Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  Next morning, helicopters returned to Tembue via ‘the Train’ to collect the SAS stay-behind force. Upon their return, Op Dingo ended.

  For their superb planning and personal participation in these two operations, Group Captain Norman Walsh, BCR, and Major Brian Robinson, MCM, were made Officers of the Legion of Merit (Operational). They certainly deserved it. Harold Griffiths received the Jacklin Trophy from Air Marshal Mick McLaren on behalf of 7 Squadron for a year of astonishing successes, not the least being Op Dingo.

  Effectiveness of Op Dingo

  OPERATION DINGO COST ZANLA IN excess of 3,000 trained men killed and something in the order of 5,000 wounded, many too seriously to be of further use. Others lost all interest in fighting and deserted.

  The two phases of Dingo involved the largest concentration of our air and ground effort for over four-and-a-half days and had cost us two dead, six wounded and a Vampire lost. But the successes achieved were astounding when compared to our gains inside the country during the eight-week period immediately preceding Dingo. At considerably higher costs in hours flown and weapons expended by jet, light fixed-wing and helicopter airstrikes, as recorded in 105 ASRs, only 283 CTs were positively known to have been killed with forty-two captured. There were almost certainly more CTs killed and wounded, both internally and externally, during this period but the combined figures could not compare with those of Op Dingo. Additionally, more servicemen were killed and wounded and one Lynx was lost inside the country during the same eight-week period. Two of those killed were Air Force men. They were Air Lieutenant du Plessis and Sergeant Underwood who crashed a Lynx in mountainous terrain whilst making a Frantan attack in support of Fireforce.

  One important aspect of the Op Dingo successes was that it lifted moral amongst the forces and white population at a time when many civilians had lost all hope in the country’s future. Emigration figures were alarming and the civilian Territorial Force was shrinking noticeably. This had less to do with terrorism and never-ending problems with Britain and the West as with doubts about South Africa’s willingness to continue supporting us. The media said little about South African attitudes but, on their return to Rhodesia from visits to South Africa, Ian Smith’s and his ministers’ faces showed that things had changed. Gone were the smiles that were always evident after such visits. After the Portuguese collapsed our politicians looked drained and grim; the odd smile so obviously forced.

  For months Ian Smith had been negotiating with local African leaders for an internal settlement that would raise Africans to political leadership under a Westminster-styled constitution. Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe had been invited to participate. Both refused, preferring armed force to gain personal power. The need to end unnecessary loss of life by Rhodesians killing Rhodesians was not for them. In fact their craving for personal power stripped them of any sense of concern for the huge numbers of people they had wasted and those they were still prepared to sacrifice.

  One man involved in the internal negotiations was Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the weak-kneed leader of UANC (United African National Council). Notwithstanding the recalcitrant attitudes of Nkomo and Mugabe, his reaction to the Chimoio and Tembue raids was to declare a week of national mourning. Although nobody seemed to pay the slightest attention to his call, it made whites wonder why Muzorewa, by then recognised as the most likely political figure to become first Prime Minister of a black majority government, could be mourning the loss of Mugabe’s CTs when he had so openly declared them to be our enemies.

  Ian Smith told the nation that the move to establish black rule in the country was to everyone’s advantage, but Muzorewa’s action did little to improve the confidence of those who had already lost hope. Nor did it stem the spreading gloom. Nevertheless regular force personnel were well pleased with the outcome of Op Dingo and remained steadfast in trusting Government to solve the political issues. Theirs was the job of containing the forces of two power-hungry and fortuneseeking demagogues.

  Operation Virile

  UNLIKE THE OPERATIONS HURRICANE AND Repulse areas where CTs had some distance to move through tribal lands before reaching white-owned farms, towns and strategic targets, Op Thrasher CTs entered directly into the commercial farming areas. Op Dingo had to a large extent blunted a westward drive from Chimoio that extended from Inyanga in the north down to Chipinga in the south. However, just prior to the attack on Chimoio, Selous Scouts had been cleared for an operation that aimed to stem the high flow of CTs moving into the Chipinga area. At the time ZANLA were able to travel unhindered from Chimoio along a primary roadway right up to the FRELIMO garrison town, Espungabera, sited alongside the Rhodesian border.

  Operation Virile, another of Selous Scouts vehicle-borne fighting columns, should have launched three days before Op Dingo, but it was held over for fear that it would stir up FRELIMO and ZANLA to the detriment of the Chimoio operation. In addition, the nature of the Scouts operation made it plain that jet support might be needed but this could not be guaranteed whilst Op Dingo was in progress. In consequence, Op Virile was only launched on the night of 26/27 November.

  Much had changed because clearance was given for Selous Scouts to destroy five bridges inside Mozambique and close air-support was included as a matter of course; a very refreshing reversal on earlier limitations. Because of the Chimoio and Tembue raids, it seemed that Vorster’s obsessions with détente had fallen away and that Bishop Muzorewa had become South Africa’s new hope. The usual ‘political denial’ had not been imposed because the bridges were of limited economic importance to Mozambique’s overall economy. We really welcomed this change and saw it as the thin edge of a big wedge.

  The objectives of this particular operation were to deny ZANLA vehicular access to the border by dropping five key road bridges between Dombe (near Chimoio) and Espungabera and destroy all motorised transport between the bridges.

  As it progressed ever deeper into hostile territory, the large column enjoyed almost continuous daylight cover by a Lynx carrying Selous Scout Captain Athol Gillespie. His jobs were to give early warning of enemy vehicle movements, to provide the main force a continuous VHF radio link with its forward HQ at Chipinga and maintain communications with a rearguard force inside Mozambique, near Espungabera.

  On the first day when the column was about halfway to its first objective, the bridge over the large fast-flowing Mabvudzi River, Air Lieutenant Chris Tucker flying the Lynx destroyed a Land Rover-sized vehicle that was moving towards the column. A pair of Hunters, flown by Rich Brand and Spook Geraty, had already cleaned up some larger vehicles farther east, but the weather precluded further Hunter involvement, forcing Chris to take on a number of targets on his own. By the 30 November the force was back in Rhodesia having successfully dropped the five bridges; a job made so much easier and safer by air support.

  Black Friday

  MANY FIREFORCE ACTIONS CONTINUED TO occur internally with variable results and limited RSF losses. This changed dramatically in a matter of hours in the Op Hurricane area on Friday 12 January 1978. Air Lieutenant Francois du Toit, the young officer I had trained in recce when he was still with SAAF, had been on helicopters for some time when he led a Fireforce action supported by another K-Car and three G-Cars. The Fireforce had been in an action initiated by the detection of an activated ‘road-runner’ (doctored portable radio).

  The action became slightly confused by a second ‘roadrunner’ signal emanating from the same general area. However, typical for the time of year, the bush was very thick and because the ground force of seventeen stops groups were largely inexperienced PATU men, only three CTs were killed. The action was not yet over when K-Car 2, flown by Air Lieutenant Chaz Goatley with gunner, Flight Sergeant Ian (Flamo) Flemming, had to leave to refuel at Mtoko. On their way they came under heavy fire from dense bush resulting in the instant death of Ian Flemming. Francois in the K-Car immediately moved across and soon had G-Cars ferrying stops directly from the first scene to the new one. Then the airborne Army c
ommander, Lieutenant Adams, was hit in the hand and was transferred to the lead GCar flown by Air Lieutenant Mantovani, who took many hits as he lifted off. On arrival at Mtoko his G-Car was grounded.

  A number of stops had already been deployed when a G-Car flown by Air Lieutenant Norman (Bambam) Maasdorp with gunner Flight Sergeant Henry Jarvie, came in with another load of troops. Just before touchdown they came under heavy fire and Henry Jarvie was killed. Norman and one soldier were wounded, and the aircraft was severely damaged necessitating a forced landing close to the CTs. The only remaining G-Car flown by Air Lieutenant Thorogood uplifted everyone from the downed helicopter and flew them off to Mtoko, leaving the two K-Cars and a Lynx, flown by Group Captain John Mussell, over the scene. By nightfall the only serviceable GCar had brought in the last of the stops from the first scene, and Francois arranged all the callsigns into over-night ambush positions. One of these positions was attacked by about 20 CTs during the night and a soldier was killed.

  During the frustrating and somewhat confused day-action the CTs had the advantage of unusually thick bush cover and, apparently, only lost two killed. We, on the other hand, had lost three killed and three wounded with two helicopters needing expensive repairs.

  I had just returned to Air HQ from weapons testing at Kutanga Range and walked into the Ops Room as news came through about Henry Jarvie and Ian Flemming. News of this shocking loss stunned everyone, but none so badly as me. I suffered an assault on all my emotions, such as never before and remember asking aloud, “Oh my God, why should such a terrible thing happen?”

  Henry (left) and Flamo (right) seen here in Umtali at the 104 (VR) Squadron Mess with (left to right) Sqn Ldr Don Howe OC 104 VR Squadron, Phil Tubbs, Johnny Lynch and Mick Fulton..

  The mainstay of our force undoubtedly lay with our technical men. As their OC on 4 Squadron, Henry Jarvie, the loveable clown, and Ian Flemming, the quiet good-natured armourer, had been two vitally important individuals. Following their transfer to helicopters, their personalities and talents benefited 7 Squadron greatly. But, that these two superb young men should die in the same Fireforce action was impossible to comprehend or accept. 12 January had been a very Black Friday for the Air Force.

  Mini-golf bombs

  I WAS SO AFFECTED BY THE loss of Henry and Flamo that I flew to Mtoko to talk to all the Fireforce participants. The problems they revealed were not new ones. Theirs had been the ongoing rainy season issue of not being able to see CTs, even when they had a fair idea of the general source of ground fire. I flew with Francois du Toit to view the contact area and whilst he was giving me a running commentary of the events, I came up with an idea that I guessed would turn similar situations to our advantage.

  Had a pair of Hunters been immediately available to deliver four Golf bombs along the line of bush in which the CTs were known to be, the shock effect on survivors would undoubtedly have been significant. However, considering the time needed to bring in the jets from Thornhill, the casualties would already have occurred and the location of the stop groups would have disallowed the use of Golf bombs anyway.

  The bush density in this photograph is relatively low yet the trunks of trees plus limited overhead foliage could easily hide many men from aerial view.

  John Mussell’s Lynx flying in support of the Fireforce action had been of little value even though he was immediately available all the time. This made me wonder if my project team could produce a weapon for the Lynx that would, in similar circumstances, provide severe shock effects with meaningful lethal range against CTs whose precise positions were not known.

  By the time I reached Salisbury, I had decided what was needed and a new project was born to exploit existing Golf-bomb technology. My intention was to provide Lynx with a sizeable punch in the form of a ‘mini-Golf bomb’.

  As always, the project team engineers and Ron Dyer responded enthusiastically, and the requirement was discussed at length before we launched into Project Juliet. At the conclusion of this project, the weapon we produced was not nicknamed the Juliet bomb but became known by the term I had first used—the ‘Mini-golf’ bomb.

  The Mini-golf took a great deal of time to develop because of numerous safety features that had to be built into the design to cater for low level release from the relatively slow-flying Lynx. It turned out to be an ugly tail-less beast that was designed for release at the end of a standard front-guns attack. The ANFO charge was contained in a thin-skinned steel cylinder surrounded by thousands of steel slugs entrapped by a 6mm steel outer-casing. Upon release, the bomb deployed a large parachute from its rear. The parachute’s function was to retard the bomb sharply and pitch it to the vertical before it reached ground.

  Simultaneous with the parachute deployment, an electric-switch device, housed in the sphere of an Alpha bomb outer casing, was released from its anchors in the nose cone. We named this device ‘the seeker’. Para-retardation on the bomb forced the seeker to fly forward of the bomb, drawing out a five-metre electric cable. When this cable was fully extended, batteries were brought into alignment to complete a link between the electrical switch in the seeker and the bomb’s detonator.

  Early trials from 150 feet were frustrating because the speed and trajectory of the seeker was faster, and therefore shallower, than that of the retarding bomb until the electric cable was fully extended. This had the effect of bringing the seeker level with the bomb, until the bomb itself was facing vertically downwards. Only then did the seeker start to move forward of the bomb. This problem was overcome by simply increasing the release height to 300 feet to allow time for the seeker to reach its correct position before it contacted ground. On impact with the ground, the seeker’s circuit closed to fire the bomb five metres above it.

  The Mini-golf’s high airburst was necessary to cater for CTs lying in ground depressions, dongas and riverbeds. To ensure the fullest possible effects of over-pressure, and to make certain that all shrapnel was directed laterally and downwards, the initiating Pentolite booster was installed at the rear of the ANFO charge. This forced propagation of the explosive wave in a shallow downward facing cone. The system worked well and gave effective over-pressure with dense shrapnel cover to thirty-five metres radius with random spike effects that extend as far as fifty metres.

  Flight Lieutenant Spook Geraty used the first Mini-golf in action on 18 June. Two days later Cocky Benecke used four in a single action that accounted for seven CTs dead. Thereafter Mini-golfs were used frequently.

  After one of the earliest Mini-golf deliveries into a bush area from which ground fire had come, but no CTs had been seen, troops located four dead terrorists and one who, though only slightly wounded by shrapnel, was found lying unconscious. He revived when an RAR soldier shook his shoulder. This particular CT was at the edge of the Mini-golf’s effective range and had been well screened by trees standing between him and the point of detonation. When questioned by SB, the CT said he did not hear the bomb explode but was “suddenly overcome by a need to sleep”. The ground troops who were more than 100 metres from the Mini-golf explosion reported being totally taken aback by the huge blast and shock wave.

  This shock effect paid off in many actions according to KCar pilot ASRs that reported two advantages accruing from Mini-golfs. One was that surviving CTs tended to remain where they were making it easier for ground forces to account for them and, more importantly, firing at aircraft either ceased or was substantially reduced.

  Mini-golf was particularly useful against large enemy forces pursuing troops engaged on over border operations. In the first such action, east of the border village of Nyamapanda, Cocky Benecke (Hornet 20) was the pilot.

  Ian Smith, Cocky Benecke, Dave Rowe and Brian Penton.

  Cocky’s ASR reads:

  Hornet 20 was tasked to assist c/s 75 (4 man RLI callsign) who was being chased by over 50 CTs and called for assistance. On arrival overhead c/s 75, s position c/s 75A who was on an OP (about 5 kms to the West of c/s 75) informed me that the terrs were sti
ll chasing c/s 75. I identified c/s 75 and fired a few rockets into bushy areas immediately behind him. After a short while of orbiting around c/s 75 I was fired on by terrs using RPG 7, RPD and AK.

  Using RPG 7 dust as an indicator I dropped a Mini-golf on that position. Mini-golf landed approx. 15 yds from RPG position. This had a major effect on those ters who survived and allowed c/s 75 to make good their escape. No more fire was directed at the aircraft and no movement was seen from that immediate area after the bomb went off.

  I continued to orbit the area and c/s 75A informed me that I was being fired on from another position 500 yards away but only from small arms. I could not see where the firing was coming from so did not attack. I then married 75 with 75A in an LZ and provided top cover until Black section arrived below Hornet 4 to uplift the c/s back to Kotwa.

  Shown in this picture of Lynx armament layout are: (Left rear to forward centre) Frantans, Mini-golf with proboscis, grenade launcher, 37mm Sneb rockets, .303 ammo belts, Light-series bomb carrier with four 28-pound fragmentation bombs and white-bodied practice bombs. Twin Browning machine-guns above wing ahead of and either side of rear engine air intake.

  The Mini-golfs had been in use for some time when, for safety reasons, it was decided to substitute the electrical seeker arrangement for a steel proboscis and accept a small reduction in killing range. Warrant Officer Bill Brown was one armourer who dreaded having to attend to early-model UXB Mini-golfs in the field. With live batteries and an electrical cable enmeshed in bush it was safest to simply rig up a delay charges to destroy such bombs.