In a less than a minute it became obvious to me that the APCs were actually a red car and a white pickup truck. I told Hummer what I saw, and he agreed. Hummer then did a lower pass, confirmed that the targets were invalid, and sent the other Hogs home.
During the rest of the sortie, JSTARS personnel had us on a wild-goose chase, trying to talk us onto a convoy they believed to be in a creek bed south of Pec. For 20 minutes, we unsuccessfully tried to find the vehicles corresponding to the radar contacts that an increasingly frustrated controller so clearly saw on his scope. As we exited the AOR, I pointed out to Hummer that Pec was burning. We learned later from the news that the peace talks had stalled and that the Serbs were buying time as they withdrew. A few of this mission’s remarkable events have now become some of my most enduring memories.
EPILOGUE
Lt Col Chris “Kimos” Haave
The personal stories in this book are reflective of the challenges, frustrations, and triumphs experienced by dedicated warriors—combatants who exhibited human emotions as they did their best in the crucible of combat. We wrote this book with the humble understanding that our success in OAF was built on the contributions and sacrifices of aviation giants. Those giants—pilots, maintainers, and support personnel—faced greater personal discomfort and family sacrifice during their service in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf than we did during OAF. The heroes that today’s A-10 community holds high include the Raven, Misty, and Nail FACs, as well as the Sandy CSAR warriors of previous wars.
Our objective in this book was to help document the A-10’s contributions to achieving US, NATO, and UN objectives in Kosovo. The primary application of force in the KEZ flowed through the AFAC’s direct control of all NATO’s attack missions, which helped terminate Serb ethnic cleansing and defeat the Serbian Third Army in the field—one of Slobodan Milosevic’s main centers of gravity. In OAF’s charged international environment, combat operations were complicated by many diverse political concerns, which led to our units’ being constrained by numerous and ever-changing operational limitations. In spite of that, skilled and experienced A-10 pilots—with hundreds of hours spent looking at the ground—demonstrated their ability to discern what was actually going on in the hills, trees, and villages of Kosovo. We are convinced that the A-10 made a significant contribution to defeating the Serbs on the ground in Kosovo.
The level of tactical information available to the operational and strategic decision makers reached an all-time high in OAF. This book recounted a few of the countless times the CAOC actively participated in the decision to attack individual targets. On some of those occasions, AFACs found and positively identified groups of moving targets and requested CAOC approval to attack. All too often, by the time the approval came, the targets had found sanctuary in the forests or villages. The increasing use of data links and unmanned air and space reconnaissance vehicles (such as Predator) has made much real-time information available to command-level staffs and has fueled the temptation to direct even individual attacks. One last OAF story follows as an example.
The operator of a Predator on station over Kosovo located a tank and simultaneously transmitted its video image to the CAOC at Vicenza, Italy, and to SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Both Lt Gen Mike Short and Gen Wesley Clark were able to watch this tank in real time while personnel in the CAOC attempted to help the AFAC visually acquire the tank by relaying directions through the ABCCC.
General Short’s son, Capt Chris “Junior” Short, was an 81st FS flight commander and the AFAC on duty at that location. The Predator’s optics provided a highly magnified image of the tank, but one with a very narrow field of view—similar to what one would see through a soda straw. Unfortunately, Junior had a very wide field of view from his ROE altitude. The officer in the CAOC had difficulty relating the Predator image to what Junior could see. Junior could not find the tank. General Clark called the CAOC to make sure they understood that he wanted the tank killed. The CAOC called ABCCC to ensure that Junior understood that the CAOC wanted the tank dead. Junior still couldn’t find it. Finally, to put more pressure on Junior, ABCCC transmitted, “[General Short’s call sign] really wants you to find and kill that tank.” Junior replied, “Tell Dad I can’t find the [expletive deleted] tank!”
The ability to prevail and achieve a favorable political outcome in future warfare is critical. In a highly integrated joint and coalition environment, success in asymmetric warfare will likely depend on the ability of flexible and capable offensive airpower to control the ground situation from the air. One of the command and control difficulties in that environment will be the development and application of appropriate ROEs in the rapidly changing tactical, strategic, and political environment. While many of these factors contributed to the complexity of the air campaign over Kosovo, OAF was not the most problematic of possible scenarios. Its complexity would have been greatly exacerbated had friendly troops been mixed with civilians in contact with the Serb Third Army and in need of air support. In future conflicts, these and other considerations could combine with real-time battlefield reconnaissance and lead to an increased desire by higher echelons of command to inappropriately control fluid tactical situations. Our hope is that future air and space leaders will resist that temptation and choose to provide clear, centralized guidance that will enable the tactical war fighters to achieve our political leaders’ objectives through decentralized execution.
Hog folks remain a humble breed of fighter jocks and wrenchturners in a high-tech Air Force where standoff munitions, computer-released weapons, laser- and GPS-guided munitions, advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), drones, and sophisticated electronic warfare are the norm. They don’t mind hearing the thousandth joke about the lack of speed and sophistication of the A-10; they just quietly go out and make a difference in the air and on the ground. We believe that the A-10 Warthog and its highly trained professionals offer the nation a robust ground-attack capability that can rapidly adapt to the challenges, threats, and objectives in a joint and coalition combat environment. We hope that Air Force leaders remain committed to such a capability and support regular and appropriate weapon-system upgrades for this aircraft. The nation needs warriors—like those who fly the A-10—warriors who are able to search the battlefield with the Mk-1 eyeball, locate the aggressor and the victims, go toe-to-toe with the enemy, look him squarely in the eye, and shoot with malice.
APPENDIX
History of Attacking Fielded Forces: Post-Vietnam to Kosovo
Lt Col Phil “Goldie” Haun
From World War I, through our Vietnam experience, and up to our recent past, the idea of interdiction has remained fairly consistent and is reflected in the latest version of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997, which defines interdiction as “operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.”[3] An amended definition of air interdiction has evolved in the USAF as an outcome of the combat experience of Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999; that evolution is reflected in AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 27 August 1999, which expands the scope to include both lethal and nonlethal systems, stating that “air interdiction… is employed to destroy, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy’s surface military potential before it can effectively engage friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives [emphasis added].”[4] The phrase “or otherwise achieve its objectives” acknowledges that airpower, as demonstrated over Kosovo, can be used in the “direct attack” of an army without the presence or foreseeable presence of friendly ground forces. The attack of fielded enemy ground forces by airpower is an old concept, but the idea that airpower can achieve military objectives in lieu of ground action is a new and highly controversial idea.
This appendix will first review the USAF’s post-Vietnam experience in the direct attack of enemy fielded forces as envisioned in the AirLand Battle doctrine developed during
the 1980s, and as experienced by the USAF in attacking the Iraqi Republican Guard in the Gulf War. It will then examine the events leading to the use of A-10 AFACs over Kosovo in directly attacking the Serbian Third Army. Finally, this appendix will give a brief history of A-10 operations in Operation Allie Force, which the reader can use along with the chronology, at the front, to provide context to this book’s various stories.
As with the Korean War, many of the lessons learned about air interdiction in Vietnam were lost, including the evolution of the Misty FAC’s Fast-FAC mission. The focus of the US military turned once again towards Europe and the continuing threat of invasion by the Soviet Union. From the late ’70s and through the ’80s, the US Army and Air Force worked to develop systems such as the Apache, air tactical missile systems (ATACMS), A-10, and JSTARS in preparation to defeat the Red Army. Air-Land Battle doctrine provided the joint vision for integrating air and land operations. Air interdiction was an essential element of AirLand Battle and a NATO term, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), was adopted to emphasize the interdiction of second-echelon ground forces moving towards, but not yet engaged with, friendly ground forces.[5] The high-threat environment of Central Europe and the plethora of targets that would arise from a massive land battle limited the potential effectiveness of Fast FACs. The detection of rear-echelon forces would be the responsibility of such systems as JSTARS—not a difficult task, considering the wave of Soviet armor anticipated to thunder down the Fulda Gap. NATO aircrews studied X-ray, Yankee, and Zulu folders containing imagery and maps of the routes the Red Army would need to use.[6] They likewise flew missions over West Germany, up to the inter-German border, to become familiar with the terrain over which they would have to fight.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 and the end of the Cold War left the United States victorious but lacking a Soviet threat on which to base its military force structure and Air-Land Battle doctrine. As the United States began to dismantle its forces in Europe, the focus shifted abruptly to Southwest Asia and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.
Attacking the Republican Guard
On 17 January 1991, the United States and coalition forces launched the Gulf War air offensive. Waves of aircraft flooded into Kuwait and Iraq, attacking key integrated air defense system nodes; airfields; command and control systems; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) sites; and electric plants.[7] Daybreak of the first day witnessed the commencement of attacks against Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait. Among the centers of gravity identified by Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the US joint forces commander, were the seven elite Republican Guard divisions held in reserve along the Iraq-Kuwait border.[8] While aerial attack continued against key strategic targets in Iraq, 75 percent of strike missions focused on the Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait.[9]
US casualties in a ground invasion were predicted to be as high as 15,000.[10] Concern over this possibility prompted Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, Gen Colin L. Powell, and Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf to develop a strategy emphasizing the use of airpower before a ground battle to significantly reduce the size of the Iraqi army, its capability to maneuver, and its will to fight. This air-first strategy proved highly successful, with friendly casualty rates below even the most optimistic estimates and friendly ground forces achieving objectives ahead of schedule and against only limited Iraqi resistance. However, this aerial achievement was not accomplished without major modifications to existing tactics.
The Gulf War air offensive consisted of three phases, conducted nearly simultaneously. Phases one and two were directed against strategic and air-superiority target sets including leadership, command and control facilities, NBC facilities, airfields, aircraft, and the IADS. Phase three targeted Iraqi fielded forces, calling for 50 percent attrition of Iraq’s 5,000 pieces of dug-in armor and artillery prior to any ground offensive.[11] In this phase, Schwarzkopf was most concerned with the three heavy divisions of the seven Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwait-Iraq border.[12] These units were widely dispersed and well dug in with thousands of earthen berms protecting their T-72 tanks.[13] Their defenses included AAA, infrared SA-13 SAMs, and radar-guided SA-6 SAMs.
Phase three required the unprecedented success of airpower against a fielded army.[14] A briefing by Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, air-planning chief, to Schwarzkopf in December 1990 estimated that the Republican Guard would suffer 50 percent attrition in only five days, assuming 600 sorties a day.[15] Air planners divided Kuwait and Iraq into a grid pattern of 30 by 30 NM squares known as “kill boxes.” Strike aircraft were assigned individual kill boxes to perform armed reconnaissance in locating and destroying Iraqi forces.[16] The task of attacking the elite Republican Guard fell to F-16s and B-52s, while A-10s were employed against the regular Iraqi divisions dug in along the Kuwait-Saudi border.[17]
By the fifth day of phase three, coalition air attacks against the Republican Guard were still far short of the 50 percent destruction expected by Schwarzkopf.[18] Postwar analysis indicated that the Republican Guard’s heavy-division armor actually suffered only 24–34 percent attrition during the entire 38 days of the air campaign.[19] Glosson’s five-day estimate proved overly optimistic for two reasons. First, the number of sorties flown against the Republican Guard fell well short of 600 per day. A combination of initial overemphasis on phase one strategic operations, a reluctance to employ A-10s deep into the battlespace, and unanticipated Scud-hunting missions reduced the number of sorties available to attack the Republican Guard. For the first five days, total strikes against Republican Guard units were constant at around 100 missions per day. By the end of the 10th day, a cumulative sortie count against the Republican Guard totaled 728 missions.[20] Second, air attacks were not as effective as war-gaming analysis had predicted.[21] The aircrews of US aircraft used medium-altitude tactics to reduce the threat from Iraqi air defenses. While this greatly improved survivability, US pilots had trained with low-altitude tactics appropriate to a war in central Europe and were relatively unfamiliar with medium-altitude tactics. Unforeseen difficulties with target identification, poor weather, and inaccuracies in delivering ballistic weapons from medium altitude all reduced effectiveness.
Increasing the number of sorties against the Republican Guard solved the first issue. However, the tactical problem of how to best destroy a dug in army remained. In response, the joint air operations center (JAOC) incorporated three changes to improve the efficiency of the operational air forces. The first tactic involved directing the unique firepower of the A-10 against exposed and vulnerable Republican Guard forces. On 27 February, Glosson instructed A-10 commanders to prepare an attack on the Republican Guard Tawakalna armored division.[22] Facing such a heavily defended force, A-10s flew 48 aircraft in six waves of eight-ship formations, instead of their usual two-ship tactics. Three days of such wing-sized attacks were mounted against the division. The Iraqis responded by stepping up their deception efforts and by digging their forces even deeper into the desert sand. Although the US Army was unable to assess the effectiveness of allied attacks, the Tawakalna division’s degraded air defenses and increased use of decoys were considered positive indicators.[23]
The second innovation was the F-111F’s introduction of “tank plinking.” Targets could be located and attacked from medium altitude with infrared targeting pods and laser-guided bombs.[24] The pods could clearly distinguish the infrared image of the warm Iraqi armor against the cold desert background.[25] This method provided the additional advantage of using targeting-pod video to verify successful attacks and boost BDA estimates.
The final tactical innovation reintroduced the Fast FAC mission. F-16CG (Block 40s) from Hill AFB, Utah, began flying as “Killer Scouts.”[26] This innovation mirrored the Misty FAC hunter-killer tactics during Vietnam but was renamed to avoid confusion with hunter-killer SEAD tactics currently used by F-4G Wild Weasels and F-16s. Killer Scouts took off early and reconnoitered their assigned kill boxes. They were allocated suffic
ient air-refueling tankers to remain on station for long periods to become familiar with the territory and increase their situational awareness. Like the Misty FACs, the Killer Scouts carried a minimum munitions load to reduce drag and increase endurance. When they identified Iraqi positions, they usually brought in F-16 strikers for the attack. Along with identifying viable target areas for attack, they also assisted in the collection of BDA. To do that, the Killer Scouts relied primarily on their own eyes, aided somewhat by binoculars. Unfortunately, operating at medium altitude made it difficult to accurately determine the number of targets destroyed. The Killer Scout role had its limitations, but this innovation led to the more efficient use of F-16s against Iraqi fielded forces.
Following the Gulf War, the USAF remained deployed in Southwest Asia, maintained two no-fly zones over Iraq, and responded to sporadic infringements by Saddam Hussein’s remaining forces. Elsewhere, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing of Muslims in April of 1992 led to the US military’s involvement with the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Meanwhile famine in war-torn Somalia brought a US military presence to Mogadishu from December 1992 until its hasty withdrawal in May of 1994. In September of 1995, US airpower was again needed. This time Operation Deliberate Force, an 11-day campaign, helped force Serbia to accept the Dayton Peace Accords.[27] By the late ’90s, NATO was convinced that airpower was an effective tool to coerce Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, and that it might be needed to solve the growing unrest in Kosovo.
A-10s over Kosovo Page 33