The American Military - A Narrative History
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Armed with lethal weapons, the American military emerged from World War II as arguably the most powerful force on the planet. The fighter pilot demonstrated remarkable skill in bringing down enemy aircraft, while the bombardier fearlessly attacked munitions factories in opposing cities from a distance. Aboard the ships of naval fleets and task forces, the sailor bested anonymous foes in the North Atlantic as well as in the South and Central Pacific. Once ashore, the engineer buried anti-personnel mines in defense of forward positions. No infantryman, however, escaped from the grim reality of the killing, even though many grew dependent on an array of machines in combat. In fact, the majority of American combatants needed massive support to surpass the capabilities of their adversaries. For every million dollars in damage to the Axis Powers, the U.S. also spent a million dollars on assets to cause it. Whatever the unintended consequences of military technology, the “totality” of its destructiveness made World War II the deadliest fight ever.
The U.S. grew determined not only to win World War II but also to secure the postwar peace. Given the economic impact of wartime enterprises, the nation recognized both the pragmatic benefits of a better life and the idealistic dreams of a safer world. Planning and logistics made big business even bigger, as indicated by the military and industrial combinations that boosted commerce. Moreover, the incredible achievements of “total war” shifted the balance of power in the world to the corridors of the Pentagon. Strategic thought evolved in relation to the complex, dynamic threats to national security, which compelled Washington D.C. to assume responsibility for a constant struggle to adjust ends and means, to reconcile the tugs of coalition partners, and to promote freedom on a global scale and scope. Communication, calculation, and coordination made the American way of war effective. It was no mere accident of history, but the world that the war ravaged appeared ready for a new international order.
Essential Questions
1 What gave the Grand Alliance a comparative advantage over the Axis Powers?
2 Was Roosevelt an effective commander-in-chief? Why, or why not?
3 In what ways did military operations in the Pacific theater differ substantially from those in the European theater?
Suggested Readings
Adams, Michael C. C. The Best War Ever: Americans and World War II. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
Altschuler, Glenn C., and Stuart M. Blumin. The G.I. Bill: A New Deal for Veterans. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
Blum, John Morton. V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1986.
Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon, 1986.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday, 1948.
Gambone, Michael D. The Greatest Generation Comes Home: The Veteran in American Society. College State: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.
Giangreco, D. M. Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.
Kennedy, David M. Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Kennedy, Paul. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War. New York: Random House, 2013.
Kennett, Lee. G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II. 1987; repr. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997.
Koistinen, Paul A. C. Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Korda, Michael. Ike: An American Hero. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
Linderman, Gerald F. The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II. New York: Free Press, 1997.
McManus, John C. The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.
Merryman, Molly. Clipped Wings: The Rise and Fall of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) of World War II. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
O'Neill, William L. A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II. New York: Free Press, 1993.
Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995.
Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II. New York: Random House, 1993.
Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.
Scrijvers, Peter. The G.I. War against Japan: American Soldiers in the Pacific and Asia during World War II. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
Sledge, Eugene B. With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: Free Press, 1984.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
13
A Cold War Begins (1945–1964)
Introduction
In early 1948, college and university students made plans for summer break. Jeanne Holm, a 26-year-old student at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, planned to serve her country. A volunteer in the Women's Army Corps, or WAC, during World War II, she yearned to wear the uniform once again. While Congress debated legislation on the “permanent status” of women in the military, she checked a box on a recruiting postcard to indicate her interest in “Air Force – Regular” and dropped it in the mail.
That summer, Holm borrowed $600 from her grandmother and steered her 1940 Chevy toward Fort Lee, Virginia. She sought the assistance of her former WAC commander, Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth C. Smith, to obtain commissioned service. On the cross-country trip, she picked up another former WAC, Evelyn Nicholson. Short of money but longing for adventure, they slept in her car each night. After arriving at Fort Lee, she returned to active duty while awaiting her commission. “You are not going to receive a commission in the Army,” the commander finally informed her. To her great surprise, someone took note of her previous postcard.
Commissioned in the newly organized Women's Air Force, or WAF, Captain Holm reported to Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. Within days, she boarded an airplane heading for Erding Air Depot near Munich, Germany, where she became a “wing war plans officer.” Discovering that no one else knew any more about war plans than she did, she carefully studied top-secret documents at the American forward base in Europe.
Holm and her fellow officers anticipated the outbreak of World War III at any moment. While the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, she assumed that the Red Army would “just walk in one day and take us all prisoners.” Her male counterparts suggested evacuating all of the WAF, but she disagreed. “No, the WAF is military,” she declared, insisting that “they need to stay here and do the jobs assigned to them.”
Figure 13.1 Recruiting poster for women in the Air Force, 1951. The Betty H. Carter Women Veterans Historical Project, Martha Hodges Special Collections and University Archives, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Holm, who later became the first female two-star general in American military history, started her Air Force career at the beginning of the Cold War. Once the dreaded Axis Powers collapsed, the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. unwound. An ideological contest sparked a series of international crises, which began in occupied Germany. At the same time, anti-colonial uprisings in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America exacerbated the mounting tensions. A series of miscalcula
tions resulted in armed conflict between opposing forces on the Korean peninsula. With the dawning of an atomic age, the clash of the superpowers created a bi-polar world rife with danger.
As the world seemed to split between communist and anti-communist countries, the American military attempted to guard the far-flung lines between them. Committed to containment, U.S. presidents abandoned the strategic concepts of unilateralism and isolationism. The lessons of Munich – that liberal democracies failed to stand against Nazi aggression before World War II – shaped the assumptions of policymakers in Washington D.C. The totalitarian regime of Joseph Stalin, who seemed as brutal as the deceased Adolf Hitler, exploited the power vacuums that emerged around the globe. The U.S. assumed a right and a responsibility for preventing the appeasement of aggressors, even if it required another war.
In the shadow of war, the U.S. focused energies and resources on military power. The Pentagon attempted to provide a nuclear deterrent, which triggered an arms race that lasted for decades. While amassing huge stockpiles of weaponry for defense, the nation competed with the “Reds” in everything from science to sports. Most of all, men and women in uniform glimpsed the ominous signs of an enemy near the Brandenburg Gate. Denouncing Soviet actions only a year after the Allied victory, Winston Churchill warned Americans in Fulton, Missouri, that “an iron curtain has descended across the continent” of Europe.
Department of Defense
After World War II ended in 1945, the U.S. began to slash the annual budgets of the War and Navy Departments. Within two years, the number of service members fell to fewer than 1.5 million. While thousands performed constabulary duties in Germany and in Japan, many more awaited their discharges at military bases in the Philippines, China, France, Great Britain, and the continental U.S. Rapid demobilization drained manpower from national defense.
Alarmed by the impact of demobilization, prominent officers endorsed the concept of universal military training. Swayed by the writings of retired General John McAuley Palmer, President Harry Truman acknowledged that the nation needed a reservoir of well-trained citizen soldiers, sailors, and airmen. The commander-in-chief asked Congress for legislation that required male citizens to undergo a year of military training upon reaching the age of 18 or after completing high school. While legislators debated the form and the function of national service, various proposals for compulsory “self-improvement” floundered. Despite the general popularity of the concept, objections ranged from the projected costs to the social implications of a “Nazi program.” Regardless of the justifications that made it more palatable, the federal government failed to find a legislative remedy that, as Truman put it, fostered “the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people.”
Though Congress eventually extended the Selective Service system, the American military depended almost entirely upon the reserve component for reinforcements. Each branch trained reservists for activation. However, they numbered less than a million. The National Guard contained the bulk of the personnel, but several divisions remained undermanned and underfunded. Though disregarded by the professional cadre in the Army, the Organized Reserve Corps contained many experienced officers from World War II. ROTC programs readied cadets at land-grant colleges and universities, where two years of training and membership in the reserves remained common. Whether assigned to combat or support units, service members in the reserve component often drew equipment and supplies from outdated stocks.
The Truman administration weighed measures to improve the federal oversight of all service members. While most military leaders wanted to unify the command and control of the armed forces, Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal advocated a looser, more decentralized system. Dubbed the “Battle of the Potomac” in the American press, months of bureaucratic squabbling and congressional hearings produced the National Security Act on July 26, 1947.
The controversial law created the National Military Establishment, which designated the Army, Navy, and Air Force as three executive departments led by civilian secretaries. Accordingly, the Air Force became an independent, coequal branch of service with jurisdiction over strategic air power, air transport, and air support. While the Army maintained primary responsibility for conducting ground campaigns and for providing occupation and security garrisons, the Navy directed surface and submarine operations, sea-based aviation, and the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which formulated inter-service plans, included the top brass of each service. The Joint Chiefs lacked a formal chairman initially, although later revisions to the law authorized one. In theory, all military affairs were supervised by the Pentagon – the headquarters for the Department of Defense, or DOD. With the former Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, retiring to private life, Forrestal became the nation's first Secretary of Defense.
While underscoring the idea of “unification,” the National Security Act effectively enlarged the bureaucracies that assisted Forrestal. It authorized the National Security Council, or NSC, which coordinated the diplomatic and military policies of the executive branch. A successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, gathered information abroad while coordinating intelligence activities. Governmental authorities assembled powerful mechanisms for national defense without achieving much clarity, firmness, or efficiency.
A more unified administration strengthened aspects of national defense, but inter-service rivalries remained a critical weakness. The Navy defended its tactical air capabilities against budget reallocations, which seemed to favor the strategic bombing assets of the Air Force. Moreover, the Army's claims in regard to land-based missions ostensibly threatened the Marine Corps. Because Forrestal failed to achieve cooperation among the competing services, Truman abruptly asked him to resign after only 18 months on the job. On May 22, 1949, he committed suicide while in a state of mental depression.
Truman turned to an aspiring political ally, Louis A. Johnson, as the next Secretary of Defense. Hoping to enhance the intercontinental capabilities of the Air Force, he approved funding for the acquisition of the new B-36 bombers in place of fighters and intermediate-range bombers. Furthermore, he cancelled funding for the 58,000-ton supercarrier, the United States, and reduced the active carrier forces and naval air groups. Fleet operations could not support heavy jets without a substantial refitting. With newspaper headlines announcing a “revolt of the admirals,” the Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned from his civilian post.
Congressional hearings followed, but the Navy failed to stop the reductions. General Omar Bradley, the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs, denounced the Navy's apparent attempt to undermine civilian control over the military. Eventually, Johnson removed the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, who tried to discredit the B-36 program. In spite of grousing from the Navy Department, the Pentagon held the upper hand.
The growing demand for non-combat personnel prompted the Pentagon to turn to women. With the support of senior military leaders, Congress began discussing passage of a bill for the re-entrance of females into commissioned service. During 1947, Captain Joy Bright Hancock of the WAVES testified in a Senate hearing about the role of women in the military. “It would appear to me that any national defense weapon known to be of value,” she asserted, “should be developed and kept in good working order and not allowed to rust or to be abolished.” Though General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz publicly endorsed legislation regarding “woman power,” congressional action stalled in the cloakrooms.
Throughout the spring of 1948, Congress held additional public hearings on the permanent role of women in the military. The Retired Military Officers Association recommended flag rank for the directors of the women's corps, but the National Council for the Prevention of War opposed any measures that would “militarize women.” No member of Congress worked more tirelessly on behalf of legislation than Maine Representative Margaret Chase Smith, who also served in the Air Force Reserve.
When the Women's Armed Services Integration Bill reached the floor, it promised opportunities for females to pursue military careers in fields such as nursing and administration. However, it precluded women from “having command authority over men.” After Congress finally passed it, Truman signed Public Law 625 on June 12, 1948.
Given the prior service of African Americans in uniform, civil rights leaders urged Truman to push for the desegregation of the military. Rather than pursuing congressional legislation, though, he decided to use his inherent powers as commander-in-chief. On July 26, 1948, he issued Executive Order 9981. It declared that “there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.” Afterward, the first Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, resigned in protest. Segregationists called Truman a communist for promulgating the order.
To implement the order as rapidly as possible, Truman established the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Chaired by jurist Charles Fahy, the seven-member advisory body examined the rules, procedures, and practices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. During public hearings in 1949, the Fahy Committee compelled the military brass to discuss desegregation. That summer, the DOD approved the desegregation plans of both the Air Force and the Navy. However, the Army continued to drag its boots for several years. Eventually, manpower shortages forced it into full compliance. After delivering a final report during 1950, the Fahy Committee was disbanded by Truman.