The British pressed on, despite casualties. “The American militia . . . were unable to resist the assault, and immediately gave way,” “moved off precipitately,” and were “pursued to the continentals.” Even if the British were somewhat slow to charge, the fighting did not last long. “The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged.” “The military valour of British troops, when not entirely divested of the powers necessary to its exertion, was not to be resisted by an American militia.” The militia “broke in the centre,” where the Little River Battalion could not finish reloading before the British charged. Without bayonets, with no time to reload, they can hardly be faulted for fleeing.29
The light infantry was the first British unit to charge. They recovered from their initial shock and started forward to give Brandon the bayonet after Hayes fired. Unfortunately for the light infantry, Brandon’s men completed reloading before Hayes fired.30 As the light infantry advanced, the Fair Forest men got off a second volley which stopped the British dead in their tracks.
With the Fair Forest volley, the entire American left was without loaded weapons when the British Legion infantry made their move. The speed with which the Americans fired, the suddenness of the British charge, and the duration of the militia-line fighting seem almost too rapid for twentieth-century comprehension, but the British Legion infantry had been trained by Hanger to cope with riflemen by charging immediately. If they were as quick to charge as the light infantry, they received Hayes’s volley, recovered from the shock, delivered their own volley, and then charged. Unlike Brandon’s Fair Forest men, the Little River Battalion had not the remotest chance of reloading once the British Legion started forward.
It took British infantry twenty seconds to cover thirty yards at the relatively slow quick step, and many riflemen could reload before the British closed to bayonet distance. At the charge, the British moved much faster, and would close within two or three yards before the militia could complete reloading.31 The Little River men did not wait to measure distances. On the main line, Lieutenant Colonel Howard saw the British rush “with bayonets upon the militia who had not time, especially the riflemen, to fire a second time.”32 Most casualties occurred among the Fair Forest and Little River Battalions. Sword wounds in these battalions were inflicted slightly later in the battle; gunshot wounds most likely occurred on the militia line before the British “charged us with their bayonets.”33 The only known South Carolina militia bayonet wound occurred in Irby’s Company of Hayes’s Battalion.34 If Irby was on Hayes’s left flank, the break in the militia line occurred at the junction of the Little River and Fair Forest Regiments.
As the British Legion infantry surged forward, Hayes, his men with unloaded rifles and no bayonets, had no alternative except immediate withdrawal. Once the Little River Battalion moved off, a huge gap appeared in the militia line. Brandon and Thomas followed Hayes rearward. The honor of breaking the militia line should go to the British Legion infantry.
Still, the militia withdrawal was according to plan. It may be that “Pickens ordered a retreat” as the British charge began, if not slightly later when he saw the gap created by the departing Little River men. When “the American militia gave way,” “the enemy rent the air with their shouts and quickened their advance,” then “pursued to their continentals.”35
In the British mind, the battle was as good as won.36 They dispersed the forward skirmishers with ease. The militia proved troublesome, but they were now fleeing the field in disorder. Surely the battle was going well and they could ease their minds about it. Despite casualties, Tarleton’s men sensed victory and stepped forward with even more confidence.
The militia’s move to safety was not as chaotic as some historians described it.37 Both Lieutenant Anderson and Sergeant Major Seymour reported orderly movement. “Being overpowered by the superior number of the enemy they retreated, but in very good order, not seeming to be in the least confused.” The withdrawing militiamen could see the silent ranks of Delawares, Marylanders, and Virginians waiting for the British. Once they were within forty yards of the Continentals, the militia could quickly withdraw to relative safety after firing another shot. Some Parthian shots were fired as the “rifelmen that Was posted in front Who Fought Well Disputing the ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree to another.”38 The militia continued their withdrawal.
Traditional accounts state that the militia ran across the front of the main line and escaped beyond the left flank. As they ran, they were charged by British dragoons from Tarleton’s left flank.39 This makes no sense practically, tactically, or historically for either group. Frightened men trying to escape would not expose themselves to British bayonets and sabers by running toward them. Tactically, any militia crossing the Continental front would mask their fire. Morgan never put his main line in jeopardy by obstructing their fire. British dragoons would be equally reluctant to ride along the Continental front exposed to heavy musket fire.
British accounts, coupled with descriptions of original American positioning, explain the militia escape. The main line, “which had as yet taken no share in the action, observing confusion and retrograding in their front, suddenly faced to the right, and inclined backwards; a manoeuvre by which a space was left for the front line to retreat, without interfering with the ranks of those who were now to oppose the advance.” Another noted, “the second line of the Americans, having opened to the right &left, to afford a passage,” the militia went to the rear.40
MAP 13.Militia-Line Withdrawal
Morgan’s tactical plan envisioned South Carolina militiamen withdrawing through the main line and taking a position behind the left flank. The retreat was planned, and “Pickens ordered a retreat to the post assigned to them, on the left of the continental troops.” This was accomplished when “the militia fell into our rear.”41 The militia did move rapidly and some did go to their horses. Most, in accordance with orders, went to a position behind Triplett. The withdrawal plan envisioned reforming behind Continental bayonets, and then going back into battle. Morgan and his aides slowed the militia, gathered them into a solid mass, and began reforming them.42
The British infantry, having disposed of the militia, continued their advance with vigor. The British pursuit was initially a continuation of the bayonet charge. Seeing the backs of the militia, they surged forward in pursuit, breaking ranks as faster men moved to the front. The “royal troops supposing the victory already gained, ardently pursued, and were thereby thrown into some disorder.”43 When officers sighted the solid regular infantry line, they halted and restored their own line.
As the militia filtered through the main line, “the British approached the continentals. The fire on both sides was well supported, and produced much slaughter.” The main battle lines were engaged above the swale. Between Triplett’s left flank and the ravine, Hammond’s skirmishers, the “volunteers from . . . South Carolina and Georgia . . . were posted to guard the flank.” The militia story continues here because once the firefight was under way, Tarleton’s “cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy’s left.” The 17th Light Dragoons attacked so suddenly, Hammond’s flankers were overwhelmed and simply ridden through.44
The lower swale was a riot of confusion. Battalion officers were trying to get companies under control and into formation. Company officers were shouting for their men to reform on them. The men, still excited by their stand, their devastating volley, and the run to the rear, were looking around for their messmates, then for their officers. Some, more poised and pragmatic than most, began reloading. Without any flags, it would have been difficult for anyone to make sense of more than 800 men clustering without formations. Then disaster struck.
“The British broke through the left wing of the Malitia,” although Joseph Pickens’s South Carolina State Troops offered a brief resistance when Private Charles Holland “was wounded by a sword thrust through the body.”45 As the dragoons galloped down into the swale, the South Carolina militi
amen were still milling about and reloading. The 17th changed that.
The militia thought they were safe in the American rear, but any impression of security created by Continental bayonets and their steady musket fire was an illusion. Some idea of the militia’s panic can be seen as only forty British dragoons rampaged down upon the disorganized militia and began hacking them about the head and shoulders. Even the usually accurate Robert Long was mentally overwhelmed as surprise magnified British numbers to “200 or 300 cavalry [who came] round in the rear of our left wing.” James Collins thought he was about to become a dragoon’s trophy. “Now,” thought I, “my hide is in the loft.”46
The 17th “began to cut down the militia very fast.” In Brandon’s Battalion, John Whelchel received “seven wounds on his head and two on his Shoulders. . . . The wounds in the head opened the skull to the brains.” Although his wounds disabled him for only “about forty days,” others were horrified. Forty years later, Brandon’s adjutant Joshua Palmer recalled John Whelchel “was cut through the skull, to the membrane of the brain . . . [I] did not expect the said John Whelchel would Survive.”47 “As the militia . . . were unable to form . . . they continued to retreat,” but others from Brandon’s Battalion fought back.
Fair Forest’s Lieutenant Joseph Hughes “bears the scars which he received from a Stroke across his right hand from one of Tarlton’s Troops.” His modest statement does not relate what Private Christopher Brandon saw Hughes do that morning. “He was not only a man of great personal strength, but of remarkable fleetness on foot. As his men, with others, broke at the Cowpens, and fled before Tarleton’s cavalry; and though receiving a sabre cut across his right hand, yet with his drawn sword, he would out-run his men, and passing them, face about, and command them to stand, striking right and left to enforce obedience to orders; often repeating with a loud voice: ‘You d—d cowards, halt and fight—there is more danger in running than in fighting, and if you don’t stop and fight, you will all be killed!’ “48 John Skain, one of three brothers serving with Hughes, was killed. A local tradition recalls that Colonel Thomas Brandon, leading by example, killed three British dragoons with his sword.49
A similar flight occurred in Hayes’s Little River Battalion, where more men went down under dragoon sabers. Jeremiah Files “was wounded . . . on the left Arm and on the right hand each wound was made with a sword.” Files’s father was killed at the same time, probably in close proximity to his son. As officers tried to restore order, some went down. James Carlisle’s “company officer Capt. [James] Caldwell was mortally wounded.”50
As pursuit continued, Hughes and other officers like him brought about some order, but the militia “were not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person.” Hughes’s company “was induced to make a stand on the brow of a slope, some distance from the battle-line, behind a clump of young pines that partially concealed and protected them from Tarleton’s cavalry. Others now joined them for self-protection. Their guns were quickly loaded and they were themselves again. Morgan galloped up and spoke words of encouragement to them.”51
Light dragoons and militiamen reached the militia horses at the same time. “Our company when just about to catch up our horses . . . [the British] fell upon us with great fury.” “They overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury.” “The Whigs reserved their fire till the enemy were so near, that it was terribly effective, emptying many a British saddle, when the survivors recoiled.”52
The militia were relieved by their own rifles and a sudden overwhelming attack by Washington’s dragoons, who outnumbered the 17th at least three to one. Washington had seen the crisis and acted immediately, leading his dragoons over Morgan Hill to hit the British head on. The American cavalry “enabled the militia to regain the tranquility necessary for returning to a state of order.” James Collins, his hide now safe, noted that militiamen “being relieved from the pursuit of the enemy began to rally and prepare to redeem our credit, when Morgan rode up in front, and waving his sword, cried out, ‘Form, form, my brave fellows! give them one more fire and the day is ours. Old Morgan was never beaten.’ We then advanced briskly, and gained the right flank.”53
As the militia rallied and began moving around Morgan Hill, a crisis occurred on the main line and nearly cost Morgan his victory, until events conspired to change American fortunes on the day. As the main line shifted, the militia put themselves in order, reformed, and headed back into battle. The militia who moved to engage the British on the American right flank in the last stages of the American counterattack were chiefly from the Spartanburg Regiment and Hammond’s South Carolina State Troops. They had not been as discomforted and maintained some order. Men from the Little River and Fair Forest Regiments who returned to action did so in two groups on the American left. Some caught their horses, mounted, and participated in the counterattack and pursuit. Others on foot acted in the traditional role of riflemen, firing at long range. There were many targets for them because the main line had achieved something of a miracle.
7: The Main Line
The fire on both sides . . . produced much slaughter.
—Banastre Tarleton, History of the Campaigns of 1780-1781
Maryland lieutenant colonel John Eager Howard led the Virginians and Continentals, forming the most powerful opposition to Tarleton’s infantry. Out of sight until the British crested the ridge in front of the militia, even then they were not clearly visible due to thicker woods behind the militia line. During the militia firelight, Morgan and Howard kept them in good order, quietly waiting for the British.1 The Continentals stood in the “beaten zone,” a term referring to ground where projectiles missing their initial target fall with effect. Bullets that missed militiamen and did not hit trees were still lethal. The weight and momentum of the .75 caliber Brown Bess musket ball made it dangerous 150 yards behind the militia. At least one officer went down from such a hit, crippled for life with a wound in his right hip.2
When the British initially appeared, Morgan rode down toward the skirmishers, but returned to the militia line. He remained behind Pickens’s men until they opened fire, then moved to the Continentals. He steadied the main line as the British advanced. Delaware private Henry Wells recalled, “the powerful & trumpet like voice of our Commander drove fear from every bosom, and gave new energies to every arm.”3
Since the militia withdrawal might create a disaster, Morgan and Howard made it clear the militia were supposed to retreat. The advance warning helped; when the militia pulled back, “the Continentals[,] . . . undismayed by the retreat of the militia, maintained their ground.”4 Morgan prepared for the withdrawal by aligning the Virginia companies en échelon to the center. As the militia moved rearward, Morgan moved to the foot of Morgan Hill across the swale. Here the militia could see him as they passed through the line toward the left rear.
During the two or three minutes it took the militia to pass through, the British reformed their own lines. The redcoated infantry had been badly hurt by the militia rifle fire, but their officers still maintained control. “The Enemy Seeing us Standing in such good Order Halted for Some time to dress their line Which Outflanked our[s] Considerably The[y] then advanced On boldly.”5 The British had to reform when they saw the Continentals. They were too disordered by the militia gunfire and subsequent bayonet charge to take on the well-disciplined American regulars. The unengaged Continentals must have been quite disconcerting to Tarleton’s infantry. Just having seen victory in the backs of the militia, they now saw trouble in the solid ranks wearing blue coats faced with red, outlined by white belts supporting cartridge box and bayonet scabbard. Skirmishers and militia had done their duty well. Tarleton’s force was hurt, and there is evidence to suggest that the fighting spirit of some men had been broken. With losses from bullets and lack of enthusiasm, the British were now facing their sternest test.
The British dressed all three battalions across the front. The British Legion infantry had their left fla
nk on the road and their right flank adjoining the light infantry. Casualties suffered against the militia meant these two battalions were now covering a smaller front than they had against the militia. Shortening the linear distance opposite the Virginians was necessary, moreover, because the canebrake and boggy ground at the head of Suck Creek constricted the battlefield. Instead of open order, the two battalions now formed a more solid line opposite Triplett’s Virginians. The 7th Regiment Fusiliers dressed right on the road to maintain contact with the British Legion. As their casualties mounted, the line shortened and its front did not extend beyond the Continental’s right flank, if it even reached that far. The 71st Regiment, moving forward behind Ogilvie’s dragoons, was not yet positioned beyond the Continental right flank as the main-line fighting began.
British officers corrected problems before advancing farther. Their men closed up and dressed ranks under fire as the main-line riflemen opened up as soon as the militia were clear. At a range well under 100 yards, Hammond’s skirmishers and Gilmore’s Rockbridge riflemen had easy targets; “a warm fire ensued, and the advance of the enemy was not with such a quick step.”6 Once reformed, the British infantry line advanced, ready to engage.
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