Saddam : His Rise and Fall

by Con Coughlin

  At this point, however, Saddam remained cautiously optimistic that he could avoid a rerun of the disastrous Gulf War. In particular he calculated that he might be able to exploit the obvious divisions that were emerging in the UN Security Council over how to handle the perennial question of forcing Iraq to abide by its disarmament obligations. It was no surprise to him and most other Iraqis that the United States and Britain should be at the forefront of the new campaign to call Saddam’s regime to account. After all these countries had been Iraq’s main protagonists at the UN throughout the 1990s, consistently arguing in favor of maintaining the sanctions embargo and the no-fly zones in the north and south of the country. Saddam, however, was aware that this view was by no means unanimous. Prior to September 11 many countries, including prominent members of the Security Council, had come to the view that Iraq was being unfairly penalized and pressed for the sanctions to be lifted. Of the five permanent members, France and Russia, which had long-established and profitable trading ties with Baghdad, adopted pro-Iraqi policies, while the Chinese, who were also keen to break into Iraq’s lucrative arms market, adopted an agnostic posture.

  These divisions had been suspended in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with both Paris and Moscow offering what appeared to be unconditional offers of support to the traumatized Americans. By the autumn of 2002 French and the Russians were articulating, in public and in private, their reservations about the way in which Washington was prosecuting the “war on terror.” So far as Moscow and Paris were concerned, there was no evidence that linked Saddam’s regime directly to the 9/11 attacks and, while Iraq continued to irritate the UN with its refusal to comply with a raft of resolutions relating to its weapons programs, neither Paris nor Moscow concurred with the view that Saddam posed a viable threat either to the Middle East or to the wider world. The Russians and French received welcome support from Germany—another country that had enjoyed lucrative trading ties with Baghdad. The mounting opposition of the continental European powers to American policy was also informed by the suspicion that the Republican administration—and the deeply committed neoconservative ideologues who held key policy positions in Washington—were intent on extending American hegemony over the Middle East, and seizing control of Iraq’s lucrative oil fields. From Saddam’s perspective, these were divisions that he believed could be usefully exploited to avert military conflict, irrespective of the Bush administration’s stated objective of effecting regime change in Baghdad.

  Indeed, the Americans and Europeans needed little encouragement from Saddam to fall out among themselves. During the autumn, various attempts were made to draw up a new Security Council resolution that was acceptable to all the relevant parties, and one that took cognizance of Washington’s determination to force Saddam finally, and unconditionally, to disarm. The UN process was formally launched on September 12 when President Bush addressed the General Assembly. After detailing Saddam’s numerous breaches of UN resolutions, Bush concluded by laying down a challenge to both the UN and Iraq. So far as the UN was concerned, Bush demanded to know whether the organization had the strength to tackle Saddam. “The world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment,” he said. “Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” The comments directed at Saddam’s regime were equally uncompromising. “If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account…. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”

  Bush’s statement of intent was unequivocal. Saddam must come clean on his WMD arsenal completely or face military action. Saddam’s only hope was that the UN, as it had on so many occasions in the past, would come to his aid, and in this respect he was not to be disappointed. While Bush seemed determined on war, French president Jacques Chirac seemed equally determined to prevent it. On September 9, prior to Bush’s speech, Chirac insisted that two resolutions were required to deal with Saddam: one to send back the UN inspectors with a tough new mandate; the second to endorse military action if the UN was dissatisfied with the Iraqi response. From the outset the French were adamant that there should be no “automaticity”—i.e., no automatic trigger that would allow the United States to go to war with Iraq without first coming back to the Security Council for approval. Moreover, the French knew that they could count on the support of Russian president Vladimir Putin, who believed that a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis could be achieved through the UN (a significant concern was to ensure that Saddam repaid the $8 billion he owed the cash-strapped Russians for arms supplies). German chancellor Gerhard Schröder made no secret of his opposition to military conflict, and it formed a central part of his campaign for reelection, which he won narrowly in September.

  Faced with such indomitable opposition, American and British diplomats had their work cut out if they were to win UN approval for military action against Saddam. In Britain Tony Blair faced the added complication of having to win over a deeply skeptical British public, not to mention his own Labour Party. To boost support for the campaign against Saddam, in late September the British government published an intelligence dossier, which had been compiled with the help of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, which sought to set out in stark terms the threat posed by Saddam’s WMD programs. Although the dossier contained little new information and drew heavily on the reports published by UN weapons inspectors after they were pulled out of Iraq in 1998, the Blair government encouraged some sections of the British press to play up the threat posed by Saddam. The morning after the dossier was published, the front page of the mass-market, pro-Labour Sun newspaper proclaimed: “Brits 45 Minutes from Doom.” The front-page story stated unequivocally that “British servicemen and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare missiles launched by Iraq…within 45 minutes.”20

  In fact the intelligence provided in the dossier made no such claim. What it said, in two separate and distinct items, was, first, that “some of the WMD” could be ready “within 45 minutes of an order to use them.” But crucially, this intelligence related to battlefield weapons, such as mortar shells, which Saddam had used during the war with Iran in the 1980s. The section relating to ballistic missiles said only that Saddam was attempting to construct a missile that, if developed, might have the range to hit British military bases in Cyprus. The cautious intelligence assessments contained in the dossier were a far cry from the lurid publicity it generated, but Blair made no serious attempt to counter the rabid anti-Saddam propaganda, which he no doubt believed would help him to rally British public opinion. The Bush administration, on the other hand, did not feel the same need to justify its actions. One year after the September 11 attacks, the opinion polls showed that most Americans were prepared to give their commander in chief a free hand to fight the “war on terror,” and so long as Saddam was thought to pose a threat to American interests, no matter how ill-defined that threat might be, the American public appeared willing to back military action against Baghdad. In early October 2002 the U.S. intelligence agencies did, however, produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that reflected much of the information contained in the British intelligence dossier. The American report stated: “Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons.” It also gave the grim warning that if Saddam could acquire fissile material he would be able to develop an atom bomb within a year.

  Despite the genuine concerns of a number of Western intelligence agencies—including the French and Germans—about Saddam’s WMD programs, American and Br
itish diplomats were struggling to find a consensus at the UN on how best to deal with Saddam. The biggest obstacle to the negotiations was the French government’s refusal to countenance a resolution that would sanction immediate military action. As a consequence a drafting process that was supposed to last only two weeks dragged on for eight, and it was not until November 8 that a resolution was finally passed—unanimously—that set out the Security Council’s new policy for dealing with Saddam. Resolution 1441 called for “an enhanced inspection regime” that would be driven by a tight timetable and required Iraq’s complete and unconditional cooperation. The inspectors were to have “unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials,” and Saddam was obliged to submit “a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons” within thirty days. From Saddam’s point of view, the biggest danger was contained in the resolution’s conclusion, which stated that: “The Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.” Although the language fell well short of Washington’s earlier demand for a resolution that would automatically trigger military action if Saddam were found to be in material breach of the UN’s demands, the French also failed in their attempts to have an explicit requirement that a second resolution needed to be drafted to authorize war. For the Bush administration, of course, “serious consequences” meant war, while for the antiwar lobby it simply meant bringing the Iraq issue back to the UN for a fresh round of negotiations on a new resolution.

  Even so, 1441 constituted a serious setback for Saddam. Throughout the autumn he had engaged in his usual tactic of trying to create divisions and sowing discord among the UN’s leading member states. At one point during the delicate negotiations in New York, Saddam tried to throw the whole process into confusion by declaring that he was quite happy to readmit the weapons inspectors back to Baghdad before a new resolution could be agreed on. At the same time Saddam was working hard to increase his popularity among ordinary Iraqis. In late October he held a referendum in which, according to Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the Iraqi vice president who announced the result, Saddam had managed to win a 100 percent “yes” vote. Saddam’s publicity campaign during the referendum had been carefully orchestrated by Baath Party officials. At one polling station little girls in shiny pink dresses and scarlet lace headbands scampered around the courtyard yelling, “Pray for the Prophet! Saddam Hussein is the new Prophet!” The day after Saddam’s victory was officially proclaimed, he further sought to improve his standing with the Iraqi public by organizing a mass release of prisoners held in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. Hundreds of common criminals were released to cheering crowds that had been bussed to the prison complex by Baath officials for the occasion. The relatives of Iraqi political prisoners who had made their own way to the prison, however, were not so lucky. Prior to the prisoner release Saddam had ordered the execution of any remaining political prisoners.

  Saddam also made a television appearance in which he urged Iraqis to put up a strong defense if the Americans attacked. Any invasion, he declared, would lead to the spilling of American blood. In his address Saddam seemed to be under no misapprehension about the threat he faced, and warned Iraqis that they could soon find themselves faced with a major war—the third in his twenty-three-year rule. “I say to you that the evil of the evil-doers will never end until they are defeated amongst all mankind comprehensively, and their defeat is in the near future.” At one point Saddam displayed a glimpse of emotion when he appeared to hold back tears as, with his right hand on a Koran, he started reading an oath to preserve and protect Iraq, its constitution, and sovereignty. “The road of blood takes you to more blood and he who tries to shed the blood of others must expect his blood to be spilled.”21

  Saddam’s immediate reaction to Resolution 1441 showed that he was still prepared to indulge in a dangerous game of brinkmanship. To start with, Iraq’s 250-member parliament, a body rarely required to discuss issues of national policy, was convened and, following a two-day debate, voted to reject the resolution. There was no doubt that the event had been carefully stage-managed, and the only speech of any significance was made by Uday, who was the only member to argue that the resolution should be accepted on the understanding that only Arab weapons inspectors would be allowed to participate in the new inspection process. Uday was preparing the ground for his father to overrule the parliament’s decision, in the hope that this would give him a stronger bargaining position at the UN in the difficult weeks that lay ahead. As the parliament was effectively responding to instructions issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, it was clear that Saddam was merely using the body so that he could appear more statesmanlike when he bowed to the inevitable and accepted the resolution, which he did with marked bad grace a few days later.

  In a letter sent by Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri explaining Saddam’s decision to accept 1441, he harshly criticized the UN mandate for its “bad contents” and accused the resolution’s cosponsors—the United States and Britain—of being part of a “gang of evil.” The letter also called the UN measure illegal and appeared to dare UN weapons inspectors to find any traces of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Iraq’s bluster made little impression on President Bush who responded to Saddam’s decision by reiterating his warning that the Iraqi dictator must disarm or face the threat of an American-led war. “If he chooses not to disarm, we will disarm him,” Bush said in a meeting with his cabinet. Saddam, of course, was indulging in the same tactics of prevarication and diversion that had served him so well in the past. But if he genuinely believed that he would be able to undermine the will of the Bush administration, he was misguided. Certainly Saddam appeared to be in no mood for compromise, as his treatment of Uday later that month revealed. Reports had appeared in the British press suggesting that Saddam had entered negotiations with Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gadhafi to provide him and key members of the Iraqi government with a bolt-hole in Tripoli, in return for paying the Libyan leader hundreds of millions of dollars. Uday, who was still in charge of the al-Babil daily newspaper, thought it would be a good idea to run an abbreviated version of the article under the mocking headline “The Barking of the Dogs.” Saddam did not find it at all amusing, however, and the following day the Iraqi Information Ministry announced the newspaper had been banned from publishing for a month for violating press regulations.22 Tensions between Saddam and his errant elder son, which had caused the regime so much discomfort in the past, were still running high.

  A new team of UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq on November 27, 2003, nearly four years after the UNSCOM team had been unceremoniously thrown out. The chemical and biological inspections team was headed by Dr. Hans Blix, while the nuclear inspections were carried out under the auspices of Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Saddam was well aware that anything less than the appearance of cooperating fully with the inspectors would trigger a conflict, and he instructed his officials to be as accommodating as possible with the inspectors, even allowing them access to presidential sites that had been the cause of so much trouble in 1998. Saddam was confident that the sophisticated concealment operation that had been undertaken by Qusay since September meant that nothing of any importance would be uncovered by the inspectors, and that the brutal effectiveness of his security forces would ensure that none of the scientists involved in the various illicit arms programs would commit any indiscretions. As one senior official involved in the inspections later admitted, “The Iraqis were much better at concealment than we thought they were going to be.”23

  Much to the chagrin of the Bush administration, the inspectors reported that they were receiving “satisfactory” access to sensitive Iraqi weapons sites, although the effectiveness of the inspections was somewhat undermined when it was revealed that the UN officials were giving the Iraqis advance warn
ing of the sites they intended to visit.24 UN officials also found Iraqi scientists reluctant to be questioned in private—a condition stipulated in Resolution 1441—and that, when they were, they denied having any knowledge of banned weapons programs. The process was not helped by the deteriorating relations between the White House and Dr. Blix, a pedantic, liberal Swedish politician who made no secret of his distaste for the warmongers in Washington. Just one week into the renewed inspections, Dr. Blix publicly criticized the Bush administration for putting pressure on the inspectors to be more rigorous in their dealings with the Iraqis, declaring, “We are in no one’s pocket.”

  Despite the Iraqis’ concerted efforts to comply with the inspectors’ demands, it did not take long before Washington had the ammunition it needed to confront Saddam. Under 1441 the Iraqis were obliged to provide a full account of its WMD program, and on December 7 Iraqi officials delivered forty-three spiral-bound volumes of documents, written in English, containing 12,159 pages, six folders, and twelve CD-ROMs, claiming that they would “answer all the questions which have been addressed during the last months and years.” At the same time, and in a calculated attempt to further improve his standing with those countries that had deep reservations about supporting military action against Baghdad, Saddam issued a statement, which was read on state television, in which he apologized for the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. “We apologize to God about any act that has angered him in the past and that was held against us, and we apologize to you [the Kuwaitis] on the same basis.” He then invited the Kuwaitis to join his fight against the “armies of occupation,” i.e., the American and British troops enforcing the no-fly zones in the north and south of the country. The public apology to Kuwait was undoubtedly a canny move by Saddam, as it satisfied yet another of the conditions stipulated at the end of the Gulf War. Of course no mention was made of paying Kuwait compensation for the damage the Iraqis had inflicted on the sheikhdom during their six-month occupation. But by giving such a detailed response to the UN on the outstanding arms issues, and making the Kuwait apology, Saddam was making a direct appeal to the antiwar lobby.