Edward I

by Michael Prestwich

  The Mirror of Justices did not achieve widespread popularity, but for all its quirks and eccentricities, it accurately reflected many criticisms of the government. Were the crises of the later years, in particular that of 1297, the result of such grievances, which were not directly the result of war, or were they rather simply the consequence of the insupportable demands of the king’s military policies? Was the crisis of 1297, like that of 1340-1, the product of an abnormal situation, or was it, like that of 1258, the result of a long build-up of discontent?

  The opposition to Edward in 1297 was two-fold: the clerical and the lay, and the two are best dealt with separately. Although the rôle of the two earls, Roger Bigod of Norfolk and Humphrey de Bohun of Hereford, is well known, the composition of the secular opposition is not easy to ascertain. The only other person named in the royal pardon issued in November 1297 was John Ferrers.[906] The document known as De Tallagio non Concedendo, about which there has been some controversy, but which appears to be a baronial draft for a settlement,[907] names the same three individuals. Ferrers’ grievance was of long standing. His consistent hostility to the king is easily explained in terms of Edward’s treatment of his father, the earl of Derby, in 1269. Ferrers was hardly a man of the same stature as Bigod and Bohun, and the chronicles do not suggest that he played a rôle of great significance in the events of 1297. It seems very likely that he was put in the same category as Bohun and Bigod in De Tallagio in recognition of the justice of his claim to the earldom his father had once held.

  Bigod and Bohun also had private grievances against the king. Bigod was being hard pressed to pay the debts he owed to the crown,[908] and Bohun must have felt aggrieved at the way he had been treated in the case of his dispute with the earl of Gloucester. In addition, they felt that their hereditary offices of Marshal and Constable were threatened by the king. This matter first came to a crisis in 1282, when Edward’s intention of making the army a force wholly paid by the crown had been opposed. Bohun demanded from the king the emoluments of his office of Constable, and this was presumably a part of the general insistence that the army be organized on traditional feudal lines.[909] The next row concerning the hereditary offices came in 1294, when Bigod, the Marshal, was appointed to command the army in South Wales, and Roger de Molis was appointed marshal of the force. The wardrobe accounts reveal that the king was himself receiving the fees due to the Marshal. After protests, Bigod was promised that no precedents would be made of his being ordered away from his rightful place at the king’s side. The officials were ordered to cease levying the Marshal’s fees, on the excuse of scarcities in the army, though it seems more likely that this was intended to pacify Bigod.[910] The issue of the rights and duties of the Marshal and Constable was to be revived in 1297.[911]

  One of the most celebrated incidents of the 1297 crisis was the arrival of Bigod, Bohun and their followers at the Exchequer on 22 August. They effectively protested at the levy of a tax of an eighth which had not been duly and constitutionally granted. The letter from the Exchequer to the king describing this incident names Robert FitzRoger, Alan la Zouche, John de Segrave, John Lovel and Henry le Tyes as accompanying the earls.[912] All but the last named appear as bannerets of Bigod’s household in a list which probably dates from this year.[913] John de Segrave was bound by indenture to serve Bigod for life.[914] John Lovel, lord of Titchmarsh in Northamptonshire, held the manor of Minster Lovell in Oxfordshire from Alan la Zouche,[915] and was given land in Yorkshire by Bigod. Robert FitzRoger held land in Northumberland and East Anglia, and appears with Lovel as a witness to a charter issued by Bigod.[916] Though these men do not form a clear territorial interest, they were linked by the ties of personal loyalty and the network of tenurial connections that would be expected in a political grouping of this period.

  Beyond this, evidence of the composition of the opposition to the crown in 1297 is slight. In the autumn various writs of summons were issued by the government in England at a time when the situation seemed to be deteriorating into a state of civil war, and one of these, sent out on 9 September, appears to be a demand that the opposition should present themselves for negotiations. From this the names of Nicholas Segrave, Fulk FitzWarin, Robert de Tateshall and Edmund Mortimer can be added to the list of opposition leaders, although Tateshall’s inclusion was probably based on misinformation, for his son was serving the king in Flanders, and he was an old associate of Reginald de Grey, who was a leading member of the council advising the young prince Edward. By 16 September his loyalty, together with that of FitzWarin, was recognized by the government.[917] It seems likely that there was considerable Marcher participation in the opposition,[918] but the composition of the movement cannot be analysed in the way that has been possible for the baronial opposition to King John. The party was swiftly formed, and swiftly disintegrated in the course of the year. FitzRoger was employed by the crown early in March, and by October was appointed to the custody of the Northumberland march.[919]

  Important as individual grievances were in arousing the hostility of Bigod, Bohun and Ferrers, the other leaders who can be identified do not seem to have had strong personal reasons for opposing the king, although it is worth noting that Robert FitzRoger was one of those forced to go to Gascony in 1295 by the threat that the Exchequer would collect all the debts he owed to the crown by means of distraint.[920] What were the issues over which the opposition disagreed with the crown? Firstly there was the question of military service, which has already been discussed. Bigod objected to the king’s plan of sending a feudal army to Gascony while a royal expedition went to Flanders. That plan was substituted for a summons of novel type, making no mention of homage or fealty. But a muster at London proved no more acceptable, while the inclusion in the summons of all landowners with at least twenty librates of land broadened the basis of the opposition. The king’s offer of pay to those who served abroad does not seem to have mollified many. Some did, however, appear at London on the specified date, 7 July. Edward then ordered the Marshal and Constable to draw up lists of how many horses they had, and how many were prepared to serve in Flanders. It looks as if the king, furious at the recalcitrance shown by the earls, decided to burden them with all the tasks that could conceivably be considered part of their offices. Naturally, Bigod and Bohun refused, sending Robert Turmy to inform the king that this was the job of a household official, as the men had not assembled in response to a formal feudal summons. Edward informed them that no precedent would be made of the task of drawing up these lists, but the earls were adamant in their refusal, and accordingly the king dismissed them from their offices. Thomas de Berkeley and Geoffrey de Geneville were appointed in their place, as Constable and Marshal respectively.[921]

  Suspicion of Edward’s intentions with regard to military service in 1297 must have been heightened by memories of earlier attempts to extend the system of military obligation, going back to that of 1282. There appears to have been hostility to his plans for a feudal summons for service in Gascony in 1294, although the campaign was abandoned because of the Welsh revolt. An important group of magnates had opposed paid service against the French in 1295. So it was very predictable that the question of service should be an important element in the 1297 crisis.

  Another important element in the crisis was the question of consent to taxation. By 1297 the reserves of cash that had been built up in the early stages of the war with France had long been exhausted, and the Flanders expedition made the king’s need of money more acute than ever. He could hardly approach the Salisbury parliament for a tax on moveables, for it was less than three months since the grant of the twelfth and eighth. But by July the financial situation was such that a new tax was clearly needed. As parliament could not be summoned in a short time, and as such an assembly would almost certainly have been disclined to make grants, Edward obtained agreement to the collection of a tax of an eighth ‘from the people standing around in his chamber’, as one chronicler put it.[922] The Exchequer promptly prepa
red the administrative machinery for levying the tax, and by 14 August the officials were claiming that all was ready.[923] These plans, however, were thwarted by Bigod and Bohun, with their supporters, who appeared at the Exchequer on 22 August. Bohun acted as spokesman, and the main point he made was that the tax had not been properly negotiated, but was being arbitrarily imposed. He emphasized that to pay such a levy to which due assent had not been given was to admit to being in a condition of servitude.[924]

  This was a straightforward constitutional argument. In the Magna Carta of John’s reign it was stated that no scutages or aids save for the three traditional aids should be levied without the common counsel of the realm.[925] Although this clause was omitted from the reissues of the charter, the principle of consent for taxes on moveables was maintained. The problem was, how should the consenting body be constituted? In the early thirteenth century the idea of a representative assembly, with powers to bind the whole nation to what was agreed, was not fully accepted. A fortieth was granted in a great council in 1232 after considerable argument, but three years later Richard Percy, William, count of Aumale, and John, earl of Lincoln, were opposing collection of the tax on their lands on the grounds that they had not personally consented to it.[926] In 1254 the magnates refused a general aid. The government accordingly made a direct appeal to the men who would have paid the aid had it been granted in the great council. Two knights from each shire were summoned to appear before the council, and they were to be empowered by the county courts to grant a tax.[927]

  Such precedents led to the practice by which grants of taxes on moveables were made by an assembly of magnates and shire representatives. Although the principle was generally accepted in Edward’s reign, the formula for the summons of the shire representatives, emphasizing the powers that they were to have to bind the community of the county to the decision made in parliament, was not established until the 1290s.[928] Consent by the burgesses to taxation was more often obtained by individual negotiations with the towns than by the attendance of representatives in parliament. That taxes need not be granted in full parliament was shown by the unusual arrangements made for the financing of the second Welsh war. In the summer and autumn of 1283 various towns and counties were approached for financial aid by royal officials under the direction of John Kirkby. This was only moderately successful, realizing receipts of £16,533 6s. 6d.[929] Accordingly, two assemblies were summoned to meet in January 1283, one at York and one at Northampton. This division was made so that the clergy of the two provinces could be approached separately, and it was obviously convenient to summon the shire and borough representatives at the same time. No magnates were summoned, for they could be consulted in the armies in Wales. The assemblies granted a tax, on condition that the magnates agreed. According to one account, the rate initially agreed on was a fifteenth, but ultimately the rate was fixed at a thirtieth. The sums paid to Kirkby in 1282 were counted as a part of the tax.[930] It seems very likely that the legislation of September 1283, the Statute of Acton Burnell, intended to case and simplify the process of debt collection, was the result of pressure put on the king and his officials in the course of these negotiations for financial aid from the burgesses. It may also reflect the concern of the Riccardi, who contributed so much to the financing of the war of 1282-3, about the recovery of debts due to them.

  Although the type of assembly that should grant taxes was not formally laid down by 1297, there was a tradition of consulting the shire representatives as well as the magnates, and in 1290, 1294, 1295 and 1296 taxes on moveables had been granted in parliament. It was clearly appreciated by the government that they were on weak ground in that no representatives had been involved in the grant of the eighth, and no formal gathering of magnates had been summoned. Detailed orders were issued to the assessors instructing them how to justify the tax. The people were to be approached in the most courteous way possible, and were to be told that the earls and barons had consented to the tax on their behalf. But, hardly surprisingly, no elaborate constitutional arguments were put forward. Emphasis was placed instead on an emotional plea that the king was risking his life on their behalf, and that the least his subjects could do was to pray for him and pay their taxes.[931] The opposition’s case as expressed in De Tallagio was that taxes should not be imposed without the consent of all the magnates, lay and ecclesiastical, knights, burgesses and free men of the realm. Edward was not prepared to accept this view, even though it did represent the normal method of granting taxes. In the Confirmatio Cartarum he simply promised that he would take no aids and prises save the customary ones without the ‘common assent of the whole realm’, a carefully imprecise phrase which did not commit him to consulting shire and borough representatives.[932]

  The crown was also on weak ground over the maltolt, the 40s. export tax on wool. The merchants had consented to this, as a substitute for a seizure of wool, and the government presumably argued that as it was they who were to pay the tax, no one else need be consulted about it. But in the April parliament of 1275 the customs duties on wool, woolfells and leather had been granted at the request of the merchants by the magnates and others in the assembly.[933] And although it was the merchants who paid the maltolt, the burden of the tax was in part passed on to the farmers. Prices were severely depressed during the years of the war with France.[934] So both in terms of precedent and interest the magnates were entitled to feel that they should have been consulted over the maltolt. The 40s. duty was therefore formally given up in the Confirmatio Cartarum, and a promise made that no such levies would be imposed in future without the consent of the community of the realm.[935]

  The many prises that were taken by the government to provide victuals for the armies provided another grievance. As already shown, the crown was traditionally entitled to such prises for the royal household, but Edward I’s extension of the system constituted an unwarranted use of a prerogative right. In the Confirmatio the king promised that no precedent was to be established by these prises, and further, he promised that they would not be taken in the future without the consent of the community.[936]

  The crisis of 1297 was not simply a matter of argument over the constitutional forms that grants of taxes and customs duties should take. In the first statement of the opposition that survives, the so-called Monstraunces, the constitutional arguments take second place to a forceful statement of the hardships that the king’s exactions have caused. It is stated that even if service was owed in Flanders, it could not be performed, as the community of the realm was so impoverished as a result of the various aids and prises.[937] The succession of annual taxes, the series of prises coinciding with a period of high prices, imposed a heavy burden on the country. By 1298 the northern clergy were so short of cash that they were permitted to pay their taxes in kind, rather than in coin.[938] A popular song of Edward’s reign expressed the opinion that the burden of royal exactions was reducing farmers to a state of misery, ‘For ever the furthe peni mot to the kynge’. Seed corn had to be sold to meet the demand for silver, and as a result land had to lie fallow. Even if the song exaggerates, and few peasants were in fact reduced to beggary, it is significant that economic woes should be blamed on royal taxation, and not on the activities of landlords.[939] The Monstraunces pointed out that many were reduced to subsistence level or below by the king’s demands.

  Edward’s quarrel with the clergy in 1297 was over the issue of taxation. There was nothing new in the king requesting aid from the clergy in that year. When they granted a tenth in 1295 Archbishop Winchelsey promised a further tenth in the following year if the war should still be in progress.[940] This was accordingly demanded at the Bury St. Edmunds parliament in November 1296. But Winchelsey made four points in a speech replying to the request. Two were in the king’s favour: the promise of the previous year, and the danger from France. Against these, however, he was able to refer to the recent papal prohibition of such grants, made in the bull Clericis Laicos, and to the poverty of the church.[9
41] A further argument was that since the assembly was summoned by the king, rather than by the ecclesiastical authorities, it was constitutionally improper to make a grant.[942] The outcome was that the clergy delayed their answer until next Hilary, when a synod of the whole English clergy met at St. Paul’s. Winchelsey on that occasion came out strongly against the royal demand, reading out the papal bull in the presence of the royal emissaries, Hugh Despenser and John of Berwick. They repeated a threat that had been made before, particularly in 1294, that if no grant was forthcoming the king would place the clergy out of his protection, and this time the threat was carried out.[943]

  The royal demand had been for a fifth, and Edward made it known that payment of the equivalent sum would buy back his protection. The archbishop pronounced sentence of excommunication on all those who obeyed the king in this,[944] but was ignored by those clerks in royal service, and by those of the northern province.[945] Severe pressure was put on the clergy by the crown. Cotton complained in particular of the seizure of horses,[946] while the archbishop’s lands and valuables were taken by the crown.[947] In Lent Winchelsey summoned a convocation of the southern province, and conceded that individuals should be allowed to follow their own consciences, with the inevitable result that almost all paid up and obtained protections.[948] The total raised in this way was £22,810,[949] just over double the proceeds of the tenth of the previous year.