Fire in the Streets

by Eric Hammel

  At the same time Lieutenant Myers's Hotel/2/5 platoon was mounting its bloodless attack, a platoon of Golf/2/5 attacked southwest through the riverfront parkland. The platoon overran a one-story building southwest of Le Dinh Duong that stood directly in front of the cultural center. Outflanked and out­gunned, the NVA abandoned the French Cultural Center, which Lieutenant Myers's platoon occupied as soon as it was evident the NVA had fled.

  The big surprise of the afternoon was the discovery that 175 civilians, including two Americans, were hiding inside the French Cultural Center. All were escorted to MACV along with the bodies of five NVA and a small cache of weapons and ammuni­tion. Not one Marine was killed or even injured in the swiftly contrived and unimaginably successful response to the NVA's harassing fire.

  *

  At 1904, Fox/2/5's 2nd Platoon, commanded by Staff Ser­geant Paul Tinson, was sitting around inside the post office complex when gunfire erupted from an underground bunker the Marines had not even known was there. Immediately, the Marines closest to the shelter's front entrance pumped in rifle fire, fol­lowed by five 3.5-inch rocket rounds and two CS tear-gas gre­nades. This produced a brief lull, and then a lone figure emerged from the bunker with his hands up. The man, who was imme­diately taken prisoner, was an NVA warrant officer.

  Through gestures and obvious threats, the Marines got the warrant officer to try to talk his companions out peaceably. However, it was evident from the strident tenor of the shouted responses that at least a few of them did not want to surrender.

  Gunnery Sergeant Ed Van Valkenburgh, the Fox/2/5 gunny, was standing at the edge of the crowd, just observing, when a Marine on the second floor of the post office called down, "They're going out the back!" Gunny Van Valkenburgh ran around to where he thought the unseen back exit might be and fired a few rounds at what he thought was a moving shadow. "No," the Marine upstairs called, "he's up against the building!" The gunny pivoted and fired two rounds at the nearest structure. A man yelped once and fell—dead, as it turned out. Instantly, another dark form emerged from the bunker and took off down the street. Van Valkenburgh fired, but he was sure he missed.

  At that point, one of Staff Sergeant Tinson's Marines— bored with the exchanges or expecting the NVA to come out shooting—fired a LAAW rocket into the front entrance of the bunker.

  To everyone's surprise, the detonation was followed by sev­eral powerful secondary explosions. No doubt, an ammunition cache inside the bunker had been set off. When the smoke cleared, Staff Sergeant Tinson's platoon, wearing gas masks, pulled twenty-four dead NVA from the bunker along with five AK-47 assault rifles, two SKS carbines, two old U.S. M-l carbines, one RPD light machine gun, five B-40 rocket launchers, and three satchel charges. There were more dead NVA in the post office courtyard that evening than anyone in 2/5 had ever seen in one place at one time. In fact, even the oldest hands had not seen a total of twenty-five dead NVA until then.

  *

  On February 4, late in the afternoon, 2nd Lieutenant Wil­liam Donnelly's 1st Platoon of Alpha/1/1 was sent from the Jeanne d'Arc complex to outpost 1/1's open left (south) flank from within the small walled compound of the Jeanne d'Arc Student Center. The Marines had no trouble securing the two-story L-shaped main building, which, though abandoned by the NVA, was strewn throughout with NVA rucksacks and crude explosive devices.

  Shortly after setting in at around dusk, Lieutenant Donnelly requested tank support and 81mm illumination to help chase NVA hecklers from a hedgerow and a small building just to the south of the Student Center compound. A Marine M-48 tank arrived at 1950, and the illumination was layed on. The first 90mm round the tank fired caused four NVA soldiers to bolt from the building, toward the open field to the south.

  From a second-story window Lieutenant Donnelly's platoon sergeant, Sergeant Joe Burghardt, was watching when the NVA bolted. Dropping the four NVA was a simple matter for Burgh­ardt. They were in the open, with virtually no place to hide, and only thirty to forty-five meters away. Since Burghardt had already claimed shooter's rights to any NVA emerging from the door the four NVA had used, no one else in the Student Center was going to steal his targets unless he fouled up altogether. He simply raised his M-16, aimed in, and squeezed the trigger—four times. All four of the NVA were cut down.

  From elsewhere in the building, Donnelly's Marines opened fire at NVA that gunfire from the tank had flushed from the hedgerow. After the fight, Donnelly's men counted twenty-two NVA corpses in the open field; one uninjured NVA lieutenant surrendered to the Marines.

  *

  Taken altogether, the achievements of the ARVN and U.S. Marine units on February 4 demonstrated that ejection of the 4th and 6th NVA regiments from Hue was only a matter of time. But, although the 1st ARVN Division and 1st Marine Regiment had seized the initiative in Hue, the NVA and VC forces they were facing were far from beaten and still able to inflict serious losses.

  If the Marine and ARVN commanders could feel eventual victory within their grasp on February 4, the NVA's Tri-Thien-Hue Front's senior staff had evidence almost within sight of its own CP bunker that its forces were still able to win important victories. While the U.S. Marine and ARVN forces inside Hue were chalking up impressive results, a battalion of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was soundly defeated in its bid to advance— albeit unwittingly—into the NVA regional headquarters.

  ***

  PART V

  Thon Que Chu

  ***

  Chapter 21

  Isolate the battlefield. According to classic military strategy for combat in a built-up area, all three of the major players in Hue should have been striving to cut off the city from the outside. In reality, none had managed it.

  The NVA battle plan for the attack on Hue did show an awareness of the need to isolate it—the 806th Battalion had closed Highway 1 between Hue and PK 17, and the 804th Battalion had attacked ARVN troops east of the city. After these attacks, however, the NVA seemed to let chances for sealing Hue slip through their fingers.

  ARVN troops did nothing to seal Hue. From the start, ARVN units aimed their efforts at breaking into the Citadel and clearing it.

  All the U.S. Marine units dispatched to Hue through Febru­ary 4 had wound up in the heart of the modern city, where they waged the battle from the inside out. No additional Marine units were available, so the Marines were in no position to seal the city from the outside.

  From the time higher U.S. and ARVN headquarters had finally realized the scope of Communist intentions, it was clear that the only units capable of surrounding Hue and holding the approaches to it were the heliborne brigades of the 1st Cavalry and the 101st Airborne divisions. However, the need to respond to other Communist threats in northern I Corps and the need to redeploy U.S. units throughout I Corps left only one U.S. Army unit in any position to respond to the Hue emergency. That unit was the U.S. Army's I Corps reserve battalion and Camp Evans "palace guard"—Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet's 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment (2/12 Cav, "2nd of the 12th Cavalry"), an element of the 1st Cavalry Division's 3rd Brigade.

  *

  The Air Cav had been in-country since mid-1965, and it had honed its techniques to perfection in the Central Highlands of II Corps. One airmobile brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, sent to Vietnam in mid-1965, had also served with distinction in II Corps. The remainder of the 101st Division had arrived in Vietnam in December 1967. After shaking down in II Corps, the untested 2nd Brigade had begun staging into northern I Corps immediately prior to the Tet offensive. It was not quite ready to begin combat operations when Tet broke.

  On the morning of February 2, the reconnaissance element of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division—B Troop, 1st Squad­ron, 9th Cavalry Regiment (B/1/9 Cav)—was flying reconnais­sance missions west of Hue from its LZ near Camp Evans. Deployed mainly in UH-1E Huey gunship and scoutship helicop­ters, the swift-moving cavalry reconnaissance troop quickly lo­cated a unit of NVA soldiers in the open only three kilometers west of the city. Six
teen of the NVA soldiers were killed in the first clash. Sightings throughout the rest of the day, followed by instantaneous assault from the air, resulted in claims of an addi­tional twenty-two NVA killed by B/1/9 Cav.

  Even before B/1/9 Cav had reported the first sighting of NVA west of Hue, however, Major General John Tolson, the 1st Cavalry Division commander, had directed Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet to turn the defense of Camp Evans over to headquar­ters and base troops. He ordered the 2/12 Cav to stage by air into a new LZ just south of PK 17. The move was completed during the afternoon.

  Beginning on the morning of February 3, General Tolson ordered Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's four companies to mount an attack toward Hue, paralleling Highway 1. For the moment, Sweet's effort would be aimed less at sealing Hue's western flank than at feeling the enemy out and, hopefully, forcing him to deploy his reserves well away from the city.

  The 2/12 Cav would not be able to conduct its assault aboard its helicopters. Even if there had been sufficient helicop­ters to lift the entire 2/12 Cav—and there were not—the helicop­ters could not have been adequately fueled or serviced. The 1st Cavalry Division was so new to the area that the bulk of its refueling and maintenance facilities were still back in II Corps, and all land routes for fuel and ammunition had been severed. Also, the weather was lousy. Though the helicopters could cer­tainly operate at low ceilings—B/1/9 Cay's reconnaissance fo­rays on February 2 had proven as much—the NVA and VC in I Corps had already shown a surprising willingness to stand up to threatening helicopters and fire back. In light of the sparse heli­copter resources, it was decided that the 650-man 2/12 Cav would walk.

  To the 2/12 Cav's commander, that was no problem. Dick Sweet was an infantryman, pure and simple. He had fought on his feet in Korea and, more recently, had been a senior instructor at the Army's Infantry School, at Fort Benning, Georgia. He was used to leading an airmobile Air Cav unit, but, under the circum­stances, he preferred meeting the enemy on foot.

  For the 2/12 Cav, the mission at Hue was unusual in that all four of the battalion's letter companies (A, B, C, and D) would be operating together in the field. The Air Cav's high-mobility heliborne tactics virtually ensured the fragmentation of Air Cav battalions; it was unusual for an Air Cav battalion commander to have more than a company or two maneuvering on the ground at any time. On the morning of February 3, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet was eager to test his mettle as the commander of a complete infantry battalion.

  The 2/12 Cav's mission to Hue was Dick Sweet's dream mission. As the only U.S. Army unit thus far committed to the Hue emergency—and the only U.S. Army or AEVN unit deployed to the verges of the battlefield—the 2/12 Cav was assigned to cover a huge area of operations: everything on both sides of Highway 1 from PK 17 to the northwestern wall of the Hue Citadel and the north bank of the Perfume River. For all practical purposes, the 2/12 Cav's zone had no western limit. If Sweet's companies located any NVA units in the zone, Sweet was to deal with them as he saw fit, to the limit of his unit's capabilities. Other battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and the virgin 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, would be com­mitted as they became available. But, on February 3 and for the foreseeable future, the northwest quadrant outside Hue belonged to Dick Sweet.

  At PK 17, late on the afternoon of February 2, Lieutenant Colonel Sweet stopped by the 3rd ARVN Regiment CP. The regimental commander told him that there was little his ARVN units could do to assist the 2/12 Cav. All four of his infantry battalions and numerous attached units were engaged to the hilt in and east of Hue, and the regimental forward CP had been ordered to move into the Citadel to direct clearing operations there. The only help the ARVN could provide, the commander said, would be support fire from two ARVN 105mm howitzers, which were to remain at PK 17. The ARVN artillery would be the only supporting arms at Sweet's disposal. His regularly assigned six-gun 105mm artillery battery was not scheduled to arrive at PK 17 for a day or two.

  The intelligence summary Sweet received was incomplete and grim. An estimated sixteen to eighteen NVA battalions were believed to be active in and around Hue, with six to eight of them north and west of the city. No one could say how these figures had been divined, and staff officers in higher headquarters openly scoffed at the high count. For some reason, Dick Sweet's instincts were aroused. He believed the enemy order-of-battle estimates— which eventually proved to be accurate.

  As preparations for the mission mounted throughout Febru­ary 2, the unfamiliar requirements of a footborne infantry sweep resulted in considerable confusion. The Air Cav troopers were used to having their packs and other personal gear flown out to them aboard logistical transport helicopters ("log ships") each time they secured a new LZ. Somehow, the directive to leave their packs at Camp Evans was interpreted to include leaving extra ammunition, sleeping bags, and blanket rolls as well. That first night, the weather turned from overcast to cold and rainy, a portent of even worse weather to come. Extra clothing and bed­ding were beyond reach, and they would remain so for the dura­tion of the operation.

  Following a cold, drizzly night, the entire 2/12 Cav jumped off from PK 17 at 0700, February 3. Though the morning was overcast and foggy, many of the troopers could see the glow of fires to the southeast, from Hue.

  Lieutenant Colonel Sweet arranged his companies in a classic diamond formation. Company A was on the point, heading southeast on the south side of and parallel to Highway 1. Com­pany B was to the right (south) rear of the point company, and Company C was to the left (north) rear. The battalion command group was directly behind Company A, and Company D was behind the command group, acting as both rearguard and re­serve. If the point company or either of the two flanking compa­nies ran into trouble, the battalion would be able to orient itself in any direction with three companies on line, one in reserve, and the battalion command group in the ideal location to control the entire battalion.

  Sweet selected Company A for the point position because of its commander, Captain Bob Helvey. Helvey had served in the area as an advisor to the 1st ARVN Division. He knew the terrain. Moreover, Helvey was a natural soldier. Sweet trusted Helvey's judgment and admired his business-as-usual attitude. If the 2/12 Cav met the enemy, Sweet wanted Helvey's Company A to be there first.

  The terrain south of PK 17 along Highway 1 was open pretty much to the limit of visibility. Despite the exposed nature of the push, the battalion encountered no enemy resistance at first. At 0850, however, Company A's point platoon began re­ceiving sporadic sniper fire. As was typical of most American combat units, the entire battalion halted in place as attempts were made to call in artillery support. However, the call for fire sup­port came to nothing because of communications problems.

  Since there was nothing to be done against the sniper-Lieutenant Colonel Sweet was not about to dispatch even a squad to find just one sniper—the battalion moved on. The sniper fired a few more ineffectual rounds, and then he quit.

  At 0945, five kilometers southeast of PK 17, Company A reached Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, the first of several thickly wooded, heavily populated "islands" on the south side of High­way 1 between PK 17 and Hue. No opposition met the battalion as it started to move through the large hamlet, but evidence of recent enemy occupation was everywhere. There were freshly dug trenches and bunkers at every turn. Even more ominous was the desertion of the prosperous hamlet by its entire population.

  After searching the empty village, the 2/12 Cav got back on the move. As soon as the point element of Company A stepped out of the treeline at the southern edge of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, the troopers saw the backs of many civilians, who were fleeing across the cultivated fields to the next settled island to the southeast, Thon Que Chu. As the civilians disappeared into the Thon Que Chu treeline, NVA soldiers could be seen manning a trench line facing the Air Cav battalion. Company A instantly deployed just inside Thon Lieu Coc Thuong's southern treeline, and Company C drew abreast on its left to cover the battalion flank in the direction of Highway 1.


  *

  The 2/12 Cav command group and supporting-arms teams spent a full hour trying to bring in outside fire support against the fortified treeline. The two ARVN 105s at PK 17 could not be called because of the language barrier, no U.S. Army artillery was in range, and the ceiling was too low for fixed-wing air support. However, several of the 1st Cavalry Division's Huey helicopter gunships and CH-47 aerial rocket artillery (ARA) helicopters were finally brought in. The Hueys' machine-gun fire and the rockets from the ARA ships looked like they were doing some good. But later inspection revealed that the NVA had dug into a mass of trenches and deep one-man spider holes that employed living bamboo hedges and palm trees to excellent advantage as overhead cover. NVA casualties from the heliborne fire were probably negligible.

  The air attacks ran for just under an hour, until a Huey shot up the wrong treeline, spraying Company A and killing one Company C trooper. At that point, Lieutenant Colonel Sweet decided to launch a direct assault against the NVA trench line.

  The ground between Thon Lieu Coc Thuong and Thon Que Chu was open and flat, with no cover other than a tiny cemetery about midway across. There was a larger cemetery about 200 meters to the northeast, and a small thicket about 250 meters to the south.

  The NVA were beginning to bring in 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds—and possibly a few 140mm rockets—against the Air Cav battalion's position. On command, Captain Robert Helvey's Company A jumped off into the open in three reinforced-platoon waves. The lead platoon crawled and ran past the small graveyard and advanced to within seventy-five meters of the NVA-fortified trench. Then it was stopped cold by heavy fire.