Sergeant Mayfield, after almost twenty years in the Army, tells an interviewer about seeing a big, hand-lettered sign that showed up overnight at his base near Baghdad: “It said, ‘785th Combat Stress Hospital,’ with an arrow pointing down the road. We were, like, ‘What’s a combat stress hospital? I’ve never even heard of that before!’”29 Critical-incidents debriefings were also instituted as a means of assisting soldiers exposed to extreme violence. In such debriefings, participants were sometimes told, in an effort to reassure, that PTSD involved normal reactions to abnormal situations.

  The experience in Afghanistan and Iraq is already having major implications for the preparation of troops for future conflicts. “During the Cold War,” observed one senior New Hampshire Guard official, “we were deploying to hardened bases in Europe and Asia. With the new global war on terror and our basing in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have sent people into areas that don’t have a hardened facility.” In her view, the “more austere environments” in which future conflicts may take place will require not only more careful screening of recruits, but also more thorough immunization of those deployed (for example, against anthrax and smallpox). Post-Gulf War innovations that deserved to be continued, in her view, include advance “blood banking” for all of those deployed and mandatory individual mental health screening upon reentry.30

  Other differences noted between these and earlier wars were more individualistic. Air Force Special Agent John R. Cencich found the 9/11 attacks far more egregious than the bombing of Pearl Harbor. While the latter had a military target, the former was a crime against humanity that provided every justification for a U.S. reprisal against Afghanistan.31 Based on his own experience, another soldier found conditions in East Africa even more rugged than those in Iraq. In Somalia, he said, the posture of U.S. troops had been defensive, the rules of engagement more unsatisfactory, and the UN involvement a seriously complicating factor.32 He came away from postings in Somalia and Jordan with the same basic lesson: “Just do your job,” however constraining the setting and rules of engagement and however formidable the geographical or political obstacles.

  Compared to Iraq, commented Marine SSgt. David James Paxson, Kosovo was “a fairly easy deployment.” There were no IEDs, no armed insurgents blending in with crowds of civilians, no suicide bombers. The troops in Iraq were tested in a major way when the Republican Guard removed their uniforms, “making it hard to tell who was friendly and who was the enemy.” Attacks against U.S. convoys and civilians were part of a last-ditch effort, he felt, to intimidate American troops. While augmenting the number of troops would increase the risk, there was simply no substitute for putting more boots on the ground in an effort to flush out the insurgents. “Now that we’re there,” he concluded, “if we leave now, no matter if the war was wrong or right, we’re going to look like the bad guys.” In his view, U.S. troops need to remain until the Iraqi army can take over. If they can’t assume responsibility, this will be considered “the Vietnam of our generation.
”33

  Of all the points of discontinuity, veterans most frequently contrasted the appreciative receptions they received upon returning from Afghanistan and Iraq with the hostile welcomes accorded returning Vietnam veterans. A number took pains to point out that despite the growing unpopularity of the Iraq war, returning veterans were still receiving far better treatment than their Vietnam predecessors. In fact, several soldiers had experienced both receptions themselves. Ty Simmons, chief warrant officer with the Illinois National Guard, had enlisted in 1968 and served in Vietnam for a year. “After Vietnam, I was a nobody,” he recalled. “I was spat upon, discarded. I was called a baby killer. I hope and pray that we never do that again, that the young soldiers will not have to go through that. The soldiers are just doing their job the best way that we can. Always support the soldier in the fight, even if you may not like what the government is doing. You may not like why they are there, but please support the soldiers…. These young soldiers are heroes. We need to support them no matter what.”34

  In the same airports where returnees from Vietnam had been hassled and mocked as baby killers, complete strangers now approach returnees to thank them for their service. “Some Vietnam vets have made a personal commitment to ensure that our reception was what theirs should have been,” commented a thankful Army Capt. Ryan Aument. “Folks will disagree with the public policy of the war but have always treated me with respect as a soldier.”35The difference has not only eased their immediate reentry but also facilitated their quest for a “new normal” once they are home. That difference notwithstanding, Amn. Mark Kaplan noted a parallel between the popular outrage in the United States at the Abu Ghraib abuses and public opposition to the Vietnam War. Similarities notwithstanding, he said, the Abu Ghraib reaction was focused and specific while the Vietnam backlash was broad and sustained.36

  CONTINUITIES

  In addition to discontinuities such as these, veterans also observe parallels with predecessor conflicts. The most frequent points of comparison are the military technology and firepower utilized, the impacts of warfare on military personnel, and the injustices experienced within the ranks by women, gay men and lesbians, and minority groups.

  With respect to military technology, some veterans draw an ominous parallel with the Indochina chapter in U.S. military history. In that war, overwhelming U.S. firepower did not ensure an American victory, nor did it set the stage for a favorable political settlement. Similarly, in the face-off against an arsenal of low-tech but lethal weaponry in Afghanistan and Iraq, the world’s most advanced warriors are seen to have lost the advantage they enjoyed in more symmetrical warfare. “We’re supposed to be the most technological army in the world, and we can’t figure out where the hell these guys are shooting from,” exclaimed Steven Rizza of the New Hampshire National Guard. “We’ve got more aircraft. We could probably line the Persian Gulf with aircraft and just walk across.”37 But the race is not necessarily won by the technologically superior.

  Direct Hit

  Cristina Frisby (AFC2001/001/53197), Photographs (PH40), VHP, AFC, LOC.

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  Sgt. Cristina Frisby served in Iraq with the Army’s 113th Medical Company, Second Medical Brigade, driving a tow truck and rescuing and repairing disabled U.S. military vehicles. This picture was taken on July 21, 2005, on a highway between Tikrit and Forward Operating Base Speicher. “The IED was hidden on the bridge and blew [out] the Humvee’s right side.”

  “We were getting hit by so many ‘fire bombs,’ as we called the IEDs, that everyone quit wearing seatbelts. When hit, the truck cabin would be immediately engulfed in searing flames and you only had a split second to grab the door and bail or be cooked.” In the incident pictured, the two soldiers in the cab managed to escape unharmed.

  In her VHP interview, Frisby describes the strenuous and stressful roles that she and other women in her unit played. She recalls the combat stress involved in simply going about her work, “every day knowing that it could be us who would be hit, but not knowing when it would happen.” Being a woman in this type of exposed and hands-on job didn’t seem to be problematic. “Nobody cared whether you were a woman,” Frisby observes. “The only thing that mattered was whether you were a good recovery mechanic.”

  “My biggest fear,” she remembers, was witnessing someone burn to death, “I did everything I could to prevent it from happening, and it never did.” She faults substandard equipment—including vehicles without up-armoring—for unnecessary injuries to the troops. Frisby received a commendation for her efforts, which frequently exposed her to hostile fire. This photograph is one of more than three hundred in her VHP file; it was taken by Spec. Cory Hoerler, another driver on her recovery team.

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  The asymmetry of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—that is, the overwhelmingly disproportionate resources of foreign interveners yet the difficulties of achieving a decisive victory—seems comparable to the conflict in Indochina. Each placed a premium on understanding the dynamics of the local scene, obtaining accurate intelligence, mounting quick responses to attacks, and maintaining control over strategic areas once captured. Counterinsurgency operations are also seen to be important in both types of settings. An additional constant is the predicament of being caught in the crossfire of internal armed conflicts and for that matter, being vulnerable to “friendly fire.” Civil wars increase the peril faced by outside interveners while delaying achievement of political solutions that could form the basis for durable peace and social reconstruction.

  Another point of continuity for those who served in Afghanistan and Iraq involves the impacts of the war on those who waged it in theater. A number of soldiers pointed out that PTSD has been a feature of every major American war, although called by a variety of names. The working definition of PTSD, mental health professionals point out, is applicable to all wars and even to non-war situations: “exposure to a traumatic event in which the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted by serious injury to others and responded with intense fear, helplessness, and horror.”38 The differences across the span of American wars are not in kind but only in degree.

  Many veterans express alarm about the incidence of PTSD—and, for that matter, TBI—in the current conflicts. Their concern is not just that with the large numbers of persons affected, the high cost of treatment, and the difficulties of reentry into society. “It is also,” explained one chaplain who has facilitated numerous discussion groups of PTSD sufferers and their families, “that those affected seem less able to buffer the shock, in part because they have a less well-developed framework of values and codes of conduct.”39 At the same time, some mental health experts question whether the concept of PTSD itself may have become overly broad and dysfunctional.40

  Another point of continuity involves issues related to the treatment of certain identifiable minority groups within the ranks and its wider implications. The treatment of women, gay men and lesbians, and blacks drew particular comment from veterans.

  The contributions made by women are widely acknowledged and applauded. “When the books are closed,” says Mayfield, “people will see that the female soldier was more of a combatant in Iraq—I don’t know about Afghanistan—than any other conflict I have been in.” By all accounts, the roles played by women in these conflicts were in many ways new to the military. With respect to the National Guard, for example, women have been accepted only since 1956 and only since 1968 have they served in active-duty ranks and performed in “almost all military specialties except in direct combat roles.”41 Women now represent not only a larger proportion of total forces—ten percent of global forces—but also play a wider array of roles.

  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, women in National Guard units have assumed leadership roles, including in combat situations. One female officer who commanded a unit that included six female soldiers observed, “My females saw combat. My females were in combat. My females did combat, and a lot more than some of these ‘all-male focu
sed’ combat units.”42 While the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq helped lay to rest the stereotype that females could not handle combat, there was, she believes, room for improvement in the military’s ability to harness the differential abilities of men and women. Women also played key decision-making roles in stateside Guard hierarchies and in hearts-and-minds activities.43

  The conflicts have also taken their toll on women, not only with respect to casualties but also with respect to health. Asked about a differential in the rates of PTSD among women and men, one DVA mental health professional notes a general finding that “when they are exposed to the same trauma, women are twice as likely to get PTSD” as men.44 According to DOD, in the Afghanistan conflict as of January 3, 2009, fourteen female soldiers had been killed, seventeen wounded, for a total of about 1 percent of U.S. casualties. In Iraq as of the same date, 101 female soldiers had lost their lives, with 598 wounded, representing about 2 percent of U.S. casualties.45

  Female interviewees comment with some regularity on incidents involving sexism, including sexual abuse. New Hampshire’s Schwab, who was otherwise highly positive about her experience in the military, filed a formal harassment complaint against one of her superiors. “I felt like I had to continually defend my honor for a year,” she explained.46 Spec. Abbie Pickett chose not to make an issue of an incident of attempted rape because she “just wanted to be one of the guys.” Nor were such experiences isolated incidents. The majority of the women from the New Hampshire National Guard interviewed by Joelle Farrell of the Concord Monitor “had dealt with sexual harassment at some point in their careers.”47 Their experience confirmed the observation of Gregory Mayfield that “military culture is a pretty high-testosterone environment.”48 The “band of brothers” feeling which is credited with strengthening the sense of solidarity among those exposed to common dangers does not always, the data show, treat sisters as full partners.