Countrymen

by Bo Lidegaard

  Svenningsen’s draft of the handwritten letter has been preserved. He must have written it that night while he and Larsen, with mounting fear, were waiting for an audience with Best, who repeatedly avoided direct confrontation with his Danish counterparts while the raids rolled on. By his own admission Svenningsen pushed as hard as he could: “I asked Dr. Best, in light of the Danish counterproposal, if he could delay the transports and obtain new orders from Berlin. Best stated that it was quite impossible for him to stop the transports, since he could not make any decision in this case. However, he would immediately forward my letter by telegraph to Berlin and ask for instructions.”13

  Again Best deftly played the sympathetic innocent who does what he can to halt the action. This was hypocrisy. But the strong Danish reactions had nevertheless already had an important effect. Best and other prominent German representatives in Denmark had long warned Berlin about massive rejection by the Danish population, which could eventually damage the continuation of the policy of cooperation to which the Nazi leadership attached such importance. It was these warnings that caused Ribbentrop to emphasize that the operation should be carried out as cautiously as possible.

  Dagmarhus, the German headquarters at Copenhagen’s Rådhuspladsen (Town Hall Square).

  “Peaceful occupation” meant that Denmark in principle maintained both its sovereignty and its neutrality. Therefore official contacts between Denmark and Germany went through the German legation, which expanded its staff and moved to larger offices at Dagmarhus, where Werner Best also had his headquarters. It reflects the paradoxical situation in occupied Copenhagen that the German legation was a neighbor to the “Jew-newspaper Politiken” and also shared the building with the Dagmar Theater on the ground floor—the stage for some of the day’s most popular revues, which specialized in poking fun at the Germans in subtle ways that escaped the censors’ rigor.

  A master of this genre was the writer and architect Poul Henningsen, who created a number of iconic items of Danish design, including the classic PH lamps. Just before the German invasion he wrote a hymn to free love, but when the censors found it too frivolous, he revenged himself by slightly altering the phrases, turning the song into an evergreen manifesto for freedom:

  They chain our mouths and hands,

  but they cannot tie our thoughts,

  and no one is imprisoned when the spirit runs free.

  We have an inner fortress here

  that is strengthened in its own worth,

  as long as we fight for what we believe.

  He who keeps his soul erect will never be a slave.

  No one can govern that

  which we determine ourselves.

  We promise with mouth and hand,

  in the darkness before dawn,

  the dream of freedom shall never die.

  The popular revue was performed some 395 times in twenty-six cities, and audiences stood up at the last stanzas. Henningsen was amused since “the conservatives in this country had to swallow a lot of modern sexual morality before they were allowed to give themselves over to the patriot- ism of the last verse.” The German authorities tried several times to get the Danish government to silence the talented Henningsen, but it was ultimately an attempt on his life by Danish Nazis that made him flee to Sweden.

  Dagmarhus survived the war, and the distinctive functionalist building is still the setting for both offices and a popular movie theater.

  Frihedsmuseet

  Even wrongs need a figleaf of legitimacy, and even an assailant needs to justify his assault. Thus the Nazi persecution of the Jews also needed grounds and legitimacy, bound up in anti-Semitic stereotypes, prejudices, and lies that made it possible to present the Jews as troublemakers, saboteurs, and enemies of Germany. The individual Jew had to be suspect, and the group associated with a larger conspiracy. Where the Jews had previously been part of society, they now had to be separated. In Denmark such complicity was explicitly rejected. Except for declared Nazis, not one single organization—not a church or congregation, not a single institution of society—expressed an ounce of understanding of, or even sympathy with, the roundup of the Jews. The occupiers were left with the full responsibility for the assault and had to carry the entire burden of the crime. This turned out to be decisive, both for the Germans’ lack of enthusiasm and zeal in the implementation of the action, and for the fate of the Danish Jews.

  Best’s response to Svenningsen was quickly communicated back to the king, who in his diary noted that “Dr. Best had said that he personally could do nothing but would send my letter by telegram to Berlin.”14

  In many ways Best couldn’t have had it better. Everyone seemed to accept that it was not he who was to blame but Berlin. The risk to him now was that his Danish partners would draw the unwanted conclusion that he was no longer the key person in the Danish-German equation. So this was only the first round. The next was to do damage control and get back into operational mode with the Danes again.

  For Duckwitz the action’s implementation was a low point that he had hoped until the end to prevent. In his diary he notes late on October 1: “Restlessly busy day. Worked tirelessly to prevent the worst.”15

  Although Svenningsen only slowly and reluctantly came to realize what was under way, he understood the people’s feelings, and he shared and expressed them himself. This was not the Germany Svenningsen knew and, despite everything, trusted. To cope with the dichotomy between the impossible and what was now unfolding before his very eyes, Svenningsen had to distinguish between Berlin and Best, between the radical Nazis in the capital and the personal partner he knew so well. Best played this sentiment skillfully and was careful always to appear as the one striving to prevent disaster. According to Svenningsen’s minutes of the interview with Best late that Friday night, this was also true when it came to the scope of the German raid, which concentrated on “the arrest and deportation of 100% Jews. Excepted were Jews or Jewesses in a marriage where the other party is Aryan. I asked if further measures against the Jews were supposed to be taken, such as property seizure or similar. Dr. Best did not think this would be the case.”

  Best now brought up his attempt to mitigate the Danes’ response: “Finally Dr. Best reported that the question of the release of the detained Danish troops would be resolved in connection with the Jewish action. Repatriation would now take place in accordance with a plan that had been set.”16

  With the German authorities’ lukewarm commitment to the action, they vied for the honor of linking the arrest of Jews with the release of Danish soldiers. In a telegram on the evening of October 1, Best emphasizes the importance of the link, pointing out that it “hereby would be made clear that no one from the German side, as has been alleged here in the last days, will equate the sons of Danish farmers with Jews and deport them like such.” Handwritten annotations in the margins of the telegram show that General Hanneken, Heinrich Himmler, and the Führer had been briefed and endorsed this barter.

  The Danish reaction brooked no misunderstanding: This was an assault on innocent citizens. Germany went from being a neighboring country that for strategic reasons had occupied Denmark under favorable terms to being an assailant perpetrating violence against the Danish people.

  The idea of linking the release of the soldiers with the arrest of the Jews demonstrates how far the Nazi leadership was from understanding the mind-set of the country it had occupied. It is also possible that the proposal served primarily to reinforce the impression in Berlin that Best was hands-on and able to keep the occupied country under control. Given his exposed position it was important for Best to appear tough and uncompromising on ideological issues—while at the same time taking an accommodating line with the Danes. How the two lines were to be reconciled was of no concern to Hitler. Best had to figure that out for himself. He was, as Leni Yahil has put it, “the prisoner of the regime he served, and of his own tactics.”17

  At about the same time the roundup of the Jews was launched in
Denmark, Best’s old mentor, SS chief executive, Reichsführer Heinrich Himm- ler, wrote a short letter to his protégé in Copenhagen. The precise date is uncertain and is disputed, but the letter seems to have been written on October 1. It reads:

  October 1943

  Headquarters in the field

  My dear Best,

  First, thank you for your various letters and telegrams. I have monitored overall developments in Denmark, which in recent times have not been entirely happy in every respect. The solution that Frits Clausen has signed up as a doctor for the Waffen SS I find very good. The promotion of the Schalburg Corps [a corps of Danish SS veterans used to terrorize civilian populations] is important. The Jewish action is also rightly done so. It will raise dust for some time, but all in all it gets the worst saboteurs and main agitators out of the way. With the repeal of martial law, SS Gruppenführer [Günther] Pancke will be appointed as higher SS and police chief. I am deeply convinced that the cooperation between you both will be most harmonious, and I have the strongest confidence that thereby many things will become considerably easier. Have the greatness of heart not to be sorry that I have not placed the higher SS and police chief as your subordinate. The form of organization is better this way.

  Yours, Heil Hitler! [no signature]

  The letter seems to confirm that the initiative for the Jewish action emanated from Best, who receives the advance compliments. But Himmler’s real objective is clear from the last part of the letter. Best had long been asking for reinforcements of German police in Denmark, and Himmler was clearly aware that he had hoped to get full command over them. A note from the meeting the previous morning confirms that Best still at this point believed he would be in command of the police troop reinforcements. Now Pancke was being elevated to a level equal to Werner Best and Hanneken, the reason probably being Himmler’s desire to have direct command over one of the three leading Germans in occupied Denmark. Over the following days Best tried several bureaucratic contortions to avoid Pancke’s involvement. But he failed, which many interpreted as an expression of Himmler’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the raid in Denmark. But the chronology indicates that Best’s bureaucratic defeat had nothing to do with the implementation of the Jewish action—rather, it was part of the power play in Berlin between Himmler and Ribbentrop.18

  The Summer Colony

  That evening, while Nils Svenningsen and Eivind Larsen waited in Dagmarhus for an audience with Werner Best, the Hannover and Marcus families stood idle on the beach not far from Hesnæs on the eastern point of the island of Falster. They waited for a boat that didn’t arrive, and for a fate they feared. They didn’t yet know that the action against them was about to be launched, and though they feared the worst they did not realize that from that night on they were to be hunted in their own country. But they knew they had to act, and set a course, as Poul Hannover observes as the families head for the nearby Abildvig summer camp, supposedly a kilometer inland:

  I learned that a summer colony lay nearby—we went there—and Erik began to break in. He demolished a big set of shutters, broke two windowpanes and opened the windows so we could get in. I didn’t dare go back to any hotel, and so we stayed. We carried the baggage over a kilometer up to the summer colony, while Talleruphuus and Goldstein drove away again. We found a petroleum lamp that could provide a little light, as well as some used candles. There wasn’t any water—not that we could find—and of course no toilets either. There were some beds without mattresses. We took the latch off the door, closed the window, went inside, and hung what was left of the shutter back up again. If anyone came past it could have been fatal. We covered the beds with our coats for the children, but it was far from enough, in addition to my winter coat and raincoat, and I, who had brought both my cotton coat and my winter coat, went around without a coat. Around 8 o’clock Talleruphuus came back alone—he still had not received any message. There was no specific agreement where to meet—there was a little jetty—I didn’t know if a ship or even a dinghy could come in there. The day before he had already spoken about how one possibly ought to give the man some money in advance—I had given Erik money to take along—1,000 kroner that was to go toward the dinghy. One could easily suggest that it was done on flimsy grounds—considerably thinner than I usually spend 1,000 kroner for.

  We let the children eat the food we had—I had obtained lunches from the farmer’s wife at Hulebækgaard—but unfortunately it wasn’t very much, and we didn’t have anything to drink. It was an awful night. We kept watch—in part to see if any of the others would come—in part to see if the ship would arrive, but no ship came. We tried to sleep, sitting in a chair—we got maybe a half hour’s sleep, but the children slept tolerably well.

  To Poul Hannover, the break-in at the summer colony represented a threshold he had a hard time crossing. Even under the difficult circumstances, he found it troubling to resort to criminal trespass. The small group had only begun to get used to being outside the law, but the illegality was getting under his skin, just as it got under Kis’s:

  We got the children settled down with our coats and the blanket, which we were glad we had taken with us. They were now a bit sad. Dorte cried because Grandfather wasn’t with us, and when I comforted her she said, “Well, it’s so hard.” I thought that myself, but I had to get the children to sleep, which I was finally able to do. Before the children went to sleep they had some sandwiches, which we had received from the Busch-Petersens. We adults got one piece of sandwich each but there wasn’t enough, so the men didn’t get anything, and there also wasn’t anything to drink. I was sad they told Palle, as he became so thirsty, and he cried because he couldn’t get anything to drink. Well, in the end all four children fell asleep in their scary rooms with a candle on the table. We kept watch in the beginning, in part to see if the others would come, and partly to see if the boat would show up, but we saw nothing. Talleruphuus was also with us during the night, but he mostly walked around the forest, probably because he was freezing, as he had given me his coat. We were freezing and hungry, but we comforted ourselves as best we could, lay across two chairs and tried to sleep a little, either on a bench or sitting down. Erik, Inger, and Poul tried to play bridge with the cards Gunnar had brought but realized it wasn’t much fun and quickly stopped. Now and then we went out to warm ourselves up, and we smoked a lot of cigarettes. The children slept pretty well until the morning.

  Poul Hannover is tormented by speculation about what is the right thing to do now:

  I don’t know what made the night worse—was it the horror of having broken in, which could be discovered—was it the uncertainty about what was to come—was it the anxiety about whether the children could handle it? We had to be perfectly clear that this was just the beginning, and that what was to come could be much, much worse. And who was this Talleruphuus anyway? The man we were so confidently entrusting with our lives? During the night I mentioned, when I spoke to him, that at least he had a chance to earn some money due to this affair. Apparently he became very indignant about this, but was his indignation genuine? There were plenty of questions one could ask. And then we were here without a radio—perhaps the planned action was accelerating now, as the news of it ran from mouth to mouth—maybe the Jewish law was now in place, turning us into outlaws and overwhelming any desire to help us with the threats they would certainly face if caught. It was not easy to appear optimistic. It was lucky that the children slept fairly well—I had to sometimes go out and walk—sneak a little stroll—it just cleared my thoughts a bit—which would otherwise probably be very confused.

  The Action

  The same evening, October 1, 1943, the sole duty officer at Police Headquarters in Copenhagen sat as usual, noting the so-called minute reports, which record the brief telephone, radio, or telex reports from the various police stations and posts. They were typically about everything from drunks to bicycle thefts to regular burglaries and other serious crimes. The log from October 1943 still exists, and t
he laconic reports depict the tragedy then unfolding:

  20.00: 20 large German vehicles are driven from Frihavn [the free transit port in Copenhagen] in a convoy. More is not known, but the radio car is keeping in touch with it and will keep reporting.

  20.40: German cars from the barracks in Herluf Trollesgade forming a convoy in front of the barracks apparently ready to move out. It appears they are making preparations to man the vehicles.

  21.10: In Frihavn 20 German vehicles were observed driving to Ny Carlsbergvej, where they are being manned by German military police.

  21.25: About 20 vehicles manned by green uniformed military police driving through Strøget … It is believed that this is about the Jews.

  21.30: It is now believed that there are 50 vehicles. There are also vehicles along Købmagergade.

  21.37: All exit roads are now occupied by the Germans, and all vehicles stopped and searched.

  21.38: 18 large trucks driving along Vestre Boulevard toward the city.

  21.40: A cop says that several German vehicles are near his residence.

  21.43: On Sølvtorvet 32 trucks are observed with canopies, fully staffed by German soldiers near Trianglen.

  21.45: All phone lines have been cut.

  21.59: Tanks have been driven onto Kgs. Nytorv.

  22.00: German vehicles are stationed on Værnlandsgade.

  22.03: Telex messages sent from the National Police Headquarters that the local commanders must go immediately to their stations, and that Danish policemen must NOT assist in any arrests initiated by the German side.

  22.10: The action started in Købmagergade. There’s a chain blocking the street, and a few small groups [of German police soldiers] go into the buildings and come back with civilians. A German major in the 4th District told a Danish policeman that this is a German affair, and that Danish policemen should not interfere with it.