Divided on D-Day

by Edward E. Gordon

  Brooke saw the circular and told Monty “he had inevitably undermined the respect and esteem of the division for him.”37 Brooke realized that this might cause Montgomery to be relieved of command and sent back to England.

  To head off this disaster, Brooke directly intervened with Gort. He promised to deliver a severe reprimand to Montgomery regarding this obscene language and to express the commander in chief's displeasure warning that he “could certainly not withstand any further errors of this kind.” Montgomery, sensing the importance of Brooke's mentorship, expressed his deep remorse. Monty's reaction to past criticisms had been cavalier and belligerent. Instead, Brooke relates, “He took it wonderfully well.” Brooke concludes the strange incident by writing in his diary, “It is a great pity that he spoils his very high military ability by a mad desire to talk or write nonsense.”38 Unfortunately Brooke would have many more opportunities in the future to intervene in order to overcome more of Monty's “nonsense.”

  On May 10, 1940, the Germans launched the Ardennes offensive, splitting the Allied front. Fearing encirclement the British Expeditionary Force and French armies, a total of over 300,000 troops, were forced back to the port of Dunkirk and evacuated back to England by June 1, 1940.

  During this retreat General Harold Alexander, Brooke, and Montgomery emerged for the first time as a fighting team. Alexander was commanding the First Division of I Corps. During these operations he was placed temporarily under Brooke's command. It was during these critical days that Brooke gained an appreciation of these two commander's strengths, which led to their future command appointments in the North African Campaign.

  Monty's Third Division survived and was immediately reequipped to defend the Sussex coast. He then was promoted to command V Corps in Dorset and Hampshire, then XII Corps in Kent (April 1941), and finally South-East Command (December).39

  During 1941 to 1942 the British military campaign in North Africa had swung from early victory over the Italian armies to disastrous defeat at the hands of the Germans with the fall of Tobruk in June 1942. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps and the allied Italian forces continued their advance toward the Suez Canal only to be halted by the British at El Alamein in July.

  On August 3, 1942, Churchill flew to Egypt to make a major change of command in what became known as the “Cairo purge.” The post of commander in chief of the Middle East Command was given to General Harold Alexander, who had just returned from a command in Burma. Lieutenant General William Henry Ewart Gott was named to command the British Eighth Army. Fate then intervened. On August 7 while flying to Cairo, Gott was killed when his plane was shot down by a flight of Messerschmitt 109s. A 2005 interview with one of the German pilots revealed that their intended target had been Churchill, not Gott.40 That evening Churchill appointed Montgomery to take Gott's place. He had been slated to command the British First Army in the forthcoming TORCH operation.

  The next morning Monty got the orders for Egypt while still shaving. He bolted out of England and arrived in Cairo on August 12. The following day he addressed his new staff by telling them, “We will then work together as a team, and together we will gain the confidence of this great army and go forward to final victory in Africa.”41

  Sir Anthony Eden was secretary of state for foreign affairs. Oliver Harvey, his private secretary, recorded this reaction to the news on August 10 in London: “What frightful luck pursues us!…It is now decided that Montgomery is to be the General to take his place. He has the reputation of being an able and ruthless soldier and an unspeakable cad.”42

  After Monty's defeat of Rommel in North Africa, he acquired the title “Montgomery of Alamein.” His swaggering image was used effectively as a propaganda tool to boost the British people's morale, just as Rommel “the Desert Fox” had been similarly used in German propaganda. Following the Afrika Korps’ surrender, Montgomery's participation in the assaults on Sicily and the Italian mainland further strengthened his reputation as the war's leading British commander.

  SHAEF Ground Command

  By the time of Eisenhower's OVERLORD appointment, there were only two serious British candidates to lead the Normandy invasion ground forces: Alexander and Montgomery.

  General Sir Harold Alexander had been the Allied theater commander in chief for the North African Campaign and was then leading the Italian Campaign. He was Churchill's favorite general—a commander in the tradition of great Anglo-Irish military gentlemen. Since the war's early days, Churchill's admiration had grown to the point that he considered him a paragon among soldiers. Alexander was popular with almost everyone in both Allied camps. He had experience of commanding army groups in the Far East and North African campaigns where he succeeded in getting people from different national backgrounds to work together. Montgomery had commanded only a single army. While Montgomery was often high-handed, arrogant, and difficult to handle, Alexander possessed immense natural charm and was without pretension. It was not part of his personality to become offensive to get his way.

  When talking to Eisenhower in early December 1943 about the appointment, Brooke discovered Ike preferred Alexander. “He also knew he could handle Alex, but was not fond of Monty and certainly did not know how to handle him.”43

  Eisenhower had drawn up a list of top British and American commanders whom he wanted with him. Alexander was at the top of this list. Ike greatly admired his low-key manner and ability to get along with generals under his command. Other British and American commanders alike believed these personality traits were essentially for overcoming the major battlefield obstacles ahead.

  Among them was American general Omar Bradley who wrote that if Alexander had commanded the overall Normandy invasion land forces, “we could probably have avoided the petulance that later was to becloud our relationships with Montgomery.” Bradley contrasted Monty's “rigid self-assurance” to Alexander's “reasonableness, patience, and modesty of a great soldier.”44

  Bradley had personally worked with both Monty and Alexander in the North African and the Sicily campaigns. After Operation TORCH had successfully positioned American troops in North Africa, they joined with Montgomery's Eighth Army to form the Eighteenth Army Group commanded by Alexander. He in turn reported to Eisenhower who was appointed the supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean. Bradley commended Alexander's forbearance and maturity as a leader in guiding the new American “field command to mature and eventually come of age.”45

  Eisenhower badly wanted Alexander appointed by the British. He went so far as to tell Churchill he would place all of the ground forces temporarily under Alexander's command until he personally took overall control of all Allied forces in Europe after D-Day. Later during the Normandy campaign Eisenhower offered this summary of Montgomery's personality: “Monty is a good man to serve with, and an impossible man to serve over.”46

  Even Brooke, shortly before the Allied invasion of Sicily, wrote in his diary, “He [Montgomery] requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation, and the war as a whole outside 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle, brilliant commander in action and trainer of men, but liable to commit untold errors in lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. It is most distressing that the Americans do not like him and it will always be a difficult matter to have him fighting in close proximity to them. He wants guiding and watching continually.”47

  With all of this backing for Alexander, why was Montgomery selected? The support of one man, his mentor Brooke, had elevated Montgomery to army command and finally to the lead British role in OVERLORD. For all his previous misgivings he still believed that Montgomery was a superior general to Alexander. Brooke had in fact earlier written (September 1943), “I am afraid that neither Eisenhower nor Alexander will ever have sufficient vision to be big soldiers.”48

  Historian Russell Weigley states, “There is every reason to believe in retrospect as Brooke believed then, that Montgomery not only surpassed Alexander as an operational commander,
but was altogether Britain's ablest general of the war.”49 This judgment is today open to serious debate.

  Churchill might have fought Brooke successfully over this key appointment. But at that time he lay exhausted in a sick bed in Tunisia. After the Tehran and Cairo conferences, Churchill was stricken with pneumonia and was bedridden for several weeks. At the end of December 1943, Churchill's doctor insisted on the prime minister taking another three weeks’ convalescence. Churchill decided to recuperate in Marrakech, where he had stayed after the Casablanca Conference.50

  As a result, Churchill was absent from the War Cabinet meetings in London when the key British OVERLORD appointment was made. Initially the cabinet was also in favor of Alexander. Churchill thought that Alexander approached military operations in the same swashbuckling spirit as his own. He also wanted to support Eisenhower's strong preference.51 However, Eisenhower's selection as OVERLORD's supreme commander surprised the War Cabinet and might have unsettled British public opinion, since many thought a Brit would be the overall commander.

  Both Brooke and Sir James Grigg, the secretary of state for war, and Clement Attlee, the deputy prime minister, told the cabinet that Montgomery was a better general than Alexander. Attlee, a socialist, objected to appointing a son of an earl. Also lending support was the OVERLORD planning staff request for “the early appointment to the British Army in England of some colorful personality who might impart the dynamism that we judged to be in short supply, through the Army to the people.”52 Who better than the “hero of El Alamein”?

  A weakened Churchill finally acquiesced to the War Cabinet's choice of Montgomery as OVERLORD's general commander, with Alexander remaining in Italy. On December 18, in a telephone call, he told Roosevelt, “The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are [sic] right as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.”53

  Incredibly even at this late date, Churchill still had high hopes that Alexander also could persuade the Americans to launch a major Allied offensive through the Balkans in the direction of Vienna. Such a campaign had always been the ultimate part of Churchill's “soft underbelly” strategy for winning the European war. Politically it might have forestalled the postwar Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Militarily it might have delayed or even canceled out a major head-to-head confrontation with the German army in northwestern Europe, eliminating the need for OVERLORD.

  On December 24, Montgomery received his OVERLORD appointment and was ordered to London to assume his new command. After his successes in North Africa and the Mediterranean he had become an international star. Monty with his trademark sweater and beret had become widely known and beloved, particularly in England. Many saw him as the savior of the Allied cause. King George VI summarized a popular British viewpoint: “How nice to have Eisenhower in nominal command with Monty at his side.”54

  TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY

  A World War I fighter pilot, Trafford Leigh-Mallory attended the RAF Staff College in 1925. He was appointed to command the School of Army Cooperation in 1927 and then was posted to the Army Staff College. In 1937 he was promoted to air commodore and made commander of No. 12 Group, Fighter Command.55

  During the Battle of Britain, Leigh-Mallory quarreled over tactics with Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, the commander of 11 Group, and Sir Hugh Dowding, head of Fifteen Command. After the Battle of Britain he used political influence to have Park and Dowding removed, and he was named the commander of 11 Group. This aroused considerable animosity within the RAF ranks. The official history of the Battle of Britain did not even mention Dowding's name. This led Churchill to comment, “This is not a good story…. The jealousies and cliquism which have led to the committing of this offense are a discredit to the Air Ministry.”56

  In November 1942, Leigh-Mallory became head of fighter command. After COSSAC was organized by General Morgan, Leigh-Mallory became the leader of a small Anglo-American staff planning air support for OVERLORD. As a result of his role in COSSAC, in August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff selected him as the SHAEF air commander in chief.57

  Eisenhower was frustrated by this appointment. He wanted an air commander who understood the importance of air support for ground operations. Leigh-Mallory had no experience with heavy bombers or airborne transport operations, having been in fighter command his entire career. This placed him at a distinct disadvantage in his future dealings with both the heads of British and American strategic bombing forces.

  Moreover, Leigh-Mallory was not a popular figure. He did not get along with other people. Leigh-Mallory was described by one British officer as a man with a “peculiar knack of rubbing everybody up the wrong way.”58 American Air Force General Elwood R. Quesada noted, “I just didn't know people at that level behaved like that. Nobody wanted to be under Leigh-Mallory, even the British.”59 Many Americans disliked him as well due to his pessimism and indecision.

  Eisenhower, upon his appointment as OVERLORD's supreme commander, was convinced from his prior invasion experiences (TORCH, North Africa; HUSKY, Sicily; AVALANCHE, Salerno, Italy) that the close coordination of air and ground forces during the invasion was essential. For that reason he chose as his deputy commander a second airman, Chief Air Marshall Arthur Tedder. It was lucky he did.

  ARTHUR TEDDER

  In World War I, Arthur Tedder commanded several different fighter squadrons in France. After the war he became the commandant of the No. 2 Flying Training school (1924). Tedder attended the Imperial Defence College in 1928, and then became assistant commandant at the RAF Staff College in 1929. By 1934 he was director of training at the Air Ministry and was promoted to air commodore. Tedder in 1936 became the commander of the RAF Far Eastern Forces (Burma, Hong Kong, and Borneo).60

  In 1938 he was named the director general for research at the Air Ministry. At the outbreak of World War II, Tedder's department was moved into the new Ministry of Aircraft Production. There he clashed with its head, Lord Beaverbrook. This also resulted in frosty relations with Churchill.

  As a result in June 1941, Tedder was transferred to the post of commander in chief of RAF operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa. His success in upgrading RAF operations was a key factor in the British victory of October 1942 at El Alamein. However, Tedder came to loathe Montgomery during this campaign.

  After the 1943 Casablanca Conference, Tedder was appointed the overall Allied air commander throughout the Mediterranean. It was then that he began to collaborate with Eisenhower. Their joint staffs worked well together better integrating the land, sea, and air elements for the invasions of Sicily and Italy.

  Upon his appointment to command OVERLORD, Eisenhower selected then air marshal Tedder as his deputy commander due to the companionable relationship that had developed between them. Tedder, like Eisenhower, saw OVERLORD as an Allied rather than a British or American operation.61

  In a February 1943 speech to a group of Allied officers Tedder vowed never to use “us British” and “you Americans.” “From now on it is ‘we’ together who will function as Allies, even better than either of us alone.”62 Tedder's resolve would be stretched to the limits over the coming months.

  WALTER BEDELL SMITH

  The appointment of Walter Bedell Smith as SHAEF chief of staff was due to his prior efficiency as a staff officer under both Marshall and Eisenhower. After serving as an officer in World War I, Smith was appointed as a staff officer and instructor at the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where then lieutenant colonel George C. Marshall was the assistant commandant. When Marshall was appointed as the US Army chief of staff in 1939, he secured the post of secretary of the general staff for Smith. After the Combined Chiefs of Staff was created in 1942, Smith was named its secretary and promoted to the rank of brigadier general. He then moved to London as Eisenhower's chief of staff and continued in that position when Eisenhower was made supreme commander of TORCH in North Af
rica and other later operations in the Mediterranean.

  Often typified as Eisenhower's “pit bull,” Smith was to handle the press and delicate political and diplomatic tasks. Smith, whose nickname was “Beetle,” became both Eisenhower's “primary shock absorber” and “hatchet man” in dealing with the difficult personalities of other commanders and as the bearer of bad tidings. Despite a reputation for toughness and irascibility, Smith managed to handle the sensitive egos of Montgomery, Patton, Bradley, and other commanders in a reliable and discreet manner. He worked hard behind the scenes to help Eisenhower foster the close Allied cooperation needed for the success of OVERLORD.63

  OMAR BRADLEY

  Omar Bradley's origins were humble. He was born in 1893 in a three-room log house on a Missouri sodbuster farm. West Point was a key early stepping-stone. His graduating class of 1915 became known as the “Class the Stars Fell On.” It produced a prodigious number of generals—59 out of 164 graduates. Bradley and fellow classmate Dwight Eisenhower both became five-star generals.64

  He was not sent to Europe during World War I, but instead was assigned to the Mexican border patrol conducting troop basic training. After the conflict Bradley taught math at West Point (1920–24) and attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1928–29).65

  Another big break came in 1929 when Bradley became an instructor in tactics at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. His abilities brought him to the attention of Colonel George C. Marshall whose influence would propel Bradley's future career. Marshall noted that Bradley “was conspicuous for his ability to handle people and his ability to do things simply and clearly.”66

  In 1934 Bradley attended the US Army War College in Washington, DC, and then worked at the War Department. When Marshall was selected as army chief of staff in 1939, he selected Bradley to be one of his two assistants.