A-10s over Kosovo

by Christopher E. Haave Kimos

  No-attack zones were geographically defined areas within Kosovo in which we could not expend ordnance. Restricted areas were also geographically defined areas within Kosovo where weapons could be employed only after receiving CAOC permission. Various authorities had established these zones for a variety of reasons. The first such area to appear in the ROEs was the no-attack zone within 10 nautical miles of the Macedonian border. While at first we did not understand, we later learned that the zone was meant to reduce the risk of possible Serb reprisals on NATO troops in Macedonia. Authorities apparently believed that the Serbs might confuse the source of the ordnance raining down on them. Their concern was that the Serbs would ignore the NATO fighters overhead, credit the attacks to NATO artillery to the south, and expand the war into Macedonia. Other restricted areas were created near the end of the campaign, particularly in areas where it was thought the KLA was operating or where refugees were gathered.

  Finally, we followed a variety of rules designed to lower the risk of collateral damage, commonly defined as the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that are not military targets. The various rules included a temporary prohibition on the use of cluster munitions, the requirement for CAOC approval before attacking targets close to civilian structures, and restrictions on the type and color of vehicles that could be engaged.

  Each of these rules had intentional and unintentional consequences for target identification and target engagement. ROEs calling for higher minimum made the pilots’ task of judging whether the vehicles on the ground were civilian or military more difficult. The border of a no-attack zone meant the enemy could move from imminent danger on one side of a road to sanctuary on the other side. Other attack restrictions on areas, munitions, and target categories slowed down the prosecution of attacks. During this waiting period targets could escape by moving to a sanctuary area, weather might move in and hide them from attack, or the waiting attack aircraft might run low on fuel and be forced to depart before receiving an attack clearance.

  Approval Process

  In the beginning of KEZ operations, the ROEs were quite simple: AFACs were their own attack-clearance authority after they had determined that the suspected object was a valid military target. CAOC approval was required only when the AFAC judged that the attack might cause collateral damage—usually to civilian buildings. During the course of the conflict, many additional target types were moved from the discretionary list to one that required CAOC approval. Later, geographic areas were defined, and targets in those new restricted areas required CAOC approval prior to attack.

  AFACs often became frustrated when it appeared the CAOC was second-guessing the targets they had chosen to attack. For example, on the second day of KEZ attacks, near the southwestern border of Kosovo, I had located two large, darkgreen military deuce-and-a-half trucks, complete with curved canvas tops. They were parked just off an asphalt road on the north side of high terrain, northwest of Mount Pastrik. As I talked a flight of Dutch F-16s through an attack on these two targets, ABCCC called in-the-clear, on strike frequency, and asked whether I had positively confirmed that the target was military. I responded, “Yes.” The F-16s had missed on their first pass, so I directed them to make another attack. Apparently my answer to the ABCCC wasn’t sufficient for the CAOC. ABCCC then asked me to describe the target—evidently to personally confirm that it was military. Because we had already received AAA fire, I didn’t think we should loiter in this area. Barely able to maintain my composure, I described the trucks in detail. After landing I called our CAOC representative who told me that since JSTARS had not detected trucks in that area, the battle-staff director needed additional assurance on the target. In this case, JSTARS could not see the trucks because a high mountain blocked the line of sight between its radar orbit and the trucks. Likewise, the E-8’s moving-target indicator would not have highlighted the parked trucks.

  We appreciated the CAOC’s concern for avoiding civilian nontargets. In a similar manner, I was particularly proud of our pilots’ strict discipline, which ensured that their attacks and the ones they directed avoided collateral civilian damage. If they were in doubt about the military nature of the target or the possibility of damaging a civilian structure, they brought their ordnance home and let the potential bad guys escape. To do otherwise might have cost the lives of innocent people and severely jeopardized the political support for KEZ operations. As CAOC “interference” became routine, I learned to control my blood pressure, jink, and talk to ABCCC.

  The CAOC seemed poorly organized to act quickly when the ROEs required its approval. When an AFAC independently found a target in a restricted area or close to a village, it usually took 15 to 20 minutes to obtain approval. For example, using Lt Al Smith’s intel imagery, Maj Goldie Haun discovered what he thought to be a radar-missile launcher in an area south of Pristina. I flew there the next morning and found the small, wooded area just on the southern edge of a square village. From 15,000 feet I looked down through the trees with my binoculars and did not see any launchers. I did, however, see about 10 rectangular metal canisters stacked on a flatbed trailer in the center of the woods. They were about 15 feet long and the size of radar-guided missiles. I had two problems: the canisters were less than 100 meters from the nearest house in the village, and a low deck of clouds had begun to move in and would soon block my view of the target area. The trees prevented success when I tried to lock up the trailer with a Maverick, and the low clouds to the east ruled out an airburst Mk-82 attack flying on a heading parallel to the houses—the only attack axis that would minimize the risk to the occupants of the house. I still had my 30 mm cannon, which would work just fine. Moving off to the west to mask my interest in the area, I called ABCCC on secure radio to request approval to attack the trailer and had to wait 25 minutes for a response. During that time, the low clouds moved into the area around the trailer. I made several more calls to help expedite the clearance. I finally got the CAOC’s approval to attack, and with it came the direction to “use the gun and not hit any houses!”

  The delay and the tactical direction were absurd and a clear violation of the principle of “centralized control and decentralized execution.” The expert on the weapon systems’ capabilities and limitations had been sitting in the cockpit, looking at the target, fully capable of making a real-time execution decision consistent with ROEs that centralized control had generated. During those 25 minutes, the low clouds moved in and obscured the northern end of the target area. Because the clouds limited my options, the only attack heading I could then use was south to north—pointed directly at the village. My bullets could have ricocheted off the trailer and into the houses. The policy to centralize execution decisions had caused the delay, which had allowed the weather to change, the Serb missile canisters to escape attack, and the missiles in those canisters to remain part of the enemy’s combat capability. Perhaps those missiles were some of the many that were subsequently shot at our pilots.

  The CAOC’s actions indicated that its personnel were under colossal pressure to produce results and avoid collateral damage. They regularly interrupted our attacks—even those authorized by the ROEs. In their zeal to ensure we had the most up-to-date ROEs, the CAOC prompted ABCCC crews to remind us of what and where we could and could not attack. Unfortunately, these calls were sometimes made over the strike frequencies that Serbs monitored, allowing them to hear, “You cannot attack any targets within 10 miles of the Macedonia border,” “you cannot attack any trucks, civilian vehicles, vehicles painted white,” and other similar transmissions. The unintended consequences of these in-the-clear transmissions were that Serbs began moving their forces south to within 10 miles of the Macedonian border and started transporting their troops in civilian vehicles instead of APCs—we saw white charter buses everywhere.

  Even when AFACs were directed to enter restricted areas to find specific CAOC-identified targets, they were still required to receive CAOC approval before they attacked.
On one occasion the CAOC tasked Capt Jim Meger to find and destroy a Serb command post. After locating it he requested approval to attack. It then took the CAOC 20 minutes to approve the strike against the command post it had sent him to destroy. These delays not only allowed some targets to escape attack, but also put our pilots at greater risk. On this occasion, it took the Serbs a lot less than 20 minutes to locate Jim, draw a bead, and fire two missiles at him (see chap. 4).

  Our frustrations grew. We were getting shot at while we waited for CAOC clearance to attack, we watched helplessly as Serbs in “civilian” vehicles burned villages, and we were denied clearance to attack enemy troops and equipment in the ROE-designed sanctuaries. I began briefing visiting dignitaries on our successes and frustrations when they passed through our base at Gioia. In late April I described our situation—from our point of view, warts and all—to two very distinguished visitors, Acting Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters and Gen John P. Jumper, commander of USAFE. I emphasized that, while we thought the current situation was unacceptable, we also understood there were probably some aspects of the ROEs and target-approval process that might justify the delays. So, we thought that informing us of those constraints could make the whole process more responsive and that we could better fulfill our responsibility for identifying valid targets. They listened carefully. General Jumper took a lot of notes, asked who had been working these issues for us at the CAOC, and asked if I knew whether Lt Gen Mike Short was aware of our problems. I told him that, every day, we passed our concerns to the lieutenant colonel who represented our unit at the CAOC. He replied, “Now you’ve got a four star.”

  General Jumper suggested that I go to the CAOC to brief General Short personally. I thought that was a good idea and discussed it with Lt Col Walrus Heise, our representative. I expected to be summoned to the CAOC during the days that followed. A few days later our unit got a call to attend a conference at Tirana, Albania, with General Short and Lt Gen John W. Hendrix, the US Army V Corps commander. The purpose of the conference was to discuss employment options with the US Army Apache helicopters. We hoped to discuss the ROEs with General Short while we were there.

  Colonel Thompson, Lt Col Coke Koechle, our two squadron weapons officers, and I flew as passengers in a C-21 from Gioia del Colle to Tirana on 1 May. We did not know that General Jumper had sent General Short an E-mail outlining our grievances with the ROEs and approval process. We soon discovered just how unhappy General Short was when he called Coke and me aside at the end of the Apache conference. Coke had worked for General Short at Headquarters USAFE, knew him well, and was not completely unhinged by the dressing-down that followed. General Short detailed for us—with incandescent clarity—that when our commander, a four-star flag officer (Vice Adm James O. Ellis Jr., AFSOUTH and NATO joint force commander) had determined the ROEs, he expected his field graders to understand and follow them, or seek clarification in appropriate channels. He did not need those same officers taking their gripes to another four star when they failed to understand or disagreed with the ROEs. “If you have a problem,” General Short said, “then come to Vicenza and see me.”

  After it was over—and I realized that I hadn’t been fired—we all had gained a new appreciation for the source of General Short’s ire. He had foreign governments second-guessing his conduct of the campaign; he surely didn’t need the same thing from his own squadron commanders and line pilots. Nonetheless, we still hoped something good would result from venting our concerns and our pain.

  Something did. Just days later, the CAOC adjusted the ROEs and replaced the 10-mile-deep no-attack border restriction with three zones: from the border to two miles, two to five miles, and five to 10 miles from the border. Attacks on targets inside 10 miles were now possible, and the probability of CAOC approval increased as the distance from the border to the targets increased.

  Our AFACs took this change to heart and besieged the CAOC with requests to attack their favorite and previously protected targets. This deluge of AFAC requests generated a negative, unintended consequence. The CAOC began to feel the need to issue a clearance for all attacks—even for those targets where the existing ROEs did not require CAOC approval. Late in the campaign, for example, ABCCC sent Colonel Thompson and me to identify an active Serb artillery site that the US Army’s counterbattery radar had located about five miles west of Prizren. It was exactly at the coordinates given, six big tubes parked around a concrete pad facing south. They were not in a restricted area and were well clear of all civilian buildings. We confirmed the target with ABCCC (call sign Moonbeam) and directed that it move our fighters forward. Moonbeam said to stand by for CAOC approval. It was clear that the controller was reading from a checklist he had been directed to use. The radio conversations went something like this:

  “Chili 11, Moonbeam, say distance to nearest civilian buildings.”

  “Moonbeam, Chili 11, this target is not in a restricted area. I do not need CAOC approval to attack it.”

  “Chili 11, the CAOC will not let you attack the target unless we get clearance.”

  “Moonbeam, attacking this target will not cause collateral damage. Say reason for needing target approval.”

  “Chili 11, we know the CAOC will insist on the information. We know we’ll get the approval faster if we have it ready.”

  “Moonbeam, go ahead.”

  “Chili 11, say distance and direction to nearest civilian buildings.”

  “Moonbeam, the nearest civilian building is 400 meters to the west.”

  “Chili 11, describe the building.”

  “Moonbeam, the building is a farm building about 20-meters square.”

  “Chili 11, Moonbeam, say type and location of the nearest civilian vehicle.”

  (I paused to find one somewhere.)

  “Moonbeam, the nearest civilian vehicle is a single car parked in the outskirts of Prizren, at least two kilometers from the target.”

  “Moonbeam copies, stand by.”

  We productively used the next several minutes (and gas) to locate some mortar pits farther to the south.

  “Chili 11, Moonbeam.”

  “Moonbeam, Chili 11, go ahead.”

  “Chili 11, the CAOC wants to know if you can attack that target without causing collateral damage to the farm building 400 meters away.”

  “I can’t believe this!” I transmitted privately to Colonel Thompson on the FM radio.

  “Moonbeam, Chili 11, inform the CAOC that I can attack this target without causing collateral damage to a building 400 meters away.”

  “Moonbeam copies, stand by.”

  We finally got our attack clearance and proceeded to destroy all six of the big artillery pieces, using all the ordnance that was carried by another A-10 flight, a GR-7 flight, and us.

  We began to accuse the CAOC folks of trying to FAC from their desks in Vicenza. This time, however, we took a different approach. We submitted a paper to the CAOC on ways to simplify the ROEs and reduce risk to the pilots, while maintaining the zero-collateral-damage safeguards. Col Stu Johnson, the CAOC chief of operations, sympathized with our request but reasoned that the alliance had about all it could take of changing ROEs. He said we’d have to do the best we could under the circumstances and promised to try to accelerate the approval process.

  That he did. In the last week or so of the campaign, as the KLA stepped up its pressure on the Serbs, the delay in receiving our target-attack approval was significantly reduced. As noted earlier, this close control by the CAOC violated a basic tenet of air and space power, which calls for centralized control and decentralized execution. Just as centralized planning and control is critical to the proper application of airpower, our Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) reminds us that so is the concept of decentralized execution—“delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control and to foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility”(23). We experie
nced centralized control and execution. Consequently, our situational responsiveness and tactical flexibility suffered.

  I want to emphasize that our discussion of ROEs, their application in OAF, and the influence that they had on our combat effectiveness is not intended to air gripes or to disparage the fine professionals who worked in the extremely difficult circumstances at the CAOC. When we complain about problems with “the CAOC,” we do not fix blame but merely identify the CAOC as our immediate contact in the command and control conduit. General Short, Colonel Johnson, and all the battlestaff directors who sat in “the chair” during the nonstop combat operations probably saved our unit from immeasurable pain on numerous occasions—and we never knew it. We did know that we had their support throughout OAF, and we gratefully and sincerely applauded their leadership after the NATO victory.

  Nevertheless, we hope that we will never again fight a war with similar ROEs. We had no knowledge of the agendas of, or the interaction and dynamics between nations, heads of state, and our leaders (SECDEF, SACEUR, AFSOUTH, CFACC, and the CAOC). Therefore, we are unable to comment on what the ROEs could or should have been. We did understand that any targeting mistakes that took the lives of innocents could easily have unraveled the international support for the campaign. However, it is our conviction that the war was unnecessarily lengthened and that innocent Kosovar lives were lost because we did not have streamlined ROEs which supported decentralized execution. Our recommendations for the future: