Saddam : His Rise and Fall

by Con Coughlin

  The most essential aspect of the sanctions-busting operation was that it enabled Saddam to continue to defy the demands of the UNSCOM weapons inspectors. The pattern up to 1995 replicated that established when they first started work. Saddam’s security forces would do everything in their power to impede the work of the inspectors, would make false claims about the true extent of the Iraqi weapons programs and devise new schemes for concealing the more sensitive material. Sami Salih, who spent five years based at the Presidential Palace running the sanctions-busting operations, said that Saddam never had any intention of complying with the requirements of the UN inspection teams. “There were missiles hidden all over Iraq. I saw them stored under swimming pools and on farms.”22 Despite all the provocations, the inspectors under the cool leadership of Rolf Ekeus continued with their painstaking task. They would present the Iraqis with incontrovertible evidence and force them to hand over the offending material. Ekeus struggled on with the mission despite Saddam’s constant brinkmanship, one day threatening to reinvade Kuwait, the next threatening a new atrocity against the Kurds. Occasionally American and British warplanes would react to the provocation by bombing antiaircraft missile batteries in Iraq.

  Although Saddam had the ability to cause the Allies immense irritation, the various schemes to remove him met with little success. This may have had something to do with the fact that from the autumn of 1993 onward the Clinton administration was deeply involved in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was enjoying one of its most constructive phases in years after the signing of the Oslo Accords. While Saddam was a nuisance, he was regarded in Washington as a containable nuisance, and any concerted effort to remove him might upset the delicate balance of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, particularly as many Palestinians were sympathetic to Iraq and would use any attack on Saddam as an opportunity to accuse the United States of anti-Arab bias.

  Clinton was certainly less obsessed with the Saddam issue than Bush had been. Since April 1991, when President Bush signed his “finding” authorizing Saddam’s overthrow, American policy had been based on a twin-track approach: to contain Saddam through a combination of sanctions and the no-fly zones while Western intelligence agencies worked within Iraq to bring him down. Initially the Clinton administration left the Bush approach essentially unchanged, and Clinton renewed Bush’s “finding” authorizing Saddam’s overthrow. Even so, Clinton was eager to avoid face-to-face confrontations with Saddam, and his advisers wanted to keep Saddam off the front pages. The phrase used by Anthony Lake, Clinton’s national security adviser, to officials working on Iraq was: “Don’t give us sweaty palms”—i.e., do not provoke any crises.23 The CIA and Britain’s MI6 were nevertheless still fully committed in their attempts to organize a coup. By late 1994 most of the intelligence activity was based in the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq. In September 1994 the CIA established its base at a heavily fortified villa at Salahdin while the Iraqi National Congress (INC) created a ministate for itself, complete with its own television station and newspaper. The INC had devised a plan to attack Mosul and Kirkuk, the two major cities in northern Iraq, which, if successful, would seriously weaken Saddam. The INC was greatly assisted in its planning by General Wafic al-Samurrai, Saddam’s former head of military intelligence, who had defected in December 1994 after learning from his colleagues at the Presidential Palace that Saddam planned to kill him.

  The INC and Samurrai were confident of success, although Washington was concerned that, if it supported the revolt, it could find itself embroiled in a messy war in Iraq, something successive U.S. administrations had been desperate to avoid since the end of Operation Desert Storm. On the eve of the INC’s planned attack, Lake sent a message to the CIA team based at Salahdin ordering them to tell the INC that “the United States would not support this operation militarily or in any other way.”24 The INC, whose plans were already well advanced, went ahead with the attack and, even without American support, achieved a degree of success, capturing several hundred Iraqi prisoners. But without U.S. support, the INC, which was backed by Jalal Talibani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Party, was unable to consolidate its gains, and the offensive petered out, leaving the Iraqi exiles deeply disillusioned about the sincerity of Washington’s commitment to overthrowing Saddam.

  The constant threat of plots, coups, and invasions, however, did little to ease Saddam’s peace of mind. He was reported to be suffering from heart trouble and the resulting dizzy spells caused by a lack of blood reaching the brain. In the summer of 1995 yet another plot was uncovered, this one organized by Mohammed Madhloum, an air force commander who tried to launch an uprising against Saddam. The attempt failed and Madhloum and his accomplices were captured. Each of them was tortured by having all of their fingers cut off, one by one. Then they were shot.25

  By this stage in his long career Saddam had developed a siege mentality. He had always taken his security to ludicrous extremes, but by the mid-1990s the aging tyrant had become almost dysfunctional in his obsession with it. Saddam spent most of his time at the Presidential Palace, which by the 1990s had become a massive, sprawling complex of about one thousand acres; on one side the Tigris provided a natural boundary, while the rest was protected by an electrified perimeter fence, with guard towers every fifty yards. The main road access was across a bridge, which had been rebuilt after being bombed in the war. Ordinary Iraqis were not allowed anywhere near the compound, and risked a jail sentence if they approached it without permission. Once past the main checkpoints, visitors were sent to one of several gates that were specially designated for different groups: the military, politicians, businessmen, or personal friends and acquaintances of Saddam’s family. The gates and the fortress itself were guarded by a confusing number of different security forces, who were there as much to keep a watchful eye on one another as to protect Saddam and his entourage. The most basic security functions were performed by trusted members of the Republican Guard; more sophisticated measures, such as electronic surveillance, by the Special Republican Guard. Overall control of the complex was in the hands of the Republican Palace Guard, while the safety of Saddam and his family was entrusted to the Organization of Special Security (OSS) headed by Qusay.

  The OSS guards were the elite corps. Most of them were recruited from Saddam’s tribe in Tikrit, and they were afforded better privileges than most of the cabinet ministers to guarantee their loyalty. They were distinguished from the other guards by their olive green uniforms, a white lanyard, and special-issue guns. They lived with their families inside the presidential compound in comfortable villas. They had their own sports and health club, hospital, and schools for their children. They dined at their own restaurant complex, where their meals were served by waiters. Every six months they received a new car, usually a Mercedes. Most of them earned twice the wage of an Iraqi cabinet minister and, when off duty, they were generally allowed to do as they pleased, so long as they obeyed the command of their master, Saddam Hussein. As one former official at the Presidential Palace commented: “They fear only God, and their God is Saddam Hussein. They were so powerful that even ministers called them ‘sir’ when they entered the Presidential Palace. No one took any liberties with them.”26

  By now Saddam had established one of the most extensive security structures in modern history. Although he rarely appeared in public, by the mid-1990s he had some eight “doubles” who could impersonate him at public functions; sometimes they appeared at different events at the same time, causing difficulties for the state-owned media, which had to prepare daily reports on Saddam’s itinerary. Visitors were still subjected to the routine where they were driven around Baghdad for hours in cars with blackened windows when invited to attend one of Saddam’s guesthouses. Being such an expert himself in poisoning his opponents, Saddam not surprisingly took great care to ensure that he did not become a victim. Before meeting any member of his government, Saddam would insist that they first wash their hands, a precaution against the
possibility that they might have poison on their fingers that could rub off in a handshake. In the interests of security no indignity was spared Saddam’s guests. All of them had their photographs and fingerprints taken, and the OSS had the right to strip-search cabinet members prior to any meeting with Saddam. Even Tariq Aziz, one of Saddam’s most trusted lieutenants, was not immune from such degradation. On rare occasions guests were subjected to an intrusive medical examination to check that they had not concealed any poison or explosives in intimate areas of their bodies. Even these elaborate precautions could not prevent the occasional security lapse. In 1996 Saddam narrowly escaped an assassination attempt when a young waitress at the Presidential Palace, who was supposed to serve him poisoned food, was overcome with fear and confessed. Saddam immediately had her taken outside the dining hall and shot. All her accomplices were tortured and executed.27

  When off duty the guards terrorized the local population, and rumors circulated of their womanizing and dissolute behavior. One guard commander was seen one evening at a nightclub trying to attract the attention of an old girlfriend. When she rejected his advances, he pulled out a gun and shot her five times in the chest. They were also said to procure women for Saddam, who, despite his second marriage to Samira Shahbandar, still had a predilection for young, blonde women. For example Saddam might be attracted to a woman he had seen on television. He would order his bodyguards to bring her to him. When he had finished with her, the bodyguards would be told to pay her handsomely. But if for some reason the woman had not pleased him, she would be taken out and shot.28

  Despite all the security, Saddam relied on a number of psychics to warn him of any impending misfortune. No doubt he had inherited his superstitious nature from his mother, who had used her collection of seashells to sell prophesies to the peasants of Al-Ouja. Saddam made particular use of an elderly blind woman psychic, to whom he paid particular attention in times of crisis. She once predicted that he would be the victim of an assassination attempt—not in itself a controversial prediction given the frequency with which he was attacked—and thereafter Saddam trusted her judgment.

  Those who visited the palace regularly, such as Sami Salih, said there was always an air of tension about the place as no one—not even most of the OSS guards—knew whether or not Saddam was present. Most of the time he worked in a small building in a sealed corner of the presidential complex, and very few officials ever ventured into his inner sanctum. Visiting dignitaries were always received in the old Presidential Palace, and only Saddam’s most trusted confidants were allowed into his private office. Access to Saddam was strictly controlled by Abdul Hamoud, his private secretary, who occupied a separate building in front of his private quarters. Whichever office Saddam used to receive his visitors was equipped with cameras and recorders. The meetings took the form of a royal audience, and guests were supposed to talk only after he had spoken, and then to keep their answers concise. Although Saddam had his sleeping quarters within the palace compound, he rarely slept there. In Baghdad alone there were at least five other palaces that accommodated his retinue, and he would move from one to the other regularly to escape detection. On those occasions when Saddam left the Presidential Palace, a number of decoy motorcades—never fewer than five—would sweep over the main bridge and into Baghdad. Saddam would not be in any of them, but would most likely have left by another exit, or through one of the secret underground tunnels that were connected to the presidential bunker.

  The only area in which Saddam’s elaborate security arrangements lacked effectiveness was in controlling the activities of his family. By the mid-1990s Uday’s activities, in particular, were a cause of much friction. He had turned the Olympic Committee into his personal fiefdom, and by controlling much of the country’s media output, he had unlimited access to one of the regime’s key components, the propaganda machine. Uday’s utter disregard for the state’s institutions created friction with Watban, his uncle and Saddam’s half brother, who controlled the Interior Ministry, and Hussein Kamel, who saw his own position as Saddam’s potential successor being eroded both by Uday’s acquisition of wealth and power, and to a lesser extent by Qusay’s emergence as a more sober influence on the government. Matters came to a head in true Tikriti fashion in the spring of 1995 when Uday forced Watban’s resignation by running a series of disparaging articles about him in his newspaper, Babel. A few days later Uday, in a drunken rage, attacked his uncle, shooting him in the leg and killing three of his companions while they were attending a private party in Baghdad. Watban, who feared for his life, claimed the shooting had been an accident, even though his injuries required him to have his leg amputated. Hussein Kamel and his younger brother, Saddam Kamel, believing that they were next on Uday’s list, fled into exile in Jordan, taking their wives, Saddam’s daughters Raghad and Rana.

  The defection of Saddam’s two sons-in-law in August 1995 was potentially the most damaging blow he had suffered since seizing power in 1979. For the first time two members of the Tikriti ruling circle had escaped Saddam’s authority and were threatening to betray the regime’s innermost secrets. Hussein Kamel, as head of Iraq’s weapons procurement program, was particularly well equipped to provide Western intelligence with a treasure trove of detail about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program. Hussein Kamel was fully debriefed by both the CIA and Britain’s M16, and then by Rolf Ekeus, the head of UNSCOM. He provided a detailed account of Iraq’s weapons program, including hitherto hidden chemical weapons plants and front companies helping with Iraq’s weapons procurement and Saddam’s VX nerve agent program. His most startling revelation was that Saddam had been within three months of testing an atomic bomb at the start of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991.

  Hussein Kamel fully expected to be granted asylum in either the United States or Britain, from where he would base his campaign to overthrow Saddam. To this end he granted an exclusive interview to Time in which he said his defection was motivated by “the interests of the country.” He was deeply critical of Saddam’s regime. The country had spent nearly fifteen years at war and had accumulated debts that it would take “generations and generations” to pay. He also tried to distance himself from the brutality of the regime. “There are too many executions in our society, too many arrests,” he complained. “Whatever the age of the critic—whether 80 or 15—many people are executed.”29

  Saddam was so enraged by the defections that for a time he was not able to eat and refused to talk to any of his close associates. Eventually, when he had calmed down, he called in Uday, whom he believed bore primary responsibility for the defections, and stripped him of all his positions. Saddam’s security forces raided the headquarters of the Olympic Committee and freed all those being held in Uday’s private jail. Saddam was forced to update his submissions to UNSCOM, including new data on biological weapons, such as anthrax and botulism, VX nerve gas, and new information on Iraq’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. UNSCOM was readmitted to Iraq and Ekeus resumed the inspections, this time equipped with incontrovertible evidence of Iraq’s nonconventional weapons infrastructure.

  Saddam moved quickly to demonstrate that he was still the strongman of Baghdad, despite the shooting of his half brother Watban and the defection of his two sons-in-law. He announced that a referendum would be held on October 15, in which eight million Iraqis would vote on the question: “Do you agree that Saddam Hussein should be president of Iraq?” Even though he dyed his hair and suffered back problems, Saddam was still presented to the Iraqi people as a heroic, virile leader. His cousin and defense minister, Ali Hassan al-Majid, was the campaign’s chief cheerleader. “Oh lofty mountain! Oh glory of God!” Majid said in an official broadcast. “By God we have always found you in the most difficult conditions as a roaring lion and courageous horseman, one of the few true men.”30 Saddam won the plebiscite with 99.96 percent of the vote. Majid performed another important service for Saddam by issuing a public denouncement of his cousins for defecting to Jo
rdan. “This small family within Iraq denounces this cowardly act,” said the statement, which was read live on Iraqi television. “His [Saddam Kamel’s] family has unanimously decided to permit with impunity the spilling of blood.”31

  If Hussein Kamel had expected a hero’s welcome in the West for his defection, he was sorely disappointed. Western intelligence officers were prepared to debrief him and his brother, but had no desire to perpetuate the relationship. In their view he was an arrogant, vainglorious individual who was too closely associated with Saddam’s regime to be considered as a viable alternative. However much they wanted to see the back of Saddam, they did not want him to replaced by one his clones.32 By the end of the year Hussein Kamel, Saddam Kamel, Saddam’s daughters, and their retinue were confined to one of King Hussein’s guesthouses in Amman, and all their overtures to be given a sanctuary in the West were met with a resounding silence.

  Sensing an opportunity to avenge himself on his errant sons-in-law, Saddam established contact with them in Jordan through his security agents. He personally phoned the sons-in-law at their Amman hideout, offering them a presidential pardon if only they would return. Apart from the embarrassment their revelations on the arms program had caused, Saddam’s honor as the family patriarch had been compromised by, as it appeared to Arab eyes, the abduction of his two daughters. Saddam gave Uday the opportunity to redeem himself by persuading the two families to return to Baghdad, tempting them with the offer of a presidential pardon. Disillusioned by the reception they had received, and arrogantly believing that they had taught Saddam a lesson, in February 1996 Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel agreed to return home with their families. For once Saddam Kamel protested against the decision of his overbearing brother, saying, “You donkey. You want us to go back to our deaths.” Hussein Kamel responded by pulling out his pistol and replying, “You will come back.”