Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  Timings were crucial because Canberras, Hunters and K-Cars allocated to the FC raid had to turn around after their strikes and link into a combined operation with the SAS against ZIPRA’s Mkushi Camp. The third target, known to us as CGT 2, was to be handled by Vampires, Lynx, four K-cars, G-Cars and RLI paratroopers. CGT 2 was one of at least four ZIPRA bases established in rough country south of the Great East Road that ran eastward from Lusaka to Malawi. Not knowing ZIPRA names for these bases, they were named Communist Guerrilla Training (CGT) bases with identification numerals 1–4.

  Diverting for a moment back to my JPS days. During the late 1960s South African, Portuguese and Rhodesian teams had been established for the Alcora Planning groups to consider mutual support in both regular and counter-insurgency warfare. Whereas I had been a member of the mapping committee, I was in the picture on most of the other committees’ work. One of these dealt specifically with plans for strategic airfields. These plans involved the upgrading of existing air bases and the building of new ones suitably sited in South West Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa.

  Each air base was to incorporate underground hangars and immediate-readiness fighter pens with intricate taxiways leading to two primary runways. The design allowed two whole squadrons of sixteen fighters to scramble simultaneously. However, the costs involved were so great that it was necessary to build the bases in stages. The first stage was to build one half of a total base with the end-plan taxiway serving as the first operational runway.

  In Rhodesia, Thornhill and New Sarum needed no work as they both exceeded the needs of Phase 1, but three other sites had been selected. These were Wankie National Park, Fylde Farm near Hartley and Buffalo Range at Chiredzi. Buffalo Range already existed as an active airfield, needing only limited work to get it to Phase 1 status. Fylde had become operational before Op Gatling was mounted on 19 October and served as the base for Hunters and Vampires during this operation. At this stage work at Wankie was still in progress.

  Green Formation of four Canberras left New Sarum a little after four K-Cars had taken off from Mana Pools on the Zambezi River. A total of six Hunters were involved. Two with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles headed directly for the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa and the other four followed a prescribed route to FC camp.

  Squadron Leader Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie as his navigator led Green Formation. Ted Brent with Jim Russell, Greg Todd with Doug Pasea, and Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan followed. The Canberras, flying low under Zambian radar, were loaded with a total of 1,200 Alpha bombs. The four Hunters of Blue Formation, led by Squadron Leader Vic Wightman with wingmen John Blythe-Wood, Ginger Baldwin and Tony Oakley, were also approaching target at low level and were some way behind the slower Canberra formation when they crossed the Zambezi River. Their speed would place them ahead for first strikes.

  White Section, the Hunters orbiting Mumbwa, were flown by Rick Culpan and Alf Wild, who listened in to the attacking force transmissions whilst hoping the MiG 19 fighters would take to the air. In this they were to be disappointed because nothing stirred. Orbiting at height near the Zambezi River in the Command Dakota were General Peter Walls, Group Captain Norman Walsh and their communications staff who would remain airborne throughout the day to cover all three operations.

  The Hunters struck dead on 08:30 taking out the FC headquarters buildings. The huge Golf bombs’ plumes were not needed as markers to give Chris Dixon’s bomb-aimer final confirmation of his line-up because Mike Ronnie could see the target during the formation’s acceleration to attack-speed.

  FC Camp. The Canberra Alpha strike was to cover the area from the treed camp area on the right, along the double path lines and beyond the parade area. Hunters were given HQ targets amongst the trees to the left of the parade ground. No anti-aircraft gun positions existed within the limits of this photograph.

  Hidden under smoke in this photo taken by a Hunter after re-strike are most of the destroyed HQ buildings.

  Chris’s radio system was linked to a tape recorder in the cockpit for possible post-strike public relations purposes. On playback of the tape, we all heard the deep breathing of the crew building up during run to target and their comments about the precision of Hunter strikes. This was followed by excited shouting between Chris and Mike when they saw hundreds of CTs running in the treed and open areas through which the Canberra formation’s bomb loads would run. On completion of their strike, Chris and Mike continued to communicate excitedly as, in the background, the calm voices of the Hunter pilots could be heard as they called, “turning in live” for their restrikes.

  When the Hunters cleared, the voice of Pink Formation leader, Squadron Leader Graham Cronshaw, showed that the K-Cars had arrived over FC camp. They were lucky that none of the anti-aircraft guns were manned as they set about attacking scattered survivors.

  Chris Dixon had been instructed to contact Lusaka Tower before his strike, but something had gone amiss with frequency selection. He only made this call to a remarkably calm African controller whilst the K-Cars were active over FC camp. This was Chris’s prepared message:

  Lusaka Tower this is Green Leader. This is a message for the Station Commander at Mumbwa from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands Farm at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no quarrel—repeat no quarrel—with Zambia or her Security Forces. We therefore ask you not to intervene or oppose our attack. However, we are orbiting your airfield at this time and are under orders to shoot down any Zambian aircraft that does not comply with this request and attempts to take off. Did you copy that?

  In response to a query from Lusaka Tower, Chris suggested that the departure of an aircraft be withheld for a short while. The controller was happy to oblige and even asked a Kenyan airliner, incoming from Nairobi, to hold off.

  Chris had flown out of range when Dolphin 3, Norman Walsh in the Command Dakota, established contact with Lusaka Tower. Immediately after this the irritated Kenyan Airways pilot asked Lusaka “Who has priority here anyway?” to which the Zambian controller calmly replied, “The Rhodesians, I guess!” The Kenyan did not have long to wait. Norman Walsh returned Zambia’s air space to the thankful controller once the K-Cars were well clear of the target.

  Shortly after the air action, Lusaka’s hospital became inundated with the inflow of wounded and dying ZIPRA personnel. All forms of transport kept bringing in more and more casualties way into the night. Zambian patients were incensed for being kicked out of their sick beds when all floor and bed space was taken up by the ZIPRA flood. Unbeknown to the Zambian medical staff, a Selous Scouts officer was sitting calmly in the waiting room, claiming to be there for an anti-cholera injection. He watched the never-ending stream of serious casualties in satisfied amazement having, himself, been responsible for locating FC camp. According to a ZAPU delegation report to a Pan African Congress held at Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979, 226 CTs were killed and 629 were wounded, most seriously.

  The K-Cars returned to Mana Pools and the jets to their bases. The gunners, preparing their helicopters for the attack on Mkushi Camp, were full of enthusiasm having just returned from FC Camp. For the technicians at New Sarum and Fylde there was no time to find out how the Zambian raid had gone; and anyway the aircrew were too tied up to share their war stories. In spite of this the armourers, engine fitters, airframe fitters, electricians, radio men and refuellers went about their business with no less enthusiasm than their colleagues way up on the Zambezi River.

  In most respects, the attack on Mkushi was conducted in the manner of the first attack on Chimoio with jet-strikes leading the action at 11:40. In this case six Dakotas dropped 120 SAS paratroopers in a semi-circle around the western and northern flanks of Mkushi base with K-Cars patrolling the Mkushi River, which formed the eastern and southern boundaries of the target. Forty-four SAS were landed by eleven G-Cars behind the cover of a small feature in the camp’s southeastern corner. Eight kilome
tres southeast of target lay the Admin Base into which an RLI protection force was para-dropped with fuel and ammunition.

  It was only when the ground fighting was underway, that the SAS realised Mkushi camp was occupied by women CTs with only a few male instructors. Our intelligence people had not known this. The women looked just like men in their camouflage uniforms and they bore their weapons with efficiency. Although some attempted to hide and take advantage of grass fires initiated by the air strikes and heavy firing, most fought back. The SAS could not help but be impressed by female aggression and fighting ability that kept the soldiers busy till late afternoon.

  With the RLI protection force at the Admin Base was one unusual character. He was Sergeant-Major Standish who, as a grey-haired Territorial Army soldier on call-up with SAS, had managed to wangle his way onto Op Gatling. Stan Standish, who had been a paratrooper at Arnheim, claimed that only the Dakotas that had brought the force to Mkushi had seen longer service than he had. He thoroughly enjoyed his parachute descent into the Admin Base and gained the admiration of the aircrews who saw him set a great example to the RLI youngsters in matters of collecting parachutes and rolling fuel drums.

  There had been some concern for the safety of helicopters parked on the Admin Base dambo (Zambian word for a small open grass area) because they presented a perfect target for any Zambian MiG 17 or MiG 19 pilot who might choose to attack them. As it happened, one MiG 19 did appear over the Admin Base but either the pilot did not see the exposed choppers or turned a blind eye and disappeared into the blue.

  Mkushi was by far the best-organised base the troops had seen with many more facilities than in any ZANLA base. A red hammer and sickle emblazoned in red on one of the buildings emphasised ZIPRA’s Russian orientation. When the fighting was over, the troops left everything just as it was for members of the press to view the next day.

  The SAS referred to reporters as ‘vultures’ because they only turned up when the killing was over. There were certainly plenty of dead bodies, piles of captured matériel, stacks of ZIPRA documents and many Soviet manuals for the vultures to photograph and inspect. The SAS also had five ZIPRA prisoners for them to interview. Once the press had done their work and were on their way back to Rhodesia late on Day 2, all equipment and buildings were destroyed.

  On Day 3 the SAS were in the process of recovering to Rhodesia when a lookout warned of the approach of a large armed force sweeping towards the main group. Hurriedly the SAS got into position and waited for the force to come to close range. They then opened fire on Zambian Army, Zambian Police and ZIPRA in a short sharp action that left forty-seven dead. Fortunately they captured a Zambian Army man and, incredibly, ZIPRA’s senior Logistics Officer. His name was Mountain Gutu and his importance will become apparent. These two prisoners, together with the other five captives, were all flown back to Salisbury.

  Well to the south of Mkushi, air attacks on CGT 2 were launched by four Vampires firing 60-pound squash-head rockets and 20mm cannons and four Lynx dropped Mini-golf bombs and fired 37mm boosted Sneb rockets. The RLI followed up in double Fireforce strength. I cannot recall any details of the ground action other than it occurred in difficult bush conditions resulting in the death of about sixty CTs. But this target turned out to be the toughest nut of the ZIPRA targets because it contained many very effective large-calibre anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Cocky Benecke took hits immediately, which forced him to withdraw with a holed fuel tank.

  Nigel Lamb wrote, “huge easily visible shells arched lazily upward, then seemed to accelerate past us”. Even climbing to 2,500 feet above target did not help so the helicopters beat a sensible retreat; but not before Mark Dawson’s K-Car received an explosive hit which knocked out the instruments and wounded Mark in the leg.

  The K-Cars split into two pairs running low level either side of a high ridge when Chaz Goatley was heard to shout to Mark Dawson that his tail rotor was slowing down. Mark knew his tail rotor drive-shaft had been severed before his machine started to spin in the opposite direction to the main rotor blades and, arching downwards, crashed through high trees which turned the aircraft upside-down. Fortunately there was no fire. The three K-Cars grouped over the downed machine before Nigel Lamb put down as close to the crash site as possible. Nigel stopped his rotors but left the engine running and hurried to the crashed aircraft with his technician-gunner Finch Bellringer. Immediately they found Mark’s techniciangunner Roelf Oelofse who, having been thrown from the helicopter, was alive but completely incapacitated with a spinal injury. Mark was still in his seat, inverted, unconscious and blue in the face because his flak jacket was pressed tightly into his neck. Nigel quickly released Mark from his seat and, with his technician’s help, moved him to his own helicopter. He wound up his rotors and climbed to join Ian Peacock’s K-Car to give top cover whilst Chas Goatley and his technician, Mike Smith, landed to recover Roelf. Roelf recovered quickly but for six agonising weeks Mark Dawson lay unconscious in St Giles Nursing Home. After recovery it became clear that brain damage would disallow the frustrated young pilot from ever flying again.

  Three operations in one day had ZIPRA reeling and the Zambian Government in a dither. ZIPRA’s total casualties, according to figures given to the Pan African Congress in Tanzania, were 396 killed, 719 wounded and 192 missing. This had cost Rhodesia the loss of an SAS soldier, Lance-Corporal Jeff Collett, fatally wounded at Mkushi, and one helicopter that had to be blown up where it had crashed.

  The Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation gave news of the FC Camp raid as its lead report on the 8 o’clock evening news, but little was said about the other two operations in Zambia. Squadron Leader Alan Cockle, the Air Force PRO, arranged for the communiqué to include Chris Dixon’s ‘Green Leader’ taped message to Lusaka Tower together with the controller’s responses. Fresh in memory was ZIPRA’s downing of the first Air Rhodesia Viscount sixteen days earlier, so news of the action against Nkomo’s forces came as a much-needed tonic for waning morale, and ‘Green Leader’ became a national hero though few knew that he was Squadron Leader Chris Dixon.

  Chris Dixon (left) with Rob Gaunt.

  Mulungushi and Mboroma

  MOUNTAIN GUTU, THE LOGISTICS OFFICER from Mkushi, turned out to be a vital man because he personally knew all the top rankers in ZAPU and ZIPRA as well as the location of ZIPRA’s headquarters units, their camps and logistics sites. He was also able to confirm that most of ZIPRA’s activities were geared to preparing for conventional warfare, though he could not give the reason for this. To us the Russian influence on ZIPRA was obvious.

  A location that immediately drew special attention was ZIPRA’s prison camp at Mboroma deep inside Zambia. Apart from ZIPRA dissidents and alleged spies, Gutu claimed that a number of Security Force personnel who had been abducted in Rhodesia were also held there. He willingly offered evidence and provided details of the ZIPRA personalities in charge of the prison camp. He not only gave the names and places in Rhodesia from which they originated but, in the typically African way, described their physical peculiarities. Whereas they were probably pretty average people, Gutu’s descriptions made them appear to be a bunch of oddballs. Here are extracts of his written descriptions:

  Camp Commander—Samson Dube. He originates from Kezi.

  Has a large scar on forehead as result of a knobkerrie blow prior to training. Approximately 35 years old.

  Camp Commissar—Hobo Maqula. Originates from the Plumtree area. Approximately 42 years old and limps on left leg.

  Chief of Staff—Takarayi Mbvizi. Has a very high-pitched voice and originates from Sinoia. Approximately 37 years old.

  Medical officer—Kenni Malungu. After faction fight in Mozambique deserted and proceeded to Zambia. Is cross-eyed. Originates from Chipinga and approximately 31 years.

  Logistics—Ndwini Sibanda. Subject is five foot five inches and bow-legged. Approximately 28 years old.

  The Selous Scouts were given the task of moving on Mboroma with the prime objective of brin
ging all the prisoners back to Rhodesia. A close-in recce of the camp, conducted from high ground right next to its southern boundary, confirmed the presence of prisoners and established routines within the camp. Ron Reid-Daly wanted to conduct a pure ground action to simultaneously ensure the safety of prisoners and to allow the right moment to be selected before launching the operation. It would have been a simple enough matter to parachute the entire force into the remote countryside for an approach on foot to the target to meet Ron’s objectives, but COMOPS disallowed this.

  Instead, Scouts paratroopers enveloped the prison camp following a limited Hunter airstrike, but it resulted in the timing of the action being wrong—just as Ron had feared. Most of the prisoners were away on various foraging tasks, well away from target. In consequence only a quarter of the prisoners, thirty-odd, were flown back to Rhodesia a couple of days before Christmas 1978; so the Dakota effort allocated to uplifting troops and prisoners from a nearby Zambian airfield way exceeded demand.

  The press had a royal time learning about the horrors of ZIPRA torture, starvation and general maltreatment of their unfortunate prisoners. Arising from this rescue mission, Selous Scouts, always maligned by the world press, were hailed as heroes and spirits were raised on that hot sunny Christmas Day.

  Mountain Gutu had also confirmed that a main ZIPRA base for conventional forces existed in the old Federal Cadets Training Centre (later the Zambian National Service Training Centre) on the west bank of the Mulungushi Dam situated north of Lusaka. Selous Scout recce specialists, Schulie Schulenburg and his African partner, made a detailed closein reconnaissance of the base to confirm what Gutu had said. This was done during the lead-up to the Mboroma rescue operation.