In contrast to hard power, which can directly change the behaviour of another state through force, threats, or inducement, soft power rests on non-physical, non-threatening and non-forceful means and mechanisms to influence the preferences and decisions of other international actors. Moreover, “soft power works indirectly and its influence is most likely to have visible effects primarily over the long term, and it will have limited relevance in discrete attempts to alter behaviour in the short term” (Kearn Jr., 2011: p.70). Soft power is more subtle and invisible, and unlike coercion and threats, aims to change the preferences and interest of other states, which cannot happen overnight. It needs more time to show progress but, at the same time, its effects are more durable. Because soft power works indirectly, it is also more difficult to prove that it is the sole cause of influence and change in the behaviour of a foreign actor. That also explains why “benefits of such soft power are much more difficult to ascertain and evaluate” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.40).
According to Nye (2011b: p.16), there are three major co-optive means through which soft power works: “agenda setting, persuasion and attraction”. Rothman (2011: p.56) suggests two mechanisms through which the power of attraction influences others’ behaviour: norm diffusion and discourse dominance. Rather than commanding or coercing others to do what one wants, a country can use its “power of attraction” to co-opt or persuade others to want the same. In other words, a country with strong soft power will find other countries more willing to accept its leadership role regionally or globally, open up to cooperation and support its objectives in the international arena.
As Nye (1990b: pp.166–7) explains:
If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will follow it more willingly. If it can establish international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power.
This was well demonstrated in the case of Poland’s support for the US intervention in Iraq, in 2003. Polish society’s enthusiasm for America helped Poland’s government make a decision to unanimously back the US invasion in Iraq, a counter to most of its European partners. There was no serious political opposition, no massive anti-war protests and anti-US movements, unlike in other European countries, which only made it easier for Polish authorities to send one of the largest military contingents to Iraq. Certainly, there were other interests and elements at play, but without strong US soft power, Poland’s support would have lacked such resolve.
Soft power can be helpful in preparing the ground for certain foreign policy decisions and gathering required international support to ultimately legitimise one’s foreign policy. As there is diminished tolerance for the use of force in the 21st century, soft power is a less-costly means to exercise power in external affairs, both in economic and political terms. As Nye (2011b: p.16) argues, “If a state can co-opt other states to comply with its objectives through persuasion, it can save on sticks (use of force) and carrots (use of economic assets)”. It stands to reason that “almost all military and economically superior states use soft power resources to further their global influence and legitimize their position” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.32). For instance, when the US did not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003, or any links between the Saddam Hussien regime and Al-Qaida, the Bush administration tried to legitimise the intervention in terms of bringing freedom and democracy. This strategy, however, was not well received, as soft power clearly cannot justify all actions.
As perceptions matter today more than ever, soft power is important not only for realising political aims but also for gaining economic benefits. That explains why countries started to invest heavily in nation-branding exercises. Each wants to be seen as a stable, credible partner and attractive market. A positive image is important to draw more foreign capital and attract more tourists and students. For instance, one Ernst and Young study found out that “countries with strong ‘soft power’ brands attract significantly more foreign direct investment” (EY, 2012a).
Along with attraction and persuasion, which can shape preferences of other states, the second means to influence the behaviour of others is through agenda setting. Agenda setting, called the “second face of power”, is not forceful manipulation of others’ preference, but of their acts through more subtle and invisible control of available options within a given system. By framing the agenda, soft power can limit the number of alternative options available and exclude those that are the least preferable. As Nye writes, “a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases” (Nye, 1990b: p.168). Although agenda setting is confined to traditional diplomacy, soft power is important to directly reach the foreign public in order to explain and justify one’s own position on crucial issues.
The initial decision of George W. Bush to frame the intervention in Iraq in 2003, in the context of “the war on terrorism”, helped him to gather a strong “coalition of the willing”, even though it was organised without the consent of the United Nations and many countries remained doubtful about the soundness of the presented arguments to justify the invasion. Similarly, Western domination, in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and its leading role in international climate change negotiations, trade talks and development cooperation, makes it difficult for developing countries to secure or legitimise their interests.
Influence over agenda setting would be extremely important for countries such as India, seeking a greater role global financial and political architecture. This explains, for instance, why BRICS countries challenge the existing international system, in which they are under-represented, and form their own coalitions to oppose Western supremacy. Establishment of the BRICS financial body, the New Development Bank, in 2014, is a case in point. India joined other emerging powers to form the BASIC forum (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) to oppose imposition of the Kyoto Protocol on developing countries at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. This also explains their preference to work through new financial forums, like the G-20, when discussing reforms in the financial system. For the same reasons, agenda setting is an important means to defend against US dominance in the world. As correctly underlined by Nye (1990b: p.155): “Proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behaviour of states. Thus, the critical question for the United States is not whether it will start the next century as the superpower with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants.”
Agenda setting is closely linked to manipulation of discourse in international relations. In the information era, states can influence public opinion by controlling dialogue. The established agenda influences opinion on what is just and what is no,t in regard to pressing issues like climate change, that involve multilateral negotiations and talks. This allows governments to appeal directly to foreign public opinion, hoping that civil society can exert internal pressure on its own governments to change certain decisions along the wishes of the prevailing soft power nation.
Competition to dominate discourse is well illustrated in the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Since the very beginning of the conflict the primary Russian news TV station in the English language –Russia Today – presented a vastly different image of the developments than was available in Western media sources, attempting to influence the conflict narrative. Indeed, the information war has become almost as important as the military conflict it seeks to describe; it is a strategic stand-off, fraught with diplomatic
tension. Russia understood well the power of perceptions and attached great importance to this soft power tool with designs to challenge the Western domination over global public opinion.
Naturally, soft power has a number of limitations. It is important to remember that soft power is relational, and like any kind of power, “it always depends on the context in which the relationship exists” (Nye, 2004: 2). This means its effectiveness is highly influenced, not only by objective circumstances, but also by subjective evaluation of its interpreters and receivers. Certainly, the message content is as important as is the nature and character of the target of soft power policies: what is attractive to one country may not be equally appealing to others. For instance, the so-called “Beijing Consensus”, which allows China to combine a closed political system with an open market economy, may be an attractive model for other authoritarian regimes to follow, but it is seen with suspicion by democratic states. Similarly, India’s reluctance to embrace the Western idea of democracy promotion seems disappointing to many in the West (Wagner, 2010; Malone, 2011a), but may be appreciated by other developing states, which oppose political interference from abroad. The fact that certain political and economic reforms preclude economic assistance granted by the European Union may be seen as a comprehensive support by some and as neo-colonial policy by others. Promotion of certain cultural or social norms can be received differently among different countries but also by different constituencies at home. In fact, there are very few universal values and standards that are highly regarded by all political actors and that would serve as a source of soft power in all circumstances.
To further complicate matters, one needs to distinguish between elites, who take part in the decision-making process, and the general public, whose control over the decision-making process is limited and indirect. In this way, soft power inevitably operates at different levels. Some soft power policies, like exchange programs, sending experts in the framework of technical assistance, or Track II dialogues, are directed at country elites. And still, nurturing a positive attitude towards another country’s culture or values via decision makers does not guarantee that such elites will adopt a decision favourable to that country. As Nye (2004: p.12) admits, “the fact that Kim Jong Il is alleged to like pizza and American videos does not mean he will abandon a nuclear program,”—as expected by the US government.
Most soft power activities – from cultural promotion to media broadcasting to development assistance – are, however, targeted at foreign societies at large. And yet, generating goodwill amongst the public, through different soft power instruments, does not assure their governments will make decisions expected by the nation exerting soft power. The fact that Bollywood movies are popular among Pakistanis does not necessarily mean that the Pakistani Army will renounce its idea of India as an “existential threat”. The ruling elites of countries may simply have different interests to those of the general public and go against the preferences of its citizens, at least for some time. It is more difficult in democratic countries, as Richard Nixon learned over the Vietnam War or, more recently, George W. Bush over the invasion of Iraq. In both cases, public opposition and criticism of official government foreign policies made each respective president’s approval ratings decline and helped end foreign interventions.
The positive thing is that, with the strengthening of democratic systems around the world, and the growth of social media and ongoing empowerment of the citizens, this gap between elites and citizens is narrowing. This suggests that the effectiveness of soft power will further increase in the future, if current global trends continue. Public diplomacy and direct work with foreign public opinion will become ever more important.
The many reasons discussed above explain the challenge to wielding soft power. Changing long-held perceptions and old stereotypes of other countries requires continuous effort and a diverse toolbox. And the results are often disappointing. As one recent analysis found, despite the heavy investment of the Asian states in public diplomacy to augment their soft power, this strategy has “had little or no positive effect on foreign public opinion to date” (Hall and Smith, 2013: 1). To have better results, countries need to first improve their soft power potential at home and then expand to strengthen soft power tools in external relations. It would require resolution of persisting problems and internal conflicts that produce a negative perception of the country abroad. Providing wealth, prosperity and security to its own citizens is the first condition for a state to be seen as more attractive to outside observers. The more successful a country is in its overall policies, the stronger soft power it has. In this sense, soft power cannot simply replace hard power: it can complement it and sometimes compensate for some deficiencies in its hard power domain.
In practice, states employ a wide variety of tools and policies to project soft power, influence the perceptions and preferences in other states and sway the agenda of international forums. The most common are economic diplomacy, public diplomacy, cultural promotion, foreign development assistance, scholarships and academic exchanges, promotional campaigns, TV broadcasting, and the use of diaspora.
Moreover, it is crucial, when nurturing soft power, to lead a coherent and firm foreign policy in which soft and hard power reinforce, rather than contradict, each other. There is nothing more dangerous to a state’s credibility than hypocrisy and double standards in international affairs. If a state promotes a benign image abroad that is contradicted by its confrontationist policies, its soft power will be undermined. Actions speak louder than words and, as Nye warns (2004: p.110), “public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for the projection of hard power is unlikely to succeed.” As observed correctly by Hall and Smith (2013: p.12): “When there is a gap between how a government describes itself through public diplomacy and how foreign audiences perceive its foreign policy, this disconnect between words and deeds can create a backlash.” This was precisely a case, for instance, with the US policy of promoting democracy in the Arab world, which, at the end of the day, led to a steady rise of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and most of the world in the post-2003 period.
How Can Soft Power be Measured?
Due to its very nature (subjective, relational, intangible, etc.), soft power is difficult to measure. It is far easier to count the number of tanks and other weapons a state has at its disposal than to assess the attractiveness of one’s culture or the legitimacy of its foreign policy. Measuring GDP and other economic indicators is less complicated than the quantification of ideational objects like values. As Nye explains, soft power is more like love – no one can clearly define it but all experience it in our everyday life (2011b: p.9).
Still, scholars who reject soft power on the grounds that it is unquantifiable overlook the fact that even hard power provides many theoretical and practical difficulties and cannot be measured precisely. What constitutes greater might: one nuclear weapon or one thousand tanks? Billions spent on defence or on technological research? Thus, hard power, too, is contextual and not easy to measure. Soft power is the same, only more nuanced.
Despite these objective difficulties, there are some methods scholars employ to evaluate soft power. Nye, reassures, “it’s quite possible to quantify sources of soft power” and, as an example, suggests to “measure and compare the cultural, communication, and diplomatic resources that might produce soft power for a country” (Nye, 2006a). In this way, one would tally the number of diplomats on service in different countries, additionally assessing how many are engaged in soft power policies. Also, the budgets of ministries of foreign affairs should be compared and the spending on cultural promotion or development assistance specifically calculated. Although this approach would be helpful in assessing commitment of countries and resources invested in soft power projection, it would reveal little about the results of this policy, or about soft power itself.
An appropriate tool to assess a country’s overall soft power is public opinion polls, which show how oth
er nations perceive the given country in various dimensions. If soft power is the “power of attraction”, then “polls are first good approximation of how attractive a country appears” (Nye 2004: p.16). This method, however, is not without serious flaws.
First, these surveys are frequently conducted by Western institutions, and thus can be biased towards the liberal Western perspective through specific framing of the questions. Secondly, these surveys concentrate mostly on Western countries and major powers and thereby neglect the views of many developing states. Therefore, while it is quite easy to compare what people think about the US in different corners of the world, it is hard to find reliable data on perceptions of Tanzania, Vietnam or Bhutan in a similar spectrum. This creates obstacles in comparisons of the attractiveness of countries, especially those less developed. Another practical problem is that many surveys are not held at regular intervals; thus, they provide only sporadic insights and not a cohesive, uninterrupted trend in views about a given country. Finally, although polls can tell something about a country’s attractiveness, they are useless in assessing that same country’s influence on other aspects of soft power – agenda setting. To conclude, public opinion polls are certainly not a perfect measure, but so far, there is no better alternative.
For instance, since 2005, the BBC World Service has conducted one of the most useful and reliable global public surveys. It assesses the perception of 16 countries and the European Union in over 20 states from all continents. Therefore, it shows not only the attractiveness of given states among a large pool of respondents but also trends of their perceptions abroad. The survey asks respondents whether they see a given country’s influences as “rather positive” or “rather negative” in international relations. The poll in 2013 included a total of 26,299 citizens across 25 countries who were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone, and the margin of error per country ranged from +/- 3.0 to 4.9 per cent (BBC, 2013). This overarching survey can be complemented by country-specific surveys (for instance, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, measuring perceptions of the US worldwide) the occasional regional poll (like the Chicago Council public opinion survey of five East Asian states in 2006), or more regular national public opinion pools.
India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy Page 4