Fire in the Streets

by Eric Hammel

  Baker's final plan was complex and, for that battalion at that time, quite radical. It called for Company C to lead the battalion out of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong in single file, and to seize Thon Phu O in the dark. As soon as that was done, still in the dark, Company B was to assume the battalion vanguard position and cross the paddyfield east of Thon Phu O as far as the berm on which Company A had become stalled during the initial Febru­ary 12 attack. At first light, right after a brief but massive ar­tillery and naval-gunfire barrage, Company B would attack in single file down the left side of a bamboo hedge that jutted out from Thon Que Chu. Then, still in single file, Company B was to turn north (left) to secure the entire length of the outer NVA-held trenchline. At the same time, Company D was to advance down the right side of the jutting bamboo hedge, penetrate into Thon Que Chu, and turn left up the second interior NVA-held trench-line, which the bamboo thicket concealed and protected.

  The idea was not to overwhelm the entire NVA line at once, but to surprise the NVA, penetrate into the southern end of their trenchlines, and roll their defenses up from one flank to the other, one emplacement at a time. To support the trench assault, Company A would man a base of fire around the downed Huey log bird. From there, Company A and the one Duster attached to the 5/7 Cav would foil large-scale reinforcement and suppress NVA mortars. As soon as the trenchlines in the bamboo thicket had been rolled up from south to north, Company B and Com­pany D, with Company C in close support and Company A in reserve, would re-form inside Thon Que Chu and attack south through T-T Woods, perhaps all the way down to the NVA headquarters bunker.

  To help breach NVA bunkers and other fighting positions, many of the troopers were to be equipped with field-expedient bangalore torpedoes—bamboo stalks filled with explosives—and pole charges. Company B's objections stemmed from the plan to attack in single file and to use unfamiliar weapons. Both were beyond the experience of the troopers, who were already edgy despite a week of careful squad-by-squad dry-run training.

  Major Baker tried to rebuild flagging confidence by going over the plan's advantages once again, but even he could not find the right words of encouragement. He had no idea if things would work out. He knew that he had put together the best plan he could, given his resources, but he could not know if it was an effective plan until it had been executed. No one could.

  *

  In the wee hours of February 21, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Vaught positioned his CP at the southwest corner of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, right on the battalion line of departure, to control the egress of their companies in the dark. As planned, Company C moved off the line of departure in single file and crossed the 500-meter paddyfield separating Thon Lieu Coc Thuong from Thon Phu O. The first objective was seized without a hitch. No NVA were found by Company C as it fanned out through the village, and not a shot was fired.

  Long before Thon Phu O had been completely scoured, Captain Howard Prince's Company B turned left and advanced about 150 meters to the northeast-southwest berm fronting the west side of the bamboo thicket. The troopers had regained control of their fears, and there was not so much as a squawk from them; discipline was perfect. As soon as the tail of the Company B file cleared Thon Phu O, Captain Frank Lambert's Company D followed, also in single file. Finding the berm was a snap. The dry streambed running between the hamlets was the perfect guidepost.

  The move across the paddyfield was a little behind schedule, probably because everyone involved in the attack was carrying a huge load of ammunition, explosives, LAAWs, and medical sup­plies. It was hot and humid long before sunup, and the blind trek across the flat, open paddyfield was physically and emotionally exhausting. Company B completed the move in the dark, but the rear elements of Company D were still on the move as the first hint of dawn appeared. There was a brief, final flurry of radio exchanges, and then Company D was ready to go. The assault companies tucked in while a withering artillery and naval-gunfire barrage rained down on the defenders.

  The NVA responded far more quickly than anyone thought possible. No wonder; the 5th NVA Regiment was a crack unit. As soon as the Company B point entered the bamboo, explosions erupted just to its front. The lead platoon commander reported back to Captain Prince that he could not see the source of the resistance and did not know if he was being attacked with mor­tars or hand grenades. The attack bogged down.

  Captain Prince's command group was right behind the lead platoon. As soon as the movement to his front stalled, Prince moved ahead into the bamboo to contact the lead platoon com­mander. Just as the captain dropped down beside the lieutenant, an 82mm mortar round fell in on top of them. Captain Prince, Company B's artillery forward observer, and their radiomen were injured; the lieutenant, the only other officer in Company B, was spared.

  Captain Prince was conscious but stunned. The only wound he could see was to his right index finger, which was dangling from the knuckle, but he was actually riddled with shrapnel. Struggling mightily to remain conscious, Prince crawled back to the main body of the company before he passed out.

  *

  Back at Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, Major Charlie Baker was only partway through a silent litany of self-congratulation when his radioman picked up a frantic call from the Company B com­mand radioman: Captain Prince was down, wounded in a snap mortar barrage.

  When he overheard the news that Howard Prince was down, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Vaught reacted instantly. He knew that Company B had only one officer left, the young lieutenant with­out command experience. "Charlie," Vaught said in a dead-calm voice to Baker, "I want you to go over there and take command of Company B." Baker nodded; said "Yes, Sir"; and took off toward the berm. It was full daylight as Baker jogged across 400 meters of open ground. He heard some firing from within the bamboo hedge along the dry streambed, but not much. There were no visible signs of combat.

  When Baker reached the berm, he squatted in front of Cap­tain Prince, who was unconscious. Nearby, two or three wounded troopers were stretched out behind the berm. No one was work­ing on Prince's or the other troopers' injuries. Baker realized that most of Company B was huddled down behind the berm. Inside the bamboo hedge, back along the stream, Company D seemed to be in the same state, hunkered down and immobile, waiting for Company B to recover itself. Everyone seemed to be stunned.

  Baker passed behind most of Company B, to the bamboo hedge along the streambed. He cursed at several immobile medics. By the time Baker had the medics at work, he found that a medevac bird was hovering just off the ground, only ten meters behind the berm. He turned his attention to getting Captain Prince and the other wounded men loaded aboard the helicopter.

  Next, Baker radioed the Company B lieutenant, who was under cover in the bamboo bordering the streambed, only a few meters forward. The lieutenant's voice was edged with panic; he reported that he was pinned down and asked for permission to withdraw. In fact, there was hardly any gunfire. Baker spoke to the young officer in what he hoped were reassuring tones: "Calm down, Lieutenant. Get organized and report back to me with clear facts." Baker waited in vain for a few minutes, then called the lieutenant again. There was no answer. Baker tried again, got no answer again, and started cursing into the mike. The company radioman tapped the major on the back and pointed to a handful of troopers who were running across the rear of the company. "Sir," the radioman offered, "the lieutenant's back there." With that, Baker told the radioman to tell the lieutenant to go back to Thon Lieu Coc Thuong and organize the flow of ammunition to the company. Company B was now Charlie Baker's problem.

  While Baker was taking control, NVA mortar rounds began falling into the woods. Baker noticed that a stream of 40mm tracer was flying down the paddyfield to his rear, from north to south. It turned out that the crew of the Duster, which was set in near the downed log bird back at Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, had gotten a fix on the NVA mortars' muzzle flashes. A few moments later, the NVA mortars, which were set in about 200 meters south of the streambed, stopped firing. The 5/7 Cav was not molested by NVA morta
rs for the rest of the day.

  When all the reports were in, it was apparent that Company B and Company D had stepped off right into heavy fire from a stout bunker that the NVA had had built since February 12. The structure was at the intersection of the bamboo thicket the two Cav companies were using to enter the NVA position and the bamboo thicket that formed the NVA outer defense line. From inside it, the defenders could see—and cover—the open area between the berm and their main line. The NVA were not doing much firing, but they had the advantage if they felt threatened.

  Time was lost getting the .50-caliber machine gun moved across the paddyfield to the berm. During the wait, Major Baker called a platoon sergeants' meeting and asked for suggestions. Sergeant First Class Harold Klein, Company B's senior noncom, who was acting as a platoon leader, suggested getting the Duster moved into the paddy behind the berm so it could suppress the NVA trenchline from close in. While this brilliant solution was implemented, Baker told the platoon sergeants that he still thought his original attack plan could work. He asked for a volunteer to lead the point platoon. There was a brief, pregnant silence, and then Staff Sergeant Broom said he would do it.

  By radio, Major Baker updated Captain Frank Lambert, and Lambert said that Company D would be ready to go as soon as the Duster started shooting. As the Duster opened fire under the direction of Sergeant First Class Klein, Private First Class Albert Rocha, the Company D pointman, crawled forward to take out the bunker with a pole charge. An NVA soldier inside the bunker fired at Rocha. The bullet hit the handguard of the trooper's M-16, but Rocha kept going. The Company D exec, 1st Lieutenant Frederick Krupa, crawled forward to help him. When the two reached the nearest firing aperture, Rocha fired his M-16 into the structure. Then Krupa jammed the ten-pound pole charge through the breach—and held it there while NVA soldiers inside stopped shooting and frantically tried to push it back out. After the charge detonated, one NVA soldier hurtled out through the back exit. Rocha shot him dead.

  The destruction of the bunker broke the back of the NVA defense and reinvigorated the 5/7 Cav assault. Company D filed past the bunker to the second bamboo hedge and secured Com­pany B's rear and right flank. At the same time, Company B's Staff Sergeant Broom led his troopers through the bamboo hedge, turned left, and began securing the forward NVA trench-line. Once in the bamboo thicket, Broom's platoon rolled into the NVA trenchline and advanced northward in single file. From behind the berm, the rest of Company B used gunfire to cover and support the vanguard platoon's advance. Company A covered both trenchlines from Thon Lieu Coc Thuong.

  Whenever Company B platoon's rotating point elements encountered NVA, they radioed Sergeant First Class Klein, who was standing upright beside the Duster, and asked him to direct the Duster crew. Then the pointman would pop a smoke grenade to mark himself, and the Duster would pound fifteen to twenty 40mm rounds into the bamboo ten to fifteen meters to the left of the smoke. The method worked fine the first half-dozen times, but the Company B point eventually ran into a bunker the 40mm rounds could not penetrate. A Huey helicopter gunship arrived on station and was directed to fire into the position from above. In addition, Major Baker sent the flamethrower team forward. The flamethrower operator advanced upright, stopped only a few meters away from the bunker, and torched it. An NVA soldier raced out the back exit, but no one fired at him as he turned the corner and disappeared, because the flamethrower operator was in the way of the troopers watching from behind the berm.

  It was just after noon, and that was the end of the battle for the bamboo thicket. Any organized NVA units that might have been left in there, withdrew. A 2/12 Cav trooper attached to the 5/7 Cav led a graves registration team to the former 81mm mortar pit in which eleven of his comrades had been interred on the night of February 4. And all five of the troopers Company D had left in front of the thicket on February 12 were recovered. Several NVA stragglers hiding in the bamboo thicket were rooted out, and there was much booty to collect and analyze. On Febru­ary 21, the 5/7 Cav had reduced about seventy reinforced bunkers and numerous smaller positions, though few had been strongly defended. The 5/7 Cav advanced through Thon Que Chu but not into Thon La Chu. The battalion never entered the Tri-Thien-Hue Front command bunker.

  As planned, the 2/501 Airborne attacked into T-T Woods at the Thon Que Chu-Thon La Chu line, and the two companies of the 2/12 Cav advanced into Thon La Chu from the south. The main force of NVA was gone; the Americans contacted only a desultory rearguard effort. The Tri-Thien-Hue Front headquar­ters bunker had been abandoned and fell without a fight. The 1/7 Cav, pushing along Highway 1 across the north side of T-T Woods, encountered only minor rearguard opposition when it jumped off at 0520.

  By day's end, February 21, Thon Que Chu and Thon La Chu had been well scoured, and the 1/7 Cav was wrapped around the eastern side of T-T Woods, only five kilometers from the Citadel's western corner. For all practical purposes, the NVA's access to Hue had been sealed. Strategically, the battle for Hue was over. The bitter fighting that occurred thereafter mainly involved NVA and VC units and individuals trying to save themselves from being captured or annihilated.

  ***

  PART X

  The Flagpole

  ***

  Chapter 37

  At 1/5's nightly commanders' meeting on February 20, Major Bob Thompson asked his company commanders if they felt their troops were up to launching a night attack—about the only tactic 1/5 had not yet attempted in its week-long Citadel ordeal. Three of the four company commanders thought their troops would be too tired to stay awake for a whole night after a full day of fighting. However, 1st Lieutenant Pat Polk's Alpha/1/5 had been in reserve for most of the week, so Thompson asked Polk if he wanted to give it a go. Polk said he would.

  What Thompson's idea finally boiled down to was the infil­tration by Alpha/l/5's minuscule 2nd Platoon of the area around the Thuong Tu Gate. Personally led by Pat Polk, the patrol—for that's what it really was—began the night move across the NVA line beginning at 2300, February 20.

  Lieutenant Polk reported at 0330 that his Marines were safely ensconced in several multistory buildings on either side of the Thuong Tu Gate. They had encountered no NVA soldiers on the way.

  At about 0600, members of the patrol interrogated an elderly Vietnamese man and two children. The captives were obviously innocent civilians with no information to offer, so they were released.

  At 0800, patrol members manning observation posts inside the buildings spotted two NVA units gathering in the open, one on either side of the Marine-held enclave. The 81mm forward observer, who had accompanied the patrol—he was the main reason for its being there—ordered a tear gas mission from a section of 4.2-inch mortars established some days earlier at MACV. The CS gas caused the NVA to disperse. Then a scout-sniper team used the confusion triggered by the CS gas to pick off targets, without drawing undue attention. Four NVA soldiers were reported killed at that time, and many others died later as a result of the unique application of bushcraft to city warfare. The patrol's position was never compromised.

  When news of the foray got around—Major Thompson had insisted that the other companies tune into Alpha/l/5's com­pany net—the entire battalion became suffused with enthusiasm. As senior officers were quick to point out, here was an object lesson that Marines could be as skilled in infiltration tactics as the mythical NVA supermen.

  *

  Throughout the day the NVA facing the main body of .1/5 did most of its resisting at long range, with machine guns and rifles. U.S. Marines attacking toward the southeast wall saw few enemy soldiers, but they felt the sting of their presence. Captain Myron Harrington's dwindling Delta/1/5 tried time and again to advance along the top of the northeast wall to the Citadel's eastern corner, but their efforts resulted in no net gains. Bravo/1/5 and Delta/1/5 jumped off into a renewed assault late in the morning, but both companies were held to minimal gains. Toward the end of the day, Charlie/1/5 was boresighted by many NVA weapons, particularly atop the south
east wall, and it was driven to ground by the intense fire.

  On February 21, the cumulative losses of 1/5 were three Marine infantrymen killed, fourteen wounded and evacuated, and five wounded and returned to duty. Against these totals, the Marines counted sixteen NVA or VC confirmed killed, one NVA soldier surrendered, and five enemy personal weapons captured. At day's end, for all the stiff resistance, elements of 1/5 were within a block of the Citadel's southeast wall.

  Through the day and into a second night, Lieutenant Pat Folk's Alpha/1/5 patrol remained in the buildings it had occu­pied around the Thuong Tu Gate.

  *

  The next morning, February 21, Captain John Niotis's Lima/3/5 was attached to the 1st Marines. At 1435, the com­pany was formally assigned to 1/5 for use in the Citadel. Imme­diately, the relatively fresh company was ordered to Doc Lao Park for a helilift into the 1st ARVN Division CP compound. The first lift was fired on by NVA machine guns, as was a subsequent lift. The operation became so hazardous that the effort was called off, leaving the last forty-five members of Lima/3/5 stranded at MACV for the night.

  Major Huong Thong's VNMC Battle Group Alpha re­mained stalled behind Thuy Quan Canal, only halfway along the Citadel's southwest wall. Impeded by the canal, which ran the full length of the VNMC front, Thong's battalions were forced to channel their attack across two bridges, both of which were dominated by NVA machine guns on the Citadel wall. When the Vietnamese Marines tried to teargas the defenders, the NVA used cloth to make field-expedient gas masks that countered the effects of the CS. A VNMC ground assault in the wake of the gas attack was beaten back at great cost to Thong's battalions. Later, NVA 122mm rockets from the high hills to the west fell into the VNMC zone, inflicting additional casualties.