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11 See Waschefort (n.8), pp. 39–52.
12 Bloom, M., Horgan, J., and Winter, C., “Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Propaganda, 2015–2016” (February 2016) 9(2) CTC Sentinel 30.
13 Ibid., at 31 –emphasis in original.
14 Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (5 June 2015), A/69/926* –S/2015/409, para. 7.
15 Boko Haram styles itself the ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’, and pledged allegiance to ISIL in March 2015. The group is based in Nigeria, but also active in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.
16 World Report 2015: Nigeria, Human Rights Watch (2015).
17 Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (n.14), para. 232.
18 Beyond Chibok, UNICEF (2016).
19 Child Trafficking: The Nature of the Issue, UNICEF, as quoted by Valentine, S., “Trafficking of Child Soldiers: Expanding the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” (2003) 9 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 109, at 109.
20 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol, 2237 UNTS 219.
21 Tiefenbrun, S., “Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children” (2007–2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 415, at 418–419.
22 Kane, J. and van de Glind, H., Training Manual to Fight Trafficking in Children for Labour, Sexual and Other Forms of Exploitation: Understanding Child Trafficking (UNICEF, 2009), p. 15.
23 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2225 UNTS 209.
24 Kane and Van de Glind (n.22), p. 14.
25 Article 3(d) of the Palermo Protocol (n.20).
26 For further discussion of child trafficking see Dottridge, M., Kids as Commodities? Child Trafficking and What to Do About It (Lausanne: Terre des Hommes, 2004).
27 Schabas, W.A., “Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum” (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 592, at 603.
28 Article 77(2) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 17512; Article 4(3)(c) of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609.
29 Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I (n.28).
30 Article 4(3), Additional Protocol II (n.28).
31 Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (n.4).
32 Sassòli, M., Bouvier, A.A., and Quintin, A., How Does Law Protect in War: Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 1999), pp. 214–217.
33 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2173 UNTS 222. See further, Drumbl (n.9), above, at pp. 136–139; and Waschefort (n.8), above, at pp. 91–96.
34 Article 4(1) of the Child Soldier Protocol (n.33).
35 Article 1 of the Child Soldier Protocol (n.33).
36 Article 2 of the Child Soldier Protocol (n.33).
37 Article 3 of the Child Soldier Protocol (n.33).
38 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90.
39 Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute (n.38).
40 Bassiouni, M.C., “The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities” (2000) 75 International Law Studies 3, at 20; and United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, “Summary Record of the 4th Meeting”, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (20 November 1998), para. 54. However, in the much criticised judgment of Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction, SCSL-2004–14-AR72(E) (31 May 2004), the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled that the crime had indeed so crystallised as early as 30 November 1996. For a critique of the judgment see Waschefort (n.8), pp. 108–115.
41 See Waschefort (n.8), pp. 98–102.
42 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol (n.20).
43 Ibid.
44 Article 38(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (n.4) –emphasis added.
45 Article 38(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (n.4).
46 Article 3(d) of the Palermo Protocol (n.20).
47 Article 3(c) of the Palermo Protocol (n.20).
48 Article 3 of the Child Soldier Protocol (n.33).
49 Schabas, W.A., An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 50.
50 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa SCSL-04-14-A (28 May 2008), at para. 141.
51 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol (n.20).
52 Rios-Kohn, R., “The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges” (1998) 5 Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 139, at 139; and Valentine (n.19), at 118–119.
53 ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182, 2133 UNTS 161.
54 ILO Forced Labour Convention No. 29, 39 UNTS 55.
55 For information on this concept see, Melzer, N., Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009).
56 IHL provides that a direct participant in armed conflict is a legitimate military target for opposing forces. As such, as soon as a child is a direct participant it may be lawfully killed by opposing forces. Yet, the use (as opposed to recruitment) of the child in armed conflict only becomes unlawful once the actions of the child meet the threshold of DPH.
57 See, for example, Waschefort (n.8), pp. 5–9.
12
Tracing the emergence of ICT-enabled human trafficking for ransom
Mirjam van Reisen, Zecarias Gerrima, Eyob Ghilazghy, Selam Kidane, Conny Rijken and Gertjan Van Stam1
Introduction
A new form of the commoditisation of human beings, called ‘human trafficking for ransom’, emerged in 2009. It involves the “abduction, extortion, sale, torture, sexual violation and killing of men, women and children” for the purpose of extortion.2 This form of trafficking utilises information and communication technologies (ICTs) as part of its modus operandi. How the technical innovations of ICTs relate to (and facilitate) this crime is important for a proper understanding of this new form of trafficking.
The exponential growth in the networking of people through ICTs is deeply influencing societies.3 With diminishing costs and increasing volumes of traffic, ICTs have become ubiquitous, and their services now reach almost all remote areas in developing countries. Telecommunications network operators are increasingly targeting mass markets with high-volume, low-price business strategies. Moreover, ICT services are also becoming globalised and standardised. These processes have resulted in global standards and harmonised regulations, aligning mobile operators and equipment producers. As a result, digital (social) media can be accessed by anyone in nearly any country (Yahoo messenger, Yahoo mail, Gmail, Gmail chat, Facebook text messaging, Facebook messenger, Skype, Skype messaging, Viber text messaging, Viber calling services, WhatsApp text messaging, and GPS services). The standardisation and harmonisation, combined with powerful computing and low-cost handsets, has enabled the explosive growth of the mass mobile market on a global scale. While this is generally regarded as a common good, it may also be a mediator of new threats to societies.
This chapter assesses how ICTs have impacted on the forms and scope of human trafficking, with particular reference to their enabling of a new form of trafficking – human trafficking for ransom. It is argued that these new technologies (and their increased accessibility and reach) have fundamentally changed the modus operandi of traffickers who trade in human beings. ICTs such as mobile phones and mobile money transfers have given traffickers the informatio
n and networks with which to run their operations, a means by which to extort ransoms, and a way of receiving payments, while protecting their anonymity. This chapter sheds light on the disruptive nature of ICTs, especially in terms of their ability to spread the impact of traumatising information (shared by mobile phones, Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, and on the Internet) to whole communities and the diaspora globally. It uses as an explanatory framework the concept of Amartya Sen of capabilities as a determinant component of social justice and freedom.4
Human trafficking for ransom
A new form of human trafficking, initially identified as ‘Sinai trafficking’ in reference to the location where it was first observed, was defined in 2012 by Van Reisen et al.5 and Van Reisen and Rijken.6 One of the key objectives of trafficking is to make money, in this case by extorting ransom payments. The extortion is achieved by forcing human beings held in captivity to contact relatives by mobile phone to demand ransom for their release. This constitutes human trafficking.7 The pressure on relatives is exacerbated by torture, which is also conducted while the victim is on the phone. In the Sinai, the torture has been extremely cruel, and many victims died until 2014, when the practice in the Sinai seems to have stopped.
The victims of Sinai trafficking were men and women of all ages, including young children, babies (some born in captivity), and the elderly. Although the majority were young adults, during the period of research (2009–2014) the median age became increasingly younger. Torture was executed for a prolonged period of time, often for a number of months, and sometimes for over a year. The cruelties included electrocution, beating, hanging, burning, chaining, prolonged exposure to the sun, severe sexual violence, forced drug use, malnutrition, water deprivation, sleep deprivation, light deprivation, and threats of killing.8 Many victims died from the torture. An estimated 25, 000–30,000 people passed through the Sinai as victims of human trafficking in the period 2009–2013, and 20–33% of these victims died as a result of the trafficking.9
The majority of victims of the Sinai trafficking were from Eritrea. The Eritrean refugees were often smuggled or trafficked from within Eritrea.10
Involvement of trafficking networks and powerful groups
Many people trafficked to the Sinai were abducted from Sudan. In Eritrea and Sudan, these abductions were allegedly mainly, but not exclusively, perpetrated by members of the Rashaida tribe, who were involved in the transport of people for the purpose of trafficking. The Rashaida tribe traditionally live on the Red Sea Coast in territory spanning Eritrea and Sudan. The Rashaida are recognised in Eritrea as an official tribe. They have a special arrangement with the Eritrean regime and leadership, which allows them to move freely across the border. The Rashaida tend to operate particularly in areas where the Eritrean military have operational border control on the ground.11 This freedom of cross-border movement has facilitated all kinds of trade, including in human beings.
According to the victims of Sinai trafficking, the transportation of people was accompanied by transportation of weapons.12 The Eritrean military leader in charge of border control, General Manjus, has been associated with the initiation of the development of the business of human trafficking involving Eritreans.13 The International Crisis Group stated:14
In the face of growing desertions, Manjus allegedly sub-contracted border policing to remnants of the Rashaida paramilitary groups active in eastern Sudan that were previously trained by Eritrean forces and were backed by Asmara before the 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.
They reportedly deployed on both sides of the border to fire at deserters. “Unlike the conscripts, they had little compunction in killing deserters. But soon, they started detaining them, and ordering [them] to contact families inside [Eritrea, asking] for a ransom to avoid execution”. The money reportedly was paid in Eritrea to Manjus’s representatives, mostly members of the Eritrean Defence Forces.
Reports by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea have repeatedly pointed to the involvement of military and security forces in controlling the border and operating a smuggling network through which refugees are abducted and extorted.15 The smuggling combines arms and people.
Sinai trafficking: modus operandi
Sinai trafficking has been extensively described in exploratory research by the Israeli organisations, the African Refugee Development Centre (ARDC), and the Hotline for Migrant Workers.16 In all of the cases investigated by the ARDC, the extortion for ransom was executed using mobile phones. The ARDC report that the traffickers called family members of the victims and made them listen to the victim being tortured. The torture was a key element of the modus operandi of the traffickers.17 Several studies focused on Sudan, identifying Eritreans as comprising the majority of victims, sometimes in combination with Sudanese and Ethiopians.18 These studies report the consecutive selling of victims in a series of transactions and for consecutive amounts of ransom demanded by different groups of human traffickers.19
These studies show that the amount of ransom demanded by Sinai traffickers rapidly increased from when the phenomenon was first reported in 2009 to when it (reportedly) stopped in 2014. In 2011, the ARDC reported: “$3,000 for smugglers, and $7,000 asked additionally from family”. These amounts were confirmed by Weldehaimot, who also found that payments ranged from “$2, 500–3,000 for smuggling while traffickers demand additional money ranging from $5,000 to $10,000”.20 Van Reisen et al. reported ransoms of up to US$ 30,000.21 Lijnders and Roberson reported that “ransom is demanded in Sudan and after deportation to the Sinai victims are released only after ransom payment of up to $50,000”.22 Amnesty International reported ransoms of up to US$ 30,000 demanded from families.23 Some of the factors that may have driven prices up include the increased availability of information on the market for human beings as ‘commodities’, more targeted interventions to bring more human commodities into the Sinai, an increase in the intensity of torture practices, and an increased willingness to pay by victims’ families, relatives, and friends as the phenomenon became more well-known and the trauma more collective. The role of ICTs in the process needs to be further examined to be understood.
Differentiation in the ransoms demanded according to nationality were also reported. Weld-ehaimot found that “[v]ictims from Eritrea or Ethiopia paid traffickers directly or indirectly an average of $2,672, while those from other countries, mostly Sudan, paid an average of $741”.24 A differentiated ‘tariff’ for ransoms was also reported by Van Reisen et al., with victims being auctioned and prices determined, among other things, according to nationality.25 Eritreans attracted higher ransoms than other nationalities. Furthermore, ransoms were demanded for people who had already died; and people for whom ransoms had already been paid were not released in safe environments, as a result of which many survivors disappeared or died before reaching safety.
The combination of increasingly higher ransom amounts being demanded, the collection of serial ransoms, the diversification of ransom tariffs according to nationality, and the unscrupulous focus on profit, without any ethical considerations, highlight the dehumanised ‘market nature’ of the trade in human beings in the Sinai.26 The modus operandi of Sinai trafficking should be considered within the broader framework of widespread and systematic forced labour and detention, as well as punishment by association, in Eritrea, which qualifies as slavery, and constitutes a crime against humanity, according to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea.27
Human trafficking for ransom in Asia and Latin America
In 2009, a similar form of human trafficking for ransom was reported in Thailand and Malaysia by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate (Committee on Foreign Relations).28 The victims originated from Myanmar. As in the Sinai, the victims were forced to contact their relatives to pay ransom for their release. The Committee on Foreign Relations identified the involvement of the Malaysian authorities, who reportedly hand over the refugees to traffickers. Szep and Marshall describe a similar form of trafficking as in th
e Sinai and identify beating as a method of torture used.29 Amnesty International describes a similar method of trafficking in Mexico, where ransoms are demanded over the phone.30 The three locations in which trafficking for ransom has been identified (Mexico, Sinai, and Malaysia/Thailand) all have 2009 as the starting point. The logic of this timing requires further examination and may well be linked to the expansion of low-cost ICTs, such as mobile phones.
ICTs as an enabler of human trafficking in the Sinai
ICTs provide the traffickers and smugglers with the means to co-ordinate and do their work effectively. They use ICTs to facilitate intelligence gathering, for negotiations on the routes, including with local security authorities, and to effect transactions. These technologies are accessible, available, affordable, and easy to use and operate, without the need for technical training or education. They also, to a large extent, allow the user’s identity to remain hidden. To be able to use these technologies, one needs to be textually and digitally literate. It is difficult to imagine contemporary human trafficking for ransom and smuggling operations being realised without the use of ICTs for communication and mobile money transfers.
The areas refugees have to travel through are rugged and largely monitored and controlled by the smugglers. The smugglers use ICTs to network with the traffickers, who are then able to ‘turn up’ to pick up refugees as follows:
Traffickers and smuggling mediators keep in touch with the families by phone or through the internet. They risk their family’s life in Eritrea if they are identified so they work in total secrecy and by using codes. The mediators exchange code names and numbers with the traffickers and in turn pass these to their clients. It is with these codes that the traffickers and the people to be smuggled meet. Smugglers and mediators use the internet to pass information of new developments within Eritrea. For instance, if there are new checkpoints installed across the country.31