India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy

by Patryk Kugiel

  Third, India has gathered more friends and allies to support its multilateral initiatives. One example of this is the vote, in 2011, for India as non-permanent member of Security Council. With the exception of China, India extracted support for its permanent membership in the UNSC from all permanent members – the largest support ever. Although there is little hope for imminent reform of the UN, India’s popularity is undeniable. Interestingly, during his 2010 trip to Delhi, US President Barack Obama vocalised that India is not an emerging power, but “already emerged”; yet another recognition of its global aspirations. At the same time, India still has the capacity to play a larger role among developing countries. Its development assistance to Africa and direct investments in many parts of the world has created sizable goodwill for the country. India’s role in Africa is not fuelling tensions and suspicion as China’s engagement there does. Even though India now is less recognised for idealistic policy, as it was renowned for during the Cold War period, its newfound pragmatism and realpolitik is what calls the day in the 21st century, and is thus well understood in many states. Especially outside the Western block, India’s adherence to NAM principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs of other countries. is better appreciated than the more patronising attitude of Western powers. This can pay off in oncoming battles regarding climate change, the new development agenda or trade negotiations. Also, financial benefits from a rising number of tourists, remittances and foreign direct investments are other tangible benefits from soft power. More detailed analysis of the effectiveness of certain soft power tools and policies is given below in two very different case studies.

  Success Story of Indian Soft Power: Afghanistan

  Afghanistan is often presented as the best proof of Indian soft power effectiveness or “civilian” strategy in the post-2001 period. Instead of contributing troops to the international mission, India chose a low profile strategy based on strong diplomatic support for the new government of Hamid Karzai, civilian engagement in reconstruction, and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. As observed by Hymans (2009: 249) Afghanistan “became the first case study of complex soft power strategy in Indian foreign policy.” Major elements of this approach were the significant development assistance, education and cultural cooperation, focus on trade and investments, diplomatic support, and stronger people-to-people contacts. Since 2002, India has committed over US$ 2 billion for reconstruction, and has established the largest scholarship program for Afghan students ever.

  Afghanistan is an important security and strategic partner for India. Both countries share a long history of civilisation, cultural and societal ties. Common interest in combating terrorism and building a “prosperous, democratic and stable” Afghanistan became a backbone of official dialogue just after the US–led invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban regime. Since 2002, President Karzai has paid 12 visits to India (the last one in May 2014, for the inauguration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi), while former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kabul twice: in August 2005 and May 2011. This dialogue at the highest level has been complemented by regular interactions between ministers of external affairs and other ministries, parliamentarians, military officials and civil society representatives.

  The climax of India’s decade-long, low-profile engagement in Afghanistan came on 4 October 2011, when both states signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership, the first of its kind to be endorsed by the Afghan government with any foreign country. This comprehensive deal envisaged strengthening cooperation in four key areas: politics and security; trade and economy; capacity development and education; and social, cultural, civil society and people-to-people relations. It foresaw more coordination in regional and international forums, including Afghan support for a permanent seat for India in the reformed UN Security Council; it established a regular Security Dialogue to coordinate the fight against international terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics and money laundering; and it called for more trade, investments and promotion of regional economic cooperation. Moreover, the deal stipulated joint efforts to develop the Afghan economy and civil service, and improve women’s rights among other things (Kugiel, 2011).

  The core of the soft power approach was significant Indian development assistance. This concentrated on areas such as humanitarian aid, infrastructure, electricity, agriculture, telecommunications and media, education, health, and capacity building. Among the most significant contributions were the Salma Dam power plant in the Herat Province (worth US$ 184 million), construction of the Afghan Parliament building, in Kabul (US$ 180 million), the Pul-e-Khumri electricity transmission line to the Afghan capital (US$ 120 million) and the 218 km-long Delaram–Zaranj road, which opened additional land access to Afghanistan through Iran (MEA, 2009). It also ran almost 100 small development and community projects in remote and rural areas. Importantly, Indian projects were developed and implemented in cooperation with Afghan partners and followed priorities set by the Afghan government in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. They were focused on local ownership of assets and, usually through completion, used hired Afghan contractors and local staff.

  Within its technical assistance program, India offered a wide range of human resource schemes for the Afghan administration and sent its experts and officials to Kabul. One crucial element of aid became educational support, routed mostly through a scholarship program for Afghan students. The ICCR provides about 1,500 scholarships annually (for long- and short-term training), thus making Afghans the largest beneficiary group. The example of Hamid Karzai, himself a graduate of an Indian University, in Simla, who emerged as a pro-India politician, is a vivid example of benefits of such a long term investment. In total, India has committed some US$ 2 billion to Afghanistan, becoming the sixth largest donor and by far the biggest contributor from its region.

  Building on strong cultural and historic links, India has opened to the Afghan people and facilitated contacts and cooperation in education, culture, tourism and business. In 2007, India officially inaugurated the Culture Centre in Kabul to further promote its culture and project soft power. Bollywood movies, TV soap operas and Hindi songs were already among the most popular entertainment options in Afghanistan. Besides the number of students coming to India for higher education, India has also emerged as an important destination for Afghans seeking medical treatment, ever since India introduced, in 2005, special medical visas, which are free and do not require applicants to provide financial statements or proof of medical insurance. “India is famous in Afghanistan for its modern hospitals and availability of medicines,” quoted one Afghan undergoing treatment in Delhi an article in the New York Times blog, in November 2013 (Bearak, 2013). Thousands of Afghans have availed this opportunity, constituting almost half of all traveling to India. According to the Indian Embassy in Kabul, over 100,000 medical visas have been issued between 2010 and 2013 alone. Several direct flights between Kabul and Indian cities cater to the needs of the growing number of Afghans coming to India for medical, tourist, business, or education reasons. In total, the number of arrivals from Afghanistan to India increased from a mere 6,000, in 2002, to over 111,000, in 2013 (Ministry of Tourism, 2003, 2014).

  Intensification of civilian cooperation also meant stronger trade and investment links, facilitated partly by India’s unilateral concessions. India had in March 2003already signed its Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan, which opened up tradepossibilities: India allowed substantial duty concessions, ranging from 50 per cent to 100 per cent, to a certain category of Afghan dry fruits (38 items). In November 2011, India removed basic customs duties for all products of Afghanistan (except alcohol and tobacco), giving them duty free access to the Indian market (MEA, 2014). It supported the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement, signed in 2010, that allows access to a land route through Pakistan to export goods to India, even though the same trucks cannot bring goods back from India. As a result, India emerged as the third b
iggest trade partner for Afghanistan and the largest market for Afghan products, absorbing some 30 per cent of Afghan exports in 2013. Indian companies have explored investment opportunities in Afghanistan, and one of the largest FDI projects in the country, the Hajigak iron ore reserves, was assigned to an Indian consortium, in 2011. In June 2012, India hosted the Investment Summit on Afghanistan, with participation of several hundred businessmen from Afghanistan, India and other countries from the region. Even though results of these initiatives are far from satisfactory, due to instability in Afghanistan, India has continued to encourage deeper integration of Afghanistan’s trade and investments network.

  India has also extended diplomatic support for Afghanistan at regional and multilateral levels. It was at India’s request that Afghanistan was admitted as the eighth member of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation, at the 2007 Delhi Summit. India has been an active promoter of Afghanistan, as a regional hub, to use its geostrategic position for trade, transit, transport and to attract regional and trans-regional investments. Despite opposition from Pakistan, India has become an active participant in the Istanbul process (or Heart of Asia process). It has been assigned the role of the leading country in one of its confidence building measures (CBM) dedicated to trade, commerce and investment opportunities, and it hosted the senior officials meeting of the Heart of Asia process on 17 January 2014. Also, India has been engaged in trilateral dialogues with the US and Afghanistan, and Iran and Afghanistan, to talk about regional solutions to Afghan instability. Recently, it stepped up efforts to connect Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean, through the Iranian port of Chabahar, as an alternative to Pakistani ports of trade. Moreover, it has been supporting Afghanistan at the UN forum and international donors meetings (Bonn, London, and Tokyo) to secure long-term commitment to the country’s security and development.

  This combination of strong political support and comprehensive civilian engagement, based on India’s soft power potential, has made India one of the closest partners for Afghanistan and generated goodwill among many Afghans. Public opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan in recent years suggest that India has emerged as one of the most positively perceived countries there. According to a joint survey, done in 2010 by the BBC, ABC and ARD, India was seen favourably by 71 per cent of the Afghans questioned, which was the best result of any nation. In comparison, the favourable view of Afghans toward the US was 51 per cent, the UK – 39 per cent, Iran – 51 per cent and Pakistan – 15 per cent.

  The Strategic Partnership, signed in 2011, underpinned by close personal contacts between leaders from both countries, had to be tested on the way towards Afghanistan’s transition period, beginning in 2014. Although India offered limited military assistance (mostly training and equipment), the core of its policy remained focused on civilian cooperation, as the tenure of pro-India president Hamid Karzai were nearing its end.

  The change of government in Kabul, in 2014, and withdrawal of most of the international troops from the country seemed to risk India’s recent strategic gains in Afghanistan. Indian experts observed, with caution, new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s tilt towards Pakistan and China. After all, President Ghani, unlike his predecessor, made his first trip to Delhi in April 2015, only after seven months in office, and already having visited Beijing, Islamabad, Washington and Riyadh, along many other capitals. Even if Afghanistan allowed stronger Pakistani influences in the country, India still has considerable assets that make it an indispensable partner for the Afghans. As recommended by Raja Mohan (2015), “if Ghani had no choice but to focus on a ‘Pakistan-first’ strategy, Delhi has no option but to patiently wait for Kabul’s new engagement with Rawalpindi to play out.” Indeed, generated soft power and multi-faceted ties give India a certain edge that no other regional players can count on in their relations with Afghanistan. This can be used in the future for stronger cooperation when domestic and regional circumstances improve. Despite these recent uncertainties, the case of Afghanistan shows that a soft power strategy can bring tangible and strategic benefits.

  Shortcomings of Indian Soft Power: Poland

  The second case study testing the effects of Indian soft power is a less obvious country: Poland. Indo-Polish relations have always been cordial, but not especially important. This can be seen as exemplary for distant countries, where India used to have a minor interest and less intensive cooperation. In the absence of vibrant economic or political cooperation, the relevance of soft power gains importance. However, it can be assumed that, in this situation, cultural cooperation, mutual perceptions and people-to-people links play more vital roles in shaping official dialogue.

  India and Poland maintained close and friendly relations during the Cold War, by virtue of their respective relationships to the USSR. Following geopolitical changes, post-1989 cooperation between the two lost momentum. India, focused on its neighbourhood and global ascendance, saw no interest in Poland, which, in turn, concentrated on its relations with the European Union and the United States. Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited Warsaw in 1979, for the last time, and thereafter no external affairs minister paid a visit to Poland during the post-Cold War period. Indian President Pratibha Patil was the highest Indian guest to Poland, in 2009. Polish trips to India included that of Polish Presidents Lech Walesa, in 1994, and Aleksander Kwasniewski, in 1999; there were visits also by Prime Ministers Leszek Miller, in 2003, and Donald Tusk, in 2010. In general, Polish representatives were much more active in keeping in contact than were their Indian counterparts. Poland has also, without much success, promoted the idea of a strategic partnership with India in last few years. A modest level of economic cooperation and limited number of converging interests has meant a lack of Indian reciprocation thus far. With trade turnover at US$ 2 billion in 2014, Poland is still not among India’s 50 top trading partners, and India ranks as Poland’s 26th commercial partner. Despite recent attempts at reinvigorating relations, there is still limited interest and a huge knowledge deficit between the two. This leaves a lot of space for Indian soft power to operate. In this regard, India’s major tools implemented in Poland include public diplomacy, cultural and educational cooperation, tourism and promotional campaigns, and strengthened links with the nascent Indian diaspora.

  Indian diplomats in Warsaw are the prime actors responsible for promotion of Indian interests, including through public diplomacy. In recent years, one can observe the growing activity of the Indian Embassy. Especially during the 2011–2014 tenure of Monika Kapil Mohta, former head of the Nehru Centre in London, as Indian Ambassador in Warsaw. Her presence gave a special boost to raising India’s visibility in Poland. Indian diplomats became keen to interact with the Polish public, giving lectures at universities, participating in cultural and economic events, and addressing students or business forums. Still, providing the precise number of these interactions is impossible, as repeated requests for relevant data from the Indian Embassy were left unanswered, which can point at shortcomings in terms of communication skills and hints at the defensiveness of Indian diplomacy. Events organised by Indian representatives rarely attracted wider media coverage and were rarely used to reach out to new audiences. Annual celebrations of Republic Day and Independence Day, as well as Holi and Diwali, drew the regular crowds of diplomatic corps, the Embassy’s cooperates and India lovers. So far, the Embassy has not engaged enough on a major scale with Polish journalists to encourage them to present a more accurate and updated picture of India.

  In the end, the general impact of diplomats on Polish perceptions of India has been rather limited, except for the occasional businessman who becomes more interested in Indian economy by individual initiative. Partially, the reason behind this is are the limited capacities of the Indian Embassy in Poland, which has been usually staffed by 2-4 career diplomats and several supporting personnel, which can be seen as unsatisfactory for the potential scale of engagement with Poland. Unlike other Western capitals, the Embassy of India in Warsaw has no India
n cultural centre that could lead cultural and promotional activities. One can assume that a limited budget for cultural and promotional activities leads to a dearth of Embassy-led concerts, art shows or other performances. However, with the Indian Embassy’s prestigious new home in Warsaw, to be opened in mid-2015, there is a hope of strengthening the scale and spectrum of public diplomacy activities. Organisation of a huge event on International Yoga Day, on 21 June 2015, is the first example of a more robust and effective promotional campaign.

  Although Poland is not a partner country of India’s development assistance, there are several slots within the ITEC program and an ICCR scholarship which is offered to Polish nationals annually. The latter plays a particularly important role in fostering educational cooperation and promotion of India. Over the last few years, Polish students have been given 10–12 scholarships each year to pursue studies in India. As empirical research confirms, “international soft power can result from success in the area of education” (Wójcicka, et al., 2015) so it is convenient to evaluate what results India sees from its scholarship program. To understand the effectiveness of this Indian soft power tool, an on-line survey was conducted, in January 2014, among Polish beneficiaries of the ICCR scholarships in recent years.