Kosovo: Direct Attack of the Serbian Third Army
Tensions between Belgrade and Kosovo increased during the late 1980s. Slobodan Milosevic used protests by minority Serbs residing in the ethnically Albanian-dominated province as the foundation for his Serbian nationalist platform and his subsequent rise to the Serbian presidency in 1987.[28] By 1989, Belgrade had revoked Kosovo’s status as an autonomous region and placed restrictions on land ownership and government jobs for Kosovo Albanians.[29] During the 1990s, Kosovar dissension spawned a series of both violent and nonviolent protest.[30] Opposition became violent in 1997 with the formation of a small group of lightly armed guerrilla fighters known as the KLA. In response to KLA ambushes of Serbian police in early 1998, Serbian forces conducted brutal retaliatory attacks against suspected KLA positions.[31] KLA support swelled within Kosovo and led to an escalation of KLA activity. In July of 1998, Serbian forces conducted a village-by-village search for KLA members, displacing over 200,000 Kosovars in the process.[32] The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis captured the attention of the international community.
In response to the KLA and Serbian exchanges, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 and Resolution 1199 in September 1998. The resolutions condemned Serbia’s excessive use of force, established an arms embargo, and called for an immediate cease-fire and the introduction of international monitors.[33] The latter demand was met in the cease-fire negotiated between US envoys and Belgrade in October 1998.[34]
However, the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians at Racak on 19 January 1999 quickly brought the cease-fire to an end.[35] Under threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian and Kosovar representatives were summoned to Rambouillet, France, to negotiate a peace agreement.[36] The compromise included the key items of a NATO-led implementation force; the recognition of the international borders of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo; and an interim three-year agreement, after which a final settlement of Kosovo could be arranged.[37] The Kosovar delegation initially refused to agree unless reference was made to a future referendum to decide the fate of Kosovo. Under the threat of the withdrawal of international support, including financial and military aid to the KLA, the Kosovar delegates reluctantly signed on 18 March 1999.[38] The Serbs, unwilling to accept a NATO-led military force within Kosovo, remained recalcitrant. In the face of diplomatic impasse, NATO air strikes were ordered to commence on 24 March.
Initial planning for NATO air strikes against Serbia began as early as June of 1998.[39] Targeting for the strikes focused on fixed command and control and military facilities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. These targets were selected for a variety of reasons, one being the low risk of collateral damage.[40] The strikes were intended as the punishment portion of NATO’s coercive carrot-and-stick strategy. The air plan in no way resembled a decisive air campaign, with the initial target list including only 100 targets.[41] Of these, only 50 were eventually approved, sufficient for only two or three nights of strikes.[42] Additionally, the desire to maintain consensus among the 19 NATO countries was reflected in the constrained nature of the strikes.
In February 1999, in the midst of the Rambouillet talks, Gen Wesley Clark, SACEUR, became concerned over the prospect of increased ethnic-cleansing operations by the Serbian army within Kosovo once NATO air operations commenced. Two of NATO’s stated military objectives involved dealing directly with the Serbian fielded forces: to deter further Serbian action against the Kosovars and to reduce the ability of the Serbian military to continue offensive operations against them.[43] Gen Wesley Clark ordered Lt Gen Mike Short, his CFACC, to increase the scope of air planning to include direct attacks on the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo.
Concealed within the verdant, cloud-covered valley of Kosovo were 40,000 soldiers of the Serbian Third Army equipped with hundreds of tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces interspersed among over a million Kosovars. In addition, a wall of mobile, radar-guided SAMs, MANPADS, and AAA (as well as a squadron of MiG-21 fighters) protected the Third Army against NATO air forces.[44]
In developing air plans against the Serbian Third Army, US planners assumed air superiority and relied on SEAD and electronic jamming assets to confuse and degrade the Serbian IADS. Assuming strike aircraft could safely enter Kosovo, two tactical problems still remained: how to locate and identify the targets and how to attack them successfully while limiting collateral damage. A-10 AFACs trained in visual reconnaissance and ASC were selected for the task.[45] A-10 AFACs would search out targets identified by either JSTARS (in real-time) or by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets during premission planning. Once targets were identified, the A-10 AFACs would control strikes using available NATO aircraft.
Beginning at 1900 Zulu on 24 March 1999, NATO air forces struck Serbian targets.[46] These attacks focused on the Serbian IADS, military command and control nodes, and airfields and aircraft.[47] NATO commenced the war with 214 dedicated combat aircraft, 112 of which were from the United States.[48] Initial NATO strikes were met with minimal resistance from Serbian SAMs and fighters. Rather, the primary response took place within Kosovo and was directed at the Kosovar population.
With the breakdown of the Rambouillet peace talks and subsequent withdrawal of international observers on 19 March 1999, Serb ground forces commenced the systematic expulsion of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, code-named Operation Horseshoe.[49] Ethnic-cleansing operations were stepped up once NATO bombing began, leaving several hundred thousand displaced refugees seeking safety in Albania and Macedonia or fleeing to the foothills within Kosovo.
Responding to the rapidly deteriorating situation within Kosovo, General Clark ordered General Short to commence attacks on Serbian fielded forces on 30 March. Poor weather delayed the first successful A-10 strikes until 6 April.[50] During OAF, A-10 AFACs flew over 1,000 missions and controlled many other strikers in the attacks on Serb forces in the KEZ. Their attacks ended on 9 June 1999, when a peace agreement was reached.
History of A-10s in Kosovo
A-10s first flew over the Balkans in 1993 when NATO aircraft began conducting air operations over Bosnia. Except for occasional relief provided by other Air Force, Reserve, and Guard A-10 units, the 81st FS maintained a continual presence at Aviano until 1997. The A-10s were the only NVG fighter aircraft capable of providing both day and night CAS and AFAC coverage for UN and NATO ground forces. F-16CG squadrons of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano were eventually trained to use NVGs and assumed most of the AFAC duties over Bosnia. With the continual presence of A-10s in the Balkans no longer required, the 81st needed only to conduct yearly deployments to Aviano to remain familiar with Balkan operations and provide AFAC coverage when the 31st FW was deployed elsewhere.
In January 1999, the 81st deployed six A-10s to replace an Aviano F-16CG squadron that had departed on a stateside deployment. The number of A-10s committed to Balkan operations continued to increase throughout OAF. With tensions rising in Kosovo following the Racak massacre, A-10s were ordered to remain at Aviano, and the squadron increased the number of aircraft to 15 by the commencement of NATO air strikes on 24 March. As the 81st deployed to Gioia del Colle AB in southern Italy, it reached 23 aircraft and leveled at that number. On 21 May, an additional 18 Air Force Reserve aircraft became operational at Trapani, Sicily, to bring the total to 41 A-10s supporting OAF.
A-10s were initially tasked with providing CSAR for NATO aircrews; A-10 pilots from the 81st FS, using Sandy call signs, were the mission commanders for the dramatic rescue of an F-117 pilot shot down near Belgrade on the fourth night of strikes. A-10s provided on-scene command, tracked the survivor’s location, coordinated the rescue effort, and provided cover for rescue helicopters during the ingress, survivor pickup, and egress of enemy territory.
Sandy was the call sign for A-1E Skyraiders that performed on-scene command of CSARs during Vietnam. A-10s have continued to use the Sandy call sign to signify the type of mission being conducted. A
-10 Sandys provided CSAR coverage for all NATO aircraft flying over Kosovo and Serbia, both day and night, throughout OAF.
On 26 March, the CAOC notified the 81st to commence AFAC missions on 30 March. Although all NATO air strikes to this point had taken place at night, a shortage of EA-6B jammers and F-16CJ SEAD aircraft prevented adding any AFAC day missions since all conventional fighter and bomber aircraft operating in Serbia or Kosovo were required to have jamming and SEAD support. NATO’s limiting factor was EA-6B and F-16CJ airframes—not aircrews; the solution was to doubleturn SEAD aircraft to support AFAC missions during the day and strike missions at night. Launching from Aviano, A-10s flew sorties of six to seven hours down the Adriatic, across Albania and up into Kosovo. Low-level clouds over Kosovo prevented aerial attacks until 6 April, when A-10 AFACs located and struck a Serbian truck park; that strike was followed by two more successful days of attacking convoys of Serbian tanks and APCs.
The excessive en route time from Aviano to Kosovo reduced the A-10’s time on station and prevented an air frame from flying two daylight missions per day. Fifteen days into the war, the CAOC ordered the 81st FS to redeploy to Gioia. On 11 April 1999, the jets from Aviano were joined in the move by an additional three aircraft from Spangdahlem. At Gioia, the sortie-duration times were reduced, on-station times were increased, and the jets could fly two daylight missions per day. A detachment from the 74th FS at Pope arrived in late April with five aircraft, nine pilots, and 65 maintenance personnel to augment 81st FS operations. A British GR-7 Harrier squadron, an Italian Tornado squadron, and an Italian F-104 Starfighter squadron were also located at Gioia. The Harriers flew as strike aircraft for A-10 AFACs on a daily basis, and the proximity of operations made for a close working relationship.
A-10 AFAC operations at Gioia commenced within 24 hours of arrival. With the growing success of strikes against their Third Army, the Serbs increased their active air defenses. A-10 AFACs began reporting barrage-fired AAA and SAM launches. On 2 May, an A-10 AFAC was struck by an SA-14 infrared-guided SAM and was forced to recover at Skopje AB, Macedonia. On 11 May, another A-10 AFAC was struck beneath the cockpit by a mobile SAM; fortunately, that missile failed to detonate, and the jet was able to recover to Gioia.
AFAC operations over Kosovo grew to cover most of the day and half of the night. A-10s covered two four-hour daylight windows, all the while maintaining four aircraft on CSAR alert during night operations. F-16CG AFACs provided some day coverage and also flew during a two- to three-hour night window. The US Navy provided day AFAC coverage as well with F-14s flying off the USS Theodore Roosevelt. Even more AFACs were needed to provide full coverage—24 hours a day, seven days a week—over Kosovo. The Air National Guard then stepped in to create the 104th EOG, a rainbowed group of 18 aircraft from units in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Idaho. By 19 May, the 104th had deployed to Trapani AB in western Sicily. The lengthy trip from Trapani to the KEZ precluded the 104th from being able to double-turn for day missions, but it was able to cover a midday AFAC window and then turn for late-night missions. Additionally, the 104th deployed three of its aircraft to Taszar, Hungary, in May to perform CSAR alert, thus improving the CSAR response time in the event of a shootdown over northern Serbia. The final aircraft to join the AFAC mission was the US Marine F/A-18D. A full squadron joined the 104th CSAR detachment at Taszar, and these aircraft were flying over Kosovo by late May.
Late May proved the most successful period for air attacks against Serb ground forces. Several factors influenced that success and combined to provide a greater opportunity for NATO air attacks. Those factors included an increased force structure, improved weather conditions, and a KLA offensive in western Kosovo that forced the Serbian Third Army out of its hiding places. NATO increased the number of AFACs and strikers for near-continuous daylight operations until combat operations ceased on 10 June 1999. A-10s continued to provide airborne and ground CAS alert until the end of June as NATO occupation ground forces entered Kosovo.
GLOSSARY
AAA—antiaircraft artillery
AB—air base
ABCCC—airborne battlefield command and control center (EC-130E)
AC—alternating current (electrical power with alternating polarity)
ACC—Air Combat Command
ADI—attitude direction indicator
ADVON—advanced echelon
AEF—Air Expeditionary Force
AEW—Air Expeditionary Wing
AFAC—airborne forward air controller, aka FAC(A)
AFSOUTH—Allied Forces Southern Europe; NATO’s regional headquarters at Naples, Italy
AGL—above ground level
AGM—air-to-ground missile
AIM—air intercept missile
AI—air interdiction
AIRCENT—Allied Air Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AIRSOUTH—Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AMRAAM—advanced medium range air-to-air missile
AO—area of operations
AOR—area of responsibility
APC—armored personnel carrier
APU—auxiliary power unit arty artillery pieces
ASC—air strike control
ATACMS—air tactical missile systems
ATO—air tasking order
AWACS—airborne warning and control system (E-3)
BAI—battlefield air interdiction
bandit—an enemy aircraft
BDA—battle damage assessment
BE—basic encyclopedia number used to catalog targets
bingo—(1) brevity term used by tactical air forces to indicate a fuel level that requires termination of the mission and recovery to a tanker or home station; (2) brevity term used by special operations SAR helicopter forces to indicate that the door gunner is abeam the survivor
bino—gyro-stabilized binoculars; 12 power and 15 power
bomblet—a CBU submunition
bootleg—unscheduled (e.g., a bootlegged tanker is an unscheduled air-to-air refueling)
BRAA—tactical control format providing target bearing, range, altitude, and aspect, relative to a friendly aircraft
break—an aggressive, abrupt maneuver to defeat SAM, AAA, or air-to-air threats
BSD—battle staff directives
C3CM—command, control, and communications countermeasures
CAIFF—combined air interdiction of fielded forces
CANN—temporarily removing parts from an aircraft (cannibalization) so others can fly
CAP—combat air patrol
CAS—close air support
CAVOK—ceiling and visibility OK
CBU—cluster bomb unit
CEM—combined effects munition (CBU-87)
CFACC—combined forces air component commander
COAC—combined air operations center
Compass Call—an aircraft configured to perform tactical C3CM (EC-130H)
CP—control point
CSAR—combat search and rescue
DC—direct current (electrical power with constant polarity)
DCA—defensive counterair
DEAD—destruction of enemy air defenses
dirtball—dirt road
doolie—first year cadet at the AF Academy
EABS—expeditionary air base squadron
ECM—electronic countermeasures
EFS—expeditionary fighter squadron
ELS—expeditionary logistic squadron
EO—electro-optical
EOG—expeditionary operations group
ESS—expeditionary support squadron
EUCOM—US European Command
EW—electronic warfare
FAC—forward air controller
fence—the demarcation line between friendly and enemy territory
FG—fighter group
FL—flight level; thousands of feet when using a standard altimeter setting of 29.92 (FL 300 is 30,000 MSL with 29.92 set)
FLEX—force level execution targeting cell (located within the CAOC)
FM—type of radio that uses frequency modulation; used by A-10 pilots primarily for interformation communication
FOV—field of view
fox mike—military phonetic alphabet expression for FM and commonly used to refer to the FM radio
frag—(1) the “fragmented order” which tasked unit aircraft, weapons, targets, and TOTs; (2) a lethal piece of warhead case that is explosively projected from the point of detonation to its impact point
FS—fighter squadron
FW—fighter wing
GAU-8—A-10’s internal 30 mm cannon (Avenger)
GPS—Global Positioning System
Guard—a common emergency frequency that all pilots monitor
hard deck—the lowest altitude for operations allowed by the ROE
hardball—paved road
HARM—high-speed antiradiation missile (AGM-88)
heads-down—when the pilot concentrates on things inside the aircraft or looking outside through the binoculars, and is unable to clear the airspace for threats or other aircraft
hitting the tanker—aircrew jargon for rejoining on, connecting to, and taking fuel from a tanker
Hog—one of several A-10 nicknames; also Warthog and Hawg
HUD—head-up-display
IADS—integrated air defense system
ICAOC—interim combined air operations center (ICAOC-5 was located at Vicenza, Italy, and often referred to as the CAOC)
ID—to identify
IFF—identification, friend or foe; a system that uses a transponder response to an interrogating radar that indicates the host aircraft to be a friend (if code is set correctly) or foe (if not set correctly)
A-10s over Kosovo Page 34