Countrymen

by Bo Lidegaard

  Larsen had also had word of Svenningsen’s conversation with the representatives of the Jewish community and of the internment plan, which seemed to be supported by the majority of permanent secretaries, even though they realized the risk of “being denounced as traitors, even more so than members of the Scavenius government had previously been.” Larsen’s informant had himself supported the proposal “as he did not think one could think only of oneself.”3

  Stockholm Intervenes

  The rumors of the Danish internment plan reached Politiken and Bergstrøm’s vigilant ears that same day. It was Herbert Steinthal who had intercepted the proposal, and he realized at once how fatal it could be: “Herbert said that Svenningsen and Eivind Larsen … had been or were about to go to Dr. Best with a proposal that would create a big Jewish concentration camp guarded by Danish policemen. A really strange thought. You put all the Jews in a sack.”

  Bergstrøm shook his head and later that evening went to the nearby Hotel Kong Frederik, where he slept when he worked late at the newspaper and could not get home because of the curfew. Again he encountered hearsay: “I strolled in to ‘Kong Frederik.’ The clerk asked if there was anything new with the Jews. He knew some. He was 100 percent Aryan himself, he said. I had rated him at least 75 percent Jewish, and I did not change my assumption after I looked closely at him.”4

  Fear and uncertainty about the Germans’ intentions were already impelling individuals to try to avoid being among those who were selected as scapegoats.

  The resistance activist Erling Foss now was also convinced that the threat was genuine. In his report of September 30 to Stockholm and London he outlines the situation: “There is hardly any doubt, after all information obtained yesterday, about the impending arrest of the Jews. Information from the circle of permanent secretaries indicates that the local Germans, both Best and also Hanneken, are unhappy about it, but the order came directly from Hitler. This also explains why the message has been circulated.… Some permanent secretaries are contemplating a Danish effort to arrange for the internment of the Jews. This is a dangerous position, because there’s no guarantee that immediately afterward one will not be forced to hand them over.

  “As the road to Sweden is hardly open for more than a minority, there is only one sensible way left. The Jews must flee from home and change their names. It won’t then be possible for the Germans to find them. The Danes then have to sabotage any attempt by the German side to convey a message that Danes are not allowed to house Jews or foreigners.… The Danish people will be able to stand together in such a passive defense against the extradition of the Jews. An immense wave of indignation is already beginning to sweep across the country.”5

  Foss bought Best’s deception, which places responsibility for the debacle in Berlin, and, like everyone else, he doesn’t see a possibility for many Jews to seek refuge in Sweden. The only chance seems to be for them to remain in hiding until the end of the war. But this would be extremely difficult for entire families with no prior experience of secrecy and illegality. Maybe Foss’s most important observation is the last, dealing with the mood of the Danish population. The wrath about the impending action was building in a great wave. The first response came in the form of protests from all sectors of society. But what would happen if the protests were not heard? How would the Danish population react then? And how would Stockholm respond to the reports now pouring in on the impending action in Denmark?

  Despite resistance from Swedish minister Arvid Richert and Danish minister Carl Otto Mohr in Berlin, time was on the side of a Swedish intervention. Svenningsen spoke late Thursday evening with Dardel, who had prevailed on Stockholm to instruct Richert to get moving in Berlin. Dardel informed Svenningsen about the wording of the proposed Swedish démarche, which emphasized to the German government the deep indignation a deportation of Danish Jews would engender in Sweden and at the same time presented the “offer that Sweden would receive all Danish Jews to intern them there for the duration of the war.”

  Although the Swedish legation in Berlin was reluctant to hand over the démarche, which now became known in Copenhagen, Svenningsen got permission to divulge its contents to Best first thing the next morning—again in the vain hope that he would seek to persuade Berlin to stop the action. But Best was far beyond that point. In fact that same day he managed to get Berlin to send orders for General Hanneken to make his Wehrmacht troops available for the action. No Danes knew this, of course, and Best’s duplicity kept the situation fluid.6

  That evening Foss wrote an additional daily report to Stockholm and London. He recounted Duckwitz’s warning, but uncertainty still loomed: “It is not possible to be certain whether something will happen.” There were reports, according to Foss’s information, “that Hitler, against even Himmler, has demanded the arrests,” and in this connection Foss conveys an interesting rumor: “If they get just a few hundred and the rest disappear, this would satisfy and no more would then have to be done because it would be assumed that Hitler would calm down and forget about the matter.”

  But doubts still rankle: “Thus far one can get an overall picture, and the warning provided fits into it, but it isn’t at all certain that the picture is right.” Moreover, in Foss’s eyes the considerations of the permanent secretaries were completely misguided: “C. B. Henriques has been to the ministries and suggested that Danes themselves should intern the Jews. The permanent secretaries showed their political incapacity today by meeting—first error—and then by agreeing to send notification to the Germans—second error. The Germans rejected the ‘offer’—however it was shaped—and didn’t want anything to do with an internment. They have still denied that the story is for real. It’s pretty strange, after all that has happened, that one should attach any credence to a German promise not to touch the Jews, whom the Danes themselves had gathered. That the Jews themselves cling to this last fragile straw is more easily understood.”7

  Foss was well informed, but he misunderstood some important details. The permanent secretaries had not adopted their proposal—let alone submitted it to the Germans. But the rumors flew, both about the Jewish leaders’ call and the secretaries’ discussions, and we are no closer to the truth about what Henriques and his companions had actually proposed to Svenningsen. There is little doubt that Foss’s information about the conversation comes from the permanent secretaries and not from Henriques himself.

  In London the Danish envoy, Eduard Reventlow, wrote in his diary that day that his colleague in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, had sent the U.S. government a note, “concerning his willingness to help with money if anything can be done for Jewish refugees from Denmark. So far, however, no actual Jewish persecution has been initiated, so that it seems to me a bit premature.”8

  The Fischer family in 1937. Paula and Josef seated in front with their three daughters, standing from left to right, Ella, Edith, and Harriet.

  Danish Jewish Museum

  Bernhard “Bubi” Cohn and his wife, Ella, at the beach early during the occupation.

  Danish Jewish Museum

  At this point the arrests were to begin within twenty-four hours.

  CHAPTER 6

  * * *

  FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1

  THE ACTION

  An Agenda of Uncertainties

  On Friday, October 1, 1943, U.S. forces broke the last resistance in Naples and took the city: The significant Allied victory sent waves of hope across the troubled Continent, where many prayed and some believed that the war might soon be over—a vain hope, as we now know.

  In Copenhagen the rumors were of the Jews. At Politiken Bergstrøm noted in his diary how he experienced the fateful hours filled with false alarms: “Heltberg said before he left that he had heard from reliable sources that the hunt for Jews would begin tonight and continue for the next 10 days. Someone came and told me that Seedorff, who had good connections, had said that the German interior minister Himmler would come here. We didn’t think that sounded probable. Amid t
he serious mood were flashes of gallows humor. Herbert [Steinthal], who is more than a tad Jewish himself, said laughingly that yesterday he had seen a myriad of obvious Jews on the street and all of them were equipped with suitcases.”

  Bergstrøm and his Jewish colleague see the irony in the emerging panic over a danger they still do not believe is about to materialize. Nothing was confirmed, and many refused to believe that it could become a reality. But for others flight was already a fact of life. At the municipal hospital Ella Fischer received a visit from the hospital’s priest. Judging by her account, it was not an edifying meeting: “In the morning the hospital priest, pastor Hejlesen, came to our room and gave a little sermon in which he repeatedly denigrated the Jews and in particular said that Christians should not follow the bad message that came from the Jews: an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Afterward he came to my bed, and I told him that I was a Jew, which he said he had been well aware of, and we talked a little about the situation, which he knew in detail, although he seemed to have scant sympathy for us.”1

  Few Danish Jews celebrated the Jewish New Year of Rosh Hashanah in their homes. Most were already on the move and many spent the beginning of Sabbath Friday evening with Christian friends and acquaintances. The final preparations fell into place on the German side, and in the morning Best announced to Berlin that the action would commence the same evening. The deported would depart by ship from Copenhagen and on special trains from Jutland and Fyn. The capacity was great and could easily accommodate all the estimated six thousand people thought to be directly affected. Best’s telegram to Berlin also establishes that he did not intend to mention the action in public and that he had decided to leave the deported Jews’ property untouched—and finally that he, in agreement with General Hanneken, was going to announce that the release of Danish soldiers detained in August was about to begin.2

  The Wehrmacht now had instructions to engage, and Best conferred extensively with Hanneken about practical implementation. Best affirmed Dr. Mildner’s orders that the police soldiers [a special German police unit] should not force their way into houses and apartments where no one answered the door. Berlin was informed of the many protests that had been received from all quarters, and not least about the warnings that the action might have a negative impact on Denmark’s production and exports.

  Best was clearly seeking to reinforce the impression in Berlin that the operation was very delicate in regard to the future cooperation with the Danes. Neither he nor other senior German officials in Copenhagen nourished any doubts that the action could develop into a huge fiasco. It was hard to imagine that many Jews were waiting patiently to open their doors and let themselves be arrested and deported by German police.

  In the Farmer’s Bed

  At Hulebækgaard, Busch-Petersen’s farm in Østre Ulslev on the island of Lolland, the two refugee families woke up to a day filled with confusion and doubt—but also with a determination at least to cross Guldborgsund Bridge to Nykøbing Falster on the way back to Sjælland. The eight uninvited guests and Erik Nyegaard constituted quite an invasion on the small farm, but everyone pitched in to make it work under ad hoc conditions. The diaries show that the Copenhageners were adjusting, but also that they felt uncomfortable about the way they had barged in on strangers. Poul Hannover notes: “The next morning we were eventually able to wash ourselves. Our hosts were terribly nice, though we had barged in like a bull in a china shop—it was the first of October, the day hunting begins. It was a tradition that his brother came down there, and that they went hunting with a neighboring landowner—and that he and his wife came for lunch—and now we, 9 people, had to be included. They had a painfully spartan bathroom—eventually we each got a kettle full of hot water—and it was lucky that we had towels—we could have never expected them to provide us with them. One by one we washed and shaved—even hung our wet towels to dry in the kitchen—Inger and Kis helped out a little.”

  Hannover has decided to seek refuge at his colleague’s summerhouse at the nearby island of Møn and also invented a plan to get the message across in coded language: “I called our agent and asked him to call Herbert Jerichow and tell him that the man from Copenhagen had received an order for 8 engines to be delivered to his property down here—and thereby provide me the address. It worked perfectly, and I got a message that showed that it was understood and that we—at least within a few days, could seek refuge in the house—he would personally take care of this. I also asked the representative if I could borrow his summer home—but that wouldn’t work—there were some ‘unfriendly’ people around—instead he proposed a guesthouse near Marielyst. I was not happy about that.”

  Poul Hannover had made progress in his short career as an illegal. He became more security conscious and began to plan for a contingency in which the group could not get an early transfer to Sweden. Herbert Jerichow’s summerhouse could be a safe haven. Now what mattered was to avoid a breakdown or discovery before they could get there. While the eight refugees on the farm desperately searched for ways out, life continued around them with an almost unreal normality. Poul Hannover continues: “Erik went on the hunt—he shot really well—and around noon the four gentlemen came home—and lunch began. It was a real hunting lunch with schnapps galore. In the middle of lunch, Talleruphuus rang Erik—we had to meet him at a certain place—but we could not get a clear message about whether they would sail or not.”

  Kis also recounts the awkward lunch: “At noon the men came home from the hunt, and lunch began. It was a real hunting lunch with piles of food and schnapps, it was a bit difficult for us, who were not in the mood for celebration. In the middle of the meal Talleruphuus called. Erik came back from the phone and nodded encouragingly to us, and we were happy at the thought that everything was in order.”

  Those who fled had to constantly stay on the move. They could not remain at the farm, and even the smallest chance was better than nothing. Especially when it pointed back toward Falster and further toward Sjælland. Poul Hannover obtains transportation: “I decided to take a car—and we all climbed into it, although we were too many.… So we left. There was no talk of my paying at the farm—the farmer said nicely: ‘We hardly feel the impact of war—we only see that we earn a little better, so we are only happy to be able to help out.’—We gave the girls 10 kroner each—I gave Erik a card so he could requisition a box of my cigars, which he could send the man as thanks for his help—and a box for himself—so we loaded everything in the car—we were 9 people, as we now had Erik along. The driver was concerned—and not without reason. A few kilometers before Nykøbing one tire exploded. We reached the town—I met our representative …—and he wished us God’s help in crossing over to Sweden. I dare say we needed it.”

  A Danish Initiative? Third Attempt

  Others were also in need of help that Friday. Starting in the early morning Svenningsen sought out Best’s right-hand man, the head of internal security, Paul Kanstein, to talk about his conversation with the Swedish minister the night before and about the forthcoming démarche, whereby the Swedish government would announce to Berlin that Sweden was ready to intern the Danish Jews there. Kanstein promised to inform Best, and Svenningsen hastened to contact the Danish minister in Berlin, Otto Carl Mohr, by phone, in order to impress upon him the urgency of the démarche. Mohr informed Svenningsen that Richert had not yet delivered the message to the Germans, and that both he and Richert had recommended that it be dropped for the time being. Richert in his telegram explained to Stockholm that the postponement was due to a lack of confidence that the démarche would have the desired effect: “Numerous Swedish press organs are considered here to have gone so far in their hostility to Germany that they’ve used up their ammunition, which means that further denunciations are unlikely to persuade the German decision makers to take special account,” he sourly explained as the clock ticked away.

  Svenningsen strongly rejected Mohr’s interpretation and resumed contact with the Swedish minister,
Gustav Dardel, who via Stockholm managed to get things moving. Reinforced instructions arrived in Berlin, and the same afternoon Richert delivered the Swedish offer, which indeed was not well received in the German Foreign Ministry. Richert was met with hot air from a subordinate official, and his dry report back to Stockholm states that “the connections to Hitler’s headquarters, where decisions are made, often completely bypass the Foreign Ministry.” It did not matter whether officials there did not know what was going on, or whether or not they would tell. The result was the same: There was no way the action could be stopped through diplomatic channels.3

  On Friday morning, while Svenningsen worked intensively to get the Swedish démarche delivered in Berlin, he ran into the speaker of the parliament, Hans Rasmussen, a staunch Social Democrat. Svenningsen took the opportunity to raise the issue of internment by Danish initiative with Rasmussen, as instructed by his colleagues at the meeting the day before. Rasmussen responded positively, but a few hours later sent Svenningsen a letter that greatly modified his initial support: “Continuing our conversation this morning regarding the possible detention of … I wish here to clarify that my support is to be understood to mean that there cannot be … any inference of commitment or obligation on our part with respect to the search for any of the relevant group of people.”4