Edward I
Page 9
IV. The Infantry
Much of the credit for the successes of Edward I’s armies is conventionally accorded to the infantry. In order to assess the rôle of the footsoldiers it is necessary to discover how many were employed in the wars. Is it true that the numbers of infantry were very substantial, as high, it has been suggested, as 60,000 for the campaign of 1296 against the Scots?[279] The methods of recruitment need to be examined. Were there any changes in the techniques used which suggest that the crown was developing new policies in the course of the reign? Then the way in which the infantry forces were used in war must be investigated. It has been argued that this reign saw for the first time the use of mounted men-at-arms and archers in one line of battle, and that in this way the foundations of later victories such as Halidon Hill and the triumphs of the Hundred Years War were laid by Edward I.[280] But the evidence for such assumptions needs to be examined.
The many accounts which survive give a clear idea of the size of the armies that Edward I put into the field. At one time during the first Welsh war there were some 15,000 foot in royal pay, of whom 9,000 were Welsh. The accounts for this campaign are hard to disentangle; contingents melted away rapidly and the remnants were combined into new units. Similar numbers were employed in the war of 1282, but not all in one force; it was rare to find more than 3,000 or 4,000 in one army. In 1287 an army of almost 11,000 foot was assembled, of whom only just over a third were English, the remainder being recruited in Wales.[281] In November 1294 there were probably over 31,000 infantry in pay in various armies in Wales, and 16,000 assembled at Chester early in December. Such a large concentration was not maintained for long. Warwick’s army reached a maximum strength of some 14,500 early in January 1295, yet by the time of the battle of Maes Moydog it numbered a mere 2,489.[282]
Detailed accounts of the infantry involved in the Gascon campaigns have not survived. Some English and Welsh were sent, but probably not in large numbers. The enrolled account for the war reveals that they, together with Spanish footsoldiers, were paid only £17,928 over the four years of the war,[283] which compares with a total cost of £26,388 for sergeants-at-arms and infantry in Wales in 1294-5.[284] It is not known how much the locally-recruited infantry were paid: Gascon cavalry and infantry together received £137,595. These Gascon footsoldiers were cross-bowmen, superior to the ordinary Welsh or English infantry, and they were paid proportionately more; one shilling a day in local money as against the eight shillings of a knight, whereas the English infantry received only one-twelfth of a knight’s wages.[285] In Flanders for the campaign of 1297-8 Edward had with him in the middle of October roughly 7,800 infantry, of whom almost 5,300 were Welsh. Numbers declined only slightly during the rest of the king’s stay abroad: by late February the army was some 7,300 strong.[286]
Edward’s intention in Scotland in all but the last campaigns of the reign appears to have been to try to crush the enemy by sheer weight of numbers. According to Walter of Guisborough, he assembled a huge army for his campaign of 1296: 4,000 horse and 30,000 foot from England, to which were later added 400 cavalry and a further 30,000 foot from Ireland.[287] But chroniclers’ figures are notoriously inaccurate, and it can be shown that there were only about 2,500 Irish infantry present.[288] Guisborough’s figures are, however, no more extraordinary than the total of 60,000 which comes from an official source, a demand made by Edward that the Exchequer should supply him with 5,000 a week for the wages of 1,000 men-at-arms and 60,000 footsoldiers, together with the expenses of the household. This is, however, better evidence of the ambitious nature of Edward’s plans than of the size of the army in 1296.[289] Only £21,443 was spent on the infantry for the campaign — nothing like enough to pay for the force originally envisaged.[290] A reasonable estimate would be that the army was some 25,000 strong in infantry, but no pay rolls survive to confirm this.
The evidence is fuller for the later campaigns in Scotland. During the winter of 1297-8, when the king was in Flanders, an expedition was sent north under the command of Warenne. The writs of summons requested some 29,000 foot from Wales, Chester and nine English counties to muster at Newcastle on 6 December. The date was as optimistic as the number. By the middle of February roughly 9,700 men had arrived, with numbers building up to 18,500 in the middle of the month, though they then declined in late February and in March as a result of many desertions.[291] For the campaign which culminated in the victory of Falkirk in 1298 the records detail orders to recruit 10,500 Welsh troops and 2,000 men from Lancashire.[292] The number of Welsh who served actually exceeded the demand, for at the start of the expedition they numbered 10,900. After over two months in the field, desertion and death had thinned their ranks by only 400. Not all the writs of summons asking for English infantry were enrolled. Large numbers were recruited: on 20 July there were 14,800 in pay, including some Irish, but a week later numbers had fallen to 12,600. The battle of Falkirk was fought on 22 July, so this is an interesting and rare indication of the number of casualties. Unfortunately there are no accounts for the English foot during the rest of the campaign, and it is impossible to say how far numbers were depleted by desertion as the summer proceeded. However, the rolls do show that at the time of Falkirk Edward had some 25,700 infantry with him, an impressive number.[293]
Although the value of huge concentrations of what must have been largely ill-armed and inexperienced troops seems questionable, it was not until the very end of the reign that the English government ceased summoning large numbers of troops to go to Scotland. For a winter expedition in 1299-1300, 16,000 were called but it proved abortive as only 2,500 appeared and promptly deserted en masse.[294] The summer campaign was taken more seriously. In accordance with a decision taken about the expedition planned for the previous year, no Welsh were summoned: they were granted respite in recognition of their service in previous years.[295] A total of 16,000 English foot was demanded from Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and the four most northerly counties.[296] But far fewer actually mustered; the maximum strength of the army being no more than 9,000. This level was not maintained, numbers falling away rapidly after the siege of Caerlaverock. By early September Edward had only about 500 infantrymen with him.[297]
Edward was very displeased by the desertions of the infantry in 1300. On 15 July he wrote to the Keeper of the Wardrobe complaining of the behaviour of the Yorkshire levies, saying that as they had maliciously deceived and treacherously failed him, they were to be immediately imprisoned and their lands and chattels seized. Local officials were not to be entrusted with this task, as the king had gathered that on occasion sheriffs and bailiffs had aided and abetted miscreants. Trustworthy men were to be given special commissions to do as the king wished, and to make an example of the deserters.[298] But this did not solve the problem, as was clear in the following year.
The king’s patience was wearing thin by the autumn of 1300. After conversation with the Scotch envoys, with whom a truce was arranged, he swore that he would lay waste the whole of Scotland and force its people into submission.[299] With this intent, large numbers of infantry were summoned for the ambitious double campaign of the following year, in which the king was to advance from Berwick and his son from Carlisle in a pincer movement. For the royal army 12,000 troops were summoned,[300] of whom just over 7,500 appeared.[301] Again the ranks were thinned by desertion. The royal officials estimated that numbers had fallen to 3,500 in the first week of September,[302] but the accounts show that in fact there were only 2,500. By mid-November, there were less than 400. The cost of this force was roughly £4,500. In contrast, £11,273 was spent on the infantry in the Carlisle army.[303] This suggests that, since 100 men cost roughly £1 a day in wages, the total strength must have been at least 12,500. As most of the men were Welsh, who were less prone to desert than the English, it is probable that the strength of this force was better maintained than that of the royal army, which was drawn from the north of England and the counties bordering on Wales.[304]
The number of
men requested for the expedition of 1303 was less than in the past: only 9,500, all from the north of England. For once, they mostly appeared at the date for which they were summoned, and at one time numbered almost 7,500. Inevitably desertion thinned the ranks, though more slowly than in previous years. A harsh new ordinance for the punishment of deserters was drawn up. Those suspected of leaving the army without permission were to be imprisoned, and the wages paid them recovered by distraint. If found guilty, they were to find guarantors to ensure that they served on some future occasion at their own cost. Severe measures were to be taken against any bailiffs found to have accepted bribes to let men selected for service stay at home.[305] Such threats may have deterred some, but there is little evidence that many legal actions were brought.
The military operations of 1303 were inconclusive, so Edward remained in the north with his troops over the winter. No extra infantry were called for, which suggests that the king was coming to revise his opinion of the value of large numbers of footsoldiers. He remained content with the 1,000 men he had with him at Dunfermline in January. For the siege of Stirling he had in addition the service of a number of workmen: at one time as many as 445. The largest corps was engaged on the construction of an elaborate siege engine, known as the Warwolf,[306] but just as this was ready for use against the castle, the Scots offered to surrender. Callously and unchivalrously Edward refused to accept their submission until the machine had been brought to bear on the walls.[307]
Experience was proving that large numbers of infantry were of little use in a war where the greatest problem was becoming that of achieving sufficient mobility to catch an elusive enemy. Small as the cavalry forces put into the field against Bruce were, the infantry were even more strikingly reduced in numbers. In 1306 Valence had some 1,500 with him during July,[308] but his victory at Methven owed little to them, being won by a cavalry charge. The number of foot who came north with the prince of Wales is not known, but as wages only totalled £1,142 there cannot have been many.[309] Orders for the recruitment of infantry were issued early in 1307, but desertions rendered an attempt to raise troops in February futile. No further efforts were made until mid-March, when writs were issued for 1,000 men to be selected in Lancashire. They were needed to pursue Bruce in the moors and marshes where he was thought to be hiding, which could not be penetrated by cavalry. Eight days later a further 1,200 footsoldiers from various northern liberties were requested. In June 1,500 Welsh were summoned.[310] From these writs it is clear that nothing on the scale of the earlier campaigns was envisaged, and the accounts confirm this. In June, John St. John had 1,700 foot with him,[311] and at the beginning of the next month Valence was sent 200 marks to pay the wages of 2,000 infantry in Argyll.[312] For the period after 23 July a full account of the infantry survives. There were exactly 500 men from North Wales, and 848 from the rest of the country. There were also contingents from the lands of the Marcher lords. Arundel’s provided 150, Warenne’s 200, and those of Lancaster, Lincoln and Hereford roughly 100 each. From the Grey estates came 265. The total number of infantry thus came to just over 2,900 men. By the beginning of September numbers had dropped to 2,660.[313] As might be expected with a small army, easy to organize and discipline, there was less desertion than in the past. Even so, in June a letter was sent to Walter Langton complaining of the desertion of footsoldiers from Lancashire, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland.[314]
The normal method of recruiting infantry for the wars was to set up special commissions, known as commissions of array, for the selection of men in the counties. In 1277 the sheriffs had been used to raise troops, but from 1282, when household knights were used,[315] it was usual to appoint men especially for this task. For the Welsh war of 1294-5 important councillors and justices were entrusted with the task: Hugh Cressingham, Roger Brabazon and Peter Malory, for example, were to select troops in six northern counties.[316] For the arraying of infantry to be sent to Gascony in the following year Cressingham was again employed, as was John of Berwick, one of the most important of the king’s clerks, and this time they were given the assistance of laymen with military experience, such as Robert FitzPayn and William Mortimer. One group of commissioners was given four counties to deal with, though none had so considerable a task as that of Cressingham and his colleagues in the previous year.[317] To collect the Welsh troops needed for the Flanders campaign Edward relied on the services of local magnates and their officials, but for the Falkirk campaign of the following year, along with such men, a prominent rôle was given to royal officials, notably John de Havering, justice of North Wales, Reginald de Grey, justice of Cheshire, and William Felton, constable of Beaumaris castle.[318]
This technique of making full use of the local knowledge of important laymen, initiated in Wales, was followed up in the rest of the reign. For the abortive winter campaign of 1299-1300 local men were combined with royal clerks, with a separate commission for each county. But clerks were not used again, and the commissions were increasingly dominated by professional soldiers: for example, in 1303 Richard le Brun and John de Hudlestone were appointed in Cumberland, and Robert FitzRoger and Walter de Huntercombe in Northumberland. As time went on, the area allocated to each commission was reduced. In 1300 and 1301 three men were appointed for the whole of Yorkshire, but in 1303 three were commissioned for each riding. In 1307 even more specialised commissions were set up for raising troops in the north of England, with a separate one for each liberty. By now, four men were appointed to choose 140 foot in Eskdale and Gillesland, a considerable contrast to the commission of two men in 1295 to levy 4,000 to go to Gascony.[319]
Evidence for the activities of these commissions is not as full for this period as it is later, perhaps because, as the system became better established and more familiar in its operation, so opportunities for abuse multiplied. The abuses leave more trace in the records than do the regular workings of the system. The one chronicle account of the operation of a commission of array refers to the collection of infantry from the southern counties for service in Gascony in 1295. According to Bartholomew Cotton, Hugh Cressingham and William Mortimer came into Norfolk and assembled from towns and villages a large number of foot-soldiers at Newmarket. The men were inspected there, and those not up to standard sent back, but shortly afterwards the whole muster was abandoned, and all returned to their homes. Equipment consisting of white tunics, knives and swords was provided at the expense of the localities.[320] This was a considerable burden. The hundred of Launditch produced 187 men for the array, their equipment and expenses costing £52 10s. 8½d. This compares with tax assessments of £241 19s. 6d. for the tenth of 1294, and £97 5s. 7d. for the ninth of 1297.[321] Cancellation of the plan to send the men to Gascony provided the opportunity for some profiteers at Newmarket to make off with the tunics, popularly known as blaunchecotes, and worth three shillings each, but legal action was successful in recovering at least some of them for the villagers who had paid for them.[322]
The commissioners of array generally seem to have left the task of selecting a specified number of men to the hundred and village communities. On occasion, the men of the localities even selected their own army officers. For the Welsh war of 1294-5 the Nottinghamshire hundred of Bassetlaw made John de Veer their ‘centenar’, or man in charge of a unit of 100 men.[323] There were ample opportunities for corruption. In the East Riding village of South Cave a man chosen for service by the villagers was offered protection by the bailiff and two other men, in return for ten shillings.[324] In the Yorkshire village of Etton the local constable was assigned, presumably by the arrayers, the task of raising money to pay the expenses of a centenar going to Scotland. But the community of the village appointed one Adam of Boulton to collect the money, which he then paid over to the constable. The latter appropriated three shillings of it to his own use, for which he was imprisoned and fined 3s. 4d.[325] It was possible for those chosen to serve to hire substitutes, and one ingenious rogue was found in the court at Halesowen to h
ave gone round to each of the men selected to go to Wales and taken payment from each to go as his substitute. He then vanished.[326] The whole community of a village might decide to hire soldiers from elsewhere to go to the muster on their behalf. This is illustrated by a court case in which it was claimed that Nicholas de Stillingfleet had agreed to find twenty men to go with him to Scotland as the contingent from a group of Yorkshire villages. He took over £3 from them, and failed to provide any soldiers.[327]
In the Welsh wars the responsibility of the county to pay the men continued until they had reached the point from which the whole army was to set out,[328] but in the Scotch wars it was normal practice for the crown to take over financial liability from the time of the county muster. In 1298 three royal clerks were appointed to pay the troops on their way north,[329] and this precedent was followed in the rest of the reign. Even in the case of the grant of military service negotiated by the Treasurer with the community of the county of Northumberland late in 1302 the infantry were to be paid by the crown once they crossed the county boundary.[330]
The arrayers of infantry were usually given commissions that were equally valid for franchisal liberties as for the rest of the country. The second Welsh war saw local bailiffs appointed to raise troops from the Welsh Marcher lordships, but that was exceptional and indicative of the special treatment that was given them during the period of the Welsh wars.[331] The creation of separate commissions for the various liberties in the north of England in 1307, together with the evidence for the separate contingents from the lordships of the Welsh Marches also indicates a concession to local susceptibilities on the part of the government. It was probably also a more efficient way of collecting troops.[332] The one liberty that always received special treatment was that of Durham. When it was under Bishop Bek’s rule no royal commissions were sent into the palatinate. For the winter campaign of 1299-1300 the king simply asked the bishop to provide 5,000 or 6,000 men, sending a royal clerk to assist the local administration in assembling them.[333] The demand for service from Durham was conspicuously unsuccessful on this occasion, the military tenants absolutely refusing to fight in Scotland.[334] Later, when the palatinate was in royal hands, Edward set up a normal commission, sensibly using local men, John FitzMarmaduke and Robert Hansard.[335] FitzMarmaduke had been a ringleader of the mutiny three years before.