A Devil of a Whipping

by Lawrence E Babits

  Morgan placed the Flying Army between his prisoners and British pursuit after moving north of the Broad River. The Flying Army struck east and crossed the Catawba at Beattie’s Ford, then moved up the east bank to Sherrill’s Ford, where other units joined them.49 As the Flying Army moved north, it began to dissolve. Western North Carolina militiamen “guarded prisoners into Burk County, [where] applicant was then honorably but verbally discharged.”50 At the Catawba River, South Carolina State Troops and many militiamen were relieved and sent back to South Carolina.51

  The march was not an easy one for soldiers or prisoners. Sergeant Major Seymour reported “the troops suffered greatly in their return to Salisbury N. Carolina with the prisoners from the high waters cold rains and want of provisions at Broad River, Catawba there was several lives lost from high waters.” “[W]e had very difficult marching, being very mountainous, the inhabitants, who were chiefly Virginians, living very poor, except one settlement on the other side the Catabo, being excellent good land inhabited by the Dutch.”52

  Nathanael Greene rode immediately to join Morgan and plan how to best deal with the British. Greene and Morgan did not move until forced to; they prepared to dispute a Catawba River crossing while the prisoners marched north. Greene probably conceived the “Race to the Dan” at Sherrills Ford when he learned Cornwallis destroyed his baggage at Ramseur’s Mill. The Flying Army remained with Morgan and Greene, between the prisoners and Cornwallis. By traveling on parallel routes, each group would be able to obtain provisions through foraging and supplies brought in by militia. Both routes would then be of little use to the British because the Americans took all readily available food. They also removed or disabled boats at river crossings.

  Cornwallis finally moved after Morgan’s men. Left behind to cover the fords and delay the British, North Carolina general William Lee Davidson and a few men were killed as the British poured across Cowan’s Ford.53 Once the British crossed the Catawba, the Americans had to get past another river, the Yadkin beyond Salisbury.

  After the British crossed Cowan’s Ford, five miles downstream, Greene and Morgan moved rapidly away from Sherrill’s Ford. Greene ordered Rowan County militia to assemble, but they failed to turn out.54 Greene ordered supplies halted at Guilford Courthouse, except some being sent on with Captain John Smith and needed by the withdrawing Americans who crossed the Yadkin at Trading Ford.55 High water that slowed the British on the Catawba made it necessary to use boats on the Yadkin, where “the Americans sunk the flat boat by boring holes through her bottom after the prisoners were set over and waiting her down with rock.”56

  After crossing, the Americans briefly waited at Trading Ford, then marched to Guilford Courthouse.57 The main army arrived on 8 February. Here, Morgan was granted permission to leave the army “untill he recovers his health.58 The main army conducted a forced march into Virginia, and crossed the Dan River to safety on 13 February 1781.59 The Flying Army, now under Otho H. Williams and known as light infantry, crossed on 14 February, just ahead of Cornwallis.60 The American army movements now became part of the Guilford Courthouse campaign.”61

  As soon as Cornwallis reached Salisbury, he wrote Greene requesting a prisoner exchange, hinting that coming warm weather would be hard on American prisoners in Charleston. He suggested it might be necessary to move them to the West Indies.62 Cornwallis offered the several hundred American prisoners in Charleston in exchange for the men lost at Cow-pens. He failed in his effort to retake the prisoners, either by force or by exchange.

  Nathanael Greene; oil painting by Charles Willson Peale (Independence National Historical Park Collection)

  In mid-March, the two armies fought at Guilford Courthouse, an action that crippled the British army but left the American army intact.63 Cornwallis then marched his men to Wilmington, North Carolina. After resting and partially refitting his troops, the British marched north into Virginia. The summer 1781 campaign was inconclusive. When Washington’s Northern Army and the French army under Rochambeau arrived in Virginia, Cornwallis fortified Yorktown and waited for help. The British navy was driven off by the French fleet under the Compte de Grasse. Alternatives exhausted, Cornwallis surrendered on 19 October 1781.

  Following Guilford Courthouse, Greene returned to South Carolina. His army fought, and lost, three pitched battles, but subordinate commands won many smaller engagements. At summer’s end, Americans controlled the South except for a coastal enclave between Charleston and Savannah. The British lost the South, and ultimately the Revolutionary War, largely because the Continentals, state troops, and militia from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia never gave up. The episode that started the British downslide can be identified as Cowpens, in large part because the British reaction ultimately led to Yorktown.

  The Cowpens American veterans represent a thin section of southern society at the time of the battle. The small group of elite leaders and the large body of yeomen took a variety of paths after the war. Some became governors, representatives, and the like; others filled lower positions, such as justice of the peace and sheriff. Many moved west, taking up land earned by their military service.

  Frederick Jackson Turner conceived a notion of the frontier as a safety valve providing opportunities for Americans to expand spatially.64 This hypothesis has been hotly debated ever since, but it has a general ring of truth.65 More than 900 names identified as Cowpens participants provide a group to statistically test Turner’s hypothesis by identifying where Cowpens veterans resided in the 1830s.66 American participants mirror society at large because they came from the same society. While they share many things with the larger civilian populace, they are a distinct group because they were all at Cowpens on 17 January 1781. That event serves as a starting point for examining their earlier and later activity.

  The 638 men in Moss who filed pension applications can be subdivided by rank, military unit at Cowpens, birthplace, residence in 1781, and residence at pension filing.67 They can be examined about social and spatial mobility in terms of their past and their military unit with information provided in pension declarations.

  Eighty-six officers’ histories are known. Officers born in the state where they enlisted were less likely to move from that state after the war when compared with those who changed residence before Cowpens.68 Of those officers not born in the state from which they served, slightly more than half moved to another state after the war. Of thirty-nine South Carolina officers, seventeen moved out of the state. Those who stayed had family and economic reasons for remaining. In many cases, they held political office before the war. Men who moved were usually little known before the war and in lower ranks such as lieutenant. In any case, officers, the elected and appointed leadership at Cowpens, seem much more likely to have held political office after the war.69

  Of 552 enlisted men traced through the pensions, only 107 were born in the state where they enlisted. Both those born outside and in their enlistment state were likely to move on. Of the 552 men, 394 (71.3 percent) moved out of state after Cowpens. Those who enlisted in their birth state and moved after the war outnumbered those who stayed by about four to one. Over twice as many South Carolina enlisted men moved out of state than stayed. One reason for this mobility is the opportunities available after the war.70

  Most men drafted for military service were surplus population. These young men had few ties, and very little investment in, their home community. Most had no trade other than farmer or laborer. During the war they became used to moving. With no trade or property of their own, they had little or no economic reason to remain home when the government offered free land after the war. They left. Men with a trade were more likely to remain in their home community.71

  Most Carolina enlisted men moved on to Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Virginians and Marylanders primarily chose Tennessee or Kentucky, but many went to Ohio and Indiana, as did the Delaware men. The Cowpens pension information shows Turner was right; men did move. The pensio
n documents provide a very strong argument for the Turner hypothesis because “Officers were more likely to stay in the state they served to return to their land or start a political career. When officers did move to new states or territories, they still pursued political careers. The enlisted men moved for new opportunities to gain land.”72

  Many British soldiers survived the hard southern campaigning and were granted land in Canada. At least 125 British Legion enlisted men took up land in Nova Scotia in 1784. Many of these men were Cowpens participants.73 Veterans whose names come down to the present usually had something bad happen to them. Christian Tager of Sandford’s Light Dragoon Company was badly wounded at Cowpens. He settled in Nova Scotia, “restless and embittered by the war, living somewhere near Amherst on his half-pay and drinking himself to dementia in the village inn.”74 Another Sandford’s Company dragoon came to a bad end, perhaps confirming what Delaware private, and sometime member of the troop, Michael Dougherty said about them being the worst set of fellows he ever encountered. Michael Hayes murdered his wife on Christmas Eve, 1785. Convicted by the first “full dress trial” held in Queens County, Nova Scotia, he was hung in Liverpool, 10 July 178o.75

  John Christy of Captain Miller’s infantry company drowned “wading the creek at Little Port Jolly,” Nova Scotia. Dr. Edward Smith, surgeon, settled in Nova Scotia after the war. Sergeant George Hammett, after being paroled following Yorktown, went to Nova Scotia and settled in Port Mouton.76 Some, perhaps predictably, officers, prospered. Lieutenant Walter Willett and Cornet Samuel Willett of Captain Sandford’s Light Dragoon Company were “granted lands at Wilmot Nova Scotia in 1784 . . . Formed a militia unit called Barclay’s Legion in 1793.”

  Some British soldiers ended up in the country they fought for and lost. Sometimes they even turn up in American pensions. “Amongst these prisoners there was one John Hailey an Englishman who now lives a near neighbor to this Declarant in White County Tennessee, but to whom he was not then personally known . . . said Hailey’s son has married the stepdaughter of this Declarant.” Hailey is John Hailey of Captain Daniel Lyman’s Company, Prince of Wales American Regiment, which served at Cowpens as light infantry.77 Samuel Moore’s recollection sums up something of the American experience. Both Moore and Hailey fought for a country, moved west, raised a family, then saw their children marry into an “enemy” lineage. Those two in-laws must have had some interesting recollections of their service to pass on to their grandchildren.

  Epilogue

  When this project began, the research was directed at learning how many men actually fought with Morgan. After the Little Big Horn Battlefield archaeology research was published, it seemed Cowpens could be treated the same way. A research proposal for Cowpens battlefield archaeology raised questions about positioning and how one could identify units involved with their material culture.

  As research continued, other questions were raised. These circulated around casualty figures, the role of North Carolina troops after they served as skirmishers, and the South Carolina militia withdrawal. The mistaken order was another intriguing part of the battle that became clearer. Why did the British infantry, especially an elite unit such as the 71st Regiment, collapse? The most confusing battle segments involved the role of the American cavalry. Finally, what happened to Tarleton’s baggage train, and how long did the battle actually last? All these questions forced a reevaluation of documentary sources and material culture and led to this book.

  Tarleton said Morgan had about 2,000 men, but Morgan claimed only a few over 800 as his total force. It is highly unlikely that more than two-thirds of 900 participants survived forty more years and then swore to participating at Cowpens, as pension documents indicate. Given men who died between 17 January 1781 and the first pension act in 1818, a sizable number of veterans did not survive to file pension applications. Where unit size is known, the pension application rate is less than one to three or four. That is, one pension application equaled at least three or four Cowpens soldiers—and this is a low figure. Some 600 men filed pensions, so the total of Americans at Cowpens should thus be between 1,800 and 2,400 men. This figure agrees more closely with Tarleton’s estimate of 2,000 than Morgan’s 800.

  The next question is why such a discrepancy occurred. The militia performance against British troops before 1781 exasperated American military leaders. Washington thought so little of militia he wanted to fight in the European fashion, and so did other experienced officers.1 After Kings Mountain, southern political leaders felt militia could defend their states without relying on a standing army of Continentals who were expensive to feed, clothe, arm, and pay. If Morgan wanted Cowpens to stand as a Continental victory against British troops, following an agenda related to a regular army, he had to show that regulars won the battle. In his original report, Morgan claimed 800 men won against “chosen” British troops. He amplified this impression by naming only Continental and long-service Virginia militia officers who had served with him since the fall of 1780, and he omitted some Virginia Continentals and state troops, such as Wallace, Oldham, and Lawson. Pickens was mentioned only in passing. McDowell was slighted entirely, yet he had been a mainstay of the Flying Army since September 1780.

  Morgan’s “regulars,” Continentals and long-service Virginia militia, numbered about 600 men: 300 Continental infantry, 82 Continental dragoons, 160 Virginia militia under Triplett, and about 50 Virginia State Troops. This total does not include Carolina and Georgia militia, nor does it include state troops. On paper, at least, Morgan counted his “regulars,” and perhaps threw in another 200 men to allow for the militia. Sergeant Major William Seymour of the Delaware Company validates this interpretation by stating explicitly that “we [had] not eight hundred of standing troops and militia.”2 If Seymour meant 800 regulars (“standing troops”) augmented by militia, then Morgan, Seymour, and Tarleton agree. Eliminating the militia made the victory seem more important because American regulars won the battle.

  Casualty lists support this interpretation. Morgan reported 12 killed and 60 wounded. By name, at least 24 Americans were killed and 104 were wounded. By assigning casualties to units, it is obvious that Morgan counted only his “regular” casualties, the Continentals and Triplett s Virginians. Furthermore, none of the many wounded men who were not hurt badly enough as to miss time in ranks were reported.3 Just as Morgan ignored the militia in counting his troop strength, he ignored their casualties. An entry in the North Carolina State Records supports the idea that Morgan counted only “regular” casualties.

  3 officers wounded and 55 non Comd. & Privates.

  10 Privates killed.

  American, 60 cavalry, 20 Infantry, Militia4

  This list shows two groups of casualties. The first consists of regulars and reports 58 wounded and 10 killed. This is remarkably close to Morgan’s claim of 60 wounded and 12 killed. The second group appears to list 80 additional militia casualties. The total casualty figures for this cryptic entry are 148 men. This is over the 128 named casualties, but very close to a doubling of Morgan’s figures.

  If Morgan considered that his 800 “standing” troops suffered 72 killed and wounded, documented casualties nearly double that total, suggesting the Americans had at least 1,600 men who suffered 127 to 148 casualties. Morgan had at least 600 men on the main line, and Tarleton claimed 1,000 men were on the militia line. There were, at the barest minimum, 125 American cavalrymen. Morgan did not lie. Even if he had accurate counts of the militia, which is unlikely, he chose his words carefully to advocate a specific cause, an American standing army. This is ironic because Cowpens is known today as a victory of militia working with regular troops.

  As research continued, it became clear that Morgan’s tactical genius had not been given enough credit. Participant narratives indicate Morgan had a well-thought-out tactical plan, flexible enough to take advantage of events as they developed. While Morgan’s tactical arrangements at Cowpens are praised as sound,5 they are never clarified, in part because h
e changed from a written plan for battle if attacked to an orally given deployment for a battle he wanted to fight. The change occurred after Pickens and others brought in more men sometime after Morgan prudently issued a written plan for action in case Tarleton caught up with the Americans.6

  The traditional three-line, European-style, defense in depth formation does not explain the fighting Morgan had in mind. His genius lay in reversing the strength of his linear formations and creating progressively stronger defensive lines. Working within traditional European military thinking, Morgan constructed a mental, as well as a physical, trap for Tarleton.7 As the British drove successive American lines from the battlefield, they anticipated victory only to encounter another, stronger line after exerting themselves. The depth of the American lines soaked up the shock of British thrusts.

  Where Tarleton ultimately used all his men in a long battle line with a mounted reserve, Morgan deployed his men in three lines and a reserve according to their weapons. In order to aid his men as much as possible, Morgan utilized the known tendency of British infantry to fire high by placing his men downhill. Low American casualties seem to be a reflection of overshooting, which also silhouetted the British against a light skyline.

  The skirmish line retired under pressure, firing as opportunity offered. They took new positions behind the militia line and on its flanks. The militia withdrawal was not intended to go very far to the rear; their rally point was behind the main line. Morgan prepared for the militia withdrawal by positioning his Virginia units en échelon to channel the militia toward their second position. Accounts suggesting the militia retreated around the left flank ignore British accounts, Morgan’s prefight main-line positioning, and common sense. Morgan stationed himself at the end of a channel where he directed militia toward their next position. Morgan and his staff then rallied the militia behind a wall of regular troops, so they could be used where needed as the fighting developed.