Struggle for Sea Power : A Naval History of American Independence (9781782397403)
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A cabal of men with significant maritime experience and knowledge drove that process. Some could see the strategic value of taking to the sea, while others, among them shipbuilders and merchants, had a vested interest in that dream.* Washington was the first who had to be convinced of the value of the sea by the pro-navy men because, while the politicians of the Continental Congress bickered and jockeyed, playing a different game, Washington could act, even without Congressional approval. Upon his arrival at Cambridge he was faced with a shocking shortage of military stores, in particular gunpowder, of which there was enough for only nine shots per man. An added weakness was a total lack of heavy artillery, which Washington believed could be solved by dragging to Boston the British cannon that had been captured at Ticonderoga. He sent a mission to the north to deal with the cannon while, relatively safe from attack in Cambridge as a consequence of British timidity, he concentrated on the problem of powder and military stores. Thus Washington turned his mind to the sea.
There was certainly no problem with shipbuilding resources, skill or supplies. North America was already a maritime state with a maritime economy. Shipbuilding was the colonies’ single largest industry, producing some 35,000 tons of ships per year and no less than a fifth of the entire British merchant fleet.19 The rebels certainly had the manpower: the Massachusetts coast was swarming with seamen thrown out of employment by the interruption of their trade that had been caused by the British blockade of Boston, and many of their fishing schooners were lying idle.20 In need of a quick and cheap solution, at the end of the summer of 1775 Washington decided to arm at Continental expense a handful of merchant ships and send them out to act against British supply ships. He began with just one but ended with seven, all leased to ‘The United Colonies’ and all with orders to seize ‘such Vessels as may be found on the High Seas or elsewhere, bound inward and outward to or from Boston, in the Service of the ministerial Army …’.21
The first to be commissioned and leased to Congress, thus becoming the first ‘American’ naval vessel, was the 78-ton schooner Hannah. She is a vessel that remains one of the most dominant figureheads of the early American navy and one that has fascinated generations of history lovers, but the most interesting thing about her is that, even after dedicated investigation by numerous scholars, we know far less about her than many people suspect. In fact we know almost nothing about her at all.
We know that she was commissioned on 2 September 1775 under the command of a Nicholas Broughton, and that she sailed on her first voyage three days later,22 but we have very little idea of what she looked like. No wreck survives to measure, preserve and discuss. Unlike other vessels in Washington’s fleet, there are no bills or accounts for her fitting out, and certainly no descriptions, portraits or sketches. In fact the only plans that survive for any schooner from the period immediately before the revolution are in the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, and there are just four. Only two actually date from the war years, and each is significantly different from the other.23 The best we can do is compare her to a surviving portrait of a ship [see fig. 14], the Baltick, built in an adjacent town on the same Merrimac River within two years of the Hannah.24 There is not even any contemporary evidence that the rebel schooner which engaged HMS Nautilus on 10 October 1775, long thought to have been the Hannah’s finest hour, was actually her. Perhaps it was, but not one contemporary source actually says so. One historian has described the constancy with which her name fails to appear in official documents as ‘disturbing’.25
This lack of information about the Hannah may seem surprising, but when viewed in the context of the time and the location, it is not, and that makes it interesting; in fact it is an important reminder that she was just one of several small ex-fishing vessels being fitted out at the time in Massachusetts. In the aftermath of Lexington there were glimpses of colonial sea power up and down the coast, fuelled by a changing perception of the British as well as by a changing perception of the Americans themselves: they suddenly saw themselves as empowered and it was catching. They now acted to deny the British their demands for colonial supplies of livestock, food and fuel and to protect their own maritime trade from British harassment.26
This was a period of intense excitement and maritime bustle throughout New England, caused by several institutions and numerous private individuals all acting independently – a distinctive characteristic of the rebellion as a whole at this time. Thus, while the shipyard at Beverly in Massachusetts was busy fitting out the Hannah, numerous American shipyards were also filled with the sound and smells of caulkers hammering and tarring seams; with the calls of men striving for unison to sway heavy masts and yards aloft; with the unmistakable thunk of heavy iron munitions being loaded on deck. Together, they created an atmosphere crackling with promise and excitement. After months of stalemate, finally the Americans were taking the fight to the British at sea. Yes, Washington had commissioned some schooners on behalf of the army, but at roughly the same time a mini-flotilla consisting of a schooner and two sloops was seized from the British in Machias, Maine by Jeremiah O’Brien, an action in which a British midshipman was fatally wounded and which still features highly in American naval lore.27 The colony of Rhode Island, meanwhile, had taken the leap that Congress was unwilling to take and had committed to creating its own navy; Georgia commissioned a sloop to seize a British ordnance transport; and Massachusetts had been on the brink of making the same decision since early June. Urged to action by a resolution of the Continental Congress of 18 July 1775 that each colony should provide for the protection of its own harbours and navigation,28 twelve of the thirteen colonies who rebelled created navies.* It was an important naval development, but the resolution was still couched in terms of defence, the operations were to be focused on local waters, and the ships were to be administered by each individual colony. These moves were all carefully judged because they were not, yet, the actions of an independent state.
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These colonies armed fishing vessels, built their own fighting ships, and organized flotillas of whaleboats, galleys, fireships and floating batteries. The navies’ roles were as varied as the craft they consisted of. Some chose to attack British trade and harass British warships; others existed just to protect people, livestock or stockpiles of materiel; for some the defence of a single significant waterway or landing spot was their only purpose.
Pennsylvania was the first to build specially designed ships: galleys armed with a single cannon in the bow. Their role was to defend Philadelphia, the seat of the Second Continental Congress, by protecting the Delaware and its mighty estuary. Pennsylvania also built eight ‘chains’ of fire-rafts – each chain consisting of six rafts, and each raft 25–35 feet long and equipped with a vicious prong of barbed iron sticking out from its bows to ensnare its target. With such a significant waterway in their midst, and one that was patrolled by British warships, the role of the Pennsylvania Navy was more than just defensive, and their galleys and guard-boats were particularly active in preventing Tories from shipping supplies downriver to British forces.29
The Virginians, better endowed with shipbuilding and naval industry than any other state, including a ropewalk at Warwick on the James River, built the largest of all the states’ navies. The force consisted primarily of galleys, armed with one and sometimes two heavy cannon, for the defence of the Potomac River and the main hub of their colony, Charlestown.30 The Virginians, along with the North Carolinians, were particularly concerned about an important navigation, via Ocracoke Inlet, which gave access from the Atlantic to Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and from there deep inland via numerous rivers. The two colonies’ navies worked together in its defence. Well defended from this moment on, Ocracoke became a major supply channel for the rebel armies.31 Making the most of their local knowledge, these navies specialized in shallow-drafted vessels that could nip in and out of the sand-bars of Virginia and the Carolinas.
The Connecticut navy w
as created principally to protect New London, one of the largest and most important seaports in New England and by far the best deep-water harbour on Long Island Sound. Well protected, it went on to become a major base for American warships and privateers of all types. The Connecticut navy is particularly noteworthy for having a dedicated spy-ship ‘to run and course from place to place, to discover the enemy, and carry intelligence’.32 It was also responsible for the most provocatively titled ship in any of the state navies: the Oliver Cromwell.
Georgia and South Carolina worked together to bottle up the British force in the key port of Savannah and were responsible for one of the most entertaining episodes of the entire war. On 27 June the governor of Savannah, James Wright, wrote a desperate plea to Samuel Graves in Boston because rebel boats had blockaded Savannah: ‘And thus you see, Sir … that they have it in their power to plunder any thing, that arrives here, and do just what they please.’33 He then begged for the assistance of ‘a sloop of war of some force’ to disperse the rebel craft. The letter fell into rebel hands and, rather brilliantly, was simply replaced with one of their own composition which painted a rosy picture of events in Savannah. One can almost sense the joy in writing this letter: ‘It gives me the highest pleasure to acquaint you, that I now have not any occasion for any vessel of war, and I am clearly of opinion that his Majesty’s service will be better promoted by the absence than the presence of vessels of war in this port.’34
Each navy had its own carefully protected identity, often expressed visually through flags, though this is becoming far less clear-cut than was once thought. For many years the most famous state navy ensign was that which was believed to belong to the South Carolina State Navy: a vivid red and blue stripe with a snake slithering over the motto ‘Don’t tread on me’. The latest research, however, makes it clear that there is no direct evidence at all linking this flag with South Carolina in this period. There is also evidence that the flag most commonly associated with the Massachusetts State Navy – a white flag with a green pine tree over the inscription ‘Appeal to Heaven’ – was also used by most of the state navies.35
This was a time of inspiration, energy and naïve excitement. The Maryland commissioners insisted that the men enlisted in their navy were visions of perfection, with ‘able bodies and perfect in all their Limbs and Sight of Sound Health without Ruptures or other visible Infirmities, above five Feet four Inches and above sixteen and under fifty years of age: and if above forty they must be of robust Constitution’.36 It would not be long before they, and all the other colonies, came to realize just how difficult it would be to man their ships with anyone at all, let alone with such models of maritime excellence.37 Nonetheless, the summer and autumn of 1775 are characterized by increased military power and a growing sense of identity for each colony – a change that reflects what was happening politically in Philadelphia.
There, the Second Continental Congress was hardening its stance towards Britain, though it was still not overtly seeking independence, and it was also reassuring representatives of the individual colonies that they would continue to retain their own freedom and independence from each other. The early history of the state navies therefore reflects the attitude of Congress both towards Britain and towards its own states, and it is actually against this background – one of increased separateness among the colonies, rather than of increased unity – that one should consider the next stage in the development of American sea power, the creation of the Continental Navy.
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By October 1775 a significant change had occurred among the American politicians in Philadelphia. A proposal from the Rhode Island General Assembly to form a Continental Navy to threaten British supply lines and protect American trade had been put to Congress in August but had been shelved – it had just seemed too radical. Ideas of reconciliation were still cherished by many and the creation of a Continental Navy was as good as any declaration of independence.38 By October, however, significant momentum had gathered behind those who believed that separation was essential, and one manifestation of that political change was Congress’s commitment to create an American navy. The creation of that navy was both a manifestation of that political realignment and a reason for its growing support over the coming months: by creating a navy many came to believe in both the possibility and the advantages of independence. Even in these early months, the rumours of a navy, even the idea of a navy, generated support for the rebel cause.
The process began on 13 October 1775 with approval of a resolution that
a swift sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns, and a proportional number of swivels, with eighty men, be fitted out with all despatch, for a cruise of three months, and that the commander be instructed to cruise eastward, for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies, and for such other purposes as the Congress shall direct.39
Soon after another vessel was commissioned for the same purpose, and these initial orders rather opened the floodgates. Those two ships, originally to be of 10 guns, became one of 10 and one of 14, and then two more were recommended, much larger, at 20 guns and then 36 guns. By mid-November four ships were being converted in Philadelphia. Then came a significant step-up. In December it was resolved that, rather than convert any large existing ships from traders into warships, they would actually build from scratch thirteen frigates and they would so so at the ludicrously exact cost of $866,666.66: five of 32 guns, five of 28 guns and three of 24 guns.40 They would be built in seven of the thirteen colonies to make best use of the available workforce and presumably to ensure that as many colonies were involved as possible: four in Pennsylvania, two each in Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island, and one each in Connecticut, New Hampshire and Maryland. Soon after work had begun on those frigates, the programme was expanded yet again with another significant step-up. Now three 74-gunners – ships large enough to be classified as ‘ships of the line’ – were to be built, as well as five more large frigates.41
This was now a truly massive commitment that would have major repercussions on the course of the war and the shape of the nation that was fighting it. To design, build, victual, man and operate these ships would require a significant centralized infrastructure. Just as the creation of the American navy was both a manifestation and a cause of political realignment in the relationship between Congress, the colonies and Britain, so was it also a manifestation and cause of increased centralization of American government. The creation of the navy is an integral piece of the picture that led to the rise of America as a fiscal-military nation state – to the printing, raising and borrowing of money and the creation of a bureaucracy to oversee the spending of the money it generated.42 This is why the birth of the American navy reflects the birth of America itself.
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Before the Americans could build a navy at sea, they first had to build a navy on paper. Congress eventually established a three-man committee tasked with preparing an estimate of the expenses. This mini committee, consisting of Silas Deane of Connecticut, John Langdon of New Hampshire and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, was the first American governmental supervisory body of the navy.43 It soon expanded to seven members and was tasked with more responsibility.* This Marine Committee laid out the basic structure of the navy: it created a system of wages; designed a uniform; conceived a set of rules and regulations; established a prize-share system; outlined expectations of conduct and boundaries of authority; drew up a list of crimes and punishments;* and addressed the questions of divine services, courts martial and terms of enlistment. At this stage the Marine Committee was also responsible for operations.44
It all started off with high levels of expectation and plenty of enjoyment. The committee met every evening on the second floor of a tavern in Philadelphia. John Adams remembered the meetings as ‘the pleasantest part of my Labours for the four years I spent in Congress’ and was detailed in his appreciation of the ‘wit, humour, anecdotes, scie
nce and learning’ that characterized the meetings and their convivial aftermath.45 At exactly this time he wrote to James Warren: ‘We begin to feel a little of a Seafaring Inclination here’46 – a line of thrilling immediacy that encapsulates the hope and energy of the time, when those pro-navy men had finally received the Congressional approval and encouragement that they had long sought.
This peak of naval vitality is significant if one is going to appreciate fully the torpor that, long before the end of the war, poisoned the American naval administration. Now back-slapping in a smoky room above a tavern, hunched with inspiration over blank pieces of parchment, reassured by a relatively stable currency to fund their dreams, these men would eventually find themselves utterly worn down by the never-ending problems they encountered. This is because building any navy in any location at any period in history was always an immense struggle. It took endless time even for those with the requisite experience and skill honed through failure. Running a navy successfully also required political dexterity, financial ingenuity, administrative efficiency, logistical robustness and excellent leadership. Yet none of the men on the Marine Committee had any experience of naval administration, and there was not a single dry dock anywhere in North America – not one.47
If one considers that these challenges – often too much for a navally inclined nation to overcome even in peacetime – were increased under the intense pressure of war and were further multiplied by the fledgling nature of the American state itself, then failure, if not inevitable, was highly likely. At the very least the operational capability of the American navy, if it ever made it to sea, would be significantly compromised – something that was immediately apparent when it became clear that the Americans were barely able to arm their ships at all. The British had discouraged ordnance manufacture in the colonies. The first American naval guns, therefore, were a hodge-podge of discovered, stolen and imported pieces intermingled with a tiny handful of cannon newly cast from recycled door-knockers and church bells.48