Similarly, for many realists, “unless a nation is equipped with sufficient military capabilities and material resources, the exercise of its soft power only creates a hollow voice in real world situations” (Lee, 2010c; p.14). It seems this is actually well understood in India. As Indian author and proponent of the soft power concept Shashi Tharoor explains (2008: p.43) about mistakes in past Indian policy: “the great flaw in Nehruji’s approach was that his soft power was unrelated to any acquisition of hard power; and as the humiliation of 1962 demonstrated, soft power becomes credible when there is hard power behind it.” Simply put, no one wants to emulate an example of a weak or poor state. Rothman (2011: pp.56–7) is absolutely right when he says that a critical category for any country’s soft power is “success”. Other countries are prone to embrace certain norms, ideals and policies of another state when they see such qualities are the source of prosperity and strength. As Rothman observes in the case of America, “countries emulate the US culture of policy practices abroad because of an innate attraction based on success” (ibid: 57).
In this sense, Nye’s narrow definition – according to which soft power entails only culture, political values and foreign policies – is incomplete. Consequently, it is necessary to expand the definition to include more elements. Even if the core soft power resources are intangible, material assets also form the country’s power of attraction. Soft power legitimises states and increases their attractiveness in the eyes of others. In the absence of economic or technological achievements, the state can promote its success in culture or political organisation, but a country’s soft power comes from myriad sources.
If the difference between soft and hard power is not tangibility, then what is that allows us to distinguish between the two? Nye claims (2011b: p.19) we need to differentiate between “power resources” and “power behaviour”, as “misunderstanding and much of the criticism of [his] theory comes from confusion between these two.” This means that soft power derives not only from specific resources but also from the certain behaviour of states that is seen as legitimate and attractive by others. It is a matter of possession balanced with use. Hard power works through coercion, command, and threats to realise its aims; soft power works through persuasion, attraction and seduction. In this sense, hard power resources, including military assets, can be a source of soft power if they are used properly. In other words, “the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.35).
In behavioural terms, Nye explains, (2011b: p.19) “resources often associated with hard power behaviour can also produce soft power behaviour depending on the context and how they are used. Command power can create resources that create soft power at a later stage, for example, institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid.” For instance, military tools can produce soft power for a country when they are used in a humanitarian mission (e.g., in 2004, the US and India used their naval forces during the rescue operation after the tsunami in Asia), dispatched for the UN peacekeeping missions or holding joint exercises with friendly armies. Some scholars propose a certain category of “soft military power” to describe military behaviour that generates soft power (Ladwig III, 2010). On the other hand, “misuse of military resources can undercut soft power” (Nye, 2006: p.11). Likewise, economic resources can create soft power when offered as development assistance or foreign direct investments, but the same such assets would undermine soft power when used as a threat of economic sanctions or withdrawal of capital. Nye observes (2006a) that “Economic strength can be converted into hard or soft power: You can coerce countries with sanctions or woo them with wealth.”
In the same vein, misuse of soft power resources does not enhance national power. On the contrary, it can create tensions and undermine hard power. Aggressive promotion of one’s culture can be seen as cultural imperialism, endangering traditions and values of other countries. Imposition of liberal cultural norms on a traditional society may be seen as coercive and threatening and can be resented and rejected. In fact, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) theory of the “clash of civilizations” attributed major conflicts along cultural and religious lines. The offensive promotion of one’s ideology, be it communism, democracy or capitalism, could become a serious source of tension between states with different political and economic systems. One recent analysis of public diplomacy of East Asian countries found “the struggle for soft power in Asia may deepen mistrust and increase the potential for hard-power conflict in the region” (Hall and Smith, 2013: p.2). Even if “there is far less conflict of interests in the process of soft power” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.28), such rivalry and tensions in soft power domain cannot be totally excluded.
It can be claimed that soft power behaviour is, in fact, more important than soft power resources. Some scholars have actually made it a core of their soft power definition. Mingjiang Li (2009: p.3) suggests understanding soft power in behavioural terms as “soft use of power”. As he explains, convincingly: “Analysing the drawbacks but adhering to the core propositions in Nye’s theoretical framework, soft power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power.” In other words, the major source of soft power is not what a country possesses, but how it uses such attributes. According to the Chinese scholar, “if culture, ideology and values can be used for coercion and military and economic strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better approach to soft power is how resources are used rather than associating resources of power as soft or hard. In essence – he suggests – soft power lies in the soft use of power to increase a state’s attraction, persuasiveness, and appeal” (Li, 2009: p.7)
This idea is correct when it is understood that soft power resources can be used in a hard power manner; conversely, hard power resources can be used in soft manner. This “soft use of power” approach does not mean a soft state; rather, it implies one reluctant to use force and coercive measures extensively and without a legitimate reason. In behavioural terms, a country’s soft power comes from certain actions and policies seen as legitimate and in line with dominating rules and expectations. Therefore, soft power is what makes a state attractive in the eyes of others.
Who Has Soft Power?
There are many actors that can accumulate and project soft power. At the state level, agents of soft power can be either public institutions or private actors: business communities, non-government organisations, cultural association, universities, the media, or intellectual or cultural elites. At the basic, non-state, level, every citizen is a primary agent of soft power, as each individual’s actions can influence the country’s image abroad. It is argued that non-state actors actually have more influence on the country’s soft power, as they have more channels of communication and often possess greater credibility to act.
Although the government is the most powerful player in the soft power domain, it may not be in full control of all soft power resources. Private actors can reinforce a country’s soft power and support government efforts – or undermine them. Pakistani nationals organising heinous terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 severely damaged the image of Pakistan abroad; the vile gang rape in Delhi in December 2012 broadcasted a disturbing message about India to the world and sabotaged the officially promoted image of the country. However, an Indian composer winning an Oscar for his movie score, or writers winning the prestigious Man Booker Prize, enhance India’s attractiveness. Although many of these activities take place without government involvement, states can use the success of their citizens for nation branding. At a minimum, the government should not undermine the soft power created by private actors (Nye, 2004: p.17).
At the international level, soft power is an attribute of state and international organisations, private actors, international non-government organisations, and multinational corporations. Fr
om an international relations perspective, the most interesting and important actors are the states, percolating through the different ministries, agencies and representatives. Here, the question arises as to why, if all states can have soft power, some have more of it than others and how those with less can improve their positions. Is soft power only a privilege of major powers, or can it be equally accessible to all states? And is it restricted only to countries adhering to certain ideologies, cultural ethos, and political and economic systems?
Because soft power is an American proposition, originally devised as a strategy for the sole superpower operating in unilateral world order, it is sometimes claimed that the concept will not work well for other countries functioning in a different context and circumstances. It is argued that the concept serves best to the hegemonic state and “soft power seems to be most relevant when considering the strategy and behaviour of the leading power (or perhaps powers) in a relatively hierarchical international system” (Kearne Jr., 2011: p.76). Soft power works here as a “transmission belt between the leading state and its followers” and new states entering such a system “are likely to construct their domestic and foreign policies to harmonise with the prevailing norms and values” (ibid).
This observation is valid in many ways. A hegemonic power has the best access to multiple channels of communication, and the greatest voice in international institutions, so it can influence global public opinion and promote norms and values aligned with its interests. This, however, does not mean that other countries cannot accumulate significant soft power. The superpower is privileged naturally in every domain, including soft power, but other countries can aspire to a similar position.
Recent experience shows that, in fact, many emerging and middle powers have embraced soft power strategies, often challenging the dominance of the sole hegemon. In the last two decades, soft power has become a fashionable concept not only in the EU and European states, but also in Japan, China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea, Venezuela and others (Thussu, 2013; Kearn Jr., 2011). This shows that soft power is neither the exclusive privilege of major powers nor of Western countries; rather, it can be utilised by all actors aspiring to play a larger international role.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese have eagerly embraced soft power in their international strategy. As a rising power, China has found it to be a helpful tool in mitigating the fears of other countries regarding its fast development. As a result, in China, “soft power has become one of the most frequently used phrases among political leaders, leading academics, and journalists” (Li, 2009: p.1). As Joshua Kurlatnzick (2007) enthusiastically claimed in his famous book, Charm Offensive, China’s soft power made remarkable success, outpacing even the US in favourability among many Asian countries. This activism has pushed other Asian states to invest more in their soft power. One can even observe a new soft power rivalry in some regions. As argued by Hall and Smith (2013: p.1): “There are two arms races happening in Asia today: one for military capabilities and another for weapons of ‘soft power’.”
The rising interest in the soft power concept means that it is no longer an American idea confined exclusively to the Western world. As many countries try to adopt the concept to local conditions and implement their own version of soft power, its definition and scope has changed to accommodate diverse perspectives. In the Chinese interpretation, for instance, soft power “means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (Kurlantzick, 2007: p.6).
The discourse on soft power has been de-Americanised and enriched by the particular “national” character of many countries (Thussu, 2013: 24). Indeed, it should not be seen as unexpected, as many have pursed similar policies long before the contemporary concept of soft power was developed. Interestingly, many found the new terminology helpful to better explain their behaviour and policies. The pertinent question, however, remains: Why do some countries have greater soft power than others, and what decides their actual position?
Nye gives three conditions for countries willing to accumulate soft power. These are: “those whose dominant cultures and ideals are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism, autonomy); those with best access to multiple channels of communication and thus more influence over how issues are framed; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance” (Nye, 2004: pp.31–32). While the second and third conditions seem quite understandable, as credibility is widely appreciated and access to communication channels is an obvious technical requirement, the first element is more controversial and subjective. It may be argued that the selection of “prevailing global norms” of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy are derived from Western liberal countries and are not necessarily widely embraced in the world, especially in many Asian or Arab countries, which emphasise a collective ethos.
Another proposition of elements that decide soft power comprises a longer and more detailed listing of a country’s characteristics in the domestic and international domain. In external relations these include: respect for international laws, norms and institutions; fundamental reliance on multilateralism and disposition against excessive unilateralism; respect for international treaties and alliance commitments; willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good; and liberal foreign economic policies. Internally, countries must demonstrate pronounced social cohesion, an elevated quality of life, freedom, sufficient opportunities, tolerance, an alluring lifestyle, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism and pluralism, as well as a functioning government and bureaucracy (Gallarotti, 2011: p.30). It is apparent that the list of domestic prerequisites clearly prefers Western democratic countries, and as such, the standards can be contested in many developing nations. Still, as long as the definition of “global norms” is shaped by the West, it will retain an edge in terms of soft power.
It appears that there is less controversy when deciding the elements generating soft power in a state’s foreign relations. This stems from a minimal common understanding of shared values and norms of international relations that is based on the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Human Rights Declaration. Policies help protect and promote these internationally agreed laws and foster multilateral solutions and cooperation reinforcing a state’s soft power. Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, which oversees the largest comparative survey of public perception of different countries – the BBC World Service Poll – noticed in 2006: “It appears that world public opinion does not look kindly on governments engaging in suspicious nuclear activities as is the case of Iran, becoming more authoritarian as in the case of China and Russia, frustrating the needs of their immigrants as in the case of France, or occupying another country without international approval as in the case of the US. On the other hand countries and regions that engage the world primarily through soft forms of power such as the case of Japan and Europe tend to get good marks” (BBC, 2006).
It seems that India fulfils many requirements to be a soft power. Nye himself did not devote much attention to India in his analysis, as he initially did not see it as an important power. He observed, however: “Asian countries have impressive potential resources for soft power” but still “lags behind that of the U.S., Europe and Japan, but it is likely to increase” (Nye, 2005).
Moreover, Nye recognised Mahatma Gandhi as the “greatest example of soft power” and pointed to the superiority of his peaceful struggle over the violent and less successful hard power strategy adopted by Yaser Arafat (Nye, 2004: p.123). He expressly underlined the importance of the Indian democratic system as one area in which India has a powerful edge over China, despite lagging behind in terms of economic development and lifting millions from poverty. According to him, the “democratic
constitution and political structure” mean that India “has passed a test that China still faces” (Nye, 2006b). He observes, however, that even though “India benefits from democratic politics, it suffers from overly bureaucratised government” and its reputation is burdened with the problems of the long standing dispute over Kashmir” (Nye, 2005).
How Does Soft Power WEork?
Soft power is not a mere theoretical concept but a practical tool bringing tangible benefits. Still, the accumulation of soft power is not enough to influence the behaviour of other states. Possession of relevant resources constitutes only soft power potential, which would need to be translated into actual power through concrete actions and policies. This requires an effective “power conversion” of resources into strategies that produce outcomes the states seek (Nye, 2011b: p.20).
It is not always easy to convincingly prove how soft power translates into concrete benefits. What is the link, if any, between cultural attractiveness of one country and the decision about it by other countries? How can respect for another country’s political values influence policy affecting that country? If one country supports the legitimate policy of another country, is it because the latter is a soft power or because it agrees with the policy outright? Why is it so difficult to show clear correlation or causation between one country’s soft power and other country’s decisions?
India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy Page 3