Rabaul 1943–44

by Mark Lardas

  Post-strike reconnaissance photography captured the damage done. Docks are burning in the background. Several ships are damaged, and the ship in the foreground (numbered “7” in the intelligence photo) has been beached or is sinking. (USAAF)

  The bombers gave as good as they got, strafing as they went in, and dropping their bombs. The battle over the harbor lasted nine minutes, with the flak defenses getting stiffer for each successive raid. The B-25s destroyed several floatplanes in the harbor, including a four-engine Kawinishi H8K (“Emily”) flying boat. Four transports, including two 5,000-ton vessels, were sunk. Two heavy cruisers and one destroyer were damaged by near misses. Two dozen auxiliaries, from repair ships to tankers, were damaged. Eighteen Japanese aircraft were destroyed. In exchange, the Fifth Air Force lost nine B-25s and 12 P-38s. Nine of each were shot down, the rest destroyed in crash-landings at Dobodura or Kiriwina. Many others were damaged.

  The Fifth Air Force flew only three more missions against Rabaul, on November 5, 7, and 10 in coordination with carrier airstrikes. These were relatively minor. Once the beachhead on Bougainville was secured, Kenney was content to turn over Rabaul to Comairsols. The Fifth Air Force turned its attention to New Guinea and western New Britain, particularly to support the invasions scheduled at Gatsama and Cape Gloucester. By Kenney’s reckoning there was no further need for the Fifth Air Force: the Japanese had lost hundreds of aircraft and scores of ships. Nothing was left.

  While the Japanese had suffered significant losses, they were still in the fight. It would take another four months to win air superiority over Rabaul. Comairsols had plenty to do.

  The US Navy moves in: November 5–December 9, 1943

  The neutralization of Rabaul was predicated on building Allied airfields on Bougainville. These permitted Allied fighters and single-engine bombers to reach Rabaul’s airfields. They also saved wear on aircraft. The long-haul flights required by the Fifth Air Force were forcing more aircraft out of service due to maintenance issues than the Japanese destroyed in combat. Additionally, whereas flights from New Guinea were often stymied by stationary fronts in the Solomon Sea, these weather patterns were typically well west of the Solomon Islands. Weather offered fewer issues to Bougainville-based aircraft.

  The Japanese expected an Allied landing on Bougainville, fortifying the airfields they had there. The United States bypassed these, landing in the lightly held middle of the island, off Empress Augusta Bay. They planned to seize and hold a perimeter just large enough to contain airfields safe from attack by Japanese artillery. The landing was made on November 1, successfully capturing the desired territory before the Japanese Army could counterattack.

  Japanese aircraft proved unequal to disrupting the invasion fleet. Several attacks were launched from Rabaul, all involving fewer than 20 bombers. In each the sole result was the loss of most of the bombers sent and only minor damage inflicted on shipping in Empress Augusta Bay. Yet if Rabaul lacked the aircraft to repel the invaders, it did provide a base for warships to threaten that fleet. Allied air power made a daylight surface action suicidal, but Rabaul was only 200 nautical miles from Empress Augusta Bay. Fast warships could leave Rabaul in late afternoon, steam to Empress Augusta Bay, spend up to two hours in surface combat, and be back at Rabaul shortly after sunrise. The Japanese were masters of naval night combat.

  Allied vulnerability in surface combat was aggravated by a lack of naval surface strength. The planned invasion of the Gilbert Islands in late November meant most of Halsey’s cruisers and all of his battleships were in the Central Pacific. The only surface forces Halsey could call on were four Cleveland-class light cruisers. But these, in concert with eight Fletcher-class destroyers sufficed to defeat the Japanese – two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers – at the battle of Empress Augusta Bay on November 2.

  Admiral Koga, commanding the Combined Fleet at Truk, decided to reinforce Rabaul. For over a year he had husbanded his cruisers for the right moment. He decided that time had been reached. He sent seven heavy cruisers: Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai, along with the light cruiser Noshiro and four destroyers as an escort, and a fleet train of two tankers. When combined with the Myoko and Haguro, already at Rabaul, these created a task force large enough to overwhelm the American cruiser screen with plenty left over to destroy any transports or cargo ships off Bougainville.

  American reconnaissance discovered the arriving ships on November 4, heading towards St George’s Channel. It was too late to get surface reinforcements to Empress Augusta Bay. Unless some way existed to eliminate the threat posed by these Japanese cruisers, the invasion was at risk.

  The morning of November 5, 1943 found USS Saratoga and Princeton off Bougainville preparing to attack Rabaul. Preparations are made on Saratoga’s flight deck to launch aircraft for the strike. (USNHHC)

  US Navy airstrike against Simpson Harbor

  November 5, 1943

  Axis

  Allied

  Airfield

  EVENTS

  1.US Naval aircraft approach via St George’s Channel. The aircraft keep a tight formation during the flight. At the bottom (c.12,000ft) are the TBFs, accompanied by 17 F6Fs (one flying close escort for the command bomber). Approximately 1,000ft above that are the SBDs; 2,000ft above them are 16 F6Fs. Flying top cover another 2,000ft above these aircraft are 19 more F6Fs. There are 97 aircraft – 23 TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, 22 SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and 52 F6F Hellcat fighters – on the mission.

  2.The Japanese have launched 70 aircraft in response – 65 various types of the A6M “Zero” fighters, and five D4Y1 Judy bombers, which are to fly over the American bombers and drop time-fused phosphorous bombs intended to explode among the US bombers (it did not work.) The Japanese are circling at c.16,000ft over Lakunai airfield, with another group approaching from the west, as the US aircraft get nearer. When the USN formation reaches Blanche Bay, they move to intercept, but wait outside the formation for it to break up, feeling it would be easy to shoot down the bombers once the formation has broken up.

  3.The USN planes make a 180-degree turn at Tavui Point, and then drop down from 15,000ft to 10,000ft as they approach Simpson Harbor.

  4.Japanese antiaircraft opens fire as the USN planes fly over Rabaul. The USN aircraft now break their tight formation for individual attack as they reach Simpson Harbor. The idea is to attack the Japanese warships along their length and from behind. The wind is from the southeast, meaning most anchored ships are pointing to the northwest.

  5.Rather than risk their own AA fire, the Japanese aircraft fly around Simpson Harbor.

  6.Cmdr Howard Caldwell in the command TBF begins directing attacks against Japanese shipping in the harbor. His command TBF plane, escorted by two F6Fs, circles at 10,000ft.

  7.The SBD Dauntless dive bombers attack the warships in groups of two or three as directed by Clifton’s command plane. They dive down at a 70–80 degree angle from 10,000ft, drop bombs between 2,000 and 1,000ft, and then level off to 500ft. They hit five out of six heavy cruisers, with a near-miss one of the light cruisers

  8.The TBF Avenger torpedo bombers in teams of three spiral down to 250ft and make torpedo attacks on cruisers and moving ships (mainly destroyers). Only two torpedoes hit: both are duds.

  9.The F6F Hellcat fighters engage and pursue the Japanese Zeros after the formation unpacks.

  10.Four to six Japanese fighters engage Cmdr Howard Caldwell’s TBF and his escorts. They dive south out of the mouth of Blanche Bay, chased by the Japanese fighters.

  11.All USN aircraft race down St George’s Channel after attacking, where they reform for the trip home, pursued by the Japanese fighters.

  US NAVY UNITS

  1.Combined flight paths of all attacking US Navy aircraft (before split)

  2.TBF Avenger torpedo bomber (commander), escorted by two F6F Hellcats

  3.TBF Avenger torpedo bombers (23)

  4.SBD Dauntless dive bombers (22)

  5
.F6F Hellcat fighters (52)

  JAPANESE

  A.A6M “Zero” fighter, and five D4Y1 Judy bombers

  B.A6M “Zeros”

  Simpson Harbor near the beginning of the November 5 raid. Cruisers are anchored, bows pointing towards the prevailing wind. At least one cruiser has already been hit. This photograph was taken by the command TBF by Photographer’s Mate First Class Paul T. Barnet. (USNHHC)

  A gun camera photo taken by a Saratoga SBD shows the heavy cruiser Chikuma damaged by a near miss from a bomb landing amidships near the starboard side. Chikuma was one of five heavy cruisers damaged by the US Navy’s November 5 raid on Rabaul. (USNHHC)

  Halsey had an aircraft carrier task force. It consisted of Saratoga, a fleet carrier, but the oldest carrier in the US Navy, the light carrier Princeton, two Atlanta-class antiaircraft cruisers and nine destroyers. Their aircraft had supported the invasion three days earlier. The task group was off Guadalcanal, refueling. Halsey staff quickly put together a plan to hit Rabaul with a carrier airstrike.

  It was risky. Naval intelligence pegged Japanese strength at over 150 aircraft. The two carriers could send fewer than 100 and that only by including every fighter, leaving the task force with no air cover. The naval aircraft’s short range meant the carriers had to move well north parallel to Bougainville and within range of Rabaul-based Japanese bombers. But it was the only way to take out the heavy cruisers. Kenney’s strafer B-25s were ineffective against heavy cruisers as they demonstrated on November 2, against Myoko and Haguro.

  Halsey ordered the strike. To get to the launch point by dawn, the task force, commanded by Admiral Frederick Sherman, steamed north at 30 knots. Cloud cover shielded the carriers from Japanese observation. One patrol plane spotted the ships, and told Rabaul that it consisted of cruisers and destroyers.

  Halsey directed Sherman to send everything. The carriers would be protected by shore-based Navy and Marine Corsairs, flying out of Munda.

  On November 5, 97 aircraft were launched: 52 F6F Hellcat fighters, 23 Avenger torpedo bombers, and 22 Dauntless dive bombers. The pilots planned the attack as they flew to Simpson Harbor. The prevailing wind was from the south-southeast. Ships anchored in Simpson Harbor would have their bows pointing toward the wind. Both torpedo and dive bombers are most effective if they approach the target ship in the direction of the fore–aft axis of the ship, as this maximizes their chances of hitting the target. Torpedo bombers flew parallel to the ship’s length, and then turned towards the ship to launch torpedoes. Dive bombers dove on the ship along its length.

  The mission commander decided to fly down the St George’s Channel until they were north of Crater Peninsula, turn south over the peninsula, and attack Simpson Harbor from the north. This route also allowed the planes to escape out the mouth of the harbor. For once everything went right for the Americans. They arrived shortly after the Japanese fleet. It had anchored and was fueling in preparation for the attack planned that night.

  Japanese radar gave warning of the raid, and the flight past Crater Peninsula gave the 70 Japanese fighters scrambled time to meet the American formation. They followed the formation but did not attack, waiting until the US formation split up. Instead the Navy aircraft held formation until they were over Simpson Harbor. There, every antiaircraft gun ashore and afloat opened up, while the Japanese fighters remained outside the curtain of flak.

  It was too late, and the flak was ineffective. Two Japanese cruisers were finishing fueling. One, Maya, took a hit in the aircraft deck. The bomb exploded in the engine room, killing 70 and wounding 60. Atago took three near misses, causing hull damage below the waterline. Takao and Mogami each took a single hit – in both cases between the two forward turrets, leaving 40 percent of their main batteries unusable. Chikuma was damaged by a near miss. Of the heavy cruisers, only Suzuya was undamaged. Light cruisers Agano and Noshiro were also hit, as were two destroyers, one by a dud torpedo.

  The Japanese fighters pounced after the bombs were dropped and the US aircraft were streaking out of harbor. By then it was too late. The fighters soon peeled off to meet a new threat: 27 B-24s and 67 P-38s sent to attack Rabaul. They struck the docks at 1225hrs, an hour after the carrier planes attacked. They met only light fighter opposition, as the Navy’s raid had drawn off most of the Japanese fighters.

  American aircraft losses were light. The Navy lost nine aircraft, while one P-38 was shot down. In exchange, Hellcats shot down two Zeroes, one D4Y1 (which had been dropping phosphorus bombs on the US formation) and one twin-engine bomber unfortunate enough to be taking off from Tobera when an escaping Hellcat flew past it. At 1640hrs, after Saratoga and Princeton recovered their aircraft, the task force headed south as fast as they had steamed north.

  Navy personnel remove casualties from the air group commander’s TBF, following a one-wheel landing with no flaps, ailerons, or radio on Saratoga after being shot up over Rabaul. Tail gunner Kenneth Bratton was wounded and photographer Paul Barnett killed by a fighter attacking the TBF. Commander Henry H. Caldwell, the pilot, climbs from his cockpit. (USNHHC)

  Admiral Takeo Kurita, commanding the cruiser force, was furious. In response Kusaka sent scouts seeking the American carriers. They found the task force just before it headed south. Kusaka sent 14 B5N2 torpedo bombers after the carriers. The bombers reported sinking two aircraft carriers. In reality they came across a three-ship convoy consisting of PT-167 and two landing craft. The torpedoes, set for deep draft ships, all underran their targets, except for two that porpoised. One struck an LCI above the waterline and failed to explode. A second went through PT-167. Four B5N2s failed to return, including one shot down by the PT boat and a second which crashed after striking a mast.

  Although the US airstrike failed to sink a single ship, it achieved its purpose. Five of the six heavy cruisers at Rabaul were damaged. Three required dockyard repairs. The midnight cruiser sortie was canceled; the Bougainville beachhead was reprieved. The Imperial Japanese Navy pulled its heavy warships out of Rabaul, and never returned.

  The US Navy was not through with Rabaul. Because of the crisis in the Solomons Nimitz sent a second carrier task force to Halsey. It was a temporary loan, only until November 14, when it had to return to the Central Pacific to support the Gilbert Islands landings. Due to difficulties finding an adequate destroyer screen, the carriers remained in port until November 8. This resulting group consisted of the Essex-class carriers Essex and Bunker Hill, light carrier Independence, and nine destroyers. They carried 211 aircraft: 96 F6F Hellcats, 46 TBF Avengers, 36 SBD Dauntlesses, and 33 SB2C Helldivers, the combat debut of the new dive bomber.

  Halsey decided to make a second carrier strike against Rabaul. This one, launched November 11, involved both carrier groups and over 300 aircraft. Sherman’s task force with Saratoga and Princeton struck from the east, launching from a spot near the Green Islands 225 nautical miles from Rabaul. The new task force, commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery, launched from southeast of Rabaul. Its aircraft left the flight deck when the carriers were 160 nautical miles from Rabaul, a lot closer than Sherman.

  Since the attack occurred a week after the November 5 strike, most of the heavy cruisers were already gone, back to either Truk or the Home Islands for repairs. Only Maya was still there, receiving repairs to its engine to allow it to reach Japan. There were still several light cruisers and numerous destroyers and auxiliary vessels in Simpson Harbor, though. While the pickings were fewer, they were still significant. There were also fewer aircraft for the Allies to face. The Japanese were down to 270 aircraft. The Rabaul-based contingent had lost 44 aircraft in a week, while the carrier aircraft were down 39. Truk was scheduled to send 28 more aircraft, but they did not arrive before the American carrier aircraft visited.

  Halsey again requested assistance from the Fifth Air Force. Kenney sent 20 Beaufort torpedo bombers on a nighttime strike at Simpson Harbor on November 9–10, which accomplished little. A B-24 raid on November 11 was washed out by weather.

>   Weather affected the Navy as well. Sherman’s group attacked first, but Rabaul was socked in. The aircraft from Saratoga and Princeton played hide-and-seek with Japanese warships ducking in and out of rain squalls. They attacked a light cruiser and four destroyers on their first strike, inflicting only minor damage. Weather washed out a second strike, but it was able to withdraw undetected.

  Montgomery’s strike went better. Skies were clearer when they went in. Torpedo bombers managed to score hits on the light cruiser Agano and destroyer Naganami. A Helldiver planted a bomb on the destroyer Suzunami. It was loading torpedoes when hit and the bomb and sympathetic detonations shattered the hull. Three other destroyers and a light cruiser received minor damage from the bombers.

  The Japanese scrambled 107 fighters to meet the carrier planes. A combination of flak and Japanese fighters would bring down nine US aircraft: four Avengers and five Hellcats. Four Hellcats, two Helldivers, and one Avenger reached the carriers, but were so badly damaged they ditched next to the carriers. Thirty other planes returned with battle damage. In exchange, 11 Japanese fighters were shot down.

  Commander Joseph C. Clifton, USN, who commanded VF-12, Saratoga’s fighter squadron, passes out cigars in the wardroom afterwards, celebrating the successful November 5 air attack on Rabaul. (USNHHC)

  The Japanese sought the US carriers following the November 5 attack. Instead of finding the carriers, they found and attacked two landing craft and PT-167. A B5N-launched aerial torpedo struck PT-167 but passed through the boat without exploding. (USNHHC)