India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy

by Patryk Kugiel

  Immediately before India’s independence, soft power thinking was revived due to the renaissance of Hinduism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and offered strong moral justification of the independence movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. For instance, Swami Vivekananda – a Hindu spiritual leader in the latter half of the 19thcentury, foresaw India’s future role in the world as that of a “messenger of peace, that of a catalyst for creating a just and moral world order” (Dixit, 2003: p.17). Mahatma Gandhi, who practiced the philosophical notion of non-violence, also saw soft power as a legitimate and effective tool for India to use in international affairs. “I am not pleading for India to practice non-violence because it is weak” – he said – “I want her to practice non-violence being fully conscious of its power. No training in or collection of arms is required for realization of this strength”. (Quoted in Dixit, 2003: pp.17–18). Likewise, people like Sri Ramana Maharishi, Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore also influenced thoughts along these lines about India’s role in the world.

  In contemporary India, there are three or four major streams of thinking about strategy security and foreign policy issues. Each of them has a distinct perspective about the greatest strengths of India and the best use of force in external relations. According to Rahul Sagar (2009: p.801), the four competing visions of India’s place in the international system include: “Moralists, who wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action; Hindu nationalists who want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilization; Strategists who advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities; and Liberals who seek prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence.”

  For another Indian scholar, Kanti Bajpai, there are three major strategic paradigms: Nehruvianism—espoused by idealists influenced by the thinking of India’s first Prime Minister, who wanted to pursue a policy based on moral principles; Neoliberalism—promoting economic interdependence as a means to stabilise and secure the world; and Hyperrealism—advocating military power as the most significant element of statecraft. Finally, an American author, Stephen Cohen (2003: p.56), suggests another categorisation of the Indian thinking on foreign and security relations: Nehruvian tradition—representing idealism, (with its variation as Gandhian – more idealistic, or Nehruvian – more militant); Realists—who concentrate on the country’s material resources; and Revitalists—who believe in the great Indian civilization as a major strength of the modern India. These different groups propose three major visions of India in the international order: “Firm India”—pursuing a forceful policy; “Conciliatory India”—willing to compromise and cooperate, and “Didactic India”—advancing policy to change perceptions of friends and foes alike (ibid).

  Referring to these traditional schools in the more recent terminology of soft power is neither easy nor perfect. But in general, it is proposed here to identify proponents of soft power with Nehruvianists, Moralists and Idealists—whereas, hard power thinkers would include Hindu nationalists, Hyperrealists and Realists. The closest to today’s notion of smart power would possibly be neoliberals and pragmatists (see Table 1). In this sense, one could assume that the idea of smart power – entailing a pragmatic combination of soft and hard power strategists – could find many supporters in India.

  Table 2.1: Select Views on Indian Power

  Soft power Hard power Smart power

  Rahul Sagar Moralists Hindu nationalists Neoliberals Strategists Neoliberals

  Kanti Bajpai Nehruvianists Hyperrealism Neoliberalism Neoliberalism

  Stephen Cohen Nehruvianists (Didactic India) Realists (Firm India) Revivalists (Conciliatory India)

  Major characteristic Moral-based foreign policy. Use of force as the last resort.

  Civilization, culture and spirituality as assets of India. War is inevitable in international relations and military power is a precondition for success and survival.

  Trade and economic interdependence can lead to prosperity and peace.

  India should develop material power – both military and economic. Mixing soft and hard power resources into an effective strategy.

  Source: Author’s own compilation

  Stephen Cohen (2003: p.53) may actually be right in claiming that “Pragmatism, realism and idealism exist side by side” in Indian strategic thinking. Others would rather claim that after the Cold War, the neoliberal thinking about foreign relations became the most popular school in India (Bajpai, 2003; Sagar, 2009). Still, analysis of newspapers and articles over recent years suggests that the foreign relations discourse was heavily influenced by hard security and defense specialists. However, there is also an observable revival of soft power thinking in India. To better comprehend the recent trends, an evolution of the role of power in Indian foreign policy over the last decades is summarised below.

  India as a Soft Power: 1947–1964

  India gained independence from the British on 15 August 1947. From the beginning, it embraced a foreign policy platform characterised by idealism and moralism. It sought to play an active international role grounded in certain norms and values rather than power politics. This soft power approach, as we could say in today’s terms, was a result of several elements coming from India’s limited material capabilities, strong civilisational base, historical experiences, role of personalities and geopolitical situation. Therefore, this was not a result of naïve idealisation of international relations, but in fact a practical adjustment to reality (Sikri, 2009; Nayar and Paul, 2003).

  First of all, India joined the community of nations as an underdeveloped and poor country. Not surprisingly, it tried to realise its global ambitions by highlighting the richness of its culture and virtue of its values instead of the misery of its economy. It accordingly pursued a foreign policy agenda backed by the power of moral arguments rather than arguments of power. Being relatively stronger in terms of intangible assets, but weak in terms of material resources, India used soft power to compensate for its hard power deficiencies. As correctly observed by Nayar and Paul (2003: p.17) “despite the handicap of the lack of material capabilities, the Indian elites attempted to play a leadership role on the basis of soft power, defined in terms of diplomacy and ideological appeal, rather than hard power, defined in terms of economic and military capabilities.”

  India’s sense of self-importance was based on its geographic and demographic size, as well as the heritage of its ancient civilization. It was one of the largest and most populous countries in the world and one of the first to regain independence after World War II. Indian leaders thought of their country not as a normal state but rather as a civilization that could usher in moral values and ethical standards into international relations. The pacifism of Buddhism and the tolerance and assimilating capacities of Hinduism formed the basis of India’s idealistic outlook towards world affairs. Indian leaders saw this unique ethical value as entitlement to a major power status and invitation to play a leading role in world affairs. Self-confident India expected the world to acknowledge this special moral position and follow its lead.

  Secondly, India’s post-independence views on external relations were shaped by the non-violent struggle with British colonial rule. Peaceful victory over one of the major world powers substantiated the claims that neither a strong army nor economic potential were indispensable to be effective in world politics. In fact, the day the British left “was Indian soft power’s finest hour” (Hymans, 2009: p.244). At the same time, the colonial experience made India’s worldview anti-colonial and anti-imperial; it imprinted a deep mistrust towards European powers, which in 1947 were still holding most of their Asian and African colonies. The experience of colonisation caused India to embark on the self-imposed crusade again colonialism and imperialism. Hence, India’s claimed objectives included assistance to other nations to gain independence and end oppression.

  Thirdly, the human factor played an exceptionally important role in shaping India’s external relations. The foreign policy of indep
endent India was largely designed and implemented by one man – Jawaharlal Nehru – the first Prime Minister of India (1947–1964) and the first Minister of External Affairs. In fact, he was responsible for preparing India’s policy much earlier, as Gandhi entrusted him with the foreign policy formulation for the Indian National Congress in 1927 (Dixit, 2003: p.10). He was one of the main leaders of the non-violent struggle and a close disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, sharing many aspects of his idealism. Nehru sincerely believed in the special role for India in international order. According to him, India was a country that could spread peace to create an international system based on justice and moral values, and help eradicate imperialism, colonialism and discrimination.

  Finally, it is important to be cognizant of the practical geopolitical context of 1947. The world was recovering from the most devastating war in history, which manifested the brutal consequences of politics based on hatred, racism and militarism. A new international order, with the nascent United Nations, was emerging, and gave many people hope that a different international system was possible: one that would be more peaceful and cooperative. At the same time, however, the alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was over, and bipolar confrontation seemed inevitable. Indian leaders were concerned that opting for any side in this new division would further constrain the country’s freedom in international affairs and would not best serve its interests. In this sense, Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was not only driven by idealism but was also a pragmatic adaptation to the global situation. Nehru “had faith in his strategy, because he felt it was in tune with fundamental trends in world history” (Hymans, 2009: p.248). Moreover, he managed to attract other countries to follow suit and carved out a significant sphere in the bipolar world. As Dixit observed (2003: p. 19):

  Nehru’s assessment was that India should keep away from the Cold War power politics, should remain committed to its own democratic terms of reference for national consolidation in order to maintain international peace and stability and to meet India’s own national interests. This approach evolved into ‘non-alignment’ becoming the guiding principle of India’s foreign policy, and, ultimately, found manifestation in the creation of Non-aligned Movement.

  During the first few years after independence, India focused on consolidation of its territory, defining relations with its neighbours, especially Pakistan and China, establishing close ties with developing countries and keeping the right distance from the evolving confrontation between the West and the USSR. The basic principle of Nehru’s strategy was non-alignment, according to which India had to pursue an independent and autonomous foreign policy. Concurrently, he sought to influence world affairs by proffering ideas of peace, equality and cooperation. His explanation of foreign strategy in the Constituent Assembly of India on 8 March 1949 can be also read as a declaration of a soft power approach:

  India is a country with tremendous vitality which it has shown through its history. It has often enough imposed its own cultural patterns on other countries, not by force of arms, but by the strength of its vitality, culture and civilization. […]What are we interested in world affairs for? We seek no domination over any country, domestic or other. Our main stake in world affairs is peace, to see that there is racial equality, and that people who are still subjugated should be free. For the rest we do not desire to interfere in world affairs and we do not desire that others should interfere in our affairs (Quoted in Dixit, 2003: pp.32–33).

  Hence, India pursued a soft power approach in which it tried to develop friendly relations with all countries, or at least with as many as possible. It presented itself as a force for peace, an opponent of war, and a spokesperson for other post-colonial countries. It supported decolonisation politically and materially, criticised Western imperialism and was among the first to condemn the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa at the UN forum. Despite being a poor country, it provided aid to other developing countries and established institutions to promote Indian culture. At first, when other major powers followed the U.S. acquisition of nuclear weapons, India insisted on denuclearisation and universal disarmament – a policy that later changed. It was a firm believer in multilateral negotiations and a staunch supporter of the United Nations as a prime global body to make international affairs just.

  The principle of non-alignment was consequently endorsed and built up a Non-Aligned Movement – a coalition of countries forging a third way in the international order, between the U.S. and the USSR. In 1954, the India–China Agreement formulated five principles of peaceful co-existence of countries. These then became the basis for discussion at the 1955 international conference of Asian and African countries in Bandung; and, in 1961, the principles were endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement at the Summit in Belgrade. Along with Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslavian Leader Joseph Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the spiritus movens of the new organization and the one who gave it a specific character. The formation of NAM was an important personal success for Prime Minister Nehru and probably the finest hour of Indian diplomacy at the global level.

  Yet, adherence to Asian solidarity and idealism were not always easy and did not always work in India’s interests. For instance, India declined, in the name of Indo–Chinese friendship, the historic American offer to replace China in the Security Council in the early 1950s (Dixit, 2003: p.56), and the Indo–China agreement on Tibet only benefited China (Mohan, 2011). India’s position alienated Western powers and facilitated the U.S. alliance with Pakistan. Its soft power strategy eventually led to a defeat in war with China in 1962, when Nehru underestimated the realpolitik thinking of its northern neighbour and ignored increasing signals of an arriving military confrontation.

  Even before that, Indian leaders realised that unconditional loyalty towards firm moral principles in foreign policy was increasingly difficult, and, on many occasions, it involved risking national interests and security. As a result, despite its calls for peaceful solutions to international problems, India reverted to a hard power approach when other strategies failed. This shift in approach was reflected in the case of the first war with Pakistan in 1947, the annexation of the Princely state of Hyderabad in 1951, and of the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961. In the context of growing political and economic ties with the Soviet Union, Nehru did not condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, even though he was very critical about the intervention of France and Britain in Egypt over the Suez crisis around the same time. This sent mixed signals about Indian policy and exposed its double standards.

  As Dixit (2003: p.67) admitted to the Western governments’ criticism, India’s stance on the Hungarian and Suez crises “negated New Delhi’s claims that its foreign policy was based on moral principles”. As he explains further (ibid):

  This criticism was (and is) valid at the apparent and normative levels, but it was the first major manifestation of India acting firmly to safeguard its perceived national interests. It also reflected the fact that India was realizing that international politics is essentially an amoral phenomenon governed by power equations and vested interest. India could not become an exception to this general predicament in international relations if it had to safeguard its interests.

  Although Nehruvian India failed to achieve its grand objective of using soft power to change the dynamics of global politics, it came closer to success in this effort than many would have imagined (Hymans, 2009: p.259). In its pursuit, India amassed goodwill and legitimacy among many developing countries and made its voice heard in multilateral forums, which far exceeded its material potential. For instance, India was chosen as a Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the Korean conflict in 1953; it successfully mediated behind the scenes to bring about the Indochina Peace Agreement in Geneva in 1954; and it was selected as the Chairman of the UN Control Commission for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. As Dixit (2003: p.47) concluded, “India’s acceptability as a reconciliatory and mediator was
both remarkable and illogical because this credibility and diplomatic success of India had nothing to do with its economic resources or military power.” Clearly, India credited its high international standing to its soft power. It had yet to learn, however, that soft power without hard power does not yield lasting success.

  China’s aggression was a final blow for Nehru, and a lesson of realism for Indian foreign policy makers. Nehru confessed his mistake in the Indian parliament in 1962, saying: “I want you all to realize the shock we suffered during the last week or so. We were getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it” (quoted in Muni, 2009: p.19). This event was, as some experts call it, “a revenge of realism” to Nehru’s pacifist and idealist foreign policy, which forced India to “modify its foreign policy in important ways in the direction of realism” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.151).

  The lost war with China was not the only problem for the Indian foreign policy’s mixed legacy during this period. India’s soft power approach enabled it to punch above its weight in international relations, and it amassed a number of friends among developing countries, but neither yielded substantial tangible benefits. The developing world played a marginal role in major international issues and could not provide India what it wanted most – elevation to global power status, or capital and technology necessary for economic development. Trade with the developing world was limited and it could not replace the Western market for Indian products. Its principled and idealistic foreign policy had irritated and alienated Western powers, which in turn ignored India’s larger aspirations and instead pursued a policy, as Nayar and Paul (2003) call it, of “regional containment”, in the form of supporting India’s regional rival, Pakistan. Initial enthusiasm for international law and the United Nations led to disillusionment when the UN Security Council acted in favour of Pakistan during the first war over Kashmir in 1948. India’s pursuit of the autarkic model of development made little progress in terms of economic growth. Instead of changing international order, India had to change its own foreign strategy. Soft power was to be replaced by hard power.