Struggle for Sea Power : A Naval History of American Independence (9781782397403)

by Willis, Sam

  Such evacuation was not an option for the Native Americans, many of whom had played key roles in assisting British fleets, particularly in the campaigns on Lake Champlain. They were not mentioned at all in the peace treaty and technically were still at war with the United States. For them the American Revolution was a significant episode in their extended decline. The promise of hope offered to the runaway slaves by evacuation in British ships also vanished into thin air, another collapse of expectation on an immense scale.31

  While this was all happening in America, the American war at sea had carried on. British merchant ships continued to require an armed escort, and it was not until 24 March 1783 that Congress actually called home its remaining privateers and naval vessels.32 The Admiralty had been entirely ineffective since the summer of 1781, when the Navy Boards had also been abolished, and in the intervening years, responsibility for the American navy had landed in the hands of a single man, Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance.33 The last ship of the Continental Navy to be sold out of service was the Alliance on 3 June 1785.

  This first phase of the life of American sea power was over, but it would come again and would surprise the world with its strength. In the interim America would have to learn to live with its independence, to pay its debts, and to trade with its allies and enemies.

  Pre-existing trading patterns flourished. The largest and most obvious trading partner was, of course, Britain, and the Americans were utterly tied to the British economy. They may have been ‘independent’ but they certainly were not economically independent.34 The financially crippled French were unwilling to extend credit, and French goods did not suit the American market as English goods did. For the four years between 1786 and 1789 trade between Britain and America was worth £2,567,000, whereas trade between France and America was worth £56,000.35

  The Spanish were simply unwilling to compromise their vision of colonial trading monopoly and refused to get involved with the Americans. The Dutch, however, were willing, and lent America 1.3 million dollars in the immediate aftermath of the peace.* Even so the Americans were never able to compete with the sheer size of the British economy, so strong that it absorbed the loss of the American economies with barely a shudder. Britain, therefore, was the key ally of the future. In the words of David Hartley, a British diplomat, Britain was ‘the first of European nations in riches … industry, commerce, manufactures … together with civil liberty, which is the source of all, and naval power, which is the support of all’.36 The British were happy to see the Americans economically dependent on their trade. Now reaching from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, America contained an inexhaustible source of riches. The building of American trade and the establishment of American–British co-operation were therefore the most important first steps for America’s new future as a major player in international relations.

  Another major step towards that goal, but one for the future, was the creation of a new American navy, for a key lesson of this war was that, even if sea power was not the magic wand that so many thought it to be, it most certainly was a tool that would determine the rise and fall of empires. The creation of a new navy only became possible once the states had resisted fragmentation and combined under a new constitution, Congress had given itself the authority to tax the American people directly, and political will had once again looked to the sea.37 Only then could the Americans even embark on the journey towards an effective, permanent navy. But, with these steps taken, and once they had experienced their own population explosion and industrial revolution, and had learned the principal lesson of this war that an effective navy could only be built and then maintained through ‘unwearied attention’ and even then with ‘the utmost difficulty’,38 they would build a navy that would, eventually, change the world all over again.

  In the meantime the Royal Navy existed in greater strength than ever before. Crucially, lessons had been learned during the war that now ensured that the fleet could be maintained in significant strength for a significant period of time – the exact challenge whose solution had so eluded them in the early 1770s. A sensible and well-funded cycle of construction and repair utilizing both private and royal yards was now in place. Britain now was both committed to, and capable of, maintaining a fleet of no fewer than 100 ships of the line, to be ready at all times,39 and this was not just a question of infrastructure but of personnel: it is no coincidence that one of the subsequent generation’s most influential and talented naval administrators – Andrew Snape Hamond – was one of this war’s most talented serving naval officers.

  The war taught the British significant lessons about the deployment of fleets, if not quite ‘strategy’ as we know it. The most important was that large naval fleets were far easier to maintain and control in home waters, near major permanent dockyards, than in foreign waters, supported by ad hoc or small local infrastructure; and so too was it far easier to keep the enemy trapped at home than to chase him all around the world. By no means is it a coincidence that the battle of the Saintes in 1782 was the first and last major action fought outside British waters by the principal British fleet; indeed it did not leave European waters again until 1944.40 The key to the British future would be small, relatively inexpensive locations that could be used as naval bases from which to police the global British maritime trade network. This global web of naval protection, occasionally boosted by large squadrons, would be augmented by immense naval strength permanently maintained in European waters, where the British could protect its own shores and homeward- and outward-bound trade convoys, and bottle up enemy warships.

  The Royal Navy was thus finally primed as the weapon it was always supposed to be – a weapon that could realize the dreams of the politicians and the public who so worshipped the god of sea power. More than anything else, this naval progress in the process of imperial loss is why, ironically, the independence of America heralded the period of Britain’s greatest imperial strength.

  A still broader lesson concerns our ability and desire to analyse and question our own behaviour. We are always happy to mishear, mis-see and misunderstand something so that the stories we weave add up. To protect us from this tendency, historians need to tell the story of what, actually, was there, and without any doubt the strongest theme of this particular history is one of collapsed expectation, of the appearance or belief in sea power not being realized in its application. Admiral Pasley summed up this problem in microcosm when his crew, having returned to Plymouth from a lengthy cruise in August 1780, were so shattered by scurvy that most were ‘incapable of moving’. And yet he knew that, from a distance, his was a ship of immense power and influence – in his words, ‘a ship of apparent force without abilities’.41 The Americans, French and Spanish were exceptionally lucky that their continued misreading, misunderstanding and mishandling of sea power did not lead to failure during the war, and the British were exceptionally lucky that their misreading, misunderstanding and mishandling of sea power did not lead to even greater losses than America – as we have seen, the entire British empire was left hanging by a thread on several occasions. By placing blind faith in a poorly understood system, all parties in this war repeatedly exposed themselves to disaster.

  There is a lesson for us all here, but at the same time, for all these difficulties faced, a little blind faith (and sometimes a lot) meant that this was a period of the most extraordinary endeavour, of the greatest military and administrative achievements of the eighteenth century, a period unique in the history of the world, and those who had been part of it knew that they had been part of something special. Thomas Paine declared, ‘Could we clear away the mist of antiquity, it is more than probable the ancients would admire us, rather than we them.’42 At the end of the war, Ezra Stiles, President of Yale, proclaimed: ‘We have lived an age in just a few years; we have seen more wonders accomplished than are unfolded in a century.’43 For, sometimes, it takes such blind faith, such willingness not to give up against all known odds, to shape the hist
ory of the world in a new way.

  * The choice of the Eagle is interesting. It was then in India, but had been Howe’s flagship at the attack on New York in 1776 and it was the ship that had been targeted, without success, by David Bushnell’s submarine.

  * Which had been retaken from the British by the French in November on de Grasse’s return to the Caribbean from Yorktown.

  * Norway and Denmark were united for 436 years, from 1379 to 1814.

  * Part of which, 70,000 in gold coin, was convoyed to America from Havana by an American frigate. Fowler, American Crisis, 130, 154.

  GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL TERMS

  Bateau: A shallow-draft flat-bottomed boat used extensively across North America in the colonial period around 30ft long and 6ft wide. The largest were capable of mounting small cannon and swivel guns.

  Bilge: The lowest compartment on a ship, where the sides meet the keel.

  Bow: The foremost part of a ship’s hull.

  Bowsprit: A spar extending forwards over the bow.

  Brig: A vessel square-rigged on two masts.

  Brigantine: A two-masted vessel with square-rigged foremast and a mainmast rigged fore and aft.

  Broadside: The side of the ship; the number of guns mounted on one side; the simultaneous fire of these guns.

  Bulwark: A barrier around the side of the deck.

  Companionway: A hatchway in a ship’s deck leading below.

  Corvette: A small warship with only one deck. Smaller than a frigate, larger than a sloop.

  Cot: A canvas hammock sewn into a wooden bed frame and suspended from the deck-head. An officer’s bed.

  Cutter: A small vessel fore-and-aft rigged on a single mast.

  Cutwater: Part of the hull, the foremost part of the prow.

  Double: To attack a ship or squadron from both sides.

  Draught: The depth of water required to float a ship.

  Fish: To strengthen a damaged spar or mast by lashing spars to it in the manner of splints.

  Frigate: A small sailing warship of fine form and high speed. Carries her armament on a single deck, her main deck, while her lower deck is unarmed.

  Galley: A type of small boat; a small sailing warship or merchantman fitted to row with sweeps; a type of inshore warship propelled primarily by oars; the kitchen of a ship.

  Gallivat: A small armed vessel, with sails and oars; used on the Malabar coast.

  Grave: To ground a ship in order to work on her hull when it is exposed at low water.

  Gun-port: A port cut in the hull to allow guns mounted below deck to fire out.

  Gunwale: A heavy timber forming the top of the ship’s side.

  Hatch coaming: The raised section of timber around the entrance to a hatchway to deflect or prevent entry of water.

  Heave to: To stop or lie to by backing some of the sails.

  Jury-mast: A makeshift and temporary mast, improvised because of loss or damage to the original mast.

  Kedge: To move a ship, typically against wind or tide, by hauling on a line attached to a kedge anchor.

  Ketch: A small vessel square or fore-and-aft rigged on a main mast with a distinctive small mizzen mast aft.

  Lateen sail: A large triangular sail rigged fore and aft on a long yard running diagonally to the bow.

  League: A measure of distance, three miles.

  Leeward: Relating to the direction towards which the wind is blowing.

  Lugger: A small sailing vessel rigged fore and aft with quadrangular sails.

  Magazine: A storehouse for explosives; a compartment in the ship for storing powder.

  Mast cap: A strong block of wood used to bind two masts together.

  Packet-boat: A vessel employed under Post Office contract to carry mail.

  Pinnace: A small boat, propelled by sail or oars, carried on a large ship to act as a tender.

  Portage: To carry water craft or cargo overland.

  Quarter: The sides of a ship’s stern.

  Quarter-gallery: A walkway or balcony projecting from the stern or quarters of a ship.

  Radeau: A type of ship used as a naval gun platform. Very basic in construction and difficult to manoeuvre. The term is derived from the French meaning ‘raft’.

  Rating: A man’s rate; a man so rated, one of the ‘common men’ of a ship’s company, having no rank.

  Rowlock: A brace that attaches an oar to a boat’s gunwales and provides a fulcrum for rowing.

  Schooner: A small sailing vessel fore-and-aft rigged on two masts.

  Scow: A flat-bottomed boat with a blunt bow, often used to transport freight.

  Scupper: A port or channel to carry water off a deck and over the ship’s side.

  Shallop: A small cruising warship.

  Shroud: A stay supporting a mast from the side.

  Sloop: A small cruising warship with only one internal deck and mounting her main battery on the upper deck.

  Spar: A mast, pole or boom.

  Spring: A hawser led from the capstan, out of the ship aft and made fast some way along the anchor cable, hauling on which will cant an anchored ship to bring her broadside to bear as desired.

  Stern: The after end of a ship.

  Strike: To lower a mast, spar or sail; to surrender; to run aground.

  Stunsail or studding sail: A light sail temporarily spread outboard of a square sail in light airs.

  Tender: A vessel employed to assist another: an auxiliary vessel.

  Thole-pin: Pegs mounted vertically in the gunwale of a rowing boat, against which the oars are pulled. An alternative to a rowlock.

  Topgallant: A square sail set on the topgallant mast, above the topsail.

  Warp: To manoeuvre a ship using hawsers made fast to the shore or buoys.

  Wear (ship): To alter course from one tack to the other by turning before the wind.

  Weather deck: A deck exposed to the sky.

  Weather gage: The windward position in relation to another ship or fleet.

  Windsail: A sail rigged as an air scoop over a hatch or companionway to catch breezes and divert them below.

  Windward: Relating to the direction from which the wind is blowing.

  Xebec: A small three-masted Mediterranean vessel with both square and lateen sails.

  Yard: A spar hung horizontally from a mast to spread the head or foot of a square sail.

  NOTES

  Introduction

  1

  GWP: G. Washington to J. Hancock, 10 July 1777; NYPL: Mazzei Papers, 8 February 1780.

  2

  See, for example, Mahan, Major Operations, 163; Clowes, Royal Navy, III, 543.

  3

  Quoted in Mackesy, War for America, 183.

  4

  Explained in Syrett, European Waters, 125–6.

  5

  Many thanks to Dr Michael Crawford for bringing this to my attention.

  6

  Baxter, British Invasion, 92.

  7

  Billias, Washington’s Generals and Opponents, vii.

  1 British Pyre

  1

  Oertling, Bilge Pumps, 1–9.

  2

  Oertling, Bilge Pumps, 59.

  3

  Lavery, Shipboard Life, 42, 53, 100, 196.

  4

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 31.

  5

  Patton, Patriot Pirates, xxii.

  6

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 34.

  7

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 36n.106.

  8

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 33–4.

  9

  Bartlett, History, 19.

  10

  Bartlett, History, 34.

  11

  Falconer, Dictionary, 128; Caruana, English Sea Ordnance, II, 449–52.

  2 American Origins

  1

  T. C. Barrow, Trade and Empire, 244; Lemisch, ‘Jack Tar’, 398–9; Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 52, 80–3.

  2

  Magra, Fisherman’s Cause, 8–9, 12, 142 ff.;
Brunsman, Evil Necessity, 222 ff., 242.

  3

  T. C. Barrow, Trade and Empire, 177.

  4

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 10.

  5

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 10–14.

  6

  From Dudingston’s immediate generation we know that James Hawker, Jeremiah Morgan and Robert Keeler were British naval officers with a similar reputation. Stout, Navy in America, 168; Bunker, Empire on the Edge, 51–3.

  7

  Quoted in Stout, Navy in America, v.

  8

  Stout, Navy in America, 141.

  9

  Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 8–11; Leslie, ‘Gaspee Affair’, 234; Maier, ‘Popular Uprisings’, 15. The Rhode Islanders were also irate that Dudingston had taken some smugglers to Boston, which was in a different state, for trial. He was perfectly entitled to do so, but it irritated the Rhode Islanders that their own judicial system was not responsible for trying their own criminals. Stout, Navy in America, 141. For more on the role of the Vice-Admiralty Courts as a cause of revolution, see Ubbelohde, Vice-Admiralty Courts, 203 ff.

  10

  Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 8, 15; Stout, Navy in America, 168; Bunker, Empire on the Edge, 68–9.

  11

  Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 27–8; Stout, Navy in America, 141.

  12

  Butler, Becoming America, 233; Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 36, 164.

  13

  Bunker, Empire on the Edge, 229–30; Fischer, Revere’s Ride, 26.

  14

  Brogan, History, 164.

  15

  Barnes and Owen, Sandwich Papers, I, 49–54; Stout, Navy in America, 161; Park, ‘HMS Gaspee’, 29–31; Bunker, Empire on the Edge, 55.