Avro Lancaster

by Richard Marks

  being. Thoughts at RAF High Command started to swing from defence to

  assembly after removal of the

  attack. The new Manchester appeared clearly to offer the chance not only to central fin.

  take the war to Germany, but to take it right into its heartland, which the shorter-ranged medium bombers struggled to reach. The RAF and Avro

  believed that there was not enough time to develop the new aircraft further and that it should enter service as soon as possible. The urgent need to strike back at Germany was coupled with a general feeling that ‘everything would be all right’ after trials with the Manchester suggested that the aircraft would be successful, and so mass production began. The Manchester was rushed into service albeit with new Vulture Mark II engines, which whilst a definite improvement on the original Vulture still lacked power and were prone to overheating and fire.

  The first Manchesters reached No. 207 Squadron, which had reformed at

  RAF Waddington on 1 November 1940 under Squadron Leader Noel Hyde.

  The squadron was made responsible for bringing the new aircraft up to

  operational standard by developing crew training regimes and new tactics. The squadron was part of No. 5 Group Bomber Command under Arthur Harris,

  whose fate seemed once again entwined with the Lancaster family. The first Manchester, L7279, was delivered to 207 Squadron on 6 November, and over the next six weeks the squadron’s strength reached 11 aircraft and 16 crews, including some of Bomber Command’s most experienced airmen.

  The entry of the aircraft into operational service, however, was delayed once again by technical faults with the Vulture engines and issues with the airframe. These were overcome and the Manchester undertook its first

  operations on the night of 24 February 1941. Six aircraft took part in the raid on Brest in France where the German cruiser Admiral Hipper had been reported. Despite the Manchesters performing as expected, the ship was not hit or damaged. The aircraft had taken part in operations just 18 months after 10

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  the prototype had flown for the first time and the career of the Lancaster family had begun.

  Despite this initial ‘success’, the early aircraft that were delivered to squadrons were early Mark I airframes that had the original triple tail fin arrangement, no dorsal turret and were unable to carry the 2,000lb bomb that had been one of the early design advantages of the aircraft over its competitors.

  The problem was quickly resolved and within a month of commencing

  operations No. 207 Squadron began to receive slightly updated Mark I

  airframes, which included a number of improvements including the addition of a dorsal Nash & Thompson FN7 turret mounting two Browning .303

  machine guns. Even the arrival of the improved Mark I did not resolve the issues with the engines, however. No. 207 Squadron suffered its first loss on the night of 20th March when L7278 crashed following an engine fire on take-off, killing both pilots and two of the crew.

  Despite its shortcomings, a second squadron was formed and equipped

  with the Manchester the day after 207’s first operational sortie. No. 97

  Squadron was formed at Waddington under Squadron Leader Denys Balsdon

  and undertook its first operation on the night of 8 April, when four of its Manchesters took part in a raid against Kiel. All four of No. 97 Squadron’s aircraft returned safely, but on the same night a Manchester of No. 207

  Squadron commanded by Noel Hyde (recently promoted to wing commander)

  failed to return. The loss of Wing Commander Hyde’s aircraft was seen as a setback to the Manchester’s early operational career, since he had been Avro Lancaster undercarriage instrumental in bringing the aircraft to operational readiness.

  assembly. This Lancaster of

  No. 44 Squadron is having its

  Grounded

  main wheel refitted. The

  undercarriage assembly is the

  same as that fitted to the

  Despite the new engines and changes to the airframe, the issues with the Manchester.

  Vulture persisted, and by April 1941 enough

  operational hours had been flown on the type to

  enable detailed analysis of the engine’s capabilities and

  weaknesses to be undertaken. Close examination of

  stripped down Vulture engines revealed that the

  overheating problem was being caused by the X

  arrangement of cylinders, which restricted cooling and

  affected lubrication of the big-end bearings. A decision

  was taken on 13 April 1941 to ground all Manchesters

  until such time as a solution to the problem could be

  found.

  Whilst the aircraft were grounded, the Avro

  engineers took the opportunity to make design

  changes to the existing Manchesters to bring them

  closer to the design specification, among which were

  the general adoption of the dorsal turret and changes

  to the bomb bay to allow the aircraft to carry the

  larger 4,000lb bomb (Avro Mod.232).

  The aircraft was finally released back into service

  following changes to the engine, and on the night of 2

  May the Manchester resumed operations. One of No.

  207 Squadron’s aircraft was the first Manchester to

  drop the new 4,000lb ‘cookie’ on a target. Although

  the bomb had already been dropped by Wellington

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  crews, it was now also available to

  Manchester units. The Manchester

  soldiered on and by the end of

  May 1941 had flown 100

  operational sorties.

  It is difficult to assess the

  effectiveness of the new aircraft

  during its first three months of

  service. The aircraft had suffered

  setbacks and losses, but it can be

  argued that this was only to be

  expected in the introduction of a

  new aircraft type into operational

  service. Analysis is also made more

  difficult by the problems of

  assessing how losses occurred,

  especially over hostile territory.

  Even so it is clear that the

  unreliable Vulture engines were the

  reason for many aborted sorties,

  the abort rate being as high as one

  A WAAF works on the

  in five aircraft during the first three months of its service. It also appears that equipment in the bomb

  more Manchesters were lost as a result of technical failure than as a result of aimer’s position of a

  enemy action. The issues with the engines continued and the Manchester was Lancaster. The gangway into

  once again grounded on 16 June, returning to service six days later. A week the nose section is fitted with

  handrails to assist the

  after that, all Manchesters were once again grounded for ‘engine overhauls’.

  crewman. The panel directly

  The issues with the unreliability of the engines continued, and

  above the WAAF is the rear of

  unserviceability had become so serious by July 1941 that the Manchester the front turret fairing; when

  squadrons had been forced to make use of obsolete Hampden bombers to

  the turret was manned the

  gunner’s legs would dangle

  make up the numbers required for operations. The Manchester was gaining a into the space occupied by

  reputation for unreliability and doubts were beginning to be expressed about the WAAF, the turret having

  its future. After much discussion in the higher echelons of the RAF it was no bottom.

  decided to persevere
with the aircraft, but with a number of modifications. The central fin was to be removed and the size of the tail plane and the two remaining fins was to be increased to improve lateral stability. The improved Manchester was designated the Mark Ia.

  Whilst the changes were being made, a new squadron was formed and

  equipped with Manchesters, No. 61 Squadron forming at North Luffenham

  on 17 July. Manchester operations recommenced on the night of 7 August, and throughout the remainder of 1941 Manchester units continued working up

  new crews, gradually increasing the number of Manchester sorties. A fourth unit, No. 83 Squadron, began re-equipping with the Manchester at Scampton in December 1941, commencing operations in January 1942. Despite this

  increase in effort, the Manchester’s contribution to Bomber Command’s efforts remained small. Its introduction to service was frustratingly slow, leaving the main workload to other types. Even though the aircraft had been in service for some ten months, the number of operational aircraft and crews was still extremely small, and by the end of 1941 there were only four operational Manchester squadrons (7 per cent of Bomber Command’s total strength) as opposed to 21 operational Wellington squadrons, which still formed the

  backbone of the Command’s strength. On 7 September 1941, Bomber

  Command sent 198 aircraft to Berlin, only four of which were Manchesters, 12

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  and on 7 November the entire serviceable strength of Bomber Command was sent to Berlin, only 15 of which were Manchesters.

  Despite its now obvious failure, the RAF was forced to persevere with the type in late 1941 as there were no alternatives. The Short Stirling was beginning to look doubtful and the Handley Page Halifax was still unproven and only equipped a handful of units. The only other option open to Bomber Command was to re-equip the Manchester units with Wellingtons and obsolete Hampdens, but this would have been a backward step. Something needed to be done to solve the Manchester’s faults.

  Four engines

  The unsatisfactory performance of the Vulture engines had convinced the design team at A. V. Roe to consider replacing them with either two Bristol Armourers refitting Browning Centaurus radial engines or two Napier Sabre I inline engines. One Manchester machine guns to a Lancaster

  airframe was sent to Napier in Luton for Sabres to be installed, but as it tail turret. The Manchester became clear that the Sabre would require lengthy development it was and Lancaster shared the same defensive weapons. The

  discarded as an option for improving the Manchester. Two Bristol Centaurus Browning .303 machine gun engines were fitted to a Manchester test airframe, which was designated the was the standard weapon Manchester Mark II. The Centaurus was a more powerful development of the used on Bomber Command

  Bristol Hercules engine fitted to the Short Stirling, but despite the promise the aircraft during World War II.

  The armourer in the turret is

  engine and airframe combination appeared to offer, the Manchester II never sitting in the gunner’s entry flew, being superseded by the extremely promising Manchester Mark III.

  doorway.

  Roy Chadwick had been considering the

  possibility of adapting the Manchester to

  accommodate four engines before the war, as

  soon as it became obvious that the Vulture

  engine was going to result in the Manchester

  being underpowered. Chadwick also thought

  that the four-engine Stirling and Halifax being

  developed alongside the Manchester would

  offer increased range and improved bomb load

  as well as greater potential for future

  development. The Manchester, despite its

  faults, was basically a good design that offered

  one distinct advantage over the other types,

  namely that it had been designed from the

  outset with a large bomb bay.

  The power-plant issue occupied the team at

  A. V. Roe and various options were discussed

  for the four-engine Manchester III. The Bristol

  Taurus and Bristol Pegasus were discarded

  fairly quickly, as Chadwick believed that the

  most sensible choice was to fit the Mark III

  with four of the proven Rolls-Royce Merlin

  engines (as fitted to the early Halifax) or four

  Bristol Hercules engines (as fitted to the Short

  Stirling). One immediate impact of fitting two

  additional engines was an increase in weight

  by 12.5 per cent over the Manchester I for the

  Merlin option, and a further 1,000lb for the

  Hercules option. In order to support the

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  increased weight, Chadwick

  and the design team at A. V.

  Roe considered strengthening

  the undercarriage and

  changing the tail assembly.

  The proposal for the

  four-engine Manchester was

  designated the Avro Type

  680, but was not considered

  a serious competitor to the

  other two four-engine

  bombers then in development

  until a new specification was

  issued by the Air Ministry.

  Specification B.1/39 was

  issued on 6 March 1939 as a

  result of work undertaken by

  the ‘Bombing Committee’.

  The specification called for a

  four-engine bomber with a

  RAF fitters working on Merlin

  maximum all-up weight of 50,000lb, including a bomb load of 1,000lb and engines. The two starboard

  two cannon armed turrets. The new aircraft was to have a crew of seven and Merlin engines of this

  be capable of an operating range of over 2,500 miles at a cruising speed of Lancaster are uncowled for

  250mph at 15,000ft. Sholto Douglas, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (ACAS), maintenance. The Merlin

  engine would be fitted to all

  insisted that the project should be progressed as a matter of urgency and marks of Lancaster with the

  several designs were considered. The designs included proposals from

  exception of the B. Mark II.

  Armstrong Whitworth (A. W. 58), which suffered from cramped crew

  accommodation, Bristol (Bristol 159), which had issues due to its two-tier bomb stowage, Handley Page (H. P. 60), which suffered from poor crew

  accommodation, Shorts (S.34) and Vickers (Vickers 405), both of which were disliked due to issues with their defensive armament, and the Avro 680. The Air Ministry believed that the Handley Page and Bristol proposals had the most promise and four full-scale prototypes were ordered in late December 1939. The Avro Type 680 was not to be proceeded with.

  Avro Type 683 Lancaster

  However, events would transpire to bring the Avro offering back to the

  Second Prototype (DG595).

  table. In May 1940 Air Vice Marshal Tedder wrote that the four prototypes The second prototype first

  flew on 13 May 1941. The

  for the B.1/39 ‘Ideal Bomber’ project should be suspended amid concerns aircraft was as close to

  about proceeding with such an advanced aircraft, and in July Handley Page production standard as

  and Bristol were informed that design work should cease. The German advance possible. DG595 is equipped

  into France convinced the Ministry of Aircraft Production that production with the FN64 ventral turret

  should be concentrated on certain types of aircraft, and the ‘Ideal Bomber’ was seen below the fuselage

  beneath the mid-upper turret.

  retired to obscurity. The RAF then removed the restriction that had plagued the earlier bomber designs,

  w
hich dictated that all new

  bombers must be able to

  operate from existing RAF

  airfields. This opened the

  doors for Chadwick to

  design an aircraft with a

  longer and thinner wing

  made of stronger materials

  and capable of taking four

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  Avro Lancaster cockpit. The

  central console that holds the

  engine controls is clearly

  visible in this image. The top

  bank of controls is the

  throttles, the lower bank is the

  propeller control levers. The

  panel of six instruments in

  front of the control column is

  the RAF’s standard cluster of

  Air Speed Indicator, artificial

  horizon, climb indicator,

  altimeter, compass and turn

  indicator.

  engines. The Avro Type 683 was now born. The aircraft was to be powered by four Rolls-Royce Merlin X engines, with increased wingspan over the

  Manchester Mark I and an enlarged tail plane.

  The outbreak of war in 1939 resulted in Avro concentrating on bringing

  the Manchester into RAF service, but the four-engine Manchester continued to be developed at A. V. Roe as a separate project under Stuart Davies. The Type 683 project revealed that the aircraft would exceed the performance laid down in the specification, giving an improved operating speed, altitude and bomb capacity. A. V. Roe had always believed that the Manchester would

  eventually be replaced by a four-engine bomber, and the thought that this might be the Halifax or Stirling models was cause for concern. The designers at A. V. Roe believed that the more sensible option was for the Manchester to be replaced by a four-engine variant to ensure commonality of parts and training. Once the Manchester I had been launched into service, the team at A. V. Roe gave greater priority to the Type 683, although the project almost stalled once again.

  The issues with the Manchester had convinced the Ministry of Aircraft

  Production that the A. V. Roe production facilities should be turned over to Halifax production. Within hours of receiving notification that this might be the case, Roy Chadwick and Roy Dobson went to the ministry with full

  performance estimates for the Type 683 and persuaded them to order two