Not on Our Watch

by Don Cheadle

  After the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the US government feared that this failed state would become a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and there are some terror suspects living in Somalia. Al-Qaeda operatives have used Somalia as a base from which to plan and launch devastating terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa. These attacks include the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of a hotel on the Kenya coast, an attempt to shoot down an Israeli passenger jet with a surface-to-air missile in Kenya, and a foiled attempt to crash a plane into the new US embassy in Kenya.

  Somalis have appealed to the US government for assistance in building a functioning state, but US policy has focused exclusively on capturing or killing terrorists. During John’s most recent trips to Somalia, he saw evidence of covert US support for warlords—some of the same warlords responsible for killing US Army Rangers in 1993—in hopes that they will capture terrorist suspects. Unfortunately for Somalis, the United States and its allies in the global war on terror have not even tried to develop solutions to the statelessness, poverty, and despair that have allowed violent extremism to take root. The alliance of Western nations should be doing everything in its power to crack down on terrorist networks in Somalia, but the current policy approach has turned ordinary Somalis against the United States and increased the power of Islamic extremists.

  In 2006, the weakness of US strategy was exposed when militias loyal to a loose network of Islamic courts routed the warlord allies of the Bush administration. The Islamists, some of them associated with al-Qaeda, captured control of much of southern Somalia and threatened a holy war against Somalia’s neighbour, and long-time enemy, Ethiopia, which in turn invaded and overthrew the Islamist authority. Catastrophic conflict looms, violent ideology spreads, and terrorist networks infiltrate Somalia, where men and boys with guns act as judges, juries, and executioners for ordinary Somalis trying to survive.

  Root Causes

  The roots of these four conflicts (Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda, and Somalia) are similar to those of other wars all over the world, whether in Chechnya, the former Yugoslavia, Colombia, Cambodia, or the Middle East.

  The first reason for violent conflict is political exclusion. Wars don’t usually start without a cause. That cause is usually rooted in a particular ethnic, regional, religious, or political group that feels excluded or marginalised from power. For example, Darfurians and southern Sudanese certainly rebelled because of deep-seated grievances that drove thousands of people in both these places to pick up a gun and fight for their rights.

  The second reason for violent conflict is greed. In conflicts around the world, those in power control the access to resources—whether natural or state—and they are often not inclined to share. It should come as no surprise then that these economic disparities are a driver for conflict. In some cases, wars begin for bigger principles but slowly transform into predatory warlordism, where armed groups take advantage of conflict and chaos as much as they possibly can. Some of the greatest predators in the world in the last century hail from this region: the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, other militias in eastern Congo and Somalia, and the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels from northern Uganda.

  The third reason for violent conflict is impunity. In so many countries stricken by conflict, there is no accountability, no rule of law. Governments or rebels, or even militias, without a cause commit unspeakable crimes against humanity, with no penalty, no sanction. The message is clear: you can kill as many people as you want, and there will be no consequence.

  The Three Ps of Confronting Mass Atrocities

  Earlier in the book we talked about the haunting similarities in how and why genocides and mass atrocities are committed and what the international community does (or does not do) in response. However, there is one critical difference between past genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia and the crises unfolding today in Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda, and Somalia: THERE IS STILL TIME TO ACT TO END THE SUFFERING.

  Despite the almost ritualistic pledge of ‘Never Again’, no coherent international system or process is in place for responding to genocide and other atrocities. What does exist is chaotic and marked by futile finger-pointing, while the slaughter continues. Passing resolutions in the UN Security Council that have no teeth (e.g., no punitive measures focused on accountability for the commission of mass atrocities) will certainly not influence the calculations of mass murderers. Left uninfluenced, the Sudanese government’s killing will not end in Darfur, and any African Union troops that might remain there will continue to have front-row seats for the slaughter.

  The real lesson of the past decade and a half dealing with the regime in Khartoum is that trying to gently persuade and offer incentives to mass murderers doesn’t work. It is a pragmatic government; it will do what it must in order to survive. Only when Sudan has been the target of serious punitive pressure aimed at stopping the atrocities will the regime modify its behaviour. UN Security Council sanctions led by the United States in the 1990s proved that; Khartoum renounced its ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations as a direct result. The lesson couldn’t be clearer, but it has been completely ignored in the context of Darfur.

  Ultimately, those committing mass atrocities must understand that punitive action will be avoided or removed only if they stop killing people and obstructing peace.

  As the ENOUGH Project has stressed, we need to make them pay for their crimes.

  The genocide in Rwanda took 100 days to exterminate 800,000 lives. Darfur and these other cases are Rwandas in slow motion. In Darfur, up to 400,000 lives have been extinguished in three years. There is a clear path out of this quagmire of death and destruction. The killing could stop tomorrow if the world pressed forward the agenda encapsulated in the Three Ps of genocide prevention: Protection, Punishment, and Peacemaking. Western countries have the ability and capacity to lead the world in responding in these three arenas. It is only a question of political will as to whether that will happen. We the people have a say in this. The Three Ps:

  1. Protecting the People

  The inability to protect human life when it is threatened en masse is the most significant failure of the international community. In Darfur and elsewhere, the world usually defers to the state authority to carry out that protection function in the context of the international legal principle of state sovereignty. But it is often the states themselves that are perpetrating the mass atrocities, or at least encouraging them or standing idly by while they happen.

  It is like the fox guarding the hen house, and in many cases the fox happens to be rabid.

  Sometimes, protection of civilians can be achieved without the use of force. The presence of human rights monitors and protection officers from humanitarian agencies can, in some cases, provide limited protection to potential victims. The deployment of international officials and their strong protection advocacy with the relevant authorities can have a deterrent effect on would-be attackers. A word of caution, though: in most cases where mass atrocities are being perpetrated, protection by presence is inadequate and only provides an alibi for those governments and institutions that don’t want to do more.

  Many of us peace and human rights advocates are rightly reluctant about the use of force. We need to get over it. There is such a thing as evil in this world, and sometimes the only way to confront evil is through the judicious use of military force. As long as the use of that force is accountable, multilateral, and focused on stopping the further suffering of victims, then we advocates of peace and justice need to be prepared to support the legitimate and discriminate use of force. Another word of caution: force needs to be deployed very carefully, or it has the capacity to make matters worse. Every situation is different. Sometimes the use of force—undertaken at the wrong time or in the wrong manner—can further inflame a crisis. A strong knowledge and understanding of the local context is critical to the succe
ssful application of external military force to protect people.

  The key to protecting civilians from atrocities is supporting international institutions to enhance their capacity to do so and building the political will in the international community to take the necessary action. In cases like Darfur and Congo:

  - IF we want to protect women from the ongoing scourge of mass rape,

  - IF we want to protect villages from being attacked and burned, and

  - IF we want to help millions of people return to their homes someday,

  - THEN peacekeeping operations have to be capable, well trained, able to operate together, well equipped, and given a mandate specifically to protect civilian life. Strong diplomatic leadership is necessary to achieve this.

  The Challenge to Protect Civilians in Darfur

  At the outset of the Darfur crisis, only the African Union volunteered to send troops to Darfur to help end the fighting. Two years into their deployment, it was clear that the job was too big for this fledgling organisation to handle. Given the Sudanese government’s stated opposition to a UN transition, by mid-2006 the African Union reached a significant fork in the road for its Darfur deployment and the future of the organisation. Either it would take control of its own destiny or continue to allow itself to be manipulated by the Sudanese regime, losing credibility with each passing week.

  The AU had been a perpetual supplicant up until then, having to beg every month for assistance even to pay its troops. International donors, including the United States, had promised to fully fund the mission but simply didn’t deliver. By continuing a half-hearted, under-resourced, and insufficiently mandated deployment with too few troops to make a difference, the AU was just providing an excuse for inaction by the UN Security Council, without doing enough to be able to protect a critical mass of civilians.

  At the end of 2006, faced with the prospect of a crushing failure in its first major test as an organisation, the AU had to make a decision, to decide whether to announce a date for handover to the UN or to withdraw its forces altogether from Sudan. Instead, it simply extended the mission for another six months, missing an opportunity to act boldly and regain some leverage that it had lost as the mission drifted and Darfur continued to burn.

  As an AU officer expressed to John, ‘When you are walking and not going anywhere, it is time to stop. The time for the UN to come in is now. I am African, but I have to admit that we cannot do that job with the existing resources and mandate.’

  The organisation will be increasingly necessary to prevent and confront atrocities across the continent. However, it could become a scapegoat for what has been a truly international failure in Darfur. The regime in Khartoum has taken the AU for a ride. It used the AU for its counterinsurgency and peace-breaking purposes. It divided Africa and the international community by forwarding the fantasy that only the AU could do the job. An AU officer told John, ‘The government of Sudan wants to keep a weak AU.’

  The AU has to stand up and decline to be anyone’s tool anymore, and just as importantly the UN Security Council has to take up its core agenda to address great threats to international peace and security. The UN should provide the foundation of any response to mass atrocities wherever they occur on the face of the earth. Africa cannot be an exception. The capacity of the AU should indeed be developed, but it should occur under the umbrella of the UN. Any other approach once again makes Africa the exception to the rule, and subject to the whims of donors and politicians everywhere.

  2. Punishing the Perpetrators

  For 60 years, the international community has struggled to find the means to punish the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Until now, efforts have been ad hoc, from Nuremberg to the international tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, to the special courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. But now we have a historic opportunity to chart a new legal course through the newly created International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC’s first three cases, not surprisingly, are the Congo, northern Uganda, and Darfur—the three deadliest conflicts in the world.

  The ICC issued its first indictments for the top five rebel leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), responsible for the highest child abduction rate in the world over the last decade. The ICC issued its first indictment in Congo for a warlord who has destabilised the northeast part of that country for years as he plundered the region’s natural resource wealth. In addition, in March 2005, the ICC had a case referred to it for the first time by the United Nations Security Council; it regarded Darfur.

  The best post-Nuremberg chance at institutionalising accountability is at stake in these, the ICC’s first three cases: northern Uganda, Congo, and Darfur. Failure in these three will ensure that impunity reigns supreme, that warlords like those in Somalia and elsewhere will feel no deterrence, and that international justice will have little meaning. The direct effect that would have on peace processes and implementation of peace agreements would be catastrophic.

  Though it has not ratified the international treaty in support of the ICC, the United States, for example, could still provide valuable information and intelligence to the ICC about specific targets for prosecution. The United States has some of the best intelligence in the world, and sharing some of it with the ICC would help accelerate efforts to indict the most heinous war criminals. It is simply unacceptable that a nation like the United States acts as a bystander while this historic attempt at justice slowly moves forward.

  The only chance we have for US participation and cooperation is through concerted, coordinated citizen action. Making our voices heard to our members of parliament and to the president is vital. It is a political decision whether the United States shares information and intelligence with the ICC or not. We need to raise the political cost of non-compliance. Americans need to shame their government until it provides help to the ICC.

  In addition to the ICC, two other tools of punishment are key to ensuring that would-be future war criminals are deterred from their atrocities: targeted sanctions and divestment.

  The UN Security Council can impose sanctions that are targeted on specific individuals accused of war crimes. This usually involves freezing assets and banning travel, the equivalent of an international scarlet letter that has variable impacts depending on how much the targeted individual cares about such penalties. Divestment is covered in Chapters 7 and 8; it involves campaigning to convince institutions, governments, and mutual funds to divest themselves of all stock holding in companies doing business with governments committing mass atrocities. Sudan is currently being targeted, much as apartheid South Africa was in the 1980s and early 1990s.

  Again, at a minimum, we must make them pay for their crimes.

  3. Promoting the Peace

  International influence and diplomacy can have pro-foundly positive consequences in resolving deadly conflict, and the most cost-effective initiative the international community could undertake in the entire arena of foreign policy worldwide would be to put a few more seasoned peacemakers in action in conflicts around the globe. The United States and its allies put extraordinary energy and money into cleaning up the messes caused by war and atrocities—literally billions of dollars in humanitarian and other aid—but in many of these places the international community barely lifts a finger to try to address the causes.

  In this regard, there is not much difference between what the international community does locally and what it does abroad.

  However, successful examples of peacemaking abound.

  JOHN:

  When I worked for President Clinton, I had the honour of working with the president’s special envoys working to end Africa’s wars. One of the things I liked most about the former president was that he was special envoy–crazy in the best of ways. He wanted the United States to promote peace wherever it could.

  Former national security advisor T
ony Lake was asked by the president to be one of these special envoys, and he volunteered two years of his life to negotiate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The war between them was the world’s deadliest between 1998 and 2000. Through Lake’s determination, backed by US leverage, we got a deal. The guns went silent immediately, and have remained so right up until the time of this writing. I served on Lake’s team during the entire process, along with Gayle Smith, Susan Rice, and Lt. Col. Mike Bailey.

  I learned a lot about what the United States can accomplish when it commits to an honourable objective. With Lake’s gravitas and connections, we were able to increase our intelligence-gathering capacities and diplomatic energy in support of the peace process. We would begin every negotiating session with an authoritative military briefing that let everyone know that we knew as much as they did and that we wouldn’t be snookered by the usual BS slung in the context of negotiations processes. We worked very closely with partners from the African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity) and the European Union, so there was total unanimity within the international community. US leadership, in close partnership with Africa, ended that war, and the cost to the United States was negligible.

  Nelson Mandela acted as an African envoy in support of conflict resolution in the tiny, violence-wracked nation of Burundi. President Clinton named former congressman Howard Wolpe as his special envoy for the region. Howard worked closely with President Mandela and the European Union special envoy, Aldo Ajello. We worked closely on strategy and brought leverage to the table. Mandela successfully brokered a peace deal that has largely held up for years.