As Tarleton watched the dragoons, his infantry came up the Green River Road. They halted, took off extra equipment, and caught their breath. After Tarleton evaluated the skirmish line, “the light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line: The legion infantry were added to their left.”14
Tarleton knew Morgan was near Broad River and the Americans could not cross it without exposing themselves to disaster if the British caught them during a crossing. Additional British forces east of Broad River were moving north to cut off the Americans. If the men opposing him were just a rear guard, Tarleton had to move quickly to continue the pursuit. A final argument to attack immediately was that American reinforcements were coming.15 Tarleton had to attack to avoid meeting a stronger American force and get on with the pursuit.
Despite the poor light and visibility, Tarleton made his decision. Predictably, it was to attack; he lost little time in sending his men against the advanced American skirmish line. “Under the fire of a three-pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy.”16 Once Tarleton committed to an attack, the battle was out of his control but he did not know this as his men moved against the skirmish line.
The light infantry and British Legion infantry moved forward east of the road. As the British battle line moved through the open fields, a cannon was trundled forward, firing as it went, aiming slightly to the left to avoid hitting British infantry. Captain Joseph Pickens’s South Carolina State Troops were farthest forward because the gentle crest of the ridge curves around to the south and almost parallels the road. As the British advanced, Americans on the extreme left began to withdraw. In effect, the light infantry began to roll back the American line.
The British were within 200 yards of the American militia line when their right wing halted after passing the rivulet. Tarleton ordered the 7th Regiment “to form upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th: A captain, with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank of the corps. . . . The 1st Battalion of the 71st was desired to extend a little to the left of the 7th regiment, and to remain one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near two hundred cavalry, composed the reserve.”17 During the deployment, initial advance, and the 7th Regiment deployment, the British were under constant long-range fire from the skirmishers.
As the 7th Regiment deployed off the road onto low ground in front of McDowell, the 71st Regiment moved to take position on their left flank. George Hanger later noted that when “the 71st were . . . moving up to form in line with the rest of the troops, whether from their not taking ground enough, or from some other circumstance, their right flank brushed the left flank of the 7th regiment, and intermixed.” Tarleton initially desired the 71st to take position beyond the 7th, but without adequate space to form, the 71st disrupted the 7th and was then detailed as a reserve. The Highlanders extended slightly beyond the 7th’s left flank, following about 150 yards behind the line.18
MAP 10.British Deployment and Skirmish-Line Withdrawal
The collision of the two units explains why the 7th was late in forming; “Major Newmarsh . . . was posting his officers.” Newmarsh had to reorder his left flank by showing officers where he wanted them after the 71st marched into them. There was more confusion among the 7th Regiment soldiers because “a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th This unsteady behaviour he silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action.”19 The Green River Road became the axis for the British attack, with legion infantry and 7th Fusileers guiding on the road. Dressing left and right, respectively, and closing up as needed ensured that the infantry line did not drift apart as the attack moved against the Americans.
As the British advanced, American skirmishers on the left conducted a fighting withdrawal and McDowell’s men continued a galling oblique fire at the British infantry. Their fire fell initially on the British Legion infantry’s left flank, but as the 7th Regiment deployed, they shifted and hit the deploying fusileers. The North Carolinians did not move back until “the bayonet was presented,” as the British infantry went forward.20
Except for the 7th Regiment’s unauthorized, scattering shots, the British did not fire until they engaged the militia line. The 7th Regiment’s fire may not have been on command, but it caused McDowell’s men to commence withdrawing. As William Lorance noted, he “was in the front line in the beginning of the Action and upon the first fire it fell back upon the second line.”21 The first British firing, aside from the cannon, was the premature shots from the jittery 7th Fusileers.
The British advanced rapidly because Tarleton did not want the Americans to get settled in new positions. Once they were moving, he wanted to keep the pressure on them. The skirmishers continued “to deliver their fire . . . then to retire, covering themselves with trees as occasion offered, loading and firing until they reached and resumed their places in the first line.”22 As they withdrew, McDowell’s left-flank skirmishers moved through the gap between Brandon and Thomas created by Hayes’s forward movement and took positions wherever they could find gaps to fire through the militia line. McDowell’s right, and Hammond’s men on the left, moved to the militia’s flanks and kept up a long-range fire.
The skirmishers followed orders precisely, forcing a British deployment and firing as they withdrew. “Majors McDowal and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire,” “strictly obeyed your orders . . . gradually retreating,” and “preserving a desultory well aimed fire.” The retrograde movement had been explained to the skirmishers, and “McDowell told his men . . . as they retreated to divide to the right & left & form in the rear.”23
Immediately after the skirmishers passed their position, the Little River Regiment on Hayes Rise withdrew to complete a solid line across the field. Their withdrawal was hurried; they knew the British were close behind them. Other militiamen could wait, but Hayes had to get his men reformed in a new position before Tarleton’s infantry got close enough to charge bayonets.
The British Legion infantry and the light infantry came on quickly, grimly confident, moving steadily at the quick step, more certain of success now that they were going forward. The trap Morgan created was already starting to close on Tarleton’s men. The full extent of the South Carolina militia line was revealed only after the British came over the crest of militia ridge. Now, as the last of the skirmishers took their positions, a new, much more deadly phase of the battle began.
6: The Militia Line
Two-thirds of the British . . . had already fallen.
—Roderick MacKenzie, Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s History, 1787
American officers made good use of the interval before the British moved forward, engaged the militia line, and began fighting in earnest.1 Morgan, the former rifleman, “walked behind and through the ranks everywhere, all the time cracking jokes and encouraging the men, and said, ‘Boys, squinney well, and don’t touch a trigger until you see the whites of their eyes.’ “2 Morgan, an experienced combat commander, wanted to settle his men and take their minds off the British soldiers’ deploying, shifting position, and getting ready to advance.
Tarleton, “relying on the valour of his troops, impatient of delay, and too confident of success, led on in person the first line to the attack.” He had good reasons to start the attack quickly. His right was formed and under fire while the fusiliers deployed. The quickest way to end the unequal long-range fight was for the British to get close enough to use their bayonets. Not all the infantry moved forward immediately because “major New-marsh . . . was posting his officers,” then a “fire from some of the recruits of the 7th regiment was suppressed, and the troops moved on in as good a line as troops could move at open files.”3 Stabilizing the line and stopping the fire caused the 7th Fusiliers to lag behind.
Tarleton, aggressive and impatient, urged his men forward withou
t waiting on the 7th Regiment. The fusiliers would just have to catch up. He could not afford to give the Americans time to get ready and certainly did not want his own men to start thinking about what lay just beyond the ridge to their front. The British moved quickly up and through the old skirmish position.
As the infantry moved, both cannon opened up at a range of 200 yards or less, point-blank range for three-pounders. With every shot, the guns recoiled about four feet, were dragged back into position, reloaded, aimed, and fired again. The gunners fired both guns nearly simultaneously as “eight times cannon went off, two at a time.”4 The firing pattern suggests the artillerymen were with the battle line. With infantry protection, they had little to fear from militia as they moved forward.
William Washington; oil painting by Charles Willson Peak (Independence National Historical Park Collection)
The cannon had little impact on the battle. Few veterans mentioned them, noting only that they signaled the start of fighting or were captured. The American positions complicated observation for the gunners and took American militia out of the direct line of fire. The little guns, even with a light six-ounce charge, threw a three-pound solid shot over 400 yards with just two degrees’ elevation. Without raising the tube more than a half degree, and using an eight-ounce charge, shot could fly more than 250 yards before the first bounce, and this placed Washington’s dragoons within range.5 When originally positioned in front of the skirmishers, the guns were elevated to clear the rising ground of militia ridge. The shot fell on the American cavalry, 250 yards behind the militia, and Washington was forced to move his horsemen slightly to the right to avoid the fire.6
There was no doubt when the infantry began to move upslope. At sunrise, the British “began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces of Cannon and three Huizzas.”7 By all accounts, the British infantry “was ordered to advance rapidly,” with a shout and a steady rush against the militia. Many veterans noted “the moment the british formed their line they shouted and made a great noise to intimidate,” “with a loud halloo.” At least one American felt the British confidence as they “advanced rapidly, as if certain of victory.” Morgan, aware of the psychological impact on his militia, reacted immediately by yelling loud enough for many to hear, “They give us the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian halloo, by G—.”8
Far to the rear, volunteer dragoon Thomas Young saw Morgan ride “down to the rifle men”; he “galloped along the lines, cheering the men, and telling them not to fire until we could see the whites of their eyes.” The wind must have been blowing northward because Young could hear, “every officer was crying don’t fire! for it was a hard matter for us to keep from it.” “Colonel Pickens directed the men under his command, to restrain their fire, till the British were within forty or fifty yards. This order, [was] executed with great firmness.”9
The British came forward, rapidly moving over the crest toward Pickens’s “militia riffle men.” Infantrymen were taught to march at eighty steps a minute. In quick time, this increased to a hundred. Every minute they covered 200 to 240 feet. In less than three minutes, they were well within musket range of the rifle-armed militia. Even on line with a rapid pace, they were under control as “the British line advanced at a sort of trot. . . . It was the most beautiful line I ever saw.”10
The South Carolina battalions waited, a short distance down the rear slope. Tarleton thought “about one thousand militia” were drawn up in his front.11 The militia were at a tree line, well behind the actual crest and less than 150 yards in front of the Continentals. The South Carolinians had been waiting almost an hour for this moment of truth. They had freshly primed rifles. Those with new flints certainly used them; men with older flints sharpened them and tested the spark before loading and priming. In the damp January weather, fresh charges, fresh priming, and new flints were crucial to good ignition.
MAP 11.The Militia Line
The “militia maintained their ground with perfect coolness.”12 The riflemen knew they would get in a first shot at longer range with greater accuracy than their enemies armed with muskets. The militia were also fresh, if somewhat chilled, and had confidence in their leaders, many of whom they elected or chose to follow. As the British line came on, “small parties of riflemen were detached to skirmish with the enemy.”13 Joseph Mcjunkin reported, “Morgan had picked out eleven of us who were to fire as a signal for opening the ball, and placed us in front several paces. . . . When they came near enough for us to distinguish plainly their faces, we picked out our man and let fly.”14 The eleven men moved forward of Brandon’s line a short distance, perhaps less than twenty feet. Hayes, Roebuck, and Thomas sent out similar detachments.15
The Fair Forest battalion’s “Col Fair [Farr] . . . believed John Savage fired the first gun . . . he saw Savage fix his eye upon a British officer; he stepped out of the ranks, raised his gun-fired, and he saw the officer fall.” Savage was east of the road, so the officer was a light infantryman or in the British Legion. Captain John Rousselet, the one British Legion infantry officer killed at Cowpens, was serving as legion commander.16 He would have been in front, urging his men to keep formation as they advanced.
MAP 12.Militia-Line Firefight
Savage’s shot precipitated other individual firings before an American volley was ordered. The firing began on the American left rather than the right because the light infantry and British Legion were moving ahead of the 7th Regiment and reached the “killing distance” first. The firing was heard by the dragoons, as Thomas Young recalled, “the militia fired first. It was for a time, pop-pop-pop—and then a whole volley.”17
When the British reached a point “forty or fifty yards” or an even closer—”thirty or forty paces”—the militia commenced volley fire. “General Morgan gave orders for the malitia to fire on the enemy.”18 The difference in range might reflect different British-unit start times and the distance covered during the five to ten seconds after the small parties’ fire and the first battalion volley. In that time, the British came another twenty to twenty-five paces nearer, closing the distance from fifty to less than thirty-five yards, before the volley fire started.
FIGURE 3.South Carolina Militia Battalions Firing Sequence
The fire was devastating. “The front line . . . poured in a close fire.” “The effect of the fire was considerable: it produced something like a recoil, but not to any extent.” The impact was magnified because it was aimed rifle fire. The desired effect was achieved because “The fire was returned, but not with vivacity or impression.”19 The light infantry and legion infantry opposite Brandon did not fire but tried to advance as they had been trained to do.
The five volleys reported by Private John Thomas in Combs’s Company indicates Roebuck, Thomas, and Hayes each got off one shot while some of Brandon’s men fired twice. Brandon’s men had little time to reload, but it was enough. The militia were going by the book as “the whole of Col. Pickens’ command then kept up a fire by regiments.”20 The volleys took a very short time. From John Savage’s first shot until the militia moved off, less than three minutes elapsed.
British infantry was trained to cope with riflemen by attacking them immediately.21 The light infantry “made two attempts to charge, but were repulsed with loss.”22 Even after the militia opened fire, the British advance was rapid enough to deny most militiamen an opportunity to reload because, as Howard said, there was no “time, especially [for] the riflemen, to fire a second time.” They only “gave the enemy one fire,” but the four battalions “fired five rounds.”23 Staggered by the first volley and their losses, the light infantry rallied and tried to charge again. Their second effort, less than a minute later, came after the Fair Forest men had reloaded. They fired again and stopped the light infantry a second time.
The American rifle fire was incredibly effective. Lieutenant Roderick MacKenzie, leading a Highland light infantry company and probably also wounded at this time, claimed “Two-thirds of the British infantry office
rs, had already fallen, and nearly the same proportion of privates.” His comment about casualties seems correct for the four to six light infantry officers, as the light infantry received Brandon’s two volleys and fire from Hammond’s skirmishers. His observations about enlisted men suffering nearly 60 percent casualties gives a clue to the shock effect of the American volleys. Both physically and psychologically, the aimed rifle fire induced “something like a recoil.” Far more telling is MacKenzie’s admission that many were not shot. The cumulative effect of short rations, lack of sleep, hard marching, cold, wet weather, and the fighting to this point left them unable to continue.24
The British Legion was hurt as badly as the light infantry. Four British Legion infantry companies suffered over 90 percent casualties in prisoners and killed. Total British losses on the day would number about 890. About 17 percent were wounded prisoners and nearly 24 percent were dead. For the entire British Legion infantry, this translates to a loss of 19 percent wounded and 26 percent killed, or 45 percent casualties for the whole battle. According to MacKenzie, most dead were in front of the militia line. British militia-line losses impressed Americans. Captain Thomas Farrow, “one of the soldiers who assisted in the burying, observed . . . the dead were found in straight lines across the field, & that it gave them a most singular appearance when seen at a distance.”25
British return fire was not effective. This is obvious from low American casualties and Joseph Mcjunkin’s 1842 comment, “they shot too high . . . we outshot them.”26 The British usually shot high and now were shooting downhill. The combination kept American casualties down, one indication of how judiciously Morgan placed his men on the landscape to achieve an advantage.
Unless an American militiaman specifically noted where, how, or when he was wounded, it is difficult to ascertain losses for the militia line. There were far more militia casualties than Morgan reported, and many were officers. In Roebuck’s Battalion, Dennis Tramell’s company suffered casualties involving changes in command as well as private soldiers. Private Hugh Warren later reported that when Captain “Lawson was Killed, Jeremiah Dixon took command.” Private Henry Pettit reported, “I was Wounded in my thigh which Injured me very much.”27 Farther left in Roebuck’s Battalion, Private Samuel Hogg “was wounded in the Shoulder.” In Thomas’s Battalion, Samuel Smith lost “his brother Aaron Smith who was severely wounded . . . he died . . . five days after.” In Hayes’s Battalion, Captain James Dillard “received a gunshot wound,” and at least one man under Irby was wounded in the left thigh by a bayonet.28
A Devil of a Whipping Page 12