The Black Prince

by David Green

  The role of archers in English victories has also been questioned in recent years and some have suggested that rather than causing the disruption and destruction traditionally associated with the English and Welsh bowmen, that archery was a less potent weapon. The disposition of these archers is a particularly vexed question, hinging on Froissart’s use of the word herce to describe their formation. All that can be said with certainty is that the archers flanked the dismounted troops and took a strong defensive position.47 This was the case at Crécy and Poitiers followed this same pattern, hardly surprising given that the prince and his commanders had seen the effectiveness of such a formation ten years previously.

  The English successes in France can be attributed to the psychological and economic effect of the chevauchée. The war was fought in the heart of France and ‘[b]y 1355 it is clear that the English were using destruction of territory as a deliberate weapon, designed to reduce the resources available to the Valois monarchy and discredit it in the eyes of its subjects’.48 Raiding tactics also meant that the English and their allies could choose the theatre of operations and, in the case of Crécy and other clashes, the battlefield itself. These factors coupled with the professional nature of recruitment to establish a highly effective fighting force and military tradition that bred success of itself.49 These battlefield tactics, although not the overall raiding strategy, were again to be useful and effective in Spain.

  Perhaps in English terms, revolution has been too closely associated with military success and that success based primarily on two battles. The Black Prince’s retinue at Crécy and Poitiers was central to English victory, forming the core of the vanguard and the heart of the army in each case. As the chief figures in the retinue fought together, the expeditionary forces developed an organised command structure and high level of discipline. It was these factors which, when used in concert with other developments in equipment and tactics, were the main elements in the early English triumphs in the Hundred Years War. As a military leader the Black Prince was both following and setting an example of ‘good practice’. It was a model primarily based on what he and members of his retinue observed in 1346. The campaigns of 1355–6 displayed courage, even foolhardiness, but the strategy may have been out of his hands in the absence of support from Lancaster. Poitiers itself was a tactical triumph and even if he was following a successful pattern, the prince must be given great credit for its success. The military aspects of the Nájera operation were more mixed. The campaign strategy was poor and it was only Enrique’s willingness to fight, and fight in a manner at odds with the advice of du Guesclin and Audrehem that gave victory to Pedro and Edward.

  The retinue of the Black Prince proved to be a highly effective military unit when used in offensive situations, although it fought its pitched battles using defensive tactics. Recruitment was rarely difficult but there were ongoing problems with regard to paying and supplying the troops, most evidently in the sieges of 1359–60 and after Nájera in 1367. Cornwall provided much of the foodstuffs, Cheshire many of the soldiers, although the recruiting captains were drawn from much further afield, and Wales a large proportion of the money. The individual success of the prince’s retinue was underpinned by a national war effort, which in Edward of Woodstock became something of a national icon. The health of the Black Prince mirrored the English military condition. The early successes were attributable to a relatively small number of commanders, many of whom found inclusion in the Order of the Garter. Many of the prince’s retinue were founder members of that august association and many others would later be granted a stall in St George’s chapel. Even when the principality of Aquitaine had been broken and the prince had died the reputation of the retinue and of its members remained. The prince himself was used, time and again, as a model by which his son should be judged and those who had fought with him, many of whom were very fine soldiers in their own right, retained something of his aura and the acclaim from Poitiers. Some of these men were soldiers through and through, but others had wider responsibilities, in local society and in parliament. Many more were members of the prince’s household and officials in the administration of his estates. That administration provided the retinue with rewards and underpinned the financial costs of the military campaigns. These two elements were inextricably interwoven. However prosaic and distant it may have seemed on the plains outside Poitiers or on the banks of the Najerilla, the victories that would follow, the opportunities to implement the tactics which would lead to the capture of King Jean and du Guesclin, came about, in part, through such concerns as demesne farming in Wales, tin mining in Devon and Cornwall, and the wine trade in Aquitaine.

  6

  The Principality of Aquitaine (1362–67)

  The Black Prince married Joan of Kent on 6 October 1361 at Lambeth in a ceremony conducted by the archbishop of Canterbury, Simon Islip. The pair had required a papal dispensation before the wedding could take place because they were related within the third and therefore prohibited degree.1 It was not the match his father had wanted, nor can it have been enjoyed greatly by a knight of the prince’s household, Bernard Brocas, a ‘tres bon chevalier qui moult grandement avoit servi le prince et pour lui tant en ses guerres que autrement avoit moult travaillié’.2 Bernard had been made an esquire at the landing at La Hougue in 1346 and fought with the prince at Crécy, Poitiers (although not in the 1355 expedition) and would do so again at Nájera. He had seen service in Normandy in 1359 and 1361, in which year he asked the prince to act on his behalf in asking for the hand of the recently widowed Joan Holland. The prince approached the countess of Kent but almost immediately married her himself.3

  Joan remains as ‘shadowy’ a figure as her husband, and like him she was not referred to by her famous soubriquet in any contemporary literature. The Fair Maid’s father was Edmund, earl of Kent, the sixth son of Edward I, and she was raised at court after his execution. It seems likely that Edward and Joan knew each other from an early age since Queen Philippa was closely involved with her upbringing. She is most renowned for her marital entanglements. After contracting a marriage to Thomas Holland, he was called abroad on military service and during this time she was convinced or forcefully persuaded by her family or the crown to marry William Montague. On Holland’s return, he found his wife married to the earl of Salisbury. His military rewards and booty enabled him to press a case before the pope that eventually resulted in the annulment of Joan’s marriage to Montague and her reunion with Holland. In 1352, the death of Joan’s elder brother led to her acquisition of the titles countess of Kent, and Lady Wake of Liddel, and Holland received the title of earl of Kent soon before his death in 1360.4

  Court and Government

  The Principality of Aquitaine was created on 19 July 1362 and formed the basis for some of the most contentious events of Edward’s career, and is the area that has received some of the least historical attention.5 This is predominantly due to the scarcity of available sources. The failure of the prince’s administration to enrol accounts at Westminster as its predecessors had done and successors would do, in addition to the loss of the Gascon register, leaves one reliant on other, more oblique documentation.

  Much of the interest in the prince’s rule stems from its consequences. The reopening of the war in 1369 has often been attributed to the poor relations established by the prince with the indigenous nobility and to the general attitude and arrogance displayed by the English administration. Sir John Chandos, who as the king’s lieutenant paved the way for the arrival of the prince and accepted the territories resulting from Brétigny on behalf of the monarch, initially established that administration. It was not a simple task; the Rouergue in particular was most reluctant to become ‘English’ as were many towns, but with no outside support they were forced to submit. Belleville was a difficult area and the French argued that it had not formed part of the treaty, and Ponthieu and the viscounty of Montreuil also proved troublesome. It is often stated or implied that, had Chandos remained
in office, the collapse of the principality might not have been so precipitous or complete, indeed that it might not have happened at all.6 The evidence for this is slim and does not take account of the very different political conditions at work in the early years of the 1360s compared to the first decade of the reign of Charles V.

  The intrinsic importance of the local nobility in the governance of any late medieval kingdom is as evident as the consequence of a failure to maintain good relations with those nobles. As Edward II, Isabella and Richard II discovered this was not always easy. How much more difficult might it have been if they had been at war with such disaffected elements for over twenty years prior to gaining power, and if the lands and reputations of those elements had been the target of one of the most thorough examples of the chevauchée and the devastation that accompanied it, which had been seen in the war up to that point?

  From the outset there was vigorous opposition to the Brétigny settlement; Pierre Bernard, count of Périgord, Jean d’Armagnac, Pierre Raymond de Comminges and Armand d’Eauze, vicomte de Castelbon, denied the right of the king of France to give them over to a new sovereign. Similarly, Gaston Fébus, always looking to play off the Plantagenets and Valois against one another, refused to do homage for Béarn, which he considered a sovereign allod and tried to assert his claim to Bigorre.7

  The principality of Aquitaine is often glibly referred to as making up about a third of all France without much consideration for what the governance of such an area would involve. It was perhaps five times as large as the duchy Edward III had inherited in 1327, consisting of 24 bishoprics, 2 archbishoprics (Auch and Bordeaux), and 13 sénéchausées. The geopolitical structure of this entity had little in common with the Gascony that preceded it and on which structures and modes of government the administration of the new territories depended.8 The principality was also very much a frontier region, not only against the uncertainties of Navarre and Charles ‘the Bad’ but also the very particular boundaries of the Atlantic and the Pyrenees. Furthermore, the hugely expanded inland borders proved only too vulnerable to assault (in those areas where allegiance was not freely returned to the French) after the collapse of the treaty in 1368/9. The traditional ‘English’ duchy of Gascony had formed a linguistic and ethnic unit while the principality was a wholly artificial political construction. Analogies might be drawn and vestigial associations made with the Angevin Empire, but although English royal memory may have been long, there was little sympathy among the inhabitants of the surrendered territories. By contrast, the Gascons, although fiercely independent, looked to England and the population did not consider itself to be occupied by a foreign power. For France, the frontier of Gascony was a march comparable to those in Scotland and Wales, with which the prince and his officials were well acquainted. Similarly, the area was also highly fortified not as a result of conquest but political fragmentation. Those castles under Anglo-Gascon control formed what has been described as the ‘nervous system of the administration’9 giving command of communications and supply routes by both road and water. Unfortunately, from the point of view of central government, sites within the old duchy and certainly beyond its borders were held by independent members of the nobility who bitterly resented any attempt to curtail their local authority either by representatives of the king of England or their neighbours.

  The principality was a complex, internally dissonant body, founded on little more than military conquest and with common traditions only so far as they might be described as ‘Angevin’. ‘L’Aquitaine repose sur un equilibre complexe où intervient tout une suite des forces différentes. Elles depend essentiellment d’une mentalité anglo-gasconne.’10

  The transition of territory and authority began in October 1360 and the first major town to be handed over was La Rochelle. There were two main tasks, ‘réorganisation administrative d’une part, d’autre part effort considérable pour assurer l’application de la paix’.11 On 1 July 1361, John Chandos was charged with annexing the new territories, and Richard Stafford and William Farley were chosen to take responsibility of the administration. Neither of these were long-term appointments: Stafford, the seneschal, had left office by 12 January 1362, and may have been replaced by Chandos in the greater office of constable of Aquitaine; Farley died on 11 September 1362 although his final accounts were not handed in until 1365.12 Several other members of the prince’s retinue were important in overseeing the transfer of territories while others were concerned with making preparations for his arrival. These included Nigel Loryng, William Felton (an old military companion of the prince’s, later to be seneschal of Poitou and the Limousin), Adam Hoghton (bishop of St Daid’s and chancellor of England, 1377–8) who was responsible for annexing Bigorre, Thomas Driffeld and Stephen Cosington.13

  The three great offices of state were the constable, seneschal and chancellor. The first to hold these offices in the principality were Thomas Felton (William’s kinsman but not his brother), John Chandos and John Harewell, the constable and chancellor of Bordeaux (1362–4).14 The seneschal was the head of government with a variety of changing duties. He presided over the council and the judicial business of the court of Gascony. The constable of Bordeaux was the next most important official accountable for financial matters. He paid the salaries of most officials, received their accounts and was guardian of the seal.15 The constables of Bordeaux came from a variety of backgrounds with previous experience in the duchy or having served the Black Prince before his arrival in Aquitaine. Bordeaux, with its population of 20,000–30,000, was the administrative capital of the principality and the constable was the chief financial minister. He was based at the castle of the Ombrière where he received revenue and made payments for which he had to account at the exchequer. He reviewed the accounts of lesser officials and had a variety of other duties, which required an extensive staff. These duties included the management of supplies and victuals, the supervision of coinage and the upkeep of castles and fortresses. Authority in Bordeaux was concentrated in a very few individuals. If they failed to be effective, it damaged the whole administration. John Streatley (in office 28 April 1348–12 September 1350 and 18 January 1354–1 July 1361) assisted Chandos with the transfer of lands and was a frequent member of the prince’s council and had also served him as an envoy. He was chancellor of Aquitaine from 1362 to 1364. Chivereston and Streatley stayed for a time at the head of the Aquitaine administration. William Farley had been keeper of the wardrobe of the duke of Gascony and succeeded Streatley as constable (20 September 1361) at the time of the handover of territories with William Loryng as his lieutenant. He travelled to Gascony around the same time as Stafford and Nigel Loryng (c. July 1361). Farley received the first accounts but died of plague soon after.16 It was after this that the administration began to develop. Bernard Brocas (not the Fair Maid’s suitor) was controller and receiver of the money due to the king at this time. He was the most experienced Englishman in south-western French financial affairs having served as controller to Nicolo Uso di Mare, John Streatley and Farley, and in 1357 he had also been keeper of the seal. He succeeded Farley on 9 December 1362 with responsibility to collect all revenues due to the king until 19 July 1362 when he had created the principality. If his activities and practice were followed by the prince’s officials then accounts were very closely scrutinised. John Ludham graduated from being the prince’s clerk to become constable. The next most important fiscal officer was the controller who was also based in the Ombrière and kept a counter-roll of the constable’s records and whose salary was half that of his superior. There was also a memorandus to guard the castle archives. Other officers included the judge of Aquitaine, the provosts with authority over towns, the bailiffs and reeves with responsibility for individual districts.17

  The centre of authority was the court and it was shaped by the character and in the image of the prince himself; ‘L’atmosphere de la cour, au milieu de laquelle il évoluait, était brillante, et il avait probablement l’habitude de s’impose
r à sa place, parmi beaucoup d’hommes de naissance et de talent. Dans ce milieu, l’exercise d’armes était une activité essentielle, et chacun s’y trouvait rompu.’18 The prince’s household and administration in England and Wales had been geared towards warfare and it continued to be so in Aquitaine.

  Every day there were more than eighty knights at his table and four times as many squires. They jousted and held revels at Angoulême and Bordeaux; all the nobles were there, joyful and happy, generous and honourable; and all his subjects loved him well because he did so much good for them.19

  The prince was accompanied to Bordeaux by a retinue of 250 men-at-arms, including three bannerets, 60 knights and 320 archers, and feed was requisitioned for 1,000 horses.20 A large number of ships were needed to transport such a retinue as well as those who had been involved in overseeing the transfer of lands after Brétigny.21 The prince was delayed until April 1363 because of the lack of available ships.22 A strong military presence was vital; frontiers had to be defended against the Free Companies and in wariness against French incursions. The military character of the court was certainly not all for show, prior to the Spanish expedition of 1367 a number of the court were involved in the battles of Cocherel and particularly in the victory for the Montfort claim to Brittany at Auray.23 Thus, while there was a formal peace between England and France (or perhaps a cold war), both countries continued to support opposing sides in extraneous conflicts.