by Gary Yee
Stadium.
Teleometer.
Wanting its own sharpshooter battalion, the British 1st Division instructed each battalion to detach one non-commissioned officer and ten men to form an ad hoc sharpshooter battalion. Commanded by Captain Gerald Goodlake, the tiny battalion was guarding the left flank when it was approached by a 600-strong Russian column. They killed numerous Russians in their fighting retreat with Goodlake alone killing five men. One man he shot through the head at 300 yards. As effective as they were, losses in the parent battalions meant the men could no longer be detailed and Goodlake’s battalion was disbanded after only two months of service.
One month later General Conrobert decided that a position known as the Ovens needed to be captured. From this position the Russian sharpshooters enfiladed the French batteries and harassed the British sappers. The Allies attacked and captured the position. Among the casualties was Lieutenant Henry Tyron, 1/95, who, in the course of the campaign, killed at least 100 Russians with 30 being killed in one day alone. Tyron had emptied his revolver at close quarters and was conspicuously standing while reloading a rifle when he was killed.
The Russians were not without their own riflemen and Colonel Reynell Pack, 7th Fusiliers, recalled losing two men to one Russian sharpshooter:
Through one of the sand-bag loop-holes a British private had been firing with, as he fancied, indifferent success, and therefore took a sergeant into consultation; the latter was judging the distance and looking through the loop-hole, whilst the private, much interested, looked over the sergeant’s shoulder. Nothing could be seen of these two men above the parapets, except perhaps the moving of their forage caps, but so judicious was the judgment and so excellent the aim of a Russian rifleman, that a shot entered the loop-hole, passed through the head of the sergeant and the throat of the private, killing both men. As the small loop-hole was scarcely visible such a shot could only have been made by the marksman calculating where the face was from the slight circumstance of a cap being observed an inch or two over the parapet, breaking the regularity of the line of defense. The two poor victims to such deadly aim were buried on the spot where they fell, and their arms and accoutrements carried back to camp.
The Indian Mutiny
The Indian Mutiny in 1857 provided another opportunity for the minié gun to show its potential. At the siege of Delhi, two Indian buglers were simultaneously shot at long range by two British riflemen. An unidentified Indian marksman nicknamed Jim the Nailer by the British was known for picking off any soldier who carelessly exposed himself. At Cawnpore Captain Atherly, 3/95, asked Rifleman Robertson to estimate the distance to a brick kiln. Robertson replied that he didn’t know, but brought Atherly’s attention to a man standing adjacent to it. Atherly adjusted his sights and shot the man through the stomach at 600 yards distance.
An interesting incident occurred involving the Black Watch (42nd Highlanders) at Secundrabah:
When the slaughter in the Secundrabah was almost over, many of the soldiers lay down under a large peepul tree with a very bushy top, to enjoy its shade and quench their thirst from the jars of cool water set around the foot of the tree. An exceptional number of dead and wounded also lay under the tree, and this attracted the notice of an officer. Carefully examining the wounds, he found that in every case the men had evidently been shot from above. The officer called to a soldier to look if he could see anyone in the tree-top. The soldier had his rifle loaded, and stepping back, he carefully scanned the top of the tree. He almost immediately called out: “I see him sir!” Cocking his rifle, he immediately fired, and down fell a body dressed in a tight-fitting red jacket and tight-fitting rose-coloured silk trousers; and the breast of the jacket bursting open with the fall, showed that the wearer was a woman. She was armed with a pair of heavy old-pattern cavalry pistols, one of which was in her belt still loaded, and her pouch was still half full of ammunition. From her perch in the tree, which had been carefully prepared before the attack, she had killed more than a dozen men.
Single-shot v. Repeaters. The quest for increased firepower was attempted in numerous ways. Multiple barrels resulted in a heavier than normal firearm. Another is to have multiple chambers, as in a revolving cylinder. These however were difficult to manufacture. A third was to load the barrel like a roman candle and have a sliding lock for each touchhole. This was proposed to the Continental Congress but no surviving examples are known. Perhaps the most innovative was the Lorenzoni rotating breechblock. Tipped downward, a cylindrical breechblock operated by a large handle was rotated away from the user to deposit powder into the breechblock and then a ball. When the handle was rotated toward the user, the ball was deposited into the barrel, and then the powder, and finally the frizzen was snapped shut and ready to fire. Safety depended on how finely machined the cylinder was with respects to the magazine. A worn cylinder meant a spark could enter the magazine. All these designs were difficult and expensive to make and it was easier to equip an army with single-shots firearms.
Repeaters were finally made practical with the introduction of the metallic cartridge, allowing for magazines integral to the firearm which, when combined with breechloading, made repeaters safe from gas leakage. When fired, the metallic cartridge would expand, sealing the breech and preventing and gas leakage toward the user. One early design was the Volcanic Arms lever action pistol which later evolved into the Henry lever action rifle of the American Civil War. Repeaters gave the infantryman to hold off many times his number and were successfully used in the Civil War and later in the Russo-Turkish battle at Plevna (1877).
Henry Heth.
Within a short period what had once been considered an extraordinary shot became easily attainable. For the first time a common infantryman could be equipped with a weapon that was accurate out to 500 yards without compromising on the volume of fire thought to win battles. The 1850s saw a proliferation of bullet designs based on variations of Captain Minié’s bullet. In America, the United States Army adopted its own minié rifle, the 1855 Springfield rifle musket. Having the technology and being able to take advantage of it was another matter. In the antebellum era Winfield Hancock sent Henry Heth an Illustrated London News clipping that briefly described the Hythe school’s rifle instruction. Using it, Heth trained his men and reported his observations, which were plagiarized and published by another officer.
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Since the effective combat range could be extended, two schools of thought emerged in Europe—one contending that armies would never again approach to within close proximity of each other since long-range fire would make casualties too high, and the other asserting that the bayonet would still decide the battle. The Second Italian War of Independence (1859) decided the issue in favor of the bayonet for the Americans.
Muzzleloaders v Breechloaders. Until the mid-19th century, muzzleloaders dominated the firearms world. They required the user to pour powder, wadding and ball down the barrel from the muzzle to load it. Generally but not always the muzzle was held upright, making the user dangerously exposed during the loading process. Early attempts at loading from the breech included a breechloading pistol and shield made for Henry VIII’s personal bodyguards. Breechloading required removal of the breechblock or some sort of a plug. This allowed the user to insert the ball and then powder from the rear of the barrel. Replacing the breechblock, the user was ready to shoot. Breechloading was faster and minimized the user’s exposure. The main problem with breechloading is that it required precise hand fitting to ensure that no gases escaped from the breech when the firearm was discharged. Being labor intensive, this was not cost effective until the Industrial Revolution and the advent of machinery.
CHAPTER 4
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
1861–65
“Man is the noblest game after all; no other chase compares for a moment with the hunting of human lives. Sharpshooters… will tell you that lion hunting is nothing to it. … Of all the pleasures I can imagine none more exciting than to
bring down your man at long range. Of course this is a serious game, yet there is nothing to be said against it if you are both patriot and marksman. For in that case you get the highest pleasure and the highest duty in one. To lie behind a stump, a heavy rifle in your hand, and the enemy within reach, and then to pick him off skillfully.”
Titus Munson Coan
THE TERM “SHARPSHOOTER” AS USED BY the Civil War soldier is almost interchangeable with skirmisher and in reading any Civil War memoir, diary or journal the reader should not assume that sharpshooter is synonymous with sniper. During the Civil War, two types of sharpshooters emerged. The vast majority were men who specialized as skirmishers and who fought in a manner much like the 5/60, Rifle Brigade, and other light infantry. The second were the specialized riflemen who fought independently and chose their own ground. These men carried target rifles or rifles that were more accurate than the standard infantry rifle.
Selecting and training sharpshooters
At war’s outbreak, Yankee inventor and expert rifle shot Hiram Berdan proposed raising a regiment of sharpshooters to the War Department. As envisioned by Berdan, sharpshooters would never fight in the line of battle, join in a charge, need a bayonet, or stand picket. Instead they would be fighting from afar, carefully selecting their targets and removing them. Armed with a breechloading double set trigger Sharps rifle, they were to be the Union’s snipers—or so Berdan thought. Calls went out and only men who could satisfy the War Department’s requirement would be accepted into the service. These men were to “at a distance of 200 yards, at a rest, put ten consecutive shots into a target, the average distance not to exceed five inches from the center of the Bull’s eye to the center of the ball.” The response was so enthusiastic that not one but two regiments were raised with a third contemplated. Besides Berdan’s two regiments, there were numerous formally raised battalions like the 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters, 1st Maine Sharpshooter Battalion, a battalion from Ohio as well as numerous independent companies that were attached to various regiments.
The First Michigan Sharpshooters lacked volunteers and used draftees to fill its ranks. This required some men to receive marksmanship instruction before qualifying as sharpshooters and the training must have been effective since almost everyone passed.
Some muzzleloading guns were equipped with two triggers. Applying pressure on the rear trigger prepared the forward or “set” trigger to be used. The “set” trigger was very light and can be adjusted in most cases, to a matter of mere ounces such that the slightest touch would discharge the firearm.
Sharps rifle carried by Berdan’s Sharpshooters. (Gettysburg Collection)
It is unknown whether Birge’s Western Sharpshooters (66th Illinois Volunteer Infantry) were required to qualify. Raised by General Charles Fremont, no evidence has been found to suggest that they did. We know from accounts at Fort Donelson that they conducted themselves much like Berdan’s Sharpshooters and were initially armed with civilian hunting or target rifles.
Initially the Confederacy did not raise sharpshooters, that need was filled by a regiment’s flank companies. This practice dates to the Colonial era when Companies A and J, the light infantry and grenadier companies of a regiment, were detailed for skirmishing. It would not be until April 1862 that the Confederate Congress authorized the raising of sharpshooter battalions. The only specification made by the Confederate Congress was that battalions were composed of select men. Select was defined neither by Congress nor the adjutant general. Who selected them and the criteria for their selection was open to interpretation. This resulted in multiple methods used by the Confederates to raise sharpshooters.
Since a company was generally a reflection of the community from which it was raised, and the men knew each other as classmates, coworkers, neighbors, church parishioners, friends, relatives, etc., they were loathe to part it for a company of strangers. As a solution, some companies were transferred regardless of the quality of its personnel. Similarly entire units were converted, like the 30th Virginia Artillery which became the 30th Battalion Virginia Sharpshooters. Draftees were inducted whether or not the draftee had any aptitude as a soldier or marksmanship skills. Some units allowed the men to vote on who transferred. Another method was for the officers to select disliked, troublesome, or sickly soldiers. In a few cases and before the practice was discontinued, men took up a subscription and hired a substitute for the sharpshooter battalion. The final and best method was to screen volunteers. Generally the candidate had to be a marksman, battle proven, and have fidelity to the cause.
Inconsistency in selection meant that the Confederate sharpshooter of 1862 was no better than his line infantryman counterpart. This did not matter to most officers since sharp-shooting meant skirmishing and that was just another onerous task that any infantryman could perform. Inasmuch as the Union brigade-level officer did not understand how to optimize the sharpshooter, their Confederate counterparts were equally ignorant and officers on both sides were still learning their trade as soldiers. There were exceptions though and in the Army of Northern Virginia, Robert Rodes’ and William Wofford’s battalions were composed of men who were carefully selected.
In the Confederate Army of Tennessee, battalions were raised by transferring entire companies into new sharpshooter battalions. No evidence has been found showing they received any specialized marksmanship training. The exception was Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s division. A veteran of the 41st Welch Regiment, Cleburne had a copy of the British musketry manual and used its methodology to train his division. He took a special interest in sharpshooting and raised his small company of sharpshooters before the Confederate Adjutant General issued the order. The father of the Confederate sharpshooter, Cleburne’s division’s reputation for marksmanship was recognized by it receiving twenty Whitworth rifles and ten Kerr target rifles—more than any other division.
Upon arrival at their camp of instruction, the Union recruit began drilling under Hardee’s Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (1861). This included marching by squad, platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments. They were also instructed on skirmishing, which called for sending men forward of the line of battle to engage and defeat the enemy’s skirmishers, pick off their officers and to dominate the terrain. The difficulty of commanding and controlling a large body of men dispersed over a vast expanse of ground was resolved by using bugle signals. This is described in one sharpshooter’s letter:
So I have been out about two miles from camp on a skirmish and Battalion drill for the first time. I was taken from my own company and put into Co. B, a company that has been here two or three months. So after we had got out into the woods the 2nd and 7th Company in the regiment were sent out as skirmishers to see if we could spy any rebels. Mind you we were on drill, not in the region of rebels. We went out a little way, deployed as skirmishers and went on at double quick. We had not gone far before the order was given to halt just as if we had seen some of the enemy. When the order to halt is given when we are skirmishing we halt and run for the nearest tree and if there is none we lay flat on our bellies so as to get out the reach of the enemy fire.
Other than the 1st Michigan Sharpshooters, no evidence has been found to support that the marksmanship instructions were provided to Berdan’s or other Union sharpshooters. Instead Berdan’s Sharpshooters conducted target practice to hone their skills:
Prize shooting was occasionally allowed, and usually created a healthy excitement among the men, as well as the visitors who were sure to be there. One of the most important of these matches was held on Thanksgiving afternoon (November 28th) between members of the target-rifle companies C, E and F, each man firing two shots off-hand at 40 rods [5.5 yards], the winner to receive $5, presented by the colonel. The day being fine there was a large attendance of public men and others who came from town to “see the Sharpshooters shoot;” the judges, Capt. Giroux of Company C and Sergt. Stevens of Company G, awarded the prize to a Vermonter named Ai Brown, his shot measuri
ng four and one-quarter inches from the center. H. J. Peck of the same company, a prominent marksman, was a close second in the match—almost a tie.
Sharpshooter training in the Army of Northern Virginia (1863–64) was more systematic and patterned after “American skirmish and French zouave drills and introduced by the commander for the government of a battalion on field, while a ‘manual of arms’ in the form of a brochure upon the system of rifle training was furnished by Maj. Gen. Wilcox.” The latter was most likely based on Appendix B of General Cadmus Wilcox’s ante-bellum (1859) treatise:
As soon as the requisite number of men was obtained, a separate camp was established, and in every respect the command was placed on an independent footing—reporting, in the case of a regiment, directly to brigade headquarters. Thus closely associated together, rank and file soon learned to know and to rely upon each other. Still further to increase this confidence, the companies were subdivided into groups of fours, something like the French army’s comrades de bataille. These groups messed and slept together, and were never separated in action, save by its casualties of disability and death. The further strengthening of this body was hoped to be accomplished by thorough drill.
Training included firearms cleaning, disassembly and explanation of every part and its function, the care of the firearm, cartridge box and ammunition, the effects of wind on the bullet, the sun on the sights, shooting uphill or downhill, an explanation of the barrel including rifling, and the diagnosing of misfires. Aiming instructions were also given and as feedback, the guns were mounted onto tripods and sighted by the soldier. His officer would then inspect the sights to check the alignment. If the sighting was defective, he would call upon another soldier who was to point out the error. Afterward the officer offered some remarks to the class. After perfecting sight alignment, the soldiers practiced dry firing.