by Gary Yee
Major William Dunlop.
The ability to accurately estimate distances was crucial since it enabled the sharpshooter to adjust his sight, as noted by William Dunlop:
The battalion was first put on drill in estimating distances. It was drawn up in line in open field; a man or an object the size of a man was stationed in front at an unknown distance, about 100 yards off, and the roll called; at the call of each name the man stepped forward ten paces, surveyed carefully the object in front, calculated the intervening space, and deliberately announced in exact figures his estimate of the distance between, and a record was made of his judgment; then the next in the same way, and so on through the entire command. The distance was increased from time to time, from one hundred to two, three, five and nine hundred yards, and an accurate account kept of each man’s judgment in each drill. The practice in this drill was continued from day to day until every man could tell, almost to a mathematical certainty, the distance at any given point within the compass of his drill. A few, however, were naturally and hopelessly deficient in their powers of estimating distance, and hence, were exchanged for others.
This was essentially the same drill taught to Civil War artillery gun layers who had to set the fuse for their shells. Those who were proficient at estimating distances next engaged in target practice:
The battalion was formed on the range, a target about the size of a man was placed in front at a distance of one hundred yards, with a bullseye in the center of about five inches in diameter enclosed within an inner circle of about fourteen inches and an outer circle of about twenty-four inches; a tripod was constructed of convenient height, with a sandbag lodged in the fork on which to rest a heavy rifle while the soldier aimed and fired, and the practice began:
The target for 100 yards, pine plank one inch thick, 2 × 6 feet.
The target for 500 yards, pine plank one inch thick, 4 × 6 feet.
The target for 900 yards, pine plank one inch thick, 6 × 6 feet.
The bullseye was enlarged, as well as the circles, as the distance was extended.
The roll was called, as in the first drill, and each man in turn stepped forward to the tripod, aimed and fired; the flag man at the target announced, by signal, the result of the fire, which was recorded; and the practice continued until the entire battalion had taken part in the drill. This practice was continued from day to day, and the distance increased from time to time up to 900 yards, with a complete record kept of each drill, until the results achieved in estimating distance and rifle training were as amazing to the brigade commander as they were gratifying to the officers and men of the battalion.
This drill originated from the British musketry manual which recommended: “the shots that strikes the target are to be denoted by flags of different colours raised above the butt.” While useful, the manual was not always followed by the Confederates and in some battalions, the requisite 60 rounds course of fire was not adhered to. “We shot two rounds apiece at the distance of 600 yards. Out of 98 shots, only five hit the board. I was one of the five and I missed the cross some distance.” The same sharpshooter described the next day’s practice. “I have just returned from our morning’s lesson of target shooting. I did about the same as yesterday and missed the board the first shot and hit it the next. There was considerable improvement in the other boys. A good number of shots struck the board. We shot at 600 yards, the same distance as yesterday.” Modernly, two shots a day is not much practice at all: the first shot dirties the bore and allows the shooter to adjust his sights or his hold for his next shot.
Sharpshooter on picket duty, Army of the Potomac.
As attrition created vacancies, it is unlikely that the replacements received any of this training since time and opportunity were lacking.
Equipment
Specialized equipment included tree-climbing spikes, as described by Berdan’s Sharpshooter Captain Stevens: “Two men in each company were also furnished with ‘climbers,’ to be used on special occasions in climbing trees.” The spikes were flat iron bars 15½ inches long and about 5½ inches wide at the stirrup. A hooked spike was on the end of the stirrup and to use the climbing spike, the sharpshooter stood on the stirrup and secured it to his shoe or boot with a leather strap and another leather strap to secure the top of the climbing spike secure to his leg. No similar example has been found for the Confederates.
Range-finding devices, called stadias, were also available. They came with a piece of string or chain attached. The user held the string or chain beneath the eye socket and held the stadia out as far as the string or chain extended. He then fitted the object into the graduated slot and looked at the number to calculate the distance.
Stadium.
Using a stadium
By necessity the cheek must be placed against the rifle’s comb to aim and in trench warfare, the slightest exposure invited a bullet. This was especially dangerous when exposing oneself in a loophole or peering out from behind a log. How the danger was eliminated is described by one soldier:
Now we would get a small stick, sharpen one end of it and slit the other end and put a small tin case looking-glass in the split (most of the boys carried them) and sit with our backs toward the Rebels and our guns stuck in the holes behind us, the muzzles pointed toward the Rebels … the guns cocked and our thumbs on the triggers. We would take the stick with the looking-glass in it and stick it in the bank front of us and whenever anything came across the gun to the glass we would pull the trigger.
By 1864, the concept was refined: “The Yankees would hold up small looking glasses, so that our strength and breastworks could be seen in the reflection in the glass; and they also had small mirrors on the butts of their guns, so arranged that they could sight up the barrels of their guns by looking through these glasses, while they themselves would not be exposed to our fire, and they kept up this continual firing day and night, whether they could see us or not.” One Union officer described it further: “There was a Yankee who came to me and showed me a small looking glass about one inch square attached to a wire that was inserted into a hole bored near the breech of a musket. Lay the musket over the works, cock the gun, looking into the glass, and when you see ahead, fire. We found we had the right thing in the right place … by using those glasses on the guns we were able to keep them from doing us any harm.” This did little to repair their broken bonds of affection and the mystic chords of memory with their Confederate counterparts.
While some Confederates were aware that mirrors were used for aiming safely, the only thing Confederates used them for was for observation:
The following incident will convey some idea of the precision of marksmanship attained by constant practice. It was told me repeatedly by Isaac Newman, one of the most fearless and truthful men I ever knew. He was the survivor of the episode. Newman and a comrade, whose name was Blake, I think, were detailed as sharpshooters in one of the rifle-pits in our front. Sharpshooters were posted and relieved at night, and but once in twenty-four hours. The attempt to reach or return from a rifle-pit in the daytime would have been followed by certain death. The pit was a hole in the ground large enough to contain two men. A curtain of earth was thrown up in front, with a narrow embrasure through which to fire. On the inside was a small banquette in front, upon which the men could sit or kneel when firing. Newman and Blake were reckless and resourceful chaps. They hit upon the device of taking a small looking-glass into the pit with them. This they hung opposite the embrasure. By this arrangement they could sit on the banquette, with their backs to the enemy, and see in the looking glass all that was going on in front, without exposing their heads.
Realizing that shooting straight at a target invited return fire, one Confederate devised a box for oblique shooting:
… so constructed and arraigned on the parapet, as it would give protection to the sharpshooters. He constructed one … 4 feet long, 6 to 8 inches square, its ends sawed off diagonally, this was placed on the parapet, at an angle of 45 degr
ees, sand-bags placed in front, to hide it from view of the enemy and protect the sharpshooter. Its test proved satisfactory, the sharpshooter had an opportunity, to get a fair sight of the Federal soldier, his aim was accurate, he fired, the smoke instead of issuing from his front, was seen issuing from our lines, from a point 2 or 3 feet to his right or left, the Federal sharpshooters, would naturally aim at this point without inflicting any damage to the Confederate soldier …
Field craft
While camouflage clothing was not invented yet, the advantage of concealment was understood and it was not without reason that German jägers and British riflemen wore green. Similarly green was selected by Berdan for the regimental uniform. Other sharpshooter units were not so fortunate and were issued the same uniform issued to other infantry and this included the 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters whose sole concession was to have black rubber buttons instead of brass ones. Some had the blue uniform but trimmed with green to signify their “sharpshooter” status. While unintentional, the gray or butternut worn by the Confederates also delivered similar results, as will be discussed later.
Field-expedient camouflage was practiced particularly by the Indians who applied their field craft and shared it. Colonel Charles DeLand, commanding officer of the 1st Michigan Sharpshooters, remembered the Indians of Company K teaching the rest of the regiment:
They, on the very first day at the front, caught on to the great advantage our enemy employed over us in the color of uniform. Ours was blue and could be seen at a long distance; while the “Johnny” (as we called them) could not be spotted at comparatively short distance, even when lying in an open field. This disadvantage to us was appreciated almost immediately that these Indians got in the field, and they would go out and find a dry spot of earth and roll in it until their uniform was the complete color of the ground before going out in the skirmish line; and if the day was wet, they would not hesitate to take mud and rub it over their clothes, for as soon as this dried a little would have what they were after the color of earth. This custom was adopted by my whole Regiment; and it was often remarked that our Regiment could do the closest skirmishing at the least cost of any Regiment in the Division.
A chance meeting made one sharpshooter the pupil of one Indian. White had been ordered to annoy the Confederate artillery and needed to cross a cornfield, across some open terrain to get to some brush where he could conceal himself:
I was very sure that if I tried to cross the opening that the rebel pickets would get a bullet into me. While on the ridge I met a Michigan soldier and he was under the same orders I was. He was a full blooded Indian. I told him that I wished that I could get down to the cover of brush but the corn was not large or thick enough to cover us from the view of the rebels. The Indian said, “Make self corn. Do as I do.” He then cut off the stalks of corn and began to stick them into his clothes and equipment. I did as he did and then we worked our way to the fence and cover of bushes without even drawing rebel fire.
Post-Napoleonic War experiments by the British Army showed that light gray was the least visible of all colors and that it blended well with the white smoke that followed a gun’s discharge. It also was excellent for towns and at Gettysburg fifteen-year-old Tillie Pierce Alleman remarked that the Confederates were “a filthy, dirty-looking set.” Her father hushed her by pointing out a nearby Confederate who had knelt to tie his shoelaces. “Oh my,” Tillie replied, “I didn’t see him! They were actually so much the color of the street, that it was no wonder we failed to notice this one.” One Union private commented on the Confederates. “They were covered with filthy rags and represented all colors of a Virginia landscape, red mud being the predominant tint. I have often wondered why we can’t see the Rebels better; now I have the answer. If this lot of Rebels had been lying on the ground we could have passed very near them and not suspected their presence, mistaking them for rocks, logs, and dirt.”
The aforementioned were incidental examples of how the Confederate gray or butternut blended well with the terrain. However, there is evidence of intended camouflage too: “The enemy skulked behind every hiding place, and sought relief in the oak leaves, between which their uniforms that there was so strong a resemblance, our men were continually deceived by them.” Other Confederate sharpshooters made efforts to conceal themselves, “We have frequently resorted to various artifices in our warfare. Sometimes we would climb a tree and pin leaves all over our clothes to keep their color from betraying us.”
Sharpshooter Edom Moon described how his squad camouflaged their position and then lured some United States Colored Troops into the open under the pretense of bartering. Instead of bartering, they ambushed the hapless men. Camouflage was also used for stalking and Union Major Joseph Stockton describes it:
I was much interested today in watching a number of Indians that belong to the 14th Wisconsin acting as sharpshooters. … These Indians had fixed their heads with leaves in such a way that you could not tell them. They would creep on their bellies a little distance, then keep quiet, then move ahead until they could get the position they were after, which was generally a log, behind which they could lie without very much exposure. They silenced the rebel cannon in front [of our position] almost entirely.
Tactics
Sharpshooting was more than shooting accurately. It also required guile to induce the opponent to reveal their location. The most convenient ruse was to place one’s hat on a ramrod and move it slightly to entice the opponent to shoot. When he did, the return fire would dispatch him. This of course required teamwork with one sharpshooter offering the bait and the other lying in wait. A Berdan’s Sharpshooter describes the ruse:
Locating the enemy’s position, four of our Sharpshooters deployed, two on each side of the road, and advance carefully through the brush some 200 yards where they lay quietly watching for further developments; but seeing or hearing nothing they rigged up a stick with a hat and coat, and shoved it out across the roadway, when instantly a report was heard and a bullet crashed through the coat. The puff of smoke seeming to issue from the center of a tree 100 yards distant, the Sharpshooters then crawled forward to either side of the road, keeping under cover as much as possible, firing at the right and left side of the tree, the result being of a very damaging character to the concealed Johnny, the receiving his quietus.
Dummies were also used to draw fire and one Union soldier recalled being deceived: “One day I and two of my companions fired for an hour at a rebel who kept forever hopping up and down behind the sand bags and calling constantly, ‘Try again, will you, Mr. Yankee?’ Finally the figure mounted up in full view, when we discovered we were cheaply sold, as the daring rebel was a stuffed suit of old clothes on a pole, while the mockery came from the real rebel, safe behind the sand bags.” It was fortunate that the Confederate did not arrange for any of his comrades to lay in wait for the Yankees to expose themselves to shoot.
After Gettysburg was captured, the Confederates occupied the town and the sharpshooters went to work in the attics of several houses. By removing some bricks, they created loopholes from which they shot the defenders of Culp’s Hill. The Yankees fought back the best they could, but couldn’t do what was necessary—drive the Confederates out with artillery, since there was a possibility that civilians could still be in Gettysburg. The Confederates relented only when they evacuated Gettysburg.
Because of their height, trees offered an excellent observation post from which to observe the enemy’s movement. Trees were used during the American Revolution as well as the Indian Mutiny. The danger of using a tree was that once detected, there was no cover to speak of and the sharpshooter was extremely vulnerable. In recognition of this danger, one Confederate officer whose men carried either Whitworth or Kerr target rifles expressly forbade his men from using trees. The men and rifles were too valuable to risk losing.
Much safer was a tower-like structure built by the Confederates on the Wilderness battlefield. “The high parapet was not only travers
ed as often as every ten or twelve feet, but was enclosed on the rear, so that the line was divided into a series of spare pens, with the banks of earth heavily riveted with oak logs. From space to space was what looked like a wooden camp chimney. But in truth was an elevated post for sharpshooters with a little loophole in front.” During the Union siege of Vicksburg, a Lincoln log tower was built by Lieutenant Henry C. Foster. Known in XVII Corps as “Coonskin” for his coonskin cap, Foster was reputed to be the best shot in the army. As the Confederate artillery had been silenced, there was no fear of the tower being shot down. Besides shooting from it, mirrors were mounted to enable the Union mortar men to drop their shells into the Confederate trenches. Naturally the Confederates shot out the mirrors but they were replaced nightly. Ordered to silence the Rebel sharpshooters, Foster “went out once at night-time, crept up toward the Confederate defenses and built himself a burrow in the ground, with a peep hole in it. There he would frequently take provisions with him and stay several days at a time, watching for the Confederates.”
Rifles
Many recruited into Berdan’s Sharpshooters had been allured by a promise that they would have telescope-equipped Sharps breechloading rifles. The Ordnance Department didn’t have any available and offered Berdan the Springfield rifle musket. First, scopes were not mass produced and in America were individually hand made. Second, having Sharps shut down the carbine line to produce rifles would not only slow down the delivery of carbines for the cavalry, but result in a lull in production while the line was converted over to produce rifles.