Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  The pilot said that Schulie was so overcome with relief and joy that he leapt out of the aircraft before touch-down and ran up to Steven to give him a powerful hug that lifted the lighterbuilt man clean off his feet. Once inside the helicopter, Schulie unceremoniously commandeered the aircrew water bottle and poured it down his companion’s parched throat. Thereafter the two Scouts looked at each other laughing and occasionally patting each other in expressions of immeasurable friendship and relief. This was the same team that was called upon to mark a major ZANLA target for an Alpha bomb night attack by a formation of Canberras.

  Madula Pan

  RADIO INTERCEPTS GAVE WARNING OF a large group of ZANLA CTs in transit to Rhodesia. It was established that they would be at Madula Pan on the night of 11/12 January 1977. This pan lay close to and south of the main Maputo rail line and air reconnaissance photos confirmed the location as having been used by previous groups. It was no more than a transit point without shelters of any kind but it covered a large expanse of bush at the southeastern edge of the almost dry Madula Pan.

  The dark patch at the top right-hand end of the pan was the only water for miles around, hence the ZANLA base position extending on the lines marked for the attack by Green leader and his two wingmen. The Inner Marker Rams was sited at the base of the tree at the top end of the white sand bank marked +. The outer marker was under the middle tree of the cluster of five largish trees to the right of the end of the pan’s phallic-like projection.

  The size of the Madula Pan target required a formation attack by three Canberras to cover the entire rest-up area. Randy du Rand was keen to conduct the attack at night to ensure maximum surprise at a time when all CTs could be expected to be in their base. So Schulie and Captain Rob Warraker met with 5 Squadron, Norman Walsh and me to discuss and plan the strike. Schulie’s role was twofold; to confirm ZANLA was resident in the expected position and to position RAMS and outer marker flares for the Canberra strike.

  A large tree on the southern edge of the pan was selected for the RAMS inner flare. This looked like a good site in terms of distance from target and bush cover to shield the bright light when the flare ignited shortly before strike. Selecting a position for the outer flare, which Schulie would ignite manually, was no easy matter. The density of bush and trees on a back-bearing from the inner marker was fairly even, which would make identification of a specific position very difficult. Eventually a particular group of trees was chosen which Schulie felt he should be able to find in the forecast weather condition of halfmoon and a clear sky.

  A first-light follow-up attack was to be made at 05:00 by an RLI Fireforce with paratroopers. This meant the airstrike needed to be made as late as possible. But since it was known that CTs tended to rise at 04:00 and disperse for fear of dawn attacks, 04:00 was the time chosen to strike. A delay of one hour between airstrike and ground follow-up was not ideal but it was considered acceptable. An extra Canberra with a full Alpha load, two pairs of Hunters and two Lynx were to be on airborne standby to assist Fireforce.

  Because there was time to do so, it was decided that a realistic rehearsal should be conducted at 04:00 on 6 January in similar terrain inside Rhodesia. This was to familiarise Schulie with the handling and positioning the flares and to allow Randy to practise the low-level formation attack. Following their flight from New Sarum to the NDB at Chiredzi, the Canberra formation planned to descend to its IP at 2,000 feet above ground. From the IP, the formation would accelerate to 350 knots during a second descent to their attack height where Randy would be at 300 feet above ground with his two wingmen stepped up 100 and 200 feet above him and spaced 100 metres to his left and right. Schulie, acting alone, made a HALO descent during the evening before the practice strike into an area that was known to contain CTs near the selected target. He laid the flares and the Canberras strike went in as planned.

  Rob Warraker flew with me to Boli airstrip in a Cessna 185 where we were collected by the G-Car that took us the short distance to meet up with Schulie and twenty RLI paratroopers who had been dropped at 05:00. Just before landing at Boli, Rob and I had seen the Dakota that had dropped the RLI paratroopers passing us on its way back to Buffalo Range.

  We inspected the Alpha strike from the air and on the ground and saw that all bomblets had landed on target. Schulie was satisfied with his side of the exercise but said that, although he had received Randy loud and clear on his radio when the Canberra formation was approaching at high altitude, there had been difficulty in hearing Randy’s instruction to light the outer flare during the low-level run toward the target. We decided that this would not be a problem for Madula Pan because the fourth Canberra could act as a radio relay back-up between Randy and Schulie. This extra Canberra could also light the inner marker RAMS if Randy was unable to do so.

  From the practice site, Schulie accompanied Rob and me for the short helicopter ride back to my Cessna at Boli. Both Rob and Schulie were huge men and Schulie also had his parachute and heavy Bergen. My aircraft was carrying a high fuel load because we had planned to fly directly to New Sarum for a debriefing with 5 Squadron. But even the nippy little Cessna struggled to make take-off speed with so much weight on board and I had a few anxious moments skimming very low over trees with the speed failing to build up in the very hot conditions that prevailed. A gentle fall of ground helped us slip off the ‘drag step’ and we were soon climbing comfortably on course for Salisbury.

  When I checked in with FAF 7 to say we were climbing out, I was asked if I had heard or seen the Dakota, then three hours overdue. We diverted to Buffalo Range immediately to participate in the air search that was being mounted. I had just reached the airfield when we were told that a survivor had just reached a working party in the sugar-cane fields and reported that the Dakota had crashed on the banks of a large river; presumably the Lundi.

  I dropped Rob and Schulie off at the Selous Scouts Fort at Buffalo Range and turned back immediately to search the Lundi River. It did not take long to find the Dakota on the south bank. The aircraft was broken in two with the cockpit smashed to bits and its rear fuselage lying under a large tree.

  Lundi crash.

  On recall from his civilian job for ‘retread’ duties, Squadron Leader Peter Barnett, the previous OC of 3 Squadron, had been second ‘dickey’ to Flight Lieutenant Dave Mallet who had joined our Air Force from the RAF. According to survivors, Peter had objected when Dave descended to fly lowlevel just above the surface of the Lundi. Whatever the verbal exchanges, heavy electrical power-lines running across the river from unseen pylons amongst trees on both high banks, sliced through the cockpit windscreen and decapitated both pilots.

  Two bulkheads immediately behind the pilots’ seats arrested the cables. This saved the life of the flight engineer who was standing behind the pilots. The aircraft decelerated down to stalling speed before the power-lines on the starboard side sheared, causing the aircraft to be dragged left by the binding cable into trees above the riverbank. Fortunately there was no fire, but Army Corporal A. Bradley was killed in the ensuing crash. Four men survived with relatively minor injuries due to the fact that the aircraft had cleared the riverbank itself and had been subject to sufficient bush-drag to soften deceleration.

  Peter (right) is seen here with 3 Squadron Commanders, Mike Gedye (left), George Alexander and Bill Smith. In the middle is AVM Harold Hawkins who had just presented the squadron’s Colours to George Alexander—the current OC.

  Madula Pan attack

  ON THE NIGHT OF 10 JANUARY, Schulie and Steven did a HALO descent well to the south of Madula Pan and made their initial approach to target before dawn. They lay in hiding for the day then, under cover of darkness before moonrise, made a final approach for Steven to crawl right up to the edge of the base to ensure that ZANLA was in residence. Having listened to many noisy conversations, all spoken in Shona, Steven moved back to Schulie who passed the word back to Scouts HQ.

  Schulie positioned the RAMS flare without difculty. Around about 03
:00 he was close to calling for a postponement of the strike because he could not find the selected clump of trees for the second flare. With little time to spare he eventually identified the spot and set up.

  Captain Chris Schulenburg, as he was best known, in his recce gear.

  Flying his Canberra at about 30,000 feet, Flight Lieutenant Ian Donaldson with the callsign Green 4, made radio contact with Schulie at 03:45 and received confirmation that all systems were ‘go’. Flying with Don were his navigator, Dave Hawkes, and Captain Rob Warraker the Selous Scouts operations co-ordinator. Ian had taken off from Buffalo Range where he was currently part of the local Fireforce. Green Leader with Green 2 and 3 had taken off from New Sarum and were flying 20,000 feet lower than Ian.

  Randy du Rand was leading with Mike Ronnie, No 2 was Al Bruce with Doug Pasea and No 3 was Ted Brent with Jim Russell. Randy’s ASR reads:

  FLOT DETAILS: Two Selous Scouts more than 2,000 metres away.

  CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS: c/s 55 on channel 21.

  WEATHER: Wisps of stratus at about 1,500 feet AGL. Half moon fairly high in the sky giving good visibility.

  NARRATIVE:

  1. Four Canberras each carrying 300 x Mk 2 FRAGS (Alpha bombs) were briefed for this strike. The first three were to run in on a first run attack at low-level using marker flares correctly placed on the ground to indicate target and direction of attack. The attack was planned for night time using low level offset bombing technique. The fourth aircraft was positioned at high level to ensure communications with the ground force and act as top cover for the helicopter assault due to occur at first light. This aircraft was based at Buffalo Range.

  2. Route to the Target. The route chosen was via Fort Victoria and Chiredzi NDBs and then to the Nuanetsi/Mozambique border which was the initial point (IP) for the bomb run. The aircraft took off at 15-second intervals and routed at Flight levels 100, 105 and 110 to top of descent near Mabalauta. A gradual descent was made to 2,000 feet AGL to the IP maintaining a ground speed of 300 knots.

  3. Run from IP to Target. The IP was overflown at 2,000 feet AGL and six minutes from the target the ground party was warned to light the flare in one minute’s time. At five minutes from target the ground party was instructed to light the manually operated flare and 15 seconds later the fuse was reported burning. The aircraft descended to 1,000 Feet AGL. At two minutes out the manual flare ignited and was observed by all three aircraft. Speed was increased to 350 knots ground speed and all descended to their bombing heights of 300, 400 and 500 feet respectively. As the lead aircraft was about to pass the first flare the second flare (RAMS) was initiated. Final heading corrections were made and all the bombs dropped in the target area. This was reported by c/s 55 and later proven by photography. No sign of any activity was seen by any of the aircraft.

  4. Recovery. The three aircraft recovered to base at FL 250. After landing it was discovered that Green Leader and Green 3 had 50 hang-ups each.

  5. Green 4. Green 4 was heard relaying messages from high altitude during the run-up to target and subsequently as Green 1, 2 and 3 returned to base. He was last heard still at high altitude awaiting the helicopter assault.

  The significance of Randy’s last paragraph will become apparent shortly.

  Schulie and Steven had heard the deep rumble from the open bomb bays then saw the aircraft brightly illuminated by the outer flare as they flashed over their position. Even at two kilometres from the ZANLA base, the roar that came to Schulie and Steven from multiple Alpha bomb explosions impressed the two Scouts enormously.

  Whilst they waited for the flare to stop burning, Schulie heard the Canberras climbing and turning for Salisbury. Then the sound of human screaming and shouting came across the quiet bush from the ZANLA camp. Schulie had to recover both flares for burial well away from Madula Pan. As he did this, he realised that ZANLA had taken a pounding because of the troubled noises that continued to reach him. He was well out of the way by the time the helicopters arrived with the assault force.

  From what they had heard from the high-flying Canberra the lead K-Car crew, carrying assault force commander Captain Richard Pomford, expected to oversee a simple mopping-up operation. Instead they were met by anti-aircraft fire of such intensity that they had to back off and call for the Hunters to strike. At the same time, Ian Donaldson, who was about to turn back to Buffalo Range in the reserve Canberra, was asked to give assistance.

  Ian made a high-rate descent and, for a reason that will never be known for certain, broke through low stratus cloud directly over Malvernia. It must have had something to do with canopy misting following the dive from the freezing conditions at high altitude into warm air with both engine throttles closed. This, coupled with a glaring sunrise ahead of the aircraft flight line, might have been the reason Don did not see the railway line which, had he done so, he would undoubtedly have avoided.

  Rhodesian forces based at Vila Salazar just across the border from Malvernia witnessed extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire with masses of tracer being directed at the Canberra before it rolled sharply and dived into the ground from where a huge fireball was seen to rise. Ian Donaldson, Dave Hawkes and Rob Warraker died instantly.

  The FRELIMO force at Malvernia had obviously been aware of the air attack at Madula Pan and was fully alerted when Ian inadvertently passed over them in perfect range for every one of many heavy and light guns. Some airbursts were seen which suggests RPG rockets may also have been launched at the aircraft.

  Back at Madula Pan, fire from the ground continued to be so intense that the helicopters and Dakota retained their troops, hoping for the Canberra and Hunters to make a difference. They did not know of the Canberra’s fate at the time. However, Selous Scouts Major Bert Sachse, flying as an observer in a Lynx, had watched a number of Hunter strikes before he realised what had gone wrong. His assessment was later confirmed by radio intercepts on FRELIMO’s command channels.

  A large FRELIMO mobile force happened to have spent the night very close to Madula Pan on the road running next to the railway line. These troops were mounting their vehicles to continue their journey when they heard the bomb strike go in on Madula Pan. The whole force turned to investigate and give assistance to their ZANLA comrades who they knew were based at Madula Pan. They arrived before first light to find ZANLA had suffered many casualties and were in a state of panic and disarray. In addition to aiding the wounded, FRELIMO prepared defences for the assault they knew would come with the dawn.

  In the face of this unexpected opposition by a force that was obviously much larger than his own, Richard Pomford called off the assault to avoid unnecessary casualties and Randy returned with three Canberras to deliver eighteen 500-pound bombs onto the target for good measure. He would have much preferred to deliver that load onto Malvernia in response to the downing of one of his Canberras; but airstrikes on any Mozambican town were taboo.

  First radio intercepts reported that ZANLA had suffered six dead and seventy wounded during the night attack. These figures were later updated by FRELIMO with final figures being ten dead and 102 wounded from a force of 120 CTs at Madula Pan. The majority of wounded were described as ‘amputees’, having lost limbs.

  Five months after this, the RLI parachuted into Madula Pan in support of Selous Scouts who were mauling ZANLA and FRELIMO forces close by. It was interesting to learn from them that, though there were no ZANLA in residence at the time, the whole camp area was littered with many human skulls and bones. Presumably these were mainly from FRELIMO men caught in the Hunter and Canberra attacks.

  The Air Force reaction to first casualty reports on the Madula strike was one of great disappointment, particularly by Randy du Rand. We had become so preoccupied with kills that wounding was almost totally discounted in assessing airstrike effectiveness. Randy even advocated reverting to the conventional bombs that we knew did little more than cost us dearly in precious foreign currency.

  I was very distressed by all of this until Group Captain Norman Walsh t
old Air Marshal McLaren that he believed the Alpha bombs had done a much better job than anyone realised. His opinion was later fully supported by the Army and Special Branch who expressed a different viewpoint from that initially expounded by many Air Force officers. Selous Scouts were the first to expand on this view in writing. Ron Reid-Daly’s contention was that the Alpha bombs had done a much better job by inflicting 90% living casualties with 10% kills than would have been the case if the figures were reversed. Air Staff opinion changed but Randy remained sceptical.

  During Federation days, the Rhodesian and Portuguese Governments exchanged names for two establishments that lay side by side across the common border. The Mozambican town in this picture was named after Lord Malvern (one time Prime Minister of the Federation) and the small village inside Rhodesia (out of sight on left side of the clearly visible borderline) was named after the Portuguese Head of State, General Salazar.

  Note the large empty railway yards that had previously handled heavy traffic moving to and from Lourenço Marques from Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland

  The Scouts recognised that dead CTs were either abandoned or buried and forgotten whereas the living wounded presented an unwanted burden by tying up other forces and vehicles in long-range evacuation to rear hospitals. Along the way other CTs and FRELIMO would see these casualties returning from the border, creating a negative impact on morale. Mozambique’s medical facilities had become totally overstretched and CTs with missing limbs and tall war stories had to be cared for. This all created a dilemma for ZANLA who kept war invalids in separate camps away from other cadres.