Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  FRELIMO had antagonised the rural people in so many ways. They had kicked out Mozambique’s white Portuguese and, in doing so, had brought about the destruction of the income base upon which rural families depended. Without the Portuguese, earnings by previous commercial, industrial and domestic workers had dried up. None of FRELIMO’s preindependence promises had materialised so the peasants, who had been forced into failed communal farming activities, were much worse off than at any time during their relatively stressfree existence under Portuguese rule.

  The peoples’ trust in MNR to return them to situations of ‘the good old days’ was reinforced by well-orchestrated radio broadcasts beamed from Rhodesia by Portuguese-speaking presenters. ‘The Voice of Free Africa’ services, whilst boosting the MNR image, incensed FRELIMO by emphasising the impotence of its leadership and slating communist ideologies that were failing to fill stomachs or keep people warm and children educated. The Mozambican peasants liked what they were hearing and MNR’s popularity soared and spread.

  The MNR might have substantially altered the course of our war had funds been available when they were needed back in 1976. This was another of many situations to which the ‘toolittle-too-late’ tag might be pinned because, from the outset, MNR was very pro-white, pro-Rhodesia and violently anticommunist. This they demonstrated by providing us with some important intelligence on ZANLA’s activities and locations. Of greater importance to Rhodesia was the fact that MNR activities were so troublesome to FRELIMO that earlier plans to pour more FRELIMO troops into the Op Repulse area were shelved. In fact many FRELIMO earmarked for Rhodesia were withdrawn to combat the MNR ‘bandits’.

  Whereas there had been no question of using the MNR to fight ZANLA CTs in Mozambique, FRELIMO sought ZANLA’s assistance to combat the MNR. Had such a situation arisen two years earlier, combined Rhodesian and MNR action would have permitted our own forces to operate in depth against ZANLA and FRELIMO for as long as we chose, unencumbered by aircraft shortages and servicing cycles. Furthermore, with the MNR seeking as much credit as possible for anti-FRELIMO activities, the destruction of Mozambique’s communications networks would have been made easy and would almost certainly have resulted in ZANLA’s eviction from Mozambique.

  The SAS enjoyed leading MNR and witnessed some very hairy fighting. They held back from each action to avoid compromising themselves and watched aghast when the first MNR leader, André, initiated ambushes and attacks by leaping to his feet, fully exposing himself with gun above head to shout the MNR slogan that triggered each action.

  True or not, I cannot say, but I heard that FRELIMO soldiers were petrified of MNR. The story goes that MNR sometimes removed the heads of their victims and scattered them around to make matching them to bodies difficult. Every FRELIMO soldier hearing of this was worried that, should this happen to him, his spirit would remain trapped in his body if someone else’s head was buried with it.

  The SAS personnel operating with MNR were changed over regularly without difficulties until their operations spread southward to a new sector in the region of Chipinga. Here the MNR group resisted an SAS changeover fearing that they were about to be abandoned. At Gorongoza it was normal practice for the four SAS men assigned to the MNR to move miles clear of the base area to meet the team changeover helicopter. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the replacement team, the MNR remained inside their safe haven totally surrounded by loyal tribesmen. However, even having gained the confidence and open support of the locals for miles around, the relatively small MNR group camping in hills east of Chipinga only felt safe with SAS in their midst. In consequence, we at COMOPS were faced with an unusual problem when we learned that these MNR men were holding their SAS colleagues hostage to prevent them from moving off for a changeover the MNR leader feared might not take place.

  At the cost of unnecessary flying hours, the situation was resolved by deploying the four-man replacement team miles from the MNR base for a long walk to effect changeover in the presence of MNR. But then, with eight SAS men making him feel doubly safe, the MNR leader attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade the first team to stay on.

  Luso Boma

  IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND Angola, South African forces were involved in a war against SWAPO (SWA Peoples’ Organisation) and to a lesser extent SAANC. As a result of their intelligence, we learned in late January 1979 that a large concentration of ZIPRA men were undergoing training under Russian and Cuban instructors at Luso Boma in Angola.

  Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the site of the large base in central-east Angola, and a preliminary feasibility study was conducted to establish if we could undertake an air attack against it. Clearly the target lay at too great a range for Hunters with under-wing stores. For the Canberras it was possible but the range left no reserve of fuel for possible Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone weather problems on the day. Initially it was decided to postpone the attack until weather conditions improved in May. However when the second Viscount was shot down by ZIPRA on 12 February 1979 it created a need for another high-profile retaliatory action and Luso was the best target we had at the time.

  OC 5 Squadron, Squadron Leader Chris Dixon (Green Leader), was brought in to discuss the matter. He immediately said his squadron could meet the task and advocated operating out of Victoria Falls Airport for a normal climb to 30,000 feet.

  The disused Portuguese aldeamento and ZIPRA barracks (top) surrounded by anti-aircraft gun positions, half of which are seen here (and ringed). The ZIPRA and SAANC barrack lines are barely visible at the top of the photograph with white fields on either side. Below the barracks are the various buildings that served as headquarters, classrooms and accommodation for Russians and Cubans.

  One engine would then be closed down for the cruise to target. Both engines would be used for the descent, attack and return to height where, once again, one engine would be closed down for the return to Victoria Falls.

  This was all very well, but Luso Boma base was too large to be covered by the formation of only four Canberras we could be certain of having on the day, when in fact six Canberras were needed to cover the whole target. An approach was made to the South Africans who had a vested interest in the same target because some SAANC were also training at Luso Boma. If we did not attack the base, the South African Air Force would probably do the job anyway. But, since we wanted to smack ZIPRA ourselves, an opportunity existed to undertake a combined formation strike. Air Commodore Norman Walsh was in favour of using an extra Canberra to drop 1000-pound bombs with variously set time-delay fuses to confuse and delay the enemy’s post-strike mopping up operations. In consequence, seven Canberras were used.

  Ted Brent.

  To launch aircraft from South West Africa and Rhodesia for link up in Angola was feasible but unwise in view of the need for joint planning and briefing of crews. So three SAAF Canberra B9s positioned at remote Fylde Air Base to keep their presence secret. After briefing, our four Canberras positioned at Victoria Falls. The SAAF aircraft, with modern engines and higher fuel capacity, had no problems with the longer range they had to fly from Fylde. Rudie Kritsinger, Roley Jones and Willie Meyer captained these bombers. Although Hunters had been discounted from the strike itself they were to be on station at height armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to counter interference from the Zambian Air Force or, less likely, Cuban-operated MiG 19s and MiG 21s based at Henrique de Carvalho in Angola.

  When the time came for start-up on 26 February 1979, Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie in the lead aircraft of Green Formation could not get one engine started. Chris immediately handed the lead to Ted Brent and Jim Russell who, as was standard practice, were fully prepared for such an eventuality. The other two Canberras were crewed by Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan and Kevin Peinke with, I think, J.J. Strydom.

  The Rhodesian formation was still climbing and had the SAAF formation visual when Chris Dixon reported being airborne five minutes behind. Ted continued with the formation of six until he was well inside Zambia. Near Mongu
he went into a shallow orbit to await Chris. At this point our radiointercepting service picked up a call from Mongu reporting the presence of ‘enemy aircraft’ to the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa.

  When Chris caught up, he instructed Ted to retain the lead and the formation continued on its way. The Non-Directional Beacon at Luso Airfield was expected to assist the formation but, typical for Africa, it was on the blink. Nevertheless the formation navigators all map-read whenever there were gaps in near continuous strata-cumulus cover along a weaving route between cumulonimbus storm clouds. Fortunately the low cloud cover ended before Luso.

  When Ted spotted the airfield at Luso, he instructed the Rhodesian pilots to fire up their cold engines as he commenced a fast descent for a wide port turn to pass low over the airfield on heading for the base which was close by. A huge storm stretched right across the run-up path to target but the Canberras had come too far to be put off by this difficulty. Three Rhodesian and three SAAF bombers moved into formation for the lowlevel attack. The fourth Rhodesian Canberra levelled off at 1,500 feet above and behind the main force.

  With six aircraft correctly stationed in their wide flat Vic positions, the formation entered heavy rain at full attack speed with all pilots holding heading and height on instruments.

  When he judged the moment was right, Ted called “Bomb doors, go.” Almost immediately the formation burst through the rain and there, dead on the planned strike-line, lay the target. The formation swept through, releasing 1,800 Alpha bombs onto a target sodden by the very storm through which it had just come. Immediately the formation was through, the seventh Canberra unloaded tightly grouped 1,000-pound delay bombs into the main CT barracks.

  Some of the few CTs that came out of cover after the rainstorm can be seen lying on the ground. Less easy to see are those lying or running through the scrub on the left side of the photographs. Note the dirt thrown up between trees top left of nearest barrack block in top photo followed by early stage of detonation in lower picture. Note also the wide spread of Alpha bomblets where dirt showers appear in the bottom photos after the full detonation to the left of the upper line of barracks in the upper photo. Note: Single round white marks at left centre of photographs are filing punch holes.

  The Canberras opened up into battle formation remaining low level for a while before climbing. The three SAAF aircraft pulling ahead because of their superior thrust and were soon lost from sight. Two Zambian MiG 19s that had searched the southwestern skies of Zambia for ‘enemy aircraft’, were already back on the ground and all Canberras reached base safely. One of the 1,000-pound bombs had failed to release over target but had detached itself later with quite a bump as it fell onto the closed bomb-bay door. Once on the ground the bomb-bay doors were opened gently, sufficiently to get a hand in to make the fused bomb safe. Thereafter, with the aid of acquired army and police mattresses, the bomb was allowed to fall free.

  Unfortunately for us, the inclement weather had driven many CTs into buildings, giving fair protection against those Alpha bombs that did not actually come through their roofs— many did.

  At my request, one of the Canberras had been fitted with a camera in its bomb bay to record its own strike. The resultant photographs revealed battle tanks, row upon row of barrack buildings and swastika-like figures of men running for cover or lying down with bomblets bouncing and bursting around them.

  According to ZAPU’s briefing to the Pan African Conference in Tanzania, ZIPRA’s casualties were 174 killed and 533 seriously wounded. They mentioned fourteen civilian cooks and bottle-washers killed and three wounded, but said nothing about the SAANC and Cuban casualties or the loss of large quantities of explosives and equipment that we knew (from radio intercepts) had been inflicted.

  Considering the weather situation and the size of the formation, the Canberra boys had conducted a fantastically cool-headed strike. At the time they did not recognise the degree of disruption they had caused, nor could they guess how this action would set ZIPRA’s plans back sufficiently to cost them dearly in time to come. Back on the ground, Ted Brent was heard to say, “Fear I knew not; but terror, yes.” He was commenting on his participation during downloading of the 1,000-pound hang-up. For armourer Warrant Officer Bill Brown, this was just another potentially dangerous situation requiring a cool head and technical expertise gained over many years in the RAF and in Rhodesia.

  Vanduzi Circle

  BACK IN MOZAMBIQUE, ZANLA HAD recovered from their late-September mauling in the Chimoio Circle and had moved closer to FRELIMO’s Chimoio town into a new site we named the ‘Vanduzi Circle’.

  From captured CTs who had been at this location during the early stages of its construction, we learned that the many camps making up the entire ZANLA complex lay between two easily identified hills. Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the existence of the new base area but from photos alone it was impossible to determine key points. To find this out, the SAS was tasked to go in to gain a clearer picture. This was necessary at the time because the Fireforces were reaping such important rewards in securing the internal Vital Ground that there could be no question of withdrawing them for another joint-force operation in Mozambique. If the SAS could pinpoint worthwhile and clearly definable targets within the Vanduzi Circle, jets would have to take them on to help keep ZANLA off balance.

  After an aborted first recce attempt, the SAS broke from their four-man team to test the viability of using just two lightly loaded men to move into the intensely active enemy base area. Whereas a total of six men were deployed in early March 1979, four established a secure base from which Richard Stannard and his companion, ‘Jungle’ Jordan, worked forward.

  These two men succeeded in scaling the difficult feature Monte Bassa, one of the two features between which the Vanduzi Circle lay. From a lofty position they watched a great deal of ZANLA activity just below their OP. For two days they monitored all movements until they were sure they had the place they had been sent to find. Hunters, Canberras and K-Cars moved in. The jet strikes were over when the helicopters arrived and drew fire from many heavy AA positions the SAS had not seen because of the density of the bush. This proved that the base was much larger than they had thought.

  When everything was quiet FRELIMO turned up, as had been expected, and for which the Hunters were busy rearming back at Thornhill. Richard and ‘Jungle’ Jordan, still unnoticed in their lofty hide, watched ZANLA’s dead and wounded being loaded onto a large truck whilst an armoured personnel carrier with FRELIMO troops prowled around.

  When the Hunters returned, Richard was able to direct them onto the personnel carrier, which was taken out along with most of the FRELIMO troops surrounding it. As this happened a Strela missile was launched unsuccessfully, again at Vic Wightman who whipped around and blasted the launch point.

  Having suffered losses due to the return of Hunters, FRELIMO realised there must be Rhodesians close by. Their radio messages were picked up in Rhodesia, passed to COMOPS, and relayed through SAS HQ to Richard who commenced his move-out after dark.

  Unfortunately the two-man team was spotted next morning and a hot pursuit by angry ZANLA resulted in Jordan being wounded and having to call for hot extraction. Not long after this Richard Stannard was back on Monte Bassa from where he again directed jet-strikes and, again, he called Hunters back to strike ZANLA and FRELIMO whilst they were gathering casualties from the first strike.

  Thanks to Richard’s successes, ZANLA was forced by FRELIMO to move away from them. The Vanduzi Circle of bases ceased to exist and it would be four months before we would find ZANLA’s new location close to our border.

  Cost comparisons

  PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM COMOPS, Wing Commander Dag Jones, acting for General Barnard, instructed MID (Military Intelligence Department) to conduct a survey on the cost-effectiveness of internal versus external operations. By the time this lengthy study was completed much had changed. Nevertheless, it served as a rough guide for planning.

  The MID as
sessment used the months January and February 1979 from which to draw figures and make comparisons. The task was difficult because they were trying to compare apples with oranges, except where costs were concerned. These are condensed details of Fireforce (FF) versus external operations, for what they are worth:

  INTERNAL:

  Fireforce Army Unit Deployments Kills Areas of Operation

  Considering that January and February had been very quiet months between major external offensives, MID’s choice was hardly an ideal time frame for comparisons. Besides, there had been considerable internal movements of forces into the Vital Ground, adversely effecting Fireforce activities in which 60% of calls proved to be ‘lemons’ because bush cover was at its thickest.

  In these two months only 262 CTs had been killed in Fireforce actions, according to physical body counts that is. The cost per terrorist killed translated into high expenditure in Rhodesian terms. (I do not remember the actual cost comparison but can recall that it was in the order of one tenth of the American figure for Vietnam.)

  EXTERNAL:

  On the other hand, according to FRELIMO radio intercepts, 103 ZANLA CTs were killed in Mozambique by jet-strikes and landmines previously laid by Special Forces. In Angola 174 ZIPRA were killed with 533 seriously wounded. Since we did not have these figures at the time, they were not included in the cost-comparison study.

  Ignoring those dead and wounded CTs in Mozambique, about which we knew nothing, the cost per terrorist killed externally (according to the study) was in the order of onethird of the internal cost. Within the next ten months this would reduce to less than a quarter in spite of greatly improved internal successes.