51. There were few North Carolina Continentals when Cowpens occurred. Morgan reported the main-line flanks were covered by North Carolinians and Captain Connelly stated, “I was a volunteer . . . called the State Troops or Malitia [sic], a part of the men under my command was drafted men for eighteen months. A part . . . was for six months and about forty was volunteers for and during the war.” These men may not have been Continentals. Since they were mounted and their commander is not listed in Heitman, they do not seem to have been Continentals. Whatever the affiliation, Connelly stated he was “under” Howard on the right flank. The word distinguishes his account from other militiamen who only mention Howard as present. Henry Connelly, pension, 1 Aug. 1833, M804, Roll 627. Coupled with Mordecai Clark’s old company on the left, Morgan’s statement that the flanks were covered by North Carolinians makes sense.
52. Buchanan and Lawson seem to have been reinforced by two companies of David Campbell’s Virginia Militia, one of which joined Morgan on 16 January. The other arrived just as the battle began. It is possible these 100 militiamen were placed behind Brandon and Hayes, but this position is suggested only by Long’s cryptic comment about Virginians breaking, which might more accurately refer to their opening ranks to let the militia through. James Braden, pension, i July 1839, M804, Roll 314; Christian Peters, pension, 19 Sept. 1832, M804, Roll 1917.
53. Gibbon, Artillerist’s Manual, 54; Riling, Regulations, 6–9, 31, and Plate 1; Long, “Statement of Robert Long,” 6; William Neel, supplementary statement to pension, 19 Mar. 1836, M804, Roll 1804. Gibbon is used only to show width of a man in ranks (two feet) because Von Steuben does not give this figure.
54. James Tate’s Augusta Riflemen were between Combs and Gilmore’s Rockbridge Rifles on the left. Hammond’s statement that “Capts. Tate and Buchanan, with the Augusta Riflemen, were to support the right of the line” has proven very confusing. Hammond is correct about Tate and Buchanan on the right flank. (See n. 50 above.)
55. Two authors mention a captain named either Beatty or Beale stationed on the far-right flank. Morgan stated that the flanks were covered by North Carolinians; it is likely Beatty was from North Carolina and commanded Burke County men after Mordecai Clark volunteered as a dragoon. The North Carolina company is detailed in pension documents. William Capps, pension, 27 Mar. 1845, M804, Roll 466; Hammond, “Notes,” in Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, 528; M’Call, History of Georgia, 506; Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:152–55; Adam Rainbault, pension, 3 Oct. 1832, M804, Roll 1994.
56. Benjamin Martin, pension, 23 Mar. 1833, M804, Roll 1637.
57. Hammond, “Notes,” in Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, 528. The relevant terminology is: “A third line, will be formed, advancing its left wing toward the enemy, so as to bring it nearly parallel with the left of the continental troops, . . . will form to the right of the second line, the left nearly opposite to the right of the second line, one hundred yards in its rear; the right extending towards the enemy, so as to be opposite to or parallel with the second line.”
58. John R. Shaw, Narrative, 54; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:70–71; John Thomas, pension, 9 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 2370. Shaw was not at Cowpens. The same wording is in the 1781 Annual Register account cited by MacKenzie in Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarletons History, 94. A similar account is in Keltie, History of the Scottish Highlands, 2, 462: “The second line . . . immediately faced to the right and inclined backwards, and by this skilful manoeuvre opened a space by which the front line retreated.” The similarity of wording to Stewart’s account suggests Keltie used Stewart as his source.
59. John Eager Howard, “Account of the Battle of Cowpens,” in Robert E. Lee, American Revolution in the South, 96. Richard Swearingen, pension, 13 Nov. 1832, M804, Roll 2329, suggests this when he notes the “regulars came up.”
60. It would be pointless to list every historian of the battle. They all omit these two aspects of Morgan’s tactical arrangements.
61. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:379. Johnson seems to be writing with hindsight in this statement. Morgan was initially quite upset with Howard when the main line withdrew.
62. James Kelly, pension, 28 Apr. 1835, M804, Roll 1466.
63. M’Call, History of Georgia, 506. The hollow way is the swale behind the Continentals; the eminence is Morgan Hill.
64. Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:152–55; Young, “Memoir,” 100. The Green River Road curves to the northeast after passing through the main-line area, so Young’s observation fits both the terrain and the infantry deployment with Washington’s dragoons all posted west of the road.
65. Young, “Memoir,” 100.
66. Collins, Autobiography, 56; Henry Connelly, pension, 15 Aug. 1833, M804, Roll 628; John Eager Howard to John Marshall, 1804, Bayard Papers.
67. Several pensioners noted they were with the baggage guard. Thomas Berry, pension, 7 June 1832, M804, Roll 228; Robert Carithers, pension, 3 Sept. 1832, M804, Roll 469; George Wiginton, pension, 11 Dec. 1833, M804, Roll 2572.
68. Nathanael Greene to George Washington, 1 May 1781, in Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution, 3: 229.
69. Stewart, Sketches of Highlanders, 2:70–73.
70. Henry Connelly, pension, 15 Aug. 1833, M804, Roll 628; William Neel, pension, 29 Oct. 1832, M804, Roll 1804; Young, “Memoir,” 100.
71. Moss, Patriots at the Cowpens, 5.
72. Young, “Memoir,” 100.
73. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:379.
74. Ibid., 1:373.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Morgan described the battle’s start twice. “Majors McDowell and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire”; “They formed into one Line Raisd a prodjious Yell, and came Running at us as if they Intended to eat us up.” Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:152–55; Daniel Morgan to William Snickers, 23 Jan. 1781, Horatio Gates Papers. The first quote is Morgan to Greene, the second, Morgan to Snickers.
2. Collins, Autobiography, 56; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 215.
3. John Baldwin, pension, 28 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 123; Richard Crabtree, pension, 2 Aug. 1834, M804, Roll 674; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 254; James McDonald, pension, 31 May 1834, M804, Roll 1677.
4. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:378; M’Call, History of Georgia, 506.
5. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 215. The question of swamps at Cowpens appears to be moot unless Tarleton meant there were no swamps in the woods, which is correct. There was boggy ground around every creek head on both sides of the Green River Road.
6. This assessment was made after an early-morning battlefield walk in intermittent rain. From Hayes Rise, it is possible to see lighter background down the road. At the height of a mounted man at the rivulet’s head, it is not possible to see uproad beyond the ridge. If Tarleton moved off the road to his right, he could not see much due to the tree-covered, mottled background, nor could he approach closely due to skirmish fire. Using terrain and the dark, Morgan effectively, if temporarily, concealed most of his force.
7. Anderson, “Journal,” 209; Collins, Autobiography, 56; Long, “Statement of Robert Long,” 5–6.
With heavier tree cover on the main line, sunrise was slightly later than in the open areas where militia stood. Damp, cloudy weather conditions made visibility difficult. Available light at daybreak was unsuited for either observation or aiming. Poor light under the trees where the Continentals were posted may have totally obscured them when the British arrived.
The interval between lightening sky at dawn and actual sunrise is a period when even a vague outline is difficult to see. The interval of poor light lasts about thirty minutes in damp, cloudy weather at Cowpens. Tarleton used this time to deploy his troops and learn more of American dispositions. “Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw
off their knapsacks and blankets to render them light for action.” Feaster, History of Union County, 79; Hanger, Address to the Army, 99.
8. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:379–80; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 215.
9. Some attribute this reconnaissance to Ogilvie or the 17th Light Dragoons. In fact, Hovenden’s British Legion troop—which encountered the American patrol, discovered the pickets, and drove them in—did this. Ogilvie’s British Legion troop and the 17th Light Dragoons backed up Hovenden. Next in line of march, they were stationed on the British flanks during the battle. Hovenden’s troop lost seventeen killed in action between the end of December 1780 and 23 February 1781. It is probable some fell in this reconnaissance by fire. Some authors claim fifteen dragoons were shot down, a specific incident that actually occurred later in the battle. Clark, Loyalists in the Southern Campaign, 2:203–4; Lawrence Everheart, pension, 7 Apr. 1834, M804, Roll 944; Fleming, Cowpens, 63; Roberts, Battle of Cowpens, 86; Schenk, North Carolina, 213; James Simons to William Washington, 3 Nov. 1803, Balch, Papers, 45–47.
10. Skirmishers “behind a rivulet” were protected from attack by boggy ground created by springs and rain. See E. Alfred Jones, Journal of Alexander Chesney, 22.
11. M’Call, History of Georgia, 506.
12. Ibid.
13. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 2:379–80; M’Call, History of Georgia, 507.
14. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 216. The British right is located by a combination of factors. Cunningham and Hammond had at least 115 men along rising ground east of the road. Shoulder to shoulder in one line, they occupied about 250 feet. At open order, the British infantry covered approximately five feet per man in two ranks. Given the numbers of light infantrymen (about 150) and the British Legion infantry (about 200), the British extended about 120 yards east of the road. The British deployment shows the skirmish line was heavy, but well spread out, averaging perhaps three feet per man.
American numbers are derived from Showman, Greene Papers, 7:157–58 (nn. 4–6); and James Jackson to Daniel Morgan, 20 Jan. 1795, Myers, Cowpens Papers, 46. The Georgians had about 55, South Carolina State Troops, about 60. Skirmishers were probably in groups, within loosely formed companies. See, for example, M’Call, History of Georgia, 506. British numbers are from “Strength Report, 15 Jan. 1781,” Reese, Gornwallis Papers. Open-order spacing for the British is based on Tarleton’s comment about the “loose manner of forming in the south,” and Abner Nash’s report of British infantry at Camden deployed at five-foot intervals in a single line. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 221; Nash to Delegates in Congress, 23 Aug. 1780, State Records of North Carolina, 15, 60.
15. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 214.
16. Ibid., 216.
17. Ibid. Tarleton said they closed within 300 yards, but this is incorrect and seems due to unfamiliar terrain and poor light. If Tarleton’s distances were correct, the 7th would have been deployed in the bog around the rivulet; at about 200 yards, the 7th was beyond the rivulet. Few Americans noted Tarleton’s two-stage deployment, indicating how smoothly the British went from column to line.
18. Hanger, Address to the Army, 104; William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:379. There was constriction on the British left. The 71st was supposed to be posted between Ogilvie’s British Legion dragoons and the 7th Fusiliers. There was no room to deploy between the two units because the dragoons could not move farther west, perhaps because of the ravine that borders the field today. Mixing the 7th and 71st flanks provides clear evidence that the western edge of the battlefield constricted troop movements.
The 169 men in the 7th Regiment required about 70 yards if men were shoulder to shoulder in two ranks with a cannon located in the regiment’s center. An additional 22 yards must be added for Ogilvie’s troop. Forty dragoons occupied a space of 22 yards (3.3 feet per horseman) if deployed in two ranks; if in one rank, they required 44 yards.
The distance between the Green River Road and the ravine on the west side of the battlefield is about 130 yards. The 71st had 240 men who required a minimum of 80 yards if in two ranks with no space between companies. After deducting space for dragoons and 7th Fusiliers, between 26 and 42 yards remained for the 71st. This was approximately half of the width they required. A nineteenth-century source provides information on space taken by mounted men in different formations. See Gorgas, Ordnance Manual, 438. Gorgas is cited only to provide information about space required by horsemen, data not found in Von Steuben.
19. Hanger, Address to the Army, 101–2, 104–5; MacKenzie, Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s History, 97; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 216.
20. M’Call, History of Georgia, 507.
21. William Lorance, pension, 3 Dec. 1832, M804, Roll 1584.
22. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:378; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 256; Lorance, pension, 1832.
23. John Baldwin, pension, 28 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 123; James Jackson to Daniel Morgan, 20 Jan. 1795, Myers, Cowpens Papers, 46; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 253; Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:152–55. Morgan’s comment about a “heavy and galling fire” is telling. A rifleman himself, Morgan undoubtedly watched with a practiced eye, and his praise is a valuable comment on their performance. The quotes are, in order, from Morgan, Jackson, Lee, and Baldwin.
CHAPTER SIX
1. Views of the second-line action are often misplaced chronologically. According to MacKenzie, “Two-thirds of the British infantry officers, had already fallen, and nearly the same proportion of privates” {Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s History, 99).
2. Feaster, History of Union County, 79. Feaster is quoting one of Joseph Mcjunkin’s postwar addresses on the Cowpens battlefield.
3. Stedman, American War, 321; Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 216.
4. Haggis, “Firesides Revisiting.” This observation is supported by Anderson, “Journal,” 209. The three-pounders are discussed by Caruana, Grasshoppers and Butterflies, and Muller, Treatise of Artillery.
5. Caruana, Grasshoppers and Butterflies, 31–32.
6. Young, “Memoir,” 100.
7. Anderson, “Journal,” 207; Jeremiah Dial, pension, 15 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 808.
8. Collins, Autobiography, 56–57; Gordon, Independence of the United States of America, 4:34; John Eager Howard to John Marshall, 1804, Bayard Papers; William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:380; Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 256; Stedman, American War, 321; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 1:71; Young, “Memoir,” 100.
9. Ramsay, History of the Revolution in South Carolina, 233; John Thomas, pension, 9 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 2370; Young, “Memoir,” 100.
10. Samuel Shaw, “Revolutionary War Letters to Captain Winthrop Sargent,” 321; Stedman, American War, 321; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:71; Young, “Memoir,” 100.
11. Tarleton, Campaigns of 1780–81, 216. Tarleton seems reasonably correct, but his figure may be low. Hayes, Brandon, Thomas, and Roebuck each had between 150 and 200 men. Hammond had at least 115 men on the left flank. North Carolinians under McDowell numbered more than 200 men. The totals suggest there were at least 900 men on line, a very conservative figure well over Morgan’s 800. If Continental infantry and dragoons (380) and Virginians (200+) are subtracted, the entire militia contingent is 220, which is simply not credible.
12. William Johnson, Sketches of Nathanael Greene, 1:380; M’Call, History of Georgia, 507.
13. Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:152–55. The quote is from p. 154.
14. Feaster, History of Union County, 79.
15. Carroll, “Random Recollections,” 101; O’Neall and Chapman, Annals of Newberry, 36. The small parties may have been designed to tempt the British into firing early. It was not a new tactic; some of the same Americans did it against Tarleton at Blackstock’s.
16. Clark, Loyalists in the Southern Cam
paign, 2:234; Raddall, “Tarleton’s Legion,” 43; Saye, Memoirs of Major Joseph Mcjunkin, 33.
17. O’Neall and Chapman, Annals of Newberry, 36; Young, “Memoir,” 100. The firing pattern differs from the Von Steuben manual, but there were obvious reasons to do so. Riling, Regulations, 65.
18. Gordon, Independence of the United States of America, 4, 34; Richard Swearingen, pension, 13 Nov. 1832, M804, Roll 2329; John Thomas, pension, 9 Aug. 1832, M8o4, Roll 2370. British accounts suggest the distance was half that reported by the Americans and claim they were within 20 or 25 yards when the first volley was discharged. See Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:71.
19. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 257; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:71.
20. Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 19 Jan. 1781, Showman, Greene Papers, 7:154. According to Von Steuben’s manual, fire is by alternate units. If Brandon fired first, Thomas was next, then Hayes, and finally Roebuck. Given delays in the 7th Regiment’s advance, Thomas and Roebuck were under little pressure because the fusiliers took longer to reach the killing distance.
21. Hanger, Sportsmen, 199–200.
22. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War, 257; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:71.
23. Collins, Autobiography, 57; John Eager Howard to John Marshall, 1804, Bayard Papers; John Thomas, pension, 9 Aug. 1832, M804, Roll 2370.
24. MacKenzie, Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s History, 99; Stewart, Highlanders of Scotland, 2:71. MacKenzie’s precise quote is, “Fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood.”
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