The Black Prince

by David Green

  The role and importance of the Castilian galley fleet in the war may have spurred the prince to involvement in the civil war in 1366–7. From the end of the thirteenth century, the French and English had made diplomatic efforts to secure the support of Castilian naval power. It became of marked importance after the treaty of Toledo in 1368, which provided Charles V with the support that eventually brought him victory at La Rochelle in 1372. Throughout the decade, the Castilians raided along the English southern coast. In 1374, the Isle of Wight was attacked. In 1375, thirty English ships were burned in the Bay of Bourgneuf. In 1377, French ships collaborated with the Castilians harrying the south coast of England. Rye was captured, Lewes was burned, the Isle of Wight overrun, Plymouth and Hastings were burned and Portsmouth and Dartmouth attacked. Winchelsea and Gravesend were assaulted in 1380.51 The failure of the English to ensure there was a sympathetic ruler in Castile proved costly.

  The importance of an Anglo-Castilian alliance is, in this context, clear and may lie at the root of the prince’s willingness to be involved in the 1367 expedition. This is not, however, apparent in contemporary sources. Chandos Herald provides no clue as to the prince’s motivation except that he considered it the honourable course of action. It has been seen as an essentially personal campaign in that ‘the Black Prince was supremely confident in English military superiority and caught up in his own legend’;52 it was a long time since the last campaign, and even longer since the glory of Poitiers. According to Froissart, the prince ignored the advice of Chandos and others on the grounds that ‘c’est contre droit et raison d’un bastart couronner et tenir à terre et royaumme’.53 If this was an attempt by the prince to maintain the true order of succession, it is tempting to speculate about anxiety concerning his own family. His own legitimacy was not in doubt but his marriage to Joan was controversial. The marital entanglements of the Fair Maid of Kent may well have been instigated by her family and by the Crown, yet she was still viewed as something of a ‘fallen woman’. The prince had been counselled against the marriage by the archbishop of Canterbury for the very reason that the legitimacy of any offspring could be challenged. It turned out to be prophetic, as Bolingbroke was to question Richard’s birth. Joan’s pregnancy may have brought such thoughts to the fore. Edward of Angoulême, although still alive, was a sickly child unlikely to survive to inherit the title of king of Galicia offered by Pedro. The Nájera campaign may have been a statement associating the prince with the cause of legitimacy and particularly with the legitimacy of his newly born son, the future Richard II.

  That the English would attempt to support Pedro was probable from the moment Enrique received French assistance. The initial motivation may have come in fact from England. On 8 May 1366, Thomas Holland, the prince’s stepson, and Nigel Loryng were ordered to Gascony and further reinforcements followed behind. Negotiations were opened with Charles of Navarre, necessary because of Enrique’s alliance with Aragon, as he controlled the remaining passes through the Pyrenees.54 The prince’s own preparations were further galvanised by the collapse of Pedro’s position in Castile. The prince met Pedro at Capbreton in August and the negotiations culminated in the treaty of Libourne on 23 September.

  The prince undertook to advance 56,000 florins to Charles of Navarre on behalf of Pedro. The expenses of the prince’s retinue and those of the Gascon lords were assessed at 550,000 florins, based on the supposition that the campaign would last no more than six months. By the time the army left Gascony this figure had alreadyrisen to 1,659,000 florins (£276,500).55 The treaty proved to be a disaster and it can only be assumed that the prince knew full well that Pedro would be unable to fulfil his side of the bargain and hoped to exploit the situation once his ally was reinstated in Castile. Certainly ‘it is clear … that neither the prince nor Charles [of Navarre] put much trust in Pedro’.56

  These discussions were common knowledge and the response, at the instigation of Pere of Aragon, in January 1367, was discussions between Enrique and Charles of Navarre. Charles agreed to break his agreement with the prince and Pedro and oppose their advance into Castile. It was rescued initially only by the action of Hugh Calveley whose raids on Miranda and Puenta-le-Reina forced Charles of Navarre to return to the allied fold after having given his support to Trastamara.57

  The prince was also responsible for the defence of the principality of Aquitaine during his absence. Measures were put in place to guard against the ravages of those members of the Free Companies not involved in Spain. Much more significant was the alliance made by Louis of Anjou, Pere of Aragon and Enrique, made with the assent of Charles V, aiming to attack both Navarre and Aquitaine. James Audley remained behind and was entrusted with the defence of the principality. In addition, wider measures were put in place for the defence of Engalnd and particularly Wales. It may have been that there was a fear of a retaliatory Castilian naval raid when the Nájera campaign was underway.58

  The prince mustered his army, which numbered between 6,000 and 8,500 troops (between a third and a half recruited from the Great Company) at Dax and crossed the Pyrenees in three main groups. The lack of wardrobe accounts, the dearth of information from Aquitaine and the few remaining indentures mean that there is limited evidence for the Nájera campaign. The main source for the operation is the account by Chandos Herald, which is so complimentary of the role of John of Gaunt that it has been suggested that it was a propaganda piece to further his subsequent Castilian ambitions, although Richard II is a more likely patron.59 Edward received a letter from Enrique on 28 February that, rather than asking the prince where he wished to meet for battle as suggested by Chandos Herald, was both an attempt to placate the invaders and show Enrique’s determination to defend his kingdom.60 Previously, Enrique had requested the return of du Guesclin, then passing through Aragon on his way back to France. First, Thomas Felton led a reconnaissance mission to spy out the enemy army, based at Santo Domingo, to prevent Pedro reaching Burgos. This party included several notable members of the prince’s retinue including William Felton, two scions of comital families in Thomas Ufford (knight of the Garter) and Hugh Stafford (son of earl Ralph, who served the prince consistently from 1359), Knolles and Simon Burley. There is some confusion about which Felton led the operation; Russell states it was William, kinsman of the seneschal of Aquitaine, Chandos Herald and Froissart indicate that it was the seneschal himself, and Barber maintains that both were involved and the force was led by Thomas. As William was seneschal of Poitou, and Thomas, seneschal of the principality, it would seem likely to have been the latter that led the expedition. The contingent, made up of 200 men-at-arms and archers, was guided quickly across Navarre.61 They crossed the river at Logroño and camped at Naveretta. After trying to establish what force Enrique had established at Santo Domingo, a raid was made on the watch in which Simon Burley captured the knight in command and other prisoners were also taken. From these, the reconnaissance party established the strength of Enrique’s army and sent messengers to inform the prince. The result of these reports was what Russell describes as ‘a first-class strategic error’, but Fowler has explained in the context of the movement of Enrique’s troops and mistrust of Charles of Navarre.62 Rather than taking the safe crossing of the river at Logroño and the relatively easy route thereafter to Burgos, the prince determined to follow the road from Pamplona into Álava and then travelled south-west to cross the Ebro at Miranda. The uncertainty of the position of Charles of Navarre may have prompted Edward to open another line of communication with Gascony. After a difficult journey the army arrived, short of provisions, in Salvatierra, which surrendered to Pedro. Enrique, at this point, did have an opportunity to effectively end Pedro’s aspirations of regaining control. Had he followed the advice of Charles V and both du Guesclin and Audrehem, the English army would have been bottled up in Álava until lack of supplies forced a retreat.

  … the King of France sent letters to King Enrique urging him to avoid fighting a pitched battle but to carry on the war
in other ways, since he could be certain that the Prince came accompanied by the flower of the world’s chivalry, but they were not the sort of men to stay for long in the kingdom of Castile and would soon go away again …63

  However, to do this Enrique had to admit military inferiority. Politically it was necessary to show a position of strength and confidence to the Castilian nobility; militarily it was disastrous. The decision mirrors that taken by Philip VI in 1346. Felton informed the prince of Enrique’s advance to Vitoria. The reconnaissance party kept ahead of the Castilians and eventually halted at Ariñez. The prince led his army to Vittoria but was not met by the Castilians. Indeed, ‘The Bastard was not yet in sight, but was on the plain on the other side of the mountain.’64 In fact the Trastamarans had based themselves at the castle of Zaldiarán from where they sent out the jinetes to harass the Anglo-Gascon foraging parties and a major attack was made on Felton’s outlying force led by Don Tello, the Bastard’s brother. He may first have defeated a small unit under the command of Hugh Calveley. It was perhaps a feint that took place while the main assault was made on Felton. Alternatively the vanguard may have been attacked after the defeat of the English at Ariñez, the chronology is somewhat confused. William Felton was killed and many prisoners were taken including Richard Taunton, Gregory Sais (a Flintshire knight and captain of Beaumont-le-Victomte), Ralph Hastings, Mitton and Gaillard Beguer. The defence of Ariñez allowed the prince time to organise his defences although it seems that the measures taken to secure the army were not of the highest order since the perfidious king of Navarre successfully arranged for himself to be ‘captured’ by Oliver de Mauny, while out hunting on 11March. This event, in combination with dwindling supplies, forced the prince to abandon his position in Vittoria. Another arduous journey brought the army south-east to Los Arcos and then south-west to Navarette, crossing the Ebro at Logroño. In the meantime, Enrique had taken up a defensive position at Nájera, where he had been defeated in 1360, which had the only bridge crossing the Najerilla. On 1April, the prince replied to Trastamara’s letter of 28 February and then deployed his forces to settle the matter. This was made much easier since Enrique, in a manoeuvre reminiscent of the battle of Maldon, abandoned his highly defensive position and crossed the river to fight in a site that ‘offered no tactical advantages whatever’.65

  The prince’s troops remained deployed as they had during the crossing of the Pyrenees. The vanguard was led by Chandos and Lancaster, with the two marshals Stephen Cosington and Guichard d’Angle, John Lord Devereux with his sons and the lord of Rays commanding the English contingent of about 3,000 archers and men-at-arms; with them were Calveley, Knolles and Olivier de Clisson. The main body, commanded by the prince, contained his personal retinue, most of the troops of the Great Company, Pedro’s Castilian forces and deserters from Enrique as well as the Navarrese forces now commanded by Martin de la Carra and the Mallorcans, it may have numbered some 4,000 soldiers. Armagnac and Albret held the right wing while on the left was the captal de Buch with men from the Free Companies and Foix. Both wings contained about 2,000 men.

  Enrique’s force was perhaps half the size of his opponents’ although it was fresh and well supplied. The English forces were better equipped and had a more organised command structure. Furthermore, they had been under arms together on campaign since February and many were old comrades in arms. Of greater importance were the disadvantages of the Trastamaran army. A divided chain of command underpinned a wide divergence in skill, tactics and equipment. They had, in du Guesclin and Audrehem, an opportunity to use the experience and knowledge of two of France’s finest soldiers who were used to English tactics and military methods. They were ignored. Du Guesclin did manage to have the jinetes more heavily armoured to protect them from the English archers, but he could not convince the Castilian and Aragonese knights to fight on foot.66 Russell makes much of the national differences among Enrique’s army and while this may have undermined the structural unity of the army, it is unlikely that the Anglo-Gascon army was an example of solidarity and fellowship. The differences between the prince and his Gascon lords were already evident and the action of the prince in reducing the number of soldiers Albret brought on campaign was seen as insulting, as was his response to the prince. The ransom that Albret owed Gaston Fébus of Foix had left him in financial difficulties. The more soldiers he brought on campaign the more money he could ‘cream off’ the wages paid by the prince.

  The crucial area of battle was the right flank that attacked the Trastamaran wing under Don Tello who fled. This allowed the captal de Buch to deal with the footmen, which in turn permitted Percy, Walter Hewitt and others on the left flank to support Gaunt in the vanguard. du Guesclin was thus enclosed on three sides by the English flanks and vanguard. The main body of the army was then brought up. Enrique had been unable to support du Guesclin and now attempted to make an attack on the prince, but again the archers kept him at bay. Although Enrique rallied his troops three times, eventually they and he fled the field. The routed army was pursued to the river banks by Jaume of Mallorca and the reserve cavalry, where many were killed and drowned.

  The failure of the Castilians at Nájera was partly due to morale, numerical inferiority and surprise at the route taken by the prince from Navarette but, more importantly, it was a battle Enrique never had to fight. The invaders could have been bottled up in Álava long before they reached Nájera. Even when they arrived there it would have been entirely possible to hold the bridge over the Najerilla until the invaders’ supplies gave out. Even so, once the decision to fight was made, the conservative Castilian nobility did not make use of the knowledge their French allies had gleaned from earlier encounters with the English. Apart from the Order of the Band, the Castilian knights remained mounted, the troops and horses were lightly armoured and suffered greatly under the attacks of the English archers. The Anglo-Gascon campaign as a whole was poorly organised and certainly entered into with little thought of the consequences and cost. The manoeuvres that brought the prince’s army to Nájera exhausted his army unnecessarily and could have ended the campaign without any sort of major engagement. Nonetheless, the movement of 10,000 soldiers with their horses and baggage through the pass of Roncevalles, some 3,500 feet above sea level in the cold of February, was a logistical triumph.

  Nájera was only the second major encounter of which the prince took command. As at Crécy and Poitiers, the terrain, the disorganisation and recklessness of the enemy were vital elements in his success. At Nájera the prince was able to advance, masked by the hill of Cuentos, appearing on the Castilian left flank at daybreak, leaving a gentle downward slope between himself and the enemy.67 The knights dismounted and the vanguard advanced under the cover of archer fire. Chandos Herald describes the knights as armed with lances, which were presumably cut down. It may be that they advanced further than intended and came into conflict with the Trastamaran vanguard led by du Guesclin, which had swung around to face them and ‘caused them much mischief’. It was during this exchange that Chandos was knocked to the ground and wounded through the visor by ‘a Castilian, great in stature – by name Martin Fernandez’68 whom he managed to kill. It may have been this wound which left him blind in one eye and was partly responsible for his death at Lussac.

  The surprise gained by the hidden movement behind Cuentos gave the English a great advantage. This certainly can be attributed to the prince and/or his advisers. It is difficult to say if the tactics used at Nájera were the prince’s own or whether he simply put into practice those that had been developed by the English over a number of years. It is certain that the total lack of a command structure in the Trastamaran army allowed the English to attack them as separate units rather than a single fighting force. The vanguard, under the command of du Guesclin, was effective but enclosed by superior numbers was not allowed to manoeuvre. Victory was secured with a very small number of Anglo-Gascon casualties. According to the letter sent by the prince to his wife, which was later circula
ted in England, only Sir John Ferrers, among the English nobles, was killed. He was referring only to the battle itself, as it is clear that William Felton died in the earlier engagement at Ariñez.69 This letter provided the basis for the account of the battle in the Anonimalle and Canterbury chronicles and that of John of Reading. If the tactics used at Nájera were a culmination of those developed throughout the Edwardian ‘military revolution’ then it does not lessen the prince’s reputation. He was using a successful system known to many of his soldiers and using it to very good effect.

  That the Black Prince had some skill as a general is not in doubt, although the example of the Spanish campaign shows a limited regard either for political realities or some aspects of the subtleties of wider military strategy. As a leader of men, however, he had great personal qualities. Furthermore, he inherited a military structure that was highly effective and efficient both in the preparation for war and on the battlefield itself. English military successes, including those of the Black Prince, were due to effective recruitment, reinforcement and financing, the provision of the necessary supplies of arms and victuals, and the support of the country at large for the king’s objectives in France. On the battlefield, the prince adopted the tactics that had developed throughout the fourteenth century and, apart from in 1367, his expeditions and campaigns were part of a wider strategic plan. The prince’s retinue was extremely effective in implementing these methods. The strategy and tactics used by the prince and put into action by his retinue were to be highly influential although they were not, in themselves, innovative.70