Saddam : His Rise and Fall

by Con Coughlin

  Even so the Moscow pact put Saddam in an immeasurably stronger position to take on the foreign oil consortium, as the alliance gave him the confidence to tackle the oil barons. He was well aware that any attempt to break the IPC’s stranglehold over the Iraqi oil industry would provoke a hostile reaction, with the big oil companies attempting to bully the Iraqis into submission, as they had done on many occasions in the past. The alliance with Moscow, however, together with the pledge the Soviets had given that they would purchase any Iraqi oil surpluses, bolstered Saddam’s chances of success. He was also greatly assisted by indications that Iraqi oil officials had received from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French trade minister, that France would decline to join an anti-Iraq boycott, so long as French interests were not harmed.

  On June 1, 1972, two months after signing the pact with Moscow, the Baath nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company. The importance of this event cannot be stressed enough, both in terms of its impact on Iraq and its future development, and in confirming the legitimacy of the Baath Party. Without oil, Iraq would be impoverished; with oil, Iraq had the potential to be one of the world’s richest nations. The nationalization of the oil industry had been the long-standing cri de coeur of generations of Iraqi nationalists, and its implementation was arguably the single most revolutionary event to take place in Iraq since its establishment. Because of the alliance with the Soviets and the duplicity of the French, the ability of the expelled members of the consortium to protest was limited, particularly after Saddam traveled to France at the end of June and struck a deal with President Georges Pompidou. Pompidou agreed to accept nationalization in return for French companies being allowed to participate in the future development and exploitation of Iraqi oil fields, and to purchase Iraqi oil at a specially agreed low price.

  Freed from the constraints imposed by the IPC, Iraq was able to exploit a range of oil fields that the IPC had declined to develop. The surge in Iraqi oil production resulted in a massive boost in government revenues. These enabled the Baath to embark upon its ambitious building project to turn the country into a modern state, and to raise the general living standards of ordinary Iraqis. They also financed the massive buildup in the country’s armed forces, which saw the army’s strength almost double in size between 1970 and 1975.

  No one was more aware of the revolutionary implications of Iraq’s oil nationalization than Saddam, who wasted no time making sure he received the lion’s share of the credit for the takeover, while also ensuring that, in so doing, he did not detract from the standing of President Bakr. Saddam had, after all, conducted the crucial negotiations both with the Soviets and the IPC. Having fully discussed the available options with Bakr, Saddam had personally conceived the ultimatum that was made to the IPC in the full knowledge that they would refuse, thereby giving the government no alternative other than to proceed with nationalization. Radio Baghdad broadcast endless revolutionary slogans such as “Arab Oil for the Arabs,” and Saddam named June 1, 1972, as “Victory Day.” Saddam himself stated, “Our wealth has returned to us.” A few years later, talking to one of his official biographers, Saddam reemphasized the role he had played personally in effecting the takeover of the IPC. “All the experts and advisers warned me against nationalisation; not one was in favour. Yet the decision was taken…. Had I listened to the Oil Minister, the decision would never have been made.”5

  Saddam’s personal involvement in the nationalization of the IPC provides a telling insight into how, even as early as 1972, he had acquired a range of highly sophisticated political skills. As has been shown, oil nationalization did not happen overnight. Indeed, according to those Iraqis who were closely involved in the nationalization process, the plan to take IPC under Iraqi control was originally conceived as early as 1970, and most of the groundwork was carried out by Murtada al-Hadithi, the oil minister, rather than Saddam himself, a fact that may explain why Murtada would later perish in one of Saddam’s purges. The Baathists were aware they needed to proceed with caution, knowing that any precipitate move on their part might cause the West, the main consumer of Iraqi oil, to close ranks and boycott the country’s main export, which would quickly bring the country to its knees. The Baathists were hindered by the expert assessment of the Iraqi Oil Ministry that Iraq was not capable of running the oil industry on its own. Numerous economic studies were undertaken to assess how Iraq might be able to survive on a given percentage of its oil revenues. And in fairness to Saddam, the advice from the technical advisers, right up to the moment of nationalization, was that Iraq was not yet ready for such a dramatic move. The key to the success of the gamble on nationalization was the support provided by the Soviets, for which Saddam could take the credit, and the support of the French, for which he could not.

  The moment Saddam believed nationalization was possible he sacked Murtada and took control of the whole project himself. “Saddam wanted to get his hands on the nation’s oil wealth because he could see that this was his gateway to fame,” recalled a former Iraqi official who was closely involved in the nationalization program. “After receiving all the technical advice, it was Saddam who took the political decision.”6 The manner in which Saddam made the historic decision to go ahead with nationalization reveals how Saddam, at this relatively early stage in his career, was able to exploit the Iraqi body politic for his own ends. Although the political decision was essentially Saddam’s, he nevertheless took care to ensure that he had President Bakr’s full support before making his move. That such a momentous decision should have been taken by Saddam, and not Bakr, says a great deal about how the balance of power in Baghdad was shifting away from the president and into the hands of his deputy. Having secured Bakr’s support, Saddam was careful to ensure that his decision had the full backing of the Baath Party’s main decision-making body, the Revolutionary Command Council, of which he was vice president. A meeting of the RCC was duly called at which Saddam received its full backing to proceed with nationalization. Saddam wanted to make sure that, if his bid for glory backfired, it would be the Baath Party collectively, and not Saddam alone, that would bear responsibility for the consequences. But if the gamble succeeded, the glory would all belong to Saddam. This tactic of sharing the burden of political accountability in the face of adversity was to become a recurrent theme of Saddam’s political career.

  Saddam’s role in negotiating the cooperation pact with Moscow and the oil nationalization program meant that, for the first time since the Baathists came to power in 1968, his reputation extended beyond Iraq. With the cold war at its height, the activities of “Revolutionary Command Council Vice President Takriti,” as he was referred to in the New York Times in 1972, in seeking a “solid strategic alliance” with the USSR was regarded as a matter of grave concern in U.S. diplomatic circles.7 Questions over the precise nature of the new Baghdad-Moscow alliance intensified in the spring of 1973 when Iraqi forces occupied a Kuwaiti border post, once more reigniting Baghdad’s irredentist claims to the sheikhdom. Washington regarded the Iraqi action as being part of a plot by Moscow to challenge American oil interests in the Gulf, which had been a major concern of U.S. policymakers since the 1950s. This suspicion persisted even after the dispute was resolved by the mediation of the Soviets, which occurred during a visit by Saddam to Moscow in March 1973, at which he had further talks with Kosygin on improving Soviet-Iraqi cooperation. The key role played by Saddam in the oil nationalization program did not pass unnoticed. When Washington and London, outraged by the typically Gallic deal President Pompidou had negotiated with Baghdad to protect French interests, threatened Paris with punitive action, Saddam responded by declaring in an interview with Le Monde, “We will not tolerate any wrong inflicted on France…. Any attempt to harm French interests would be considered as an act of hostility against Iraq.”8 Saddam’s emergence as a key player in Baghdad’s power politics was recognized by both the State Department in Washington and the Foreign Office in London and before long articles were appearing in the Weste
rn press in which Saddam was flatteringly described as Iraq’s “Nasser.”9

  If the outside world was starting to take notice of Saddam, foreign observers were merely catching up on the political reality that had pertained in Baghdad since late 1970, when Saddam had successfully dispensed with his main political rivals, Tikriti, Ammash, and Shaikhly. For the two years that Ammash had held the office of deputy prime minister, senior advisers in the Iraqi government had enjoyed personal contact with Bakr, and meetings would be held at the Presidential Palace on an almost weekly basis. Officially, Bakr was head of all the government departments and committees, dealing with every aspect of the administration, such as education, health, and transport. In practice he left the day-to-day running to Ammash, and he chaired the meetings so that he could remain in touch with developments. But after Saddam moved into Ammash’s office, the meetings at the Presidential Palace became more and more infrequent until they stopped altogether. Saddam took charge of all the main government departments, and chaired the key planning meetings, and Bakr became more and more removed from the machinery of government.

  At this stage in his career Saddam’s obsession with security was starting to manifest itself. Officials attending meetings at his office in the National Assembly Building were subjected to various checks. Saddam himself entered his office by a special, secluded entrance. Although he was gradually usurping Bakr’s position at the heart of the administration, Saddam was careful not to give the impression that his status was in any respect superior to Bakr’s. He made sure that his office was smaller than Bakr’s, and when he traveled around the country he was insistent that he should have fewer bodyguards than Bakr. In everything he did Saddam took great care not to upset his mentor. When a government department had reached the point where a decision needed to be made, Saddam would visit Bakr and, in an amicable way, suggest that the president should authorize a particular course of action. Having heard Saddam’s analysis of the issue, Bakr would invariably accept Saddam’s judgment, as he did with the nationalization of the IPC. If for any reason Bakr did not agree, Saddam would be disinclined to challenge him directly, but would manipulate him over a period of time—weeks, if necessary—until he got his way.

  Saddam’s emergence as the driving force behind Bakr’s regime still owed much to the support and encouragement he received from his president and fellow Tikriti, and Saddam was aware that he should not underestimate either Bakr’s popularity or power. By the 1970s Bakr was well into his fifties, and appeared to be content with fulfilling a patriarchal role. As one of the last surviving members of the Free Officers responsible for overthrowing the monarchy in 1958, he enjoyed considerable support throughout the country. Not by nature an assertive individual, Bakr carried out the ceremonial functions of his office while allowing Saddam a free hand in consolidating the regime’s position and eliminating its enemies. It has also been suggested that, from an early stage in the Baathist government, Bakr did not enjoy the best of health. As early as 1971 he was hospitalized for what was reported in the Iraqi media as a “slight indisposition.” This might be one explanation why Saddam, who enjoyed robust health, acquired far greater powers than are normally invested in a deputy, so that he was soon able to put himself in a position where his services were indispensable to Bakr. This, of course, was precisely the role Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam’s uncle, had envisaged when he encouraged Bakr to take on his nephew in the 1960s. By appointing a deputy twenty years younger than himself, Bakr had calculated that he would have many years in power before the issue of the succession arose. But with the benefit of hindsight it appears that from the early 1970s Saddam’s sole game plan was to seize the presidency at the earliest available opportunity. If Bakr allowed Saddam more independence of action than most deputies receive, that is not to suggest that he was unaware of Saddam’s intrigues, or of the reasoning that lay behind them. Bakr was fully apprised of the infrastructure of institutionalized terror that had been constructed under his auspices by Saddam, and personally condoned the use of violence—including the barbarity of the Palace of the End—against the regime’s enemies. And as Saddam cut a swathe through the ranks of his political rivals, it gradually became apparent to the Iraqi public that the country was being governed by a dual leadership consisting of Bakr and Saddam; these were the men who made the important decisions, more often than not at Saddam’s instigation. Even if he had his eye on the presidency, at this point in his career Saddam remained careful not to overstep the mark in his relations with Bakr. In a speech broadcast on Iraqi radio in late 1971, for example, he went out of his way to deny suggestions that he had usurped Bakr’s position. “I know there are some who claim that Saddam Hussein is the number one man in Iraq,” he said, “but we have a President who exercises his constitutional powers. In our view he is the number one man and, even more, we consider him the father and the leader.”10

  The period that followed oil nationalization was crucial to Iraq’s future development, and Saddam resolved to be fully involved in every aspect of the Baath Party’s master plan to modernize the country. The Baath now enjoyed popular, and widespread, support throughout the country. The Iraqi people at large believed that for the first time in their history they had a government that was neither a monarchy nor a military junta, but one that was genuinely concerned with improving their lot. Saddam and the Baath were more confident. Saddam had quashed most of his rivals, and the Baath had neutralized most of its political enemies. Saddam’s position as head of the security infrastructure was also greatly assisted by a secret deal he had struck with Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet KGB intelligence operation, to improve the quality of Iraq’s surveillance techniques.

  From the moment it had seized power in 1968 the Baath had attempted to fulfill its promise for a more equal redistribution of the country’s wealth, but its efforts had been constrained by the limited oil revenues. Even after nationalization all departmental budgets were severely curtailed to enable them to cope with the anticipated backlash from the West. The quadrupling of OPEC oil prices that occurred in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, however, finally provided the Iraqi authorities with the opportunity they had been waiting for, allowing them to reap the rewards of the newly liberated oil wealth.

  Saddam the nation builder was chairman of all the key committees and was personally responsible for the Baathists’ ambitious plan to modernize the country. He more than anyone was aware that the key to improving his own popularity and that of the Baath Party would be how the new oil wealth was apportioned. By 1980, Iraq’s oil revenues would be worth $26 billion compared with a figure of $476 million shortly after the Baath seized power,11 and this phenomenal rise in the government’s revenues was entirely due to Saddam’s nationalization of the oil industry. In 1968 oil provided about 22 percent of national income; by 1980 this had risen to 50 percent. This enabled the government to fund the massive redevelopment program that had been promised by numerous regimes, but had never been accomplished. The Baath’s restructuring of the economy, however, was to be conducted in a totalitarian fashion. The party set itself three main goals: (1) the elimination of an upper, and even middle, class of wealth and privilege and a more equal distribution of income and services; (2) the establishment of a socialist economy, with government ownership of national resources and the means of production; and (3) diversification of the economy, allowing Iraq as much economic independence as possible.

  Every project, whether building a new school or hospital, was subjected to Saddam’s personal scrutiny, and all proposed expenditures had to be authorized by the Planning Board, of which Saddam was the chairman. Saddam signed contracts with the USSR to expand Iraq’s oil industry. He signed contracts with the French to build huge turnkey factory complexes, equipped with everything from machinery and production equipment to pencils on the director’s desk. He negotiated with the Brazilians to build railroads, with the Belgians to build a phosphate complex, and with the Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Germans, and Japanese for h
igh technology, labor and expertise. He built schools and a powerful radio and television network capable of broadcasting Baathist propaganda throughout the Arab world. He extended Iraq’s electricity grid into the most remote areas of the countryside. All this activity led foreign observers to point to Iraq as one of the success stories of the Third World. Unlike Africa, where money was all too often spent on useless prestige projects, Saddam’s vast nation-building master plan was actually improving the living standards of ordinary Iraqis.

  Even with the new oil wealth coming onstream, Saddam demanded value for money. His favorite tactic was to have Western and Soviet companies bid against each other on contracts so that Iraq would get the best deal. Saddam called this policy “nonalignment,” and its main goal was to preserve independence of action. His experience with the Soviets had taught him the perils of being too dependent on one outlet. Saddam made sure that the influx of foreigners brought in to work on the various construction projects did not pollute the Baathist revolution. His security forces were instructed to ensure that “contaminating influences” did not come in contact with ordinary Iraqis. Foreign workers were followed, on occasion interrogated, and encouraged not to develop social contacts with Iraqi civilians. Foreign newspapers and magazines were confiscated and all foreign workers were required to apply for exit visas before they left the country, and the permits were sometimes withheld as a means of intimidation. Saddam explained his philosophy for dealing with foreign companies to a group of visiting Arab journalists in 1974. “We have no reservations about dealing with companies anywhere in the world, on a basis that guarantees the respect of our sovereignty and ensures both parties a legitimate profit. Our country has large-scale projects, prodigious projects, and we have great ambitions. The idea that we might isolate ourselves from the world to live according to our own devices is foreign to us, and we refuse it categorically.”12