This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History

by T. R. Fehrenbach

  There will be more threats in fringe areas, like Korea, because Communist doctrine demands them. Here ends and even morality will be vague. There will be no cheap, easy, or popular answers to these threats. We may have the choice of limited, controlled violence for temporary ends—or of blowing the whistle on the game—and with the game, possibly mankind.

  The enemy is no superman, as was proved on Pork Chop Hill. Anything he can do, we can do better—if we have the will. At Pork Chop men said we played the enemy game, not our own—but from Saigon to Berlin the enemy game may be the only one in town.

  Korea showed, or should have shown, that all is not easy in this world, that for the rest of this century things may not get better but will probably get worse, and to talk despairingly of going up in smoke or frying in hard radiation is no answer. If the free nations want a certain kind of world, they will have to fight for it, with courage, money, diplomacy—and legions.

  Korea showed it was time to tell the men who man our legions that there is nothing easy is this world, that there are tigers, and to furnish them not only with atomic life eradicators but tiger guns. Korea showed that a free government must be prepared to do the unpopular thing, even if it destroys itself. Governments are not important; nations and peoples and what they stand for, are.

  It was time for free, decent societies to continue to control their military forces, but to quit demanding from them impossible acquiescence in the liberal view toward life. A "modern" infantry may ride sky vehicles into combat, fire and sense its weapons through instrumentation, employ devices of frightening lethality in the future—but it must also be old-fashioned enough to be iron-hard, poised. for instant obedience, and prepared to die in the mud.

  If liberal, decent societies cannot discipline themselves to do all these things, they may have nothing to offer the world. They may not last long enough.

  Aristotle wrote, Almost all things have been found out, but some have been forgotten.

  Americans have learned of Brad Smith, who first saw long, black T-34s rumble forward in the rain at Osan, of the late Company A, of Frank Muñoz and Company at the horror of Kunu-ri, of Mike Shinka on Obong-ni, John Yancey led back blind from the icy hills beside Chang-jin, and Joe Clemons' dozen men who were King indeed on Pork Chop Hill. These were the Korean War—the misery, the waste, the splendor, the courage, the trauma that lingers still. Millions of Americans can find no meaning in any of it.

  It is while men talk blithely of the lessons of history that they ignore them.

  The lesson of Korea is that it happened.

  | Go to Table of Contents |

  Chronology

  25 June 1950

  NKPA invades South Korea.

  U.N. Security Councils calls for end of aggression.

  27 June 1950

  U.N. asks members to go to aid of ROK.

  28 June 1950

  Seoul falls; ROK Army destroyed.

  30 June 1950

  President Truman orders U.S. ground forces into Korea.

  5 July 1950

  First U.S. ground troops go into action at Osan.

  7 July 1950

  U.N. creates United Nations Command, under commander appointed by U.S.

  5 July-4 Aug.1950

  U.N. Forces fight delaying action across South Korea.

  4 Aug. 1950

  Pusan Perimeter in southeastern Korea established.

  5-19 Aug. 1950

  First Battle of Naktong Bulge.

  27 Aug.-15 Sept. 1950

  Perimeter battles, heaviest fighting of war.

  1 Sept.-5 Sept. 1950

  NKPA great Naktong Offensive.

  15 Sept. 1950

  Inch'on landings.

  18 Sept. 1950

  U.N. breakout from Pusan Perimeter.

  19 Sept.-1 Oct. 1950

  U.N. pursuit and exploitation.

  26 Sept. 1950

  Seoul recaptured.

  7 Oct. 1950

  U.N. Forces cross 38th parallel.

  U.N. sanctions defeat of North Korea, reunification of country.

  12 Oct. 1950

  First Chinese Communist troops enter Korea.

  15 Oct. 1950

  Truman and MacArthur meet at Wake Island.

  19 Oct. 1950

  P'yongyang, N.K. capital, taken.

  26 Oct. 1950

  X Corps lands at Wonsan on east coast.

  1 Nov. 1950

  CCF ambush 1st Cav. Div. at Unsan

  10-26 Nov. 1950

  X Corps advances toward Yalu in east, Eighth Army in west.

  24 Nov. 1950

  MacArthur's "final offensive" jumps off.

  25 Nov.1950

  CCF strike Eighth Army along Ch'ongch'on River in west.

  27 Nov. 1950

  CCF strike 1st Marine and 7th Division at Changjin Reservoir in east.

  26 Nov.-1 Dec. 1950

  U.S. 2nd and 25th divisions defeated along Ch'ongch'on in west. Retreat.

  27 Nov.-10 Dec. 1950

  X Corps fights back toward port of Hungnam in east. Marines retreat from Kot'o-ri.

  22 Dec. 1950

  Walker killed; Ridgway to command of Eighth Army.

  24 Dec. 1950

  X Corps sails from Hungnam. North Korea evacuated.

  4 Jan. 1951

  Seoul captured by CCF.

  14 Jan. 1951

  U.N. lines rest along 37th parallel in South Korea.

  25 Jan. 1951

  U.N. reassumes offensive.

  1 Feb. 1951

  U.N. votes to end Korean conflict by "peaceful means."

  14 Feb. 1951

  CCF counteroffensive; CCF turned back at Chipyong-ni.

  17 Feb.-17 March 1951

  U.N. continues offensive, moves north.

  18 March 1951

  Seoul retaken.

  11 April 1951

  MacArthur recalled; Ridgway assumes command at FECOM, Van Fleet of Eighth Army.

  22 April 1951

  CCF offensive; Glosters hold on at Imjin.

  30 April 1951

  CCF breaks contact.

  16-22 May 1951

  U.S. forces halt CCF Soyang Offensive.

  May Massacre.

  23 May-1 June 1951

  U.N. drives north.

  13 June 1951

  U.N. on 38th parallel.

  23 June 1951

  Soviet Delegate Malik proposes truce in U.N.

  10 July 1951

  Truce talks begin at Kaesong.

  1 Aug.-31 Oct. 1951

  U.N. launches limited attacks to straighten lines: Bloody, Heartbreak Ridge battles.

  27 Nov. 1951

  Truce talks resume at Panmunjom; cease-fire line agreed upon, at line of contact.

  Nov. 1951-April 1952

  Stalemate along Korean battlefront during discussions at Panmunjom.

  2 April 1952

  Screening of U.N. POW's begins; Koje-do riots commence.

  7 May 1952

  General Dodd captured by Communist POW's at Koje-do.

  12 May-12 June 1952

  Mark Clark replaces Ridgway at FECOM. General Boatner quells disturbances on Koje.

  June 1952-Oct. 1952

  Stalemate along battlefront while truce talks deadlocked on pow repatriation question. Hill battles rage on Baldy, Whitehorse, elsewhere.

  8 Oct. 1952

  Truce talks recessed at Panmunjom; complete deadlock.

  Oct.-Nov. 1952

  Heavy pressure on ROK's in center of line.

  ROK Army comes of age.

  Nov. 1952

  Indian proposal on POW's in U.N.

  Dec. 1952

  President-elect Eisenhower comes to Korea; intensification of U.N. psychological warfare.

  Dec., Jan., 1953

  Continuation of stalemate; hill battles.

  11 Feb. 1953

  Maxwell Taylor replaces Van Fleet at Eighth Army.

  22 Feb. 1953

  U.N. Command agai
n proposes exchange of sick and wounded POW's.

  5 March 1953

  Death of Josef Stalin; struggle for power in Kremlin disaffection in Soviet satellites.

  28 March 1953

  Communists agree to pow exchange proposed by U.N.C.

  30 March 1953

  Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian U.N. proposal of November, 1952. Resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom.

  16-18 April 1953

  Battle for Pork Chop Hill.

  20-26 April 1953

  Exchange of sick and wounded POW's at Panmunjom.

  27 April 1953

  Resumption of plenary sessions at Panmunjom.

  May 1953

  Savage fighting along stalemated line while details of truce ironed out at Panmunjom.

  4 June 1953

  Communists agree in effect to all U.N. truce proposals.

  25 June 1953

  Robertson begins "Little Truce Talks" with Rhee to secure ROK acceptance of armistice; CCF launch massive attacks against ROK divisions.

  7 July 1953

  ROK agrees to truce terms.

  27 July 1953

  Cease-fire signed at Panmunjom. Fighting ends.

  4 Sept. 1953

  Screening and repatriation of POW's begins at Freedom Village, Panmunjom.

  | Go to Table of Contents |

  Glossary of Principal Weapons

  Because of the limited nature of the Korean War, all combatants chose to fight it largely with surplus weapons from World War II. No startling developments, either in weaponry or tactics, came out of the conflict. While the United States made innovations and great improvements in logistical techniques, cold-weather clothing, and medical service, the only wholly new developments were the use of helicopters for reconnaissance, transport, and evacuation on a large scale, and the employment of jet aircraft in combat. The most modern jet, the F-86 Sabre, was thrown into the aerial war only when Communist forces first employed a first-rate, modern aircraft, the MIG-15, in what was essentially a field test.

  Throughout the entire course of the war, weapons, radios, and vehicles, on both sides, remained of World War II vintage, although newer series of each had either been developed or were in production. In this sense, the Korean War was definitely anachronistic, for not only were nuclear weapons withheld, but so were modern varieties of transport, communication, and conventional weapons. At the beginning, the United States had no modern conventional weapons, a great weakness due to the complete cessation of procurement for ground warfare following World War II; but the Communist bloc, fighting through its secondary powers, followed the same course in employing only old or obsolescent weaponry, though much of this was of more recent manufacture, and in better condition, than that in American hands in 1950.

  One indication of Communist thinking toward the future of warfare lies in the fact that Communist nations have continued, after World War II, Korea, and up to the present time, to develop and place in production whole new series of conventional arms, in addition to nuclear devices and means of delivery. The United States in recent years has produced new conventional arms in scant supply and with marked governmental reluctance, preferring to base its strategy wholly on the nuclear deterrent.

  The principal infantry weapons used in Korea (with the exception of Commonwealth forces, which used British issue), were the following, the majority of which are now obsolete.

  United States

  U.S. Rifle Caliber .30 M-1 (Garand): The basic shoulder weapon of United States, ROK, and many other U.N. rifle regiments. A vintage of the mid-1930's, it was gas-operated and semiautomatic, fired an 8-round clip, and weighed 9.5 pounds, 10.5 with bayonet. Its effective range was about 500 yards, and its rate of fire up to approximately 30 rounds per minute.

  U.S. Carbine Caliber .30: Produced as both a semiautomatic and full-automatic weapon, it fired a lighter bullet than the M-1 Rifle, with correspondingly less range, accuracy, and killing power. Fitted with a 15-round magazine, or 30-round or so-called "banana magazine"; gas-operated, it was carried principally by company-grade officer's, NCO's, clerks, and the like. Weight, 6 pounds. Developed during World War II from Garand principle.

  Pistol, Caliber .45 M-1911 A-1: The standard United States side arm, a large semiautomatic pistol, with great stopping power and an effective range of some 25 yards. Developed and issued prior to World War I, it was carried by field-grade officers, signal linemen, gun crews, tankers, and men whose duties of other burdens precluded carrying of rifle or carbine.

  Browning Automatic Rifle, or BAR: Firing the same cartridge as the Rifle, M-1, either semi- or full automatic, the bar could be operated either as a shoulder weapon or from a bipod. With a rate of fire of almost 500 rounds per minute, it was the principal automatic weapon of the rifle companies, one or more being issued to each rifle squad. Weighing 16 pounds, it was developed from Browning's principle during World War I.

  U.S. Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1919 A-3 (Light Machine Gun, or LMG): An air-cooled, 32-pound fully automatic machine gun, with bipod and shoulder rest; recoil-operated on the Browning principle, capable of sustained fire of 450-500 rounds per minute. Firing the same cartridge as the Rifle, M-1 and BAR, it was the infantry platoon machine gun. Developed in World War I.

  U.S. Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M-1917 A-1 (Heavy Machine Gun, or HMG): a heavier version of the above, water-cooled and tripod mounted, and thus capable of both a greater, longer, and more accurate rate of fire. Issued to the Weapons Company of the infantry battalion. There were approximately 500 machine guns of both types in the U.S. infantry division.

  U.S. Machine Gun, Caliber .50, Browning: Weighing 82 pounds, this large-caliber machine gun was mounted on trucks, tanks, and other vehicles, and not carried into close infantry combat. Air-cooled, but with a heavy barrel, the .50-caliber machine gun fired approximately 575 rounds per minute, to a range of 2,000 yards. Approximately 350 scattered throughout the infantry division.

  Rocket Launcher, 3.5-inch or 2.36-inch (Bazooka); Rocket launchers, developed during World War II, fire a hollow shaped charge capable of penetrating thick armor plate. The 3.5, which replaced the obsolete 2.36 in 1950, weighed 15 pounds and fired an 8.5-pound charge. There were some 600 bazookas in the Korea infantry division. Characterized by a large and distinct backblast, the aluminum tube generally was not effective beyond 75 yards against medium armor. Widely issued as infantry antitank weapon.

  The 57mm, 75mm, and 105mm recoilless rifles: Infantry-carried artillery. They develop high blast from escaping gases on discharge, but no recoil, as with howitzers or cannon. The obsolescent 57mm could be shoulder-fired, while the newer and heavier guns were crew-served, firing from tripods. Effective against infantry and fortifications, such as bunkers, they fire regular shells with a flat trajectory over long ranges. The 105mm was developed during Korea.

  Infantry mortars, 60mm, 81mm, 4.2-inch: Mortars are primarily antipersonnel weapons, consisting of simple, seated-breech tubes and base plates, which throw high explosive shells at a high angle, capable of reaching into valleys, trenches, and into defilade impervious to direct fire. The 60mm mortars were carried into position with the rifle companies; the 81mm's were handled by the weapons companies, and the 4.2-inch fired by a special mortar company within the regiment. The 81mm, with an effective range of 4,000 yards, to 1,800 for the 60mm, weighs more than 100 pounds and is not easily transportable in rough terrain by foot troops. The 4.2-inch, virtually an artillery weapon, is normally vehicle mounted.

  The Quad .50: This was a half-tracked vehicle of World War II vintage, mounting four .50 machine guns capable of being fired as a unit. Developed as an antiaircraft weapon, with the advent of fast jet craft it became an antipersonnel weapon capable of hurling an immense amount of fire into hillsides and valleys against advancing infantry, or of throwing long-range harassing small-arms fire against enemy routes by night. Firing as many as 100,000 rounds per day, the Quad .50 could go over hills like a vacuum cleaner, suckin
g them devoid of life.

  The Dual 40: Also developed as an AA weapon, the Dual 40 was a fully tracked vehicle with a tanklike silhouette mounting twin Bofors 40mm antiaircraft automatic cannon. It was also used to support the infantry line, in the same manner as the Quad .50.

  The artillery weapons. During Korean operations, the standard U.S. artillery of World War II, the 105mm, 155mm, and 8-inch howitzers and rifles were employed in tremendous quantity. Developments were made in direction, spotting, and radar-sensing. Toward the end of the conflict, Korea was primarily an artillery war, with both sides dug in and cannonading each other rather than employing maneuver.

  Armor. At the outset of the fighting, to its tremendous disadvantage, the United States had no tank in the Far East capable of engaging the obsolescent Russian T-34. The light M-24, primarily a reconnaissance vehicle with thin armor plate and light 75mm cannon, was augmented during August and September, 1950, with various U.S. interim model medium tanks, such as the M-26 Pershing, mounting a 90mm gun. Gradually, the old M4A3E8, the World War II workhorse, the Sherman, fitted with a newer high-velocity 76mm gun, became the principal Korea battle tank. It had a high silhouette, light armor, and an inadequate gun, but it was more maneuverable in the alternately steep and boggy Korean terrain than more modern tanks, such as the heavy-armor, heavy-gun British Centurion III. Failure to mass-produce a good main battle tank was one of the Army's principal weaknesses during the period; the concentration was more on seeking an effective antitank weapon than relying on the more expensive tank itself.