by Gary Yee
“I could see nothing but the tall figure standing on the breastworks; he seemed to grow, phantom-like, higher and higher, assuming through the smoke the supernatural appearance of some great spirit of death. Again did he reload and discharge and reload and discharge his rifle with the same unfailing aim, and the same unfailing result; and it was with indescribable pleasure that I beheld, as we marched [toward] the American lines, the sulphorous clouds gathering around us, and shutting that spectral hunter from our gaze.
“We lost the battle, and to my mind, that Kentucky Rifleman contributed more to our defeat than anything else; for while he remained to our sight, our attention was drawn from our duties. And when at last, we became enshrouded in the smoke, the work was completed, we were in utter confusion and unable, in the extremity, to restore order sufficient to make any successful attack.”
James Tandy Ellis of the Filson Club of Louisville, Kentucky later “made long inquiry and search for the name of this Kentucky rifleman, and at last found that his name was E. M. Brank of Greenville, Kentucky, and … found his grave at Greenville.” Ephraim McLean Brank was born in Greenville, on August 1, 1790 to Robert Brank and Margaret McLean. He studied law and during the war served as a lieutenant in the Kentucky Detached Militia. After the war, Brank returned to Greenville and resumed his practice before passing away in 1875 at age eighty-four.
Several questions come to mind. Is there corroborating evidence? Why wasn’t Brank himself shot? At what distance did Brank commence firing, and, finally, is there any truth to this fabulous tale? Turning to our first question, a variation has been found from another source:
An interesting note came from a newspaper in 1840 (entitled Anecdote of the Battle of New Orleans): “A daring Tennessean, with a blanket tied around him, and a hat with a brim of enormous breadth, who seemed to be fighting on his own hook, disdaining to raise his rifle over the bank of earth and fire, in safety to his person, like his more wary fellow soldiers, chose to spring, every time he fired upon the breast work, where balancing himself he would bring his rifle to cheek, throw back his broad brim, take sight and fire, while the enemy were advancing to attack, as deliberate as though shooting at a herd of deer; then leaping down the other side he would reload mount the works, cock his beaver, take aim and crack again.”
“This he did”; said an English officer who was taken prisoner, and who laughingly related it as a good anecdote; “five times in rapid succession as I advanced at the head of my company. Though the grape whistled over our heads, for the life of me, I could not help smiling at the grotesque demi-savage, demi-quaker figure, as he threw back the broad flap of his castor to obtain a fair sight— deliberately raise his rifle, shut his left eye, and blaze away at us. I verily believe he brought down one of my men at every shot.”
Whether this account is merely an elaboration by an imaginative writer or more details from the same observer is difficult to gauge. Notable differences include the reference to jumping up and down from the breastworks and the closing of the left eye. The latter would be difficult to see at a distance or through the haze of battle.
On the next issue, how could the British 3/95 riflemen who outfought Napoleon’s finest skirmishers overlook a solitary figure standing atop the breastworks? It is unthinkable that they would ignore a prime target. For an explanation, we turn to Sir Harry Smith of Pakenham’s staff: “The American riflemen are very slow, though most excellent shots.” While marksmanship is vital, 3/95 Quartermaster Williams Surtees provides details: “[T] he enemy had been quite prepared, and opened such a heavy fire upon the different columns, and upon our skirmishers, (what had been formed for some time within 100 or 150 yards of the enemy’s works,) as it is not easy to conceive.” If we accept Pickles’ figure of 2,032 American riflemen to 546 British, or four to one, Surtees’ comment is not unreasonable.
Furthermore, Surtees provides another insight that increases this disparity: “The right column, under General Gibbs, was to consist of the 4th, 21st, 44th, and three companies of my battalion. … The left column, commanded by General Keene, was to be composed as follows, viz.—one company of the 7th, one of the 21st, one of the 43d, and two of ours.” This division further reduced the number of British riflemen facing American riflemen and increased the ratio enjoyed by the Americans to 9:1 (2,232 v. 239). Corroborating Surtees is Sir Harry: “Never since Bueno Ayres had I witnessed a reverse, and the sight to our eyes, which had looked on victory so often, was appalling indeed. … The fire, I admit, was the most murderous I ever held before or since …” This was quite a compliment considering Sir Harry had fought the Spaniards in Argentina, the Dutch, the French in Spain and Waterloo, and had seen action in South Africa (Sixth Cape Frontier War) and in India where he was knighted. Simply put, there were more American riflemen present and they simply overwhelmed their British counterparts who not only had to contend with them, but also with the American artillery. One British officer wrote: “The rifle-corps individually took post to resist any forward movement of the enemy, but the ground already named being under a cross fire of at least twenty pieces of artillery, the advantage was all on the side of the Americans.”
The battle of New Orleans.
The other question concerned the distance from which Brank commenced firing and again Sir Harry provides a clue. Detailed to a party tasked with burying their dead, Sir Harry noted: “A more appalling spectacle cannot be conceived than this common grave. The Colonel, Butler, was very sulky if I tried to get near the works. This scene was not more that about eighty yards away from them …” A British column marching at ordinary pace covers 62½ yards per minute (30-inch pace at 75 paces per minute). It would take over six minutes for a column to advance over 400 yards. The column however, stopped to return fire. Sir Harry reported: “[H]ad our heaviest column rushed forward in place of halting to fire under a fire fifty times superior, our national honour would not have been tarnished, but have gained fresh lustre.” Lieutenant John Henry Cooke, 43rd Infantry, fought at New Orleans and confirms the British halted and fired. “As this column neared the American lines, the musketry opened on them while crossing the drains which here and there intersected these flats; and as there was not the least cover, the troops began to suffer much, and opened a heavy fire of musketry, which positively obliged the rifles which led them to cling to the earth.” “Rifles” as used by Cooke is in reference to the 3/95 riflemen, who were suppressed by their own supporting infantry! It was at 80 yards distance from the American position that most British soldiers fell and were buried. Furthermore, 80 yards is generally beyond the effective range of musket-armed soldiers.
With the exception of Brank, the Americans weren’t offering a “figure of a man” and only their heads were visible from behind the earthworks. As at Breed’s Hill during the American Revolution, the British column stopped to fire when it should have rushed forward. While it is possible that Brank commenced firing from 400 yards distance, this isn’t plausible considering Brank was shooting offhand. For steadiness, rifle shooting with a roundball flintlock rifle at 300–400 yards is generally done either prone or lying upon one’s back. During the American Revolution a bugler, whose horse was both behind and between that of Lieutenant Colonels Banastre Tarleton and George Hanger, was shot from 400 yards by a rifleman who “laid himself down on his belly; for, in such positions, they always lie, to make a good shot at a long distance.” Given that Brank fired at least four times and that it takes about a minute to reload, or three minutes altogether for three reloads, the column would have, at ordinary pace, advanced 187½ yards. Add the 80 yards for where most soldiers fell and we attain a minimal distance of 267.5 yards. Since Brank “resumed his former attitude” after his first shot, some distance must be added and how much more is left to conjecture.
British Captain J. Nelson Cooke described the devastating effect of American rifle fire:
Subsequent examination of the field gave a clue to the cause of the panic. It was the wonderful accuracy and mur
derous effect of the American fire. The casualties by cannon was very few. Nearly all fell to rifles. Of those killed an appalling proportion particularly at the point nearest the lines were shot through the head. The American hunting rifles carried small balls. One of our ounce musket balls melted up and poured in their molds would make three of them. But through the head or viscera they were as fatal as any. Hitting the face or forehead, life went out as the ball went in! I had seen many battlefields in Spain and the East, fresh with carnage. But no where had been such a scene as the spot where the Forty-fourth was butcher’d.
5/60 Rifleman (left) and 95 Rifleman (right) during Napoleonic Wars
We turn now to the final question of whether a solitary rifleman could wreak such havoc. Surtees who, “was not in it … but I was so posted as to see it plainly,” provides corroboration: “[T]he right column never reached the point to which it was directed; but from the dreadful fire of every kind poured into it, some of the battalions began to waver, to halt and fire, and at last one of them completely broke, and became disorganized.” One British officer wrote: “On our right again, the Twenty-First and Forty-fourth being almost cut to pieces, and thrown into some confusion by the enemy’s fire, the Ninety-third pushed up and took the lead.” Before the battle Sir Harry noted: “The soldiers were sulky, and neither the 21st nor the 44th were distinguished for discipline—certainly not of the sort I had been accustomed to.” Seeing the 44th waver, Pakenham cried out, “Lost for the want of courage,” rode off to rally them, and was mortally wounded.
Numerous newspaper accounts provide the same account and it was repeated as late as July 10, 1861, in Virginia’s Richmond Dispatch. Another source is the (non-contemporary) diary of Isaac Bard who researched the history of Muhlenberg County, where Brank originated, and wrote: “It is said that Ephraim Brank and Edward Jarvis mounted the breastworks and there fired into the British army, as they marched up, as fast as their friends could load the rifles for them. I can see it stated lately in a highly respectable paper that Mr. Brank brought down several British officers in their march up to our breastworks at the battle below New Orleans …”
Clearly Brank did not repel the entire column single-handedly and he had the support of cannons as well as over two thousand other riflemen. This does not belittle Brank’s achievement but places it into perspective. His was the “influence on the mind” that broke resolve. With its officers terror-stricken, the men leaderless and demoralized, it is easy to see why the British column broke. British casualties being over 33 percent (2,100 killed or wounded and over five hundred captured), the prowess earned by the Revolutionary War American rifleman was not tarnished by their heirs at New Orleans. The British Medical Director’s casualty report included an interesting observation: “Of the total number (3,325) about three thousand were struck by small bullets of the type American sharpshooters used in their rifles; the rest (about 325) by missiles of artillery or by the ounce balls used in regulation muskets.”
CHAPTER 3
PERCUSSION ERA AND THE MINIÉ BALL
1817–57
“The Frenchmen were shot down helplessly by an unseen enemy.”
Technological advances
FRUSTRATED THAT THE FLINTLOCK’S FLASH STARTLED game birds, Scottish clergyman Alexander Forsyth discovered the explosive property of fulminate of mercury as a means of ignition and patented his invention in 1807. Several clumsy attempts were made to adapt Forsyth’s discovery to firearms and only after Joshua Shaw placed a small dab of it into a copper cup, called a percussion cap, was its potential realized. The cap was placed onto a nipple that was screwed into the bolster. The nipple was bored out such that when the hammer struck the cap, the cap sent a flame down the nipple and through the bolster and from the bolster to the barrel’s powder charge. Since they were more reliable and less prone to failure in the rain than flintlocks, percussion-fired firearms were adopted universally.
Bullet design was not stagnant either. In 1838 the French in Algiers found themselves coming under long-range fire from the Arab natives, whose firearms had aperture sights with several holes, each at a different height from its base and this gave the user the ability to accommodate for a varying distances. In 1838 the Duke of Orléans was annoyed by the long-range fire of an Arab sheik. He offered 5 francs to any man who could bring the Arab down. One chasseur stepped out of the ranks and after taking careful aim fired and killed him at 650 yards. What made this feat possible was a new gun invented by Captain Gustave H. Delvigne which had a powder chamber smaller than the bore. An undersized ball was dropped down the barrel and then smashed to fit the grooves by pounding it with a ramrod. Since each soldier rammed the ball down differently, inconsistent results were yielded.
Hythe School of Musketry, 1855.
Delvigne’s design was superseded by one by Colonel Thouvenin whose breech had a stud, or tige (anvil) as he called it, protruding from the bottom of the breechplug. The bullet itself was undersized to the bore and cylindrical-conical shape with a flat bottom. After inserting the conical bullet down the barrel, the soldier struck it three times with the ramrod to expand it to fit the rifling. Englishman W. W. Greener designed an undersized two-piece that when fired, drove the plug into the ball, causing it to expand and fit the rifling.
Surpassing them all was the minié ball. Named after French Captain Claude Minié, it was an undersized conical bullet with a hollow base that contained an iron cup. When the gun was fired, the cup forced the bullet to expand to fill the bore. Like Greener’s design, it was undersized and didn’t need any number of taps to seat and expand it. A rifle firing the minié ball could be loaded as quickly as the musket and was more accurate than the round-ball rifle. However if the iron base was lost, the minié would not expand. Across the pond in America, Harper’s Ferry armorer James Burton found that by thinning the base of the minié ball, the same expansion could be had without needing an iron cup or plug. It was now possible to arm every soldier with a rifle with the potential to hit a man-sized target at 450 meters. To take advantage of the minié rifle’s potential, instructional shooting schools like Vincennes in France or Hythe in England sprung up to train soldiers on how to use it. Their instructional books did reach America, but only enjoyed a limited readership. The final innovations of the era were in optics and sights. Prismatic teleometers (monoscopes) with stadia lines for rangefinding were developed and around 1861 bubble spirit level sights were introduced. The latter allowed the user to determine at a glance whether his firearm was canted.
The Crimean War
War with Russia provided a convenient testing ground for the new guns. When the British advanced on Sevastopol, the 2/95 screened their advance. On October 23, 1853, Rifleman Henry Herbert spotted a Russian officer riding a white horse. After adjusting his sights, he shot the officer who fell from his horse. Herbert thought the distance was 1,000 yards but upon pacing the distance, discovered it was 1,300. More Russian losses from long-range fire followed and Russian General Menshilkov noted, “The sharpshooting of the English riflemen caused our troops terrible losses.” Joining him in his complaint was General Edward Todleben: “At the Alma their infantry, armed with smooth-bores, could not hit anything beyond 300 paces, while the Allies reached them at 1,200 paces and more. When they got near enough to equalize the disadvantages in range, their battalions were disorganized by the allied fire.”
Serving in the trenches with the 90th Regiment was Lieutenant Garnet Wolseley who, when not working as a volunteer engineering officer, engaged in sharpshooting. He would wait by a loophole with a cocked rifle and have an enlisted man raise a forage cap on a ramrod just slightly over the parapet. The moment a Russian fired and revealed his position, Wolseley fired at the smoke. Afterwards, if the Russians commenced an artillery bombardment, it convinced Wolseley that he had either killed or wounded a Russian. After one shot, the bombardment was so horrific, that the officer of the day investigated and after learning that Wolseley was responsible, ordered him “to shut up
.” Wolseley desisted for only a while before he began sharpshooting Russian gunners or any other man who exposed himself. In a letter to his dowager aunt, he explained, “man shooting is the finest sport of all, there is a certain amount of infatuation about it, the more you kill the more you wish to kill.”
Among the 1/95 was Lieutenant Godfrey, who “proceeding in advance of his battalion with a few men, under the cover of a ridge, made such excellent shooting at the Russian gunners (at 600 yards) the men handing him their rifles as fast as he fired that, in his own words, ‘We got the credit of silencing them.’” Godfrey’s feat was substantiated by Todleben who wrote that “… the enormous losses which the enemy’s riflemen inflicted on the Russian Artillery. A perfect cloud of riflemen, hid in thick brushwood, opened a very accurate fire against our artillery at a distance of 800 paces. Some of our guns from time to time rained case on them, but the discharge only checked the fire of the enemy’s riflemen for a minute. … It was more the fire of rifled small arms than that of the artillery of the enemy which reached our artillerymen, of which the greater part were killed or wounded.”