Fire in the Streets

by Eric Hammel

  *

  The battle in the VNMC zone on February 22 began at 0645, when NVA soldiers manning positions atop and within the Citadel wall opened fire with machine guns and rifles. Mortars set in farther to the southeast just added to the mayhem. Casual­ties began mounting noticeably. At 0830, an NVA counterattack pushed part of a battalion of the 3rd ARVN Regiment out of a schoolhouse it had been holding for days in the zone between the VNMC battle group and the U.S. Marine sector.

  The VNMC battle group was again supported by creeping 8-inch howitzer barrages from the south. The 8-inch registration rounds for each fire mission were placed on a line 300 meters to the southeast of the VNMC line. The subsequent all-out barrage was drawn closer in small increments until Vietnamese Marines on the front line sent word that they were receiving shrapnel in their positions. Then, following each barrage, ARVN loudspeak­ers were brought up and the NVA and VC facing the VNMC battle group were given an opportunity to surrender. Most of the Communist fighters remained in their bunkers and fighting holes, but they allowed hundreds of civilians to cross into the VNMC lines. No doubt, some NVA and VC fighters escaped in civilian disguise, but several were captured after flunking interro­gation or after being turned in by civilians loyal to the GVN.

  For all the good the artillery and propaganda barrages did, the 4th and 5th VNMC battalions made no forward progress on February 22. The NVA and VC holding the Huu Gate open were, if anything, more determined then ever.

  *

  Victory was in the air in the 1/5 zone of action. Al­pha/1/5's 2nd Platoon had spent the night of February 22 atop the wall at the Citadel's eastern corner, and the NVA in the area had made no hostile moves in its direction. At 0800, February 23, Captain Myron Harrington's Delta/1/5 attacked from its line a block from the southeast wall and punched through to the objective against sporadic sniper fire. Two Marines were wounded in the final assault, and one dead NVA soldier was discovered as the thin little company spread out to scour the area in its sector.

  When Delta/1/5 went into the attack toward the wall, Captain John Niotis's much larger Lima/3/5 pivoted to the south­west to attack toward the Imperial Palace's eastern corner. There were not many NVA facing the company, but those that were put up remarkably strong resistance. Initial progress was slow, no doubt partly because the men of Lima/3/5, veterans of only one day's city fighting, were playing it safe.

  One of the two or three M-48 tanks supporting Captain Niotis's company was struck at 0945 by a B-40 rocket. One crewman was killed, one crewman was slightly injured, and the heavily damaged tank had to be driven to the rear.

  Sensing that the end of NVA resistance was near at hand, Major Bob Thompson and Major Len Wunderlich left the 1/5 CP and moved forward to the porch of a masonry building from which they could observe and direct their battalion's final maneu­vers. By then, Lima/3/5 had found its stride. As Bob Thompson observed from his new CP, he thought it was the most beautiful attack he had ever witnessed—better even than the many re­hearsed demonstrations he had observed or taken part in at Quantico. The sky had been clear at dawn, so there were plenty of Marine jets overhead, their pilots able and eager to deliver bombs, napalm, and rockets to within 100 meters of the advancing 1/5 front. Once it got over its early-morning caution, Lima/3/5 moved forward like a well-oiled machine. And the two or three surviving tanks and two Ontos were right on the money, attack­ing in perfect harmony with the infantry. In the course of the initial phase of the attack, the long-sought Thuong Tu Gate finally fell into U.S. Marine hands.

  At about 1000, the tank platoon sergeant or his gunner apparently saw movement in the 1/5 CP building, which had only just been occupied by Major Thompson, Major Wunderlich, and their CP group. The tank crewmen jumped to the conclusion that the building was in enemy hands. For their part, the two majors were certain that they had front-row seats for the inevita­ble destruction of an NVA position somewhere behind the CP. They were thoroughly enjoying the show until they realized that they were staring straight down the 90mm gun's barrel. At what felt like the last instant, the gun barrel went up and the turret traversed. The gunner had seen a better target. The tank fired several rounds over the CP, toward the Imperial Palace wall, but then the gun was traversed back on the battalion CP. Bob Thomp­son saw a little puff of smoke and then—BOOM—a 90mm round tore into the CP building. Fortunately, Major Thompson, Major Wunderlich, and all their assorted radiomen were already sprawled on the deck when the tank round detonated on the concrete archway over the porch. As if that were not enough, the tank commander raked the porch with his .50-caliber cupola machine gun. Major Thompson instinctively headed for the door so he could get inside the masonry building, but his brand-new bodyguard threw Thompson to the ground and covered his body with his own. Thompson was amazed. His former bodyguard had been shot dead the day before, and the new bodyguard had been selected at random by the battalion sergeant major. Thompson did not even know the new kid's name, and he was sure the lance corporal knew him only as "Major." Then, compounding Thomp­son's amazement, a dead calm Len Wunderlich grabbed the handset from the battalion radioman and in uncharacteristically vulgar language ordered the tank platoon sergeant to cease fire. Miraculously, beyond damage to Major Thompson's equanimity, the tank attack had caused no harm.

  A short time later, one of the tanks supporting Lima/3/5 was struck by several B-40s fired from the Imperial Palace wall. Three of the tank crewmen were wounded. A minute later, as the damaged tank was pulling back, it was struck by three more B-40s. Lima/3/5 Marines who spotted the source of the RPGs fired their M-16s and M-60s while calling for a 60mm mortar mission. The NVA returned fire at the Lima/3/5 Marines, but the mortars quickly blotted out the NVA position. The tank completed its withdrawal unmolested, but one Lima/3/5 Marine was killed, six were wounded and evacuated, and five sustained minor wounds in the exchange.

  At 1020, the main body of Alpha/1/5 was struck by three 82mm mortar rounds as it inched its way along outside the Imperial Palace's northeast wall. Four Marines were wounded and evacuated; one Marine, who was lightly injured, stayed with the company.

  Early in the afternoon, Delta/1/5 was attacking to the southwest, mainly clearing NVA-held bunkers and passages within the southeast wall. At length the company's lead element ran into a large NVA force holed up in a series of interconnect­ing, mutually supporting bunkers and pillboxes. Heavy fire from NVA. rifles, machine guns, and RPGs threatened to stop the Delta/1/5 drive, but Captain Myron Harrington was not in the mood to let anything stand between him and final victory. Har­rington moved forward with a pair of teams armed with 3.5-inch rockets and directed them against what he perceived as the cor­nerstone of the NVA defensive sector. Then Harrington darted from front-line position to front-line position, pinpointing objec­tives for his troops and directing suppressive small-arms fire. As Harrington personally called artillery and mortar fire down to within twenty-five meters of his own position, four NVA posi­tions were overrun. As the NVA defensive sector started to crack, Harrington worked his way forward, rallied his company's point elements, and personally led an assault on yet another NVA position. At that point, Delta/1/5 began to make headway through the crumbling NVA defenses. When the attack finally routed the NVA force, Harrington's Marines counted twenty-five dead NVA soldiers within the strongpoint. Captain Myron Har­rington was awarded a Navy Cross for his role in leading the attack.

  *

  As soon as Major Bob Thompson was certain that the NVA defenses all across 1/5's front were finally crumbling, he asked the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment, to join him in the 1/5 CP. The ARVN captain, a rather dandified individual, had been asking Thompson for days to be allowed to mount the final attack on the flagpole from which the giant NLF banner remained flying over the center of the Citadel's southeast wall. Thompson kept telling the ARVN battalion commander that any such attempt would be suicidal until the Citadel's eastern corner was in friendly hands. During the afternoon of February 23, Thompson told the
ARVN captain that the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment, could probably seize the flagpole right then and there. Thompson expected the ARVN officer to jump at the opportunity, but the ARVN battalion commander just replied, "Maybe you better take it."

  It was out of the question for 1/5 to seize the flagpole. Higher headquarters had made it abundantly clear that, no matter what it was able to accomplish, the U.S. Marine battalion was not permitted to strike the NLF colors from the Citadel's main flag­pole, nor was it permitted to enter the Imperial Palace grounds. In deference to South Vietnamese national pride, only ARVN or VNMC units would be permitted to seize those two ultimate political objectives.

  Given the restrictions, 1/5 ended the day in possession of all the objectives it was allowed. Except for straightening its front line and mopping up throughout its rear, there was nothing left for 1/5 to do inside the Citadel of Hue.

  On February 23, the 4th and 5th VNMC battalions began their attack at 1100. An immense early-morning air and artillery bombardment had been promised all along their front, but hours had passed and no such support had appeared. Lacking support even from their own 81mm mortars, for which there was still no ammunition, each battalion simply attacked with three companies abreast. Once again, the Vietnamese Marines were unable to get across Thuy Quan Canal. Despite repeated efforts by officers and staff noncommissioned officers to motivate the troops, it was clear that the VNMC battle group was going to get nowhere that day.

  By day's end, morale in the 4th and 5th VNMC battalions had taken a nose dive. An air of sullenness swept through the ranks, an unprecedented turn of events among the elite ranks of the stoic VNMC.

  *

  Apparently, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment, was prevailed upon by higher authority—General Truong, no doubt—to advance with his entire unit along the top of the Citadel's southeast wall from the Delta/1/5 line to the flagpole. The ARVN troops moved forward in the darkness be­fore dawn, and the final assault was mounted at 0500. They easily overran the NVA unit holding the objective, killing thirty-one of the enemy soldiers.

  At dawn the huge NLF banner that had taunted and haunted South Vietnam's and America's political leaders since January 31 was hauled down by the triumphant ARVN soldiers. Moments later, it was replaced with an equally large flag displaying the colors of South Vietnam.

  *

  At 0730, its morale revitalized by this moment of glory, the main body of the 3rd ARVN Regiment, bolstered by a troop of the 7th ARVN Armored Cavalry Battalion, advanced against spotty resistance to the outer walls of the Imperial Palace. For most of the next three hours, a circus atmosphere prevailed inside the Citadel. To the accompaniment of patriotic music broadcast over loudspeakers, the ARVN soldiers thoroughly shot up the palace wall and hurled hand grenades over the top. By 1025, the last shred of hostile fire had been subdued. General Truong ordered the Hoc Bao Company, the 1st ARVN Division Recon­naissance Company, and the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regi­ment, to kick open the Imperial Palace's Ngo Mon Gate and secure the interior. More preparatory gunfire and grenade-throw­ing ensued, and the attack finally got underway at 1515. At 1700, the Imperial Palace was declared secure.

  Throughout the morning, the VNMC battle group tried once again to breach the NVA defenses. As soon as the attack jumped off, it became obvious that many of the NVA had been withdrawn or had simply abandoned their positions. Before noon, two companies of the 4th VNMC Battalion had secured the vital Huu Gate, and the two-battalion attack quickly advanced beyond it. Any NVA or VC remaining inside the Citadel were now trapped there. The Vietnamese Marines were unable to complete the attack to the Citadel's south corner by sunset, but they jumped off again at 0500 the next day. At last, on February 25, with the help of two U.S. Marine Ontos, the south corner fell.

  ***

  Epilogue

  The city of Hue was declared secure by I ARVN Corps headquar­ters on February 26, 1968, one day after the liberation of the Imperial Palace. Though official communiques celebrated the end of the battle, bloody combat operations in and around Hue con­tinued against stubborn Communist units and stragglers for the next three weeks.

  Of the three U.S. Marine battalions committed to combat in Hue, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Gravel's 1/1 continued to run security patrols in the area east of MACV until it was relieved in early March. By the end of February, Lieutenant Colonel Ernie Cheatham's 2/5, which by February 10 had liberated the modern city center as far as the Phu Cam Canal, had just about destroyed the main body of the 4th NVA Regiment in aggressive sweep-and-pursuit operations south of the canal. During the first few days of March, Cheatham's 2/5 and Major Bob Thompson's 1/5 conducted sweep-and-security operations between the Perfume River and the South China Sea. Task Force X-Ray declared the end of Operation Hue City on March 2. On March 4, 1/5 was returned to the 5th Marines and ordered to Phu Bai to refit. On March 5, Colonel Stan Hughes and his regimental staff left MACV and returned to Phu Bai. On March 8, 2/5 began mov­ing south to begin a new operation under the direction of the 5th Marines.

  Following the fall of the Citadel, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division continued to sweep toward the city from the north and west. They and other elements of both U.S. Army divisions crossed the Perfume River and conducted mop-up operations for several days. Then the U.S. Army units were withdrawn to begin new operations that had been planned before the Tet emergency broke.

  VNMC Battle Group Alpha also remained in contact with Communist units and stragglers in and around Hue. When it was withdrawn in early March, the three battalions were returned to their southern cantonments to reequip and train replacements for the hundreds of Vietnamese Marines killed and wounded in Saigon and Hue.

  The 1st ARVN Division, which was headquartered in Hue, continued to mop up in and around the city, but it slowly went, back to its previous routine of sweeping around and across north­ern I Corps. It took many months for the division to regain its pre-Tet strength, and months longer for it to absorb and train new conscripts. Yet, as long as the division benefited from the stalwart leadership of Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, it remained one of the best of the ARVN combat divisions.

  In the end, beautiful Hue lay in ruins. Years of rebuilding lay ahead, and the task was far from completion when the Republic of Vietnam fell before the final NVA offensive in 1975. However, the real tragedy of the battle for Hue lay, not in the physical damage or even in the loss of national treasures, but in the deaths of many hundreds of Hue's citizens—the random deaths and maimings in the battles to liberate the city, and in the nearly 2,000 documented cases of mass murder and execution that claimed the lives of many of the nation's leading businessmen, government workers, politicians, theologians, foreign missionar­ies and doctors, intellectuals, and teachers. From this brutal human toll—discovered in many unmarked individual and mass graves found over a period of months and years—neither the city nor the nation ever rebounded. In a way, the unified nation of Vietnam is still paying a colossal price for the irredeemable acts of the Communist hit squads.

  ***

  Bibliography

  BOOKS

  Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988.

  ——. Secrets of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990.

  Nolan, Keith William. Battle for Hue: Tet 1968. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983.

  Oberdorfer, Don. Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971.

  Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978.

  Phan Van Son. The Viet Cong Tet Offensive (1968). Saigon: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1969.

  Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986.

  Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987.

  —— . Vietnam Order of Battle. New York: U
.S. News and World Report, Inc., 1981.

  Tolson, Major General John J., 3rd. Airmobility: 1961-1971. Washing­ton, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973.

  Westmoreland, General William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1976.

  PERIODICALS

  Bullington, James R. "And Here, See Hue," Foreign Service Journal, November 1968.

  Christmas, G. R. "A Company Commander Reflects on Operation Hue City," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1971.

  ——. "A Company Commander Remembers the Battle for Hue," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1977.

  Harkanson, John, and Charles McMahon. "USMC & Tet '68: There's a Little Trouble in Hue . .. ," Vietnam Combat, Winter 1985.

  ——. "Tet '68/USMC in Hue: The Grunts' War," Vietnam Combat, Spring 1986.

  ——. "Tet '68/USMC in Hue: The Second Week," Vietnam Combat, Summer 1986.

  ——. 'The Last Days of Tet '68: Hard, Hungry, Horrible," Vietnam Combat, Winter 1986.

  Smith, Captain George W., USA. "The Battle of Hue," Infantry, July-August 1968.

  Truong Sinh. "The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue During Mau Than Tet (1969)," Hoc Tap, December 1974.

  OFFICIAL SOURCES

  Many official documents were used to piece this story together. Among them were the Command Chronologies and After Action Re­ports submitted by Task Force X-Ray; the 1st Marine Regiment; the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. The operations of elements of the 1st Cavalry Division's 3rd Brigade are covered in several detailed narrative reports written soon after the events by the 14th Military History Detachment.