The militia coming over Morgan Hill as the Highlanders collapsed indicates how rapidly battle sequences occurred. Most returning militiamen were under Thomas and Roebuck, but McDowell’s men swarmed up out of Maple Swamp to cut off any further retreat. The militia’s decision to get back into the fighting was made easier once they saw Howard’s fire stagger the Scottish Highlanders. “The militia who had fled, seeing the fortune of the day changed, returned and joined in the pursuit.” They moved forward, following the path of Washington’s dragoons and Howard’s infantry, who swept through the Highlanders and went down the battlefield.88
As the militia rejoined the battle, the Continentals followed Howard toward the cannon. “Their artillery was not thrown in the rear, but was advanced a little at the head of the line.”89 The artillery position indicates some British infantry either failed to pursue or retreated more rapidly than the Highlanders.90 The gunners were left alone—a fatal situation for artillerymen. Howard noted the British cannon a short distance away and “called to Captain Ewing, . . . to take it. Captain Anderson . . . hearing the order .. . kept pace until near the first piece.”91 “When within a few yards, he saw the man at one of them about to put the match to it, levelled at them. At this critical moment he ran up, and, with the assistance of his spontoon, made a spring, and lit immediately upon the gun, and spontooned the man with the match.”92
Anderson and Ewing, from companies on opposite ends of Howard’s battalion, were in close proximity because of the clustering effect caused by the bayonet charge and because Anderson moved his company by the left oblique after hearing Howard’s shout. “There were two pieces of cannon as stated, but they were not stationed together, one was on the [British] right and the other on the left, opposed to col. Howard’s command, only one of them was taken by capt. Anderson, the other was taken by some other officer.”93 At the other gun, Howard “saw some of my men going to bayonet the man who had the match,” “who appeared to make it a point of honour not to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his obstinacy, would have bayonetted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match.”94 The gunners fought to the end, “till the whole of the artillery-men attached to them were either killed or wounded.”95
Tarleton, seeing his artillery in danger, tried “to rally the infantry to protect the guns . . . the effort to collect the infantry was ineffectual: Neither promises nor threats could gain their attention.”96 After Tarleton’s infantry failed to rally, he tried to get his reserve dragoons to save the guns. A few dragoons came galloping toward the melee around the cannon but were intercepted by Continentals and Virginians moving beyond the guns. Maryland private Andrew Rock “received a severe cut with a saber from one of the Brittish Cavalry upon his left arm.” Delaware private Henry Wells “was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton’s Troopers, With his Sword with Such violence, that the colar of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the flesh & skin Sleightly scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not or welt on my Sholder.”97 Some Virginia State Troops were sabered in this encounter, too. James Braden “received a saber wound in the right hand.” Isaac Way “was severly wounded on the Side, back, arms, head and in the face by the cutt of the sword of a British draggoon.”98 Virginia injuries show Edmund Tate’s men covered Howard’s right as he advanced into the swarming fugitives.
Andrew Pickens; engraving by James Barton Longacre, after a painting by Thomas Sully (National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution)
After Tate’s men went past the Highlanders, Pickens and McDowell’s militiamen filled the gaps and surrounded the 71st. Hammond led his men around to the Scots’ left and rear and opened fire on them, cutting off their escape into Maple Swamp. Despite the rout and rifle fire, the Highlanders appear to have rallied after running a short distance back up the slope. They “stood . . . after they retreated, and had formed into some compact order.” This did not last long. After taking the guns, Howard’s Continentals stormed into this last resistance. Howard personally went “towards the right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads, and as I called to them to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords. Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers, gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I . . . asked him what he was about. The explanation was that they had orders to give no quarter, and they did not expect any. . . . I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant.” Warned by Duncanson, and “exclaiming ‘Give them quarters,’ “ Howard tried to prevent a massacre.99
The situation was volatile. Georgian James Jackson, Pickens’s brigade major, ran “the utmost risque of my life in attempting to seize the colours of the 71st Regiment. . . being saved by an exertion of Colonel Howards.”100 Pickens claimed “the 71st which was there surrendered to me and I believe every officer of that Regiment delivered his sword into my hands. . . . Major McCarthur surrendered to me some distance from the battle ground and delivered his sword to me. . . . I sent back to Gen’l Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur with the sword.”101
The British right also collapsed. The Carolinians, including Brandon and Hayes, “among which were the Virginia militia, pushed them so close that they gave them no time to form.” The militia “advanced at the same time and repulsed their right flank, upon which they retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field.” “We then advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long. They began to throw down their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war.” “Two British light infantry companies laid down their arms to the American militia.”102
Some North Carolina militiamen, after retreating to their horses, mounted and returned to the fray. Being mounted, they had an ideal opportunity to apprehend isolated fugitives. Hugh McNary remembered that “when the Enemy first gave way the Americans pursued them deponent was in front, and got far enough ahead of his company, to stop a British officer, the officer Surrendered. Deponent dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, after getting them he discovered that his company had stoped pursuit, and was returned back; he mounted his horse, and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold.”103
As the Americans gained the upper hand, Thomas Young saw that the “British broke, and throwing down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!” “Tarleton’s quarters” had already rung out from the Americans as they rampaged over the field, from the swale south past militia ridge, gathering up individual soldiers and driving on. Their own success left the Americans scattered and disorganized. Seeing the confusion, Tarleton tried to seize an advantage.104 In the meantime, Washington’s cavalry continued the effort to totally destroy the British force.
8: Cavalry Actions
We made a most furious charge.
—Thomas Young, “Memoir of Major Thomas Young,“ 1843
Cavalry activity is part of the larger battle chronology but has been separated for clarity, in part because separate battle increments moved in such rapid sequence. Cowpens mounted action was widely scattered and took place as part of several battle stages.1 Preliminary clashes were incidental to the main flow of the combat along the Green River Road axis, but dragoon clashes around the main line were crucial to the American victory. The cavalry movements explain American success and British failure at Cowpens. American cavalry met British dragoons head on in the American left rear, on the American right, and during the counterattack. These episodes led to a clash around the cannon and culminated in the celebrated personal combat between Lieutenant Colonel William Washington and three British officers near the battle’s end. Finally, the American pursuit of Tarleton was primarily a cavalry operation.
Mounted operations are a major key to understanding Morgan’s victory even though they were the least orchestrated by his tactical planning. The delicate timing of American cavalry movements underscores the key role played by Washington’s Third Continental Light Dragoons, mounted state troops, and militia volunteers. Cavalry action’s sequential order is only partially related to the infantry fighting.
When the American mounted groups mustered on the morning of 17 January, Washington had more than 150 men. These numbers were only half the British cavalry’s strength, but judicious selection of when and where to use his dragoons allowed Washington to achieve success every time he engaged. Tarleton’s advantage in cavalry strength was negated because he violated economy of force while Washington utilized all his men at the right time and place to achieve mass.2
American dragoons formed up on Morgan Hill. From this central location they were free to move and still be in position to block a militia retreat. The probable arrangement of cavalry units was as troops formed up in columns. The front rank of each troop formed a line facing south across the swale. This formation allowed rapid deployment to either flank or the front.
Morgan instructed Washington to respond to a crisis or opportunity. His role as reserve permitted only a general plan, and Morgan gave Washington a great deal of freedom “to be able to charge them should an occasion offer.”3 Washington wanted his dragoons fighting at close quarters with the sabers he personally preferred. To implement his plans, he issued “positive orders to his men not to fire a pistol.”4
Tarleton posted “a captain, with fifty dragoons” on each flank. The detachments protected his flanks, threatened Morgan’s, and left Tarleton a mounted reserve of four troops. Captain David Ogilvie commanded the left-flank British Legion dragoons; Lieutenant Henry Nettles led the 17th Light Dragoons on the right.5 As infantry fighting began, British dragoons moved along with the infantry while the reserve waited on the Green River Road behind the battle line. American dragoons sat on their horses on Morgan Hill, but British artillery “opened so fiercely upon the centre, that Col. Washington moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right wing.”6 Slightly west of their original position, American dragoons now protected Morgan Hill, positioned behind the American right center.7
As the main-line firefight intensified with no result, Tarleton ordered a double envelopment of the American main line. “The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy’s left.”8 They burst through Hammond’s flanking skirmishers and attacked reforming militia. At the same time, British Legion dragoons moved forward, supported by the 71st, and drove off McDowell’s flankers. The 71st assaulted the American right flank while Ogilvie moved against the American rear.9
When the 17th hit the militia, Washington’s dragoons were concealed behind Morgan Hill. Upon learning “cavalry were cutting down our riflemen on the left,” “Washington’s cavalry made an attack upon them, . . . defeated them with considerable loss,” and “obliged them to retire in confusion.”10 Washington’s movement countering the 17th Light Dragoons was in keeping with his role responding to a crisis. His “charge was made on the enemy’s cavalry . . . , leaving . . . eighteen of their brave 17th dragoons dead on the spot.”11 The 17th Light Dragoons, outnumbered at least four to one, suffered losses in their advance and had just been staggered by close-range rifle fire. Finally, they “had pretty much scattered.”12 Surprised, opposed by greater numbers, and lacking unit cohesion, they were overwhelmed. The survivors rode for safety, pursued by some white-coated 3rd Light Dragoons. Washington’s action stabilized the dangerous situation on the American left. After the cavalry covered the militia, “we retired to the rear,” and reformed.13 This first clash occurred while Ogilvie fought his way through McDowell on the American right. As the dragoons reformed, Continental infantry retreated. Washington was seen by Lieutenant Colonel Howard, who noted his position “on the summit; for I had a full view of him as we retreated from our first position.”14 Howard, withdrawing his infantry, also saw “the enemy’s cavalry retreating the way they had advanced, by our left flank, and Washington in pursuit of them.”15 “Lieutenant Bell, having previously taken off with him, in pursuit of the enemy on our left, nearly a fourth part of your regiment.”16 Howard saw Bell’s white-coated Americans chasing the British, recognized them as Washington’s dragoons, and thought Washington was with them.
Ogilvie’s troop, finished with McDowell’s skirmishers, passed the American right flank. When Tarleton saw Wallace’s Virginians move off the main line, “an order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge.”17 The British reserve moved forward to militia ridge but did not charge. Their lack of enthusiasm left Ogilvie unsupported as the Highlanders pursued the Continentals. McDowell’s two- or three-minute delaying action on the American right flank was critical. Without McDowell’s stand, Ogilvie’s troopers would have reached the American rear while Washington was engaged with the 17th Light Dragoons. Washington, given time, reacted to this crisis and moved “to cover with his dragoons the rear of the broken provincials.”18 Thomas Young described the action, “the command to charge was given We made a most furious charge, and cutting through the British cavalry, wheeled and charged them in the rear. In this charge, I exchanged my tackey for the finest horse I ever rode.”19
Once again, Washington’s entire force achieved numerical superiority over a single British troop. Captain Ogilvie’s troop, “which did not exceed 40 men . . . exposed to a heavy fire, and charged at the same time by the whole of Washington’s dragoons, was compelled to retreat in confusion.”20 Washington’s men slashed their way through Ogilvie, wheeled, and rode back through the disorganized troopers while the British reserve watched from the crest of militia ridge less than 200 yards away. The ride out and back through Ogilvie took Washington less than two minutes and covered about 200 yards. The charge kept the British Legion’s reserve out of the fight, because when they saw Washington ride over Ogilvie they did not attack. Alexander Chesney thought the British Legion “was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden . . . on seeing their own Regt opposed to them in the rear [they] would not proceed against it.”21
Now the withdrawing American infantry was almost ready to stop. As they halted, faced about, and fired, Washington’s dragoons passed beyond the American line. As his cavalry cleared the infantry’s line of fire, Washington sent a messenger to Howard reporting, “They are coming on like a mob. Give them one fire and I’ll charge them.”22 Washington’s dragoons wheeled on Morgan Hill as Howard’s infantry began firing into the 71st. “The critical moment lost on the one side was eagerly seized on the other. . . . Washington charged with his cavalry.” Thomas Young described his third charge of the morning, “the bugle sounded. We, about half formed and making a sort of circuit at full speed, came up in rear of the British line, shouting and charging like madmen. At this moment Col Howard gave the word ‘charge bayonets!’ “23
This third American cavalry charge was timed very closely to the Continental bayonet charge. The short instant while the dragoons “half formed” was crucial as Howard’s volleys struck down the British and the cavalry wheeled out of the line of fire. “At the Same time that We Charged [bayonets], Col Washington Charged the horse Which Soon gave Way.” “This charge was made at the same moment that I charged the infantry.”24
Washington’s dragoons hacked their way through the 71st and rode on. Washington next encountered “Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battalion of the Brave 71st . . . who, under the Operation of a Universal panic . . . instantly surrendered.”25 Washington’s troopers passed through the infantry and headed for Tarleton’s reserve cavalry. Their path passed the artillery, “whom you immediately made prisoners, but the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2—3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot.”26 The artillerymen may have tried to limber up the guns to get them away, but Washington prevented this, leavi
ng the guns for Howard’s infantry. Simons overstated the cavalry role as the artillerists fought to the death against Howard’s infantry.27
After passing the guns, the Americans rode screaming after the British Legion reserve troops. Their calls were so loud that Sergeant Everheart, still a prisoner, “could hear them distinctly cry out as their watchword, ‘Buford’s play.’“28 The intimidated British dragoons still refused to advance. “These dragoons never fought well . . . neither at Blackstocks, in this affair, or any other . . . fair conflict.”29 “Tarleton sent directions to his cavalry to form about four hundred yards to the right of the enemy, in order to check them, whilst he endeavoured to rally the infantry to protect the guns. The cavalry did not comply with the order.”30 When his infantry did not rally, Tarleton tried to get his dragoons into the fighting around the guns, but “it was in vain that Tarleton endeavoured to bring his legion cavalry to charge and check the progress of the enemy: They still stood aloof, and at length fled in a body through the woods, leaving their commander behind.”31
Note: British Legion and light infantry frontage reduced by 25%, 7th Regiment frontage reduced by 20% in allowance for casualties at militia line.
MAP 19.Cavalry Movements in the Counterattack
Tarleton and his officers went to extreme lengths to rally their men. George Hanger responded to charges that Tarleton failed by noting, “exertions were used, and most vigorous ones, to enforce obedience to the orders . . . some officers went so far as to cut down several of their men, in order to stop the flight.” “In this last stage of defeat Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day . . . but all attempts to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless. Above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle.” The British Legion dragoons rode off to fight another day.32
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