Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  I was intrigued by this information and looked into the possibility of towing a suitable ‘whistle’ through the air behind a Hunter flying at high speed. Calculations, or should I say guesstimations, showed that the required amplitude of sound waves oscillating at four cycles per second could be achieved without danger to the pilot or anyone on the ground. Only in a sustained steep turn at the right speed would ‘killer sound waves’ focus for the few lethal seconds needed to cover a fair sized area within the orbit.

  Had we had the time and found a suitable way of testing such a device, we might have produced an ideal low-cost weapon for a large variety of CT targets. I am left wondering if the concept was realistic, or not.

  Katoog

  DURING MY VISITS TO CSIR in Pretoria I became very interested in an aeronautical division project known as Katoog, which is Afrikaans for ‘cat’s eye’. This project looked to the future when a helicopter gunship pilot would be able to aim his power articulated guns by simply placing an illuminated spot in his helmet visor onto a target.

  When I had checked on the project, back in February 1978, no noticeable progress had been made since my previous visit many weeks earlier. The South Africans were obviously in no great hurry as they knew that helicopter gunships and their rotating ‘chin turrets’, for which Katoog was intended, lay a long way off in the future.

  For my part I could see immediate use for the Katoog system in a side-firing mode, so I asked if it would be possible to let me take the equipment, as it was, for a short-duration trial in Rhodesian operational conditions. The CSIR engineers were especially keen because this would give them early technical feedback; so a signal was sent up to Air HQ in which I made a proposal to borrow the equipment. Authority was given for me to pursue the matter with the South Africans.

  Because Katoog was a top-secret project there was much to-and-fro communicating in Pretoria before the request was accepted in principle. However, the South Africans insisted on finishing an incomplete mounting for four .303 Browning machine-guns and conducting ground-firing trials before passing the system over. The gun mounting incorporated hydraulic servos to traverse and pitch the guns in direct response to Katoog’s sighting sensor.

  There was no hope of finalising a pilot helmet sight before the gun system itself was ready. So I requested that CSIR produce a simple mounting post on which to fix their angle-sensing device with a collimator-reflector gunsight affixed between two handgrips incorporating a firing button. The idea was that the guns would be operated by one of our helicopter gunners sitting in a sideways-facing seat set central to the front doorway of an Alouette. On his left side, the multiple-gun platform would be wholly accessible to him with gun barrels projecting through the rear doorframe.

  By early May the system was working well and was transported with the senior project engineer to Salisbury on six weeks’ loan. As soon as the whole unit had been fitted to an Alouette, firing trials were conducted with the CSIR project engineer making suitable adjustments to allow for direct aiming at targets with the guns offset for normal attack speed. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt and Corporal Thompson conducted these tests.

  Ted Lunt.

  Ted Lunt was the Squadron Commander of 8 Squadron, which had only just been created, ostensibly to lessen the burden on No 7 Squadron. Initially 8 Squadron operated Alouette IIIs, though none of us knew then that the true purpose of creating this new unit was to prepare for the on-take of larger helicopters.

  We moved to FAF 4 at Mtoko and commenced work right away. The Alouette with the Katoog system was referred to as ‘K-Car Alpha’ to distinguish it from the 20mm K-Car gunships. The plan was for Ted to position at a safe place that was nearest to the area I was searching and wait for my call. In this way, and acting entirely on his own, he could respond very quickly.

  We struck luck immediately when I called him to a large CT camp near an abandoned farmstead southeast of Mtoko. As Ted arrived, over thirty CTs broke cover and started running and splitting into small groups. I called for Fireforce as Corporal Thompson’s first long burst downed six CTs. Five stayed where they fell.

  Ted’s specific instruction was to remain at 1,200 feet above ground so that the Katoog aiming system and the four-gun mount could be compared directly with the established 20mm cannon performance. Whereas the first burst had been made from the correct height I could see that Ted was progressively dropping height to get at small groups now scattered and snivelling from cover to cover. So far as I could see CTs were dropping every time the guns fired but some rose again, staggering noticeably.

  K-Car Alpha had run out of ammunition before the Fireforce took over. Most of the seventeen CT’s accounted for had either been killed by Katoog or were so severely wounded that they were unable to escape the attention of the troops. Katoog had proven itself on its first live outing.

  This poor-quality photo of K-Car Alpha shows how the four-gun fit looked when it came into squadron service with the name Dalmatian Fit. The essential difference from prototype is that, to make way for an airborne Army commander’s seat (in which one armourer is seen sitting) the gun control yoke with gunsight was set high above and to the rear of the gun platform. Also seen in this photo is the pilot’s armoured seat designed to protect head and body against enemy fire entering from the port side.

  Ted was directed onto a number of unoccupied places before I put him onto a group of fourteen terrorists. Corporal Thompson knocked hell out of these guys who attempted to fire back at the helicopter until they realised they came short every time they stopped running in zigzag fashion. By the end of the action Ted had dropped right down to about 300 feet to get at three remaining survivors who made the mistake of going into cover under a small clump of bushes. They did not stand a chance. The whole group lay dead before troops arrived to sweep the area.

  At this stage I brought in Hamie Dax, our successful PRAW recce pilot, to help cover more ground in an endeavour to locate a particular CT gang that was giving Centenary farmers a bad time. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt with Corporal Thompson responded to a call from Hamie.

  This is what Ted wrote in his ASR of 23 June 78:

  Gun trials on the Alpha fit continued daily with K-Car prepositioning in areas as required in support of air recce.

  PRAW crew (Dax and McCay) reported a likely camp at US400294 and requested a check out. No movement or signs of occupation were visible to the PRAW but in view of the pattern of camps found thus far, Dax indicated good possibilities. Run was made from NNE at tree top height in view of wind and terrain with last few hundred meters under direction of PRAW.

  As the camp central complex was approached, K-Car Alpha observed an armed CT at very close range and opened fire. Immediately 8-10 CTs broke from the area scattering in all directions.

  Targets were engaged with great difficulty and of necessity from close quarters at slow speed in view of the thick vegetation and rapid departure of CTs.

  There being no Fireforce immediately available and PRAW not having seen CT’s from height, many CTs unfortunately made good their escape. Several CTs were observed hiding in bushes and these were engaged and killed with very little trouble—indeed of those killed only two managed to get off a few rounds.

  Upon initiation of the contact FF (from Mtoko) was called for and arrived within 30 mins or so. By this time no more CTs could be found and, having briefed K-Car 1 on the set-up and indicated the whereabouts of the 6 dead, K-Car Alpha withdrew to carry on with recce reactions, there being other camps to check in the area.

  Under direction of FF Mtoko, paras were dropped to the East (1.5 km) then carried in by G-Car. A sweep line was formed consisting of 4 sticks (16 men) which moved from E to W towards a stop-line of 4 men. The camp was searched but only 6 dead located. No blood spoor was found and stops were uplifted and FF returned to Mtoko at last light.

  ENEMY ACTION:

  Nothing unusual—CTs remained within camp and only broke once engaged by K-Car Alpha. No attempt made to fire upon PRAW it seems,
even though he was circling for some time prior to heli arrival.

  DETAILS NOT FORMING AND INTEGRAL PART OF NARRATIVE:

  4 of the 6 killed were fleeting targets—Alpha fit proved amazingly effective against these. This weapon proved itself to be far superior to the 20mm in this respect. 3 guns only were used, the 4th having jammed in the initial firing period.

  Superb handling of the situation by the gunner Cpl Thompson.

  I was asked to insert comments for the field commander and wrote this:

  a. This report is written on behalf of OC FAF 5 at his request.

  b. I was operating an area with PRAW pilot Dax. The Alpha K–Car was close at hand at Madziwa Mine with Lynx at immediate readiness at Mtoko.

  c. This was another trial at air recce with immediate response, made possible by the need to test Katoog. Previously, recce information would be checked out the day after its attainment. This was failing as terrorists were obviously moving off after recce aircraft cleared the area. The plan on this day was to recce until a suitably fresh camp was located. Upon location the aircraft would remain overhead to keep CTs static and call for K-Car Alpha and the Lynx.

  d. When Hamie Dax called, I moved over to him arriving some 4 minutes after K-Car Alpha. I then descended to 400 ft over the helicopter. All six terrorists had been accounted for before arrival of the Lynx, which was only 9 minutes after K-Car Alpha’s first strike.

  e. This action by an unsupported helicopter was not intended as the plan was for Lynx to link up with K-Car Alpha before moving to target. However, Squadron Leader Lunt moved quickly and being satisfied with my presence and the closeness of Lynx he proceeded to do battle. This type of action must be avoided in the future by adoption of a more flexible approach by the Fireforce. I am responsible for this situation, as I could have held K-Car Alpha back until the Lynx reached him.

  f. Initial representation has been made to COMOPS (Gp Capt Walsh) requesting a follow-up by providing recce with immediate support. However, the potency of the Alpha K-Car is an essential ingredient if good opening results are to be achieved by a small element responding immediately to recce calls.

  g. The stereotype employment of Fireforces has not produced acceptable results for over four months, making an altogether more aggressive approach essential. Recce will provide good results if Fireforces are positioned close to an area being covered by one or more recce aircraft; for instance Benecke and Dax. In turn, recce must work on the best intelligence available—as happened in today’s work. Full Fireforce should not be used to make the initial checkout as this is cumbersome and slows down the whole procedure. One K-Car, a G-Car and a Lynx are all that is needed. If an action breaks, the remainder can be brought in at short notice. This system would also allow simultaneous check out on two camps, should the situation arise.

  h. Another aspect that bears consideration is identifying specific terrorist leaders or terror groups requiring elimination. In today’s strike we identified the terrorist group we wished to locate. The group was responsible for many actions against Centenary farms and this was having an adverse effect on farmers, their families and workers. The group contacted proved to be the very one we sought. Its leader, with size 10 boots and a frame to match, was amongst those killed.

  j. Cost of ammunition expended—a mere $172.80.

  On the night of 23 June 1978, probably whilst Ted Lunt was writing the ASR quoted above, a gang of CTs committed dreadful murder of seventeen innocent white missionaries and four of their children. This took place at the Elim Mission in the Vumba. The mission had previously been the Eagle Preparatory School that my brother Tony and I attended as founder pupils thirty years earlier. Rhodesians of all races were horror-struck by this senseless action, yet the rest of the world simply laughed it off, as they would do again when Air Rhodesia Viscount airliners were shot down.

  The Katoog system continued to be used with considerable success, either acting alone or used as a component of Fireforce. Apart from the success of the sighting system, the density of fire from four guns using .303-ball ammunition proved many times more efficient, and a great deal cheaper, than single-barrel, slow-firing cannons with explosive 20mm shells.

  Katoog was returned to South Africa at the conclusion of the six-week trial period. Six long months then passed before 7 Squadron received two systems, now referred to as either Dalmatian Project or Alpha Fit, for permanent use. Some of the 7 Squadron crews loved the weapon. However, most preferred the 20mm cannon because of the irritatingly high stoppage rate of .303 Browning guns.

  Philippa Berlyn

  PHILIPPA BERLYN (MARRIED NAME—CHRISTIE) was a Salisbury journalist who spoke fluent Shona. She was short, stocky and very plain in dress and looks but when it came to writing she was brilliant. Philippa had a very special interest in the wellbeing of black women and was particularly troubled by the hard times they were facing in the rural areas. However, since CTs disallowed newspapers in the areas they worked, Philippa could not get her messages and advice through to them. Because of this, she decided that she had to go to the women, and to hell with the risks that went with doing so.

  I cannot remember the date she came to me at FAF 5, asking to be dropped off at a village some thirty kilometres northeast of Mtoko. She had already arranged to meet with a large number of local women and had been given clearance, in writing from Minister P.K. van der Byl, to make the visit. However the Army was unable to assist immediately and the Air Force had not been notified. Nevertheless, I sorted things out with Air HQ and clearance was given to deliver her at sunset for her all-night indaba, and collect her at sunrise.

  The location to which Philippa was going happened to be a particularly hot spot, so the G-Car in which she flew was accompanied by a K-Car to cover the landing. The G-Car pilot who delivered Philippa was very relieved when he saw the large crowd of expectant women rushing to meet her as she climbed out, skirt flying, to meet them. But, like all of us, the pilot could not help being deeply concerned for the safety of this very brave white woman.

  When the war ended, I learned from ZANLA that the local ZANLA commander had been fully aware of Philippa’s impending visit and had instructed CTs not to fire at the helicopter but to keep a low profile. After dark and unbeknown to Philippa, ten CTs crept forward and remaining in the shadows surrounded the meeting place to listen to every word she spoke. So impressed were they by her fluency in Shona and the advice she gave the women that her departure by helicopter at sunrise went unchallenged.

  Philippa’s husband, law Professor Dick Christie, was not only good-looking, he differed a great deal from his softly spoken and very well-mannered wife. Whenever distanced from his professional environment he always let his hair down. Dick was an Air Force Volunteer Reserve officer who flew second ‘dickey’ in Dakotas. His favourite place for call-up was FAF 7, Buffalo Range. Dick Christie always celebrated his last night at FAF 7 by mixing a strange alcoholic concoction that included mashed bananas. There were never many takers for Dick’s ‘free drink’ that went by some catchy name. In consequence, he drank more than he bargained for and got very happy, noisy and quite sloshed. It was in this condition that he became involved with others in ‘roof-rattling’ sleeping helicopter crews. Late drinkers often annoyed tired crew who had gone to bed at a sensible hour by throwing stones onto the noisy tin roofs of their billets. Dick joined in but, instead of throwing small sized stones, he heaved a brick that failed to make the height of the roof. Instead, it went through a window and broke the leg of a sleeping helicopter pilot. Next morning, a very sombre Dick was particularly embarrassed as he walked up the sloping deck of the Dakota past the unfortunate pilot who was lying strapped to a casevac stretcher. To add to his embarrassment, the pilot asked Dick if he was in a fit enough state to fly the Dakota.

  Final tracker dogs trial

  I HAD JUST BEEN AWARDED THE Defence Cross for Distinguished Service (DCD) for my project work when I was approached to try out dogs in a genuine track-down of CTs.
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br />   I learned that Flight Sergeant Terry Rubenstein, under direction from Wing Commander Rex Taylor, had resuscitated the radio tracker dog project. Rex and members of the Air Force Dog Section at New Sarum had been very annoyed by the Police Dog Training Centre’s inability, or disinterest, in progressing the system to full operational status, so they trained two African handlers and their Alsatians for the task. Wing Commander Peter Cooke had tried them unsuccessfully in April 1978. The problems Peter encountered then were resolved but it was considered that I was the best man to make a final test.

  DCD presentation by acting President Pithy.

  Later with Beryl and son Paul who had, much to my astonishment and delight, successfully passed the gruelling selection process to become a member of the elite SAS.

  I could not expect to be given an Alouette III for this task so Ted Lunt converted me onto an Alouette II because there were some spare at New Sarum. I had not flown this aircraft before even though most of the earlier helicopter pilots had undergone their initial helicopter training on this machine.

  The Alouette II was not as pleasant to fly as its big sister, the Alouette III, but for me it was so much nicer than any fixed-wing aircraft. With two handlers and two dogs on board there was hardly room to move. Again I chose to base at Mtoko where I arranged ten ‘volunteers’ to walk a trail in the late evening. Next morning the dogs followed the trail without difficulty. Having satisfied myself that the dogs and handlers appeared to know their business it was just a matter of waiting for someone to come up with CT tracks to follow.

  When a radio call came through reporting a night attack on a farm with fresh CT tracks confirmed, I called for the handlers and their dogs. Almost immediately I noticed how nervous the handlers were. As we lifted off one or both of them made their nervousness known by releasing wind which filled the cabin with an unwelcome stench.