Jihad vs. McWorld
Page 8
The world still spins on the energy of fossil fuels—nonrecyclable and irreplaceable. The United States represents an especially foreboding case study, for here is one of the world’s richest fossil fuel producers using up its own resources in an orgy of consumption that is reflected neither in elevated living standards nor in a proportionately larger GDP. Nor have we learned much from two major crises in supply and our ever more debilitating dependency on foreign oil: gas prices remain absurdly low, taxes (even after the Clinton administration’s budget initiative added 4.3 cents) are insignificant, and strategic stockpiles unimpressive.
Even more than with minerals, energy resources represent a form of power that seems to shrink as it grows. That is the irony of modernization, described by modernity’s first incisive critic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau had seen that the power given us by science and technology to gratify our needs actually compounds and multiplies them so that as our power increases our satisfaction diminishes. If happiness is a function of needs in harmony with our capacity to satisfy them, “progress” will always mean that power, however fast it grows, will be outstripped by needs, which grow faster. Hence, modern man’s conundrum: the more powerful he becomes, the more miserable he feels. All that we have only serves to make us “need” more, and the more we have the more we need in order to protect what we have. Like the proverbial landowner who yearns only for the land adjacent to his, our modern consumer needs only products that are proximate to products he already possesses. The TV “needs” the VCR, which “needs” a laser disc player, which “needs” a computer, which “needs” endless software. The automobile first “needs” theft protectors and radar detectors and cassette players and onboard computers, and then it needs places to go and drive-in facilities, then parking lots and strip malls and pretty soon it needs all of what passes for modern civilization—goods that a person must slave for over a lifetime to begin to be able to afford. And then of course she will complain that she has no leisure to enjoy the “possessions” that turn out to feel more like her owners than her property.
What Hobbes called the quest for power after power that ends only in death has become the quest for oil wellhead after oil wellhead that ends only in economic and environmental bankruptcy. In America, it hardly seemed possible that supply could ever be overtaken by demand. From the discovery of oil in western Pennsylvania just before the Civil War—a discovery that would make John D. Rockefeller’s fortune—right down to the 1930s, exploration seemed to uncover new reserves far faster than an industrializing world used them up. Yet within a few years of the end of World War II, America found itself sliding into dependency, though reliance on imports was at first thought to be nothing more than a matter of convenience and efficiency.
Why pump expensive domestic petroleum when foreign oil was so cheap? In the century’s first three quarters, oil use in America had grown by about 3 percent a year, while real Gross National Product (GNP) was growing at an average 4 percent a year.20 Domestic production, peaking in 1970, managed to keep up to need, with 88 percent of consumption still being met from domestic American sources in 1970.21 But as a result of the 1973 Mideast War and oil embargo, the one-tenth or less of our fuel needs that depended on foreign imports in the sixties nearly tripled by 1974, creating for the first time a vivid sense of national jeopardy. Imports in 1974 had grown to 28 percent of consumption while oil prices had spiraled up from $1.73 a barrel in 1970 to $10.89 at the end of 1974.22 By 1980, imports had risen to 38 percent of domestic consumption and by 1990 to 42 percent.23 Today, despite a lingering business turndown and roller-coaster consumption patterns that have kept world oil production under the peak production levels reached in the seventies, American import dependency has remained well above 40 percent and in 1994 went, for the first time, above 50 percent.
These long-term rising figures for imports reflect both a very gradual decline in domestic production and an appetite for energy that, though it moderated in the late seventies as prices rose, has continued to grow. While domestic energy consumption fell from an alltime high of 11.30 million barrels per day in 1970 (for crude oil and natural gas), to around 9 million barrels per day in 1990, consumption rose from less than 15 million barrels per day to an all-time high of nearly 18 million barrels in the late seventies (although since then consumption has fallen, risen, and fallen again, leaving it only slightly higher today than it was fifteen years ago). If prices stay low, experts at the Energy Information Administration predict that domestic production may fall to about 6 million barrels per day by 2010, while consumption could rise to nearly 24 million barrels per day, a deficit of 17 or 18 million barrels that could add up to a dependency on imports of nearly 75 percent of consumption by 2010.
The American story is every developed nation’s energy nightmare. If we exclude those OPEC nations like Qatar and Bahrain with minuscule populations and gargantuan production surpluses,24 almost all of the industrial nations are import-dependent, in many cases almost completely so. With roughly one-half of the world’s GDP between them (27 percent for the United States, 16 percent for Japan, and 7 percent for Germany), America, Japan, and Germany import far more than half of their energy—under 50 percent for the United States but more than 90 percent for Japan and somewhere in between for Germany.25 Because it has gone nuclear, France produces most of its own energy, but when we look at consumption rather than production, it too remains import-dependent.26 Among OECD nations, only Canada and Australia, and with their North Sea oil, Norway and the United Kingdom, turn out to be net energy producers—which has allowed Norway to stay out of Europe. On the other hand, the world’s five largest economies are the world’s largest energy importers. The stronger the nation, the more fragile its independence.
There also lurks in this welter of statistics a powerful element of injustice that illuminates a darker side of McWorld. Even as nations are superseded by transnational markets, their populations remain the producers and consumers of the global market. The unequal distribution of world resources skews and unbalances affairs, and turns McWorld—its virtues and its vices—into a playground for some and a cemetery for others. If we look at energy consumption in the rich nations where America is again the archetype we get a disturbing take on fairness. Not only is there less and less to go around, but what is left is being more and more unfairly and inefficiently allocated. Unfairness thus turns out to be a crucial trait of McWorld, and although it is not our primary focus here it cannot be ignored.27 (See Appendix A.)
Mineral and Energy Resources: Jihad or McWorld?
WITH RESPECT TO McWorld, the clearest conclusion that can be drawn from this review is that the integrating forces of interdependence associated with globalism actually reinforce the fragmenting tendencies of Jihad they seem to combat. For mineral and energy use patterns seem both to enhance interdependence by reinforcing the imperative for global cooperation and to underscore divisiveness, injustice, and weakness, disclosing the susceptibility of the new world economy to the forces of Jihad. The vulnerability of the developed countries’ emerging McWorld is thrown into sharp relief by asking how many of the world’s primary energy producers outside the OECD are likely candidates for Jihad and its associated pathologies: that is, how many seem ripe for episodes of internal turmoil, political instability, civil war, or tribal fragmentation. (See risk tables) Among Jihad-prone producers, we can surely count Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and ex-Yugoslavia as high-risk; moderate-risk nations—would you invest your children’s savings in any of the following?—include Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Albania, Romania, the republics of the former USSR, Angola, Cameroon, the Congo, Gabon, China, India, Malaysia, and Mexico, and of course the rest of the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Egypt, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. In 1991, the high-risk group accounted for almost 8 million barrels per day of 60 million worldwide; that is about 13 percent of the world’s oil production.
JIHAD AND OIL PRODUCTION: RISKS
These are final numbers for world oil production for 1992.
Numbers are in 1,000 barrels/day. Total world production:
60,029.4 (thousand barrels/day).
High Risk
Algeria 771.3
Iran 3,415.3
Iraq 417.3
Libya 1,468.7
Nigeria 1,887.0
Yugoslavia 22.2
TOTAL 7,981.8 (thousand barrels/day)
13.30 percent of the total world production of oil is occurring in nations that are either currently involved in an ethnic conflict or are at a high risk for future conflicts.
Moderate Risk
Albania 30.0
Angola 553.2
Argentina 554.3
Brazil 640.7
Cameroon 139.0
China 2,833.6
Commonwealth of Independent States* 8,898.8
Congo 182.7
Egypt 870.7
Gabon 302.7
India 573.8
Kuwait 845.3
Malaysia 661.0
Mexico 2,775.7
Oman 729.0
Peru 115.7
Romania 140.0
Saudi Arabia 8,206.7
United Arab Emirates** 2,337.2
Venezuela 2,328.7
TOTAL 33,718.8 (thousand barrels/day)
56.17 percent of the total world production of oil is occurring in nations that are at a moderate risk for future ethnic conflicts.
GRAND TOTAL ________
41,700.6 (thousand barrels/day)
69.47 percent of the total world production of oil is occurring in nations that are at a high and moderate risk for current or future ethnic conflicts.
Source: The International Petroleum Encyclopedia (Tulsa: PennWell Publishing Company, 1993).
*Commonwealth of Independent States
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
**United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Osujara, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quaiwain
JIHAD AND OIL RESERVES: RISKS
A worldwide look at proven oil reserves. (Proven oil reserves = amount of oil recoverable at current prices with current technology.) These are final numbers for January 1, 1993.
Numbers are in billion barrels. Total world oil reserves: 997.04 billion barrels.
High Risk
Oil Reserves Percentage of World Oil Reserves
Algeria 9.20 0.92
Iran 92.86 9.31
Iraq 100.00 10.03
Libya 22.80 2.29
Nigeria 17.90 1.80
Yugoslavia 0.08 0.008
TOTAL 242.84 billion barrels 24.36
24.36 percent of the total proven oil reserves are located in nations either currently involved in an ethnic conflict or at a high risk for future conflicts.
Moderate Risk
Oil Reserves Percentage of World Oil Reserves
Albania 0.17 0.012
Angola 1.50 0.15
Argentina 1.57 0.16
Brazil 3.03 0.30
Cameroon 0.40 0.04
China 24.00 2.41
Commonwealth of Independent States* 57.00 5.72
Congo 0.83 0.08
Egypt 6.20 0.62
Gabon 0.73 0.07
India 6.05 0.61
Kuwait 94.00 9.43
Malaysia 3.70 0.37
Mexico 51.30 5.15
Oman 4.48 0.45
Peru 0.38 0.04
Romania 1.57 0.16
Saudi Arabia 257.84 25.86
United Arab Emirates** 98.10 9.84
Venezuela 62.65 6.28
TOTAL 675.50 billion barrels 67.75
67.75 percent of the total proven oil reserves is located in nations that are at a high and moderate risk for current or future ethnic conflict.
GRAND TOTAL ______
918.34 billion barrels of oil
92.11 percent of the total proven oil reserves is located in nations that are at a high or moderate risk for current or future ethnic conflict.
Source: The International Petroleum Encyclopedia (Tulsa: PennWell Publishing Company, 1993).
In the moderate-risk group, non-Arab nations account for about 21 million barrels a day (better than a third of global production), while the Middle East tinderbox (not including high-risk-category Iraq and Iran) accounts for nearly 13 million more barrels a day, or another fifth of world production. Add it up: better than three-fifths of the world’s current oil production (and almost 93 percent of its potential production reserves) are controlled by the nations least likely to be at home in McWorld and most likely to be afflicted with political, social, and thus economic instability.28
The results are equally disconcerting when we rate energy exporters in the high-and moderate-risk categories on a democracy scale. Since democracy is correlated with continuity of government and thus stability and since democratic nations are less likely to make war on other democracies than nondemocratic nations, oil-producing democracies make safer partners in McWorld’s trade relations. Yet the Western powers were content to return Kuwait to oil production without inducing it to become more democratic.
The most rigorous standards would put the Latin American group and India on the democratic margin, at best, giving them only 7 of the 42 million barrels produced by nations in the high-and moderate-risk group, and leaving over four-fifths of production in these two groups in non-democratic hands. If all of the oil-producing ex-USSR republics actually become democratic, another 10 million barrels will be “safe,” but nearly one-half of world production will still remain at risk. Indeed, the subdivision of once-extensive federations like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union into smaller fragments has turned once-producing exporters into net importers. As part of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine could think of itself as part of a powerful fossil-fuel and lumber producer. But though it has now acquired the illusion of independence, it has become a needy importer desperately negotiating with Russia for oil, gas, and wood. Yuri Byelomestnov, director of the Ukraine’s October Mine, says bitterly: “Ukrainian independence, it’s a mistake…. [N]ationalism blinds intelligence. We used to get 8,000 pieces of equipment—conveyor belts, lumber—from Russia a month. Now we can’t get them.”29
The logic is spare and fearful: both Jihad and McWorld weaken nations. Jihad splinters them but increases their dependency on McWorld; McWorld draws nations out of their isolation and autarky, but in making them dependent, reduces their power. Democracy suffers either way, especially if, as I will argue below, democracy historically has rooted its liberties in nation-state institutions. Even as we secure the macropeace through trade, treaties, law, cooperation, and common force, the microwars occasioned by Jihad’s fractious parochialisms become of ever greater global significance. Interdependence makes boundaries permeable not just for the good but for the bad, for Jihad no less than for McWorld.
3
The Industrial Sector and
the Rise of the East
HOW DIFFERENT IS the story when we move from the domain of raw resources to manufactured goods—supposedly the foundation of any national economy? Manufactured durable goods constitute the traditional industrial sector by which the rise of capitalism has generally been measured. Until recently this sector has been regarded as the engine of all developed economies. The decline of American manufacturing in traditional domains like steel and automobiles has thus been closely associated with a putative erosion in world economic leadership. America’s “rust belt” has turned America into a vast rust bucket. The “American Century” celebrated by Life’s Henry Luce in 1941 ended without ceremony sometime in the 1970s when America crossed the midway point on its sad journey from being the world’s largest creditor nation to being its largest debtor nation and when Europe and Japan, well recovered from the war, began to eat away at America’s leadership in automobile, home appliance, electronics, and computer ma
nufacturing. Paul Kennedy, David Calleo, and other pessimists have concluded that the American epoch, scarcely half a century long, is over.1
By the same logic, the emerging economic powers to whom the future supposedly will belong have been identified in recent decades by their emerging industrial manufacturing potential. The multiplying “tigers” on the Asian side of the Pacific Rim like Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, Singapore, and China (with Hong Kong) have thus caught up to and even surpassed European powers like Germany and France as major economic players. Smaller and less noticed specialists in manufacturing like Israel, Iraq, Cuba (before the demise of their Communist patrons), Botswana, Kuwait, and Libya have also come to exercise an economic influence disproportionate to their size while Chile, Turkey, and even Mexico may yet achieve extraordinary rates of growth in this decade.2 All of the above countries devote over half of their GDP to industry.3 Yet these trends prove little. Projections based on manufacturing capacity are fundamentally flawed because they miss the direction in which the evolving economy is moving. Economic strength in the era of McWorld has passed to the domain of services, and here new and distinctive measures of leadership have emerged quite separate from the traditional industrial sector.