Countrymen

by Bo Lidegaard

  Yours CLD

  The farewell letter has a brief addition reflecting David’s distress, and surely that of many others, at the deliberate attempt to question and undermine their personal credibility and honesty. For a man like David this humiliation was almost harder to bear than the fear of deportation and death—as is also reflected in Poul Hannover’s difficulty in coming to terms with the family’s intrusion into the deserted vacation colony. Like most citizens these men nourished a deep skepticism in regard to the armed resistance movement, which at this time was still seen to be dominated by Communists and other radical forces whom the pillars of society considered threatening, as they did other criminals. Not because of sympathy with the Germans or as a reflection of cowardice, but because most accepted the premise that Danish society’s best defense against Nazism was to unite under the prevailing social order. Therefore the Nazi accusation that the Jews were behind the sabotage was not only wrong, it was also insulting. This is why David felt the urge to add the following short postscript to the letter: “I do not need to assure you, with your knowledge of me, that I have never done anything that would in the least way motivate my arrest. On the contrary I have, always when I had the opportunity, as strongly as possible, tried to make people understand that any illegal activity had to be condemned.”10

  The Open Door

  The message about the night’s action reached the Swedish Foreign Ministry in the morning, and shortly after lunch Foreign Minister Christian Günther called the German minister over to protest, and to propose that the ships transporting Jews to Germany be diverted to Swedish ports instead. Although the first reports were that there were sixteen hundred detainees on board, Sweden was ready to receive them and to provide whatever help was need to alleviate their situation. The minister was not impressed. Sweden had no right to interfere in the Danish-German relationship, and he could therefore only receive the bid for help. Moreover the foreign minister’s reference to the bad effect that the action would have on Swedish public opinion left little impression. The German minister noted acidly that the Swedish press’s posture toward Germany was already so hostile that it could hardly get worse. In this he was wrong.11

  Neither the politicians in Stockholm nor the Swedish legation in Berlin nourished any illusion that Nazi Germany would allow the Danish Jews to seek refuge in Sweden. The proposal served other purposes. The Swedish government wanted to demonstrate to the troubled Swedish public that it was doing everything possible to help in this desperate situation. The Free Danes in Stockholm were also drumming up public support and encouraging the Swedish government behind the scenes to take an active line in its efforts to help. The most prominent Free Dane in Stockholm, the journalist Ebbe Munck, who served as a liaison between the Danish resistance and the free world, worked persistently to put maximum pressure on the Swedes, who the courageous activist thought were moving too slowly. So did the world-famous Danish nuclear physicist, Niels Bohr, whose mother was Jewish, and who was in Stockholm for some weeks after his escape in September. Bohr had contacts with the government and the Swedish king and crown prince. He too deployed intense efforts to get the Swedish effort into gear.

  Though both men lobbied throughout the Saturday, it was hardly the Danish activity that triggered the Swedish advances. The door to Sweden was already wide open, and Sweden also had a strong interest in demonstrating to the free world that after its extensive cooperation with Germany during the first years of the war and the halfhearted effort to save the Norwegian Jews in November 1942, the country was now ready to take action for the Danish Jews.

  Like all the other players in the complicated diplomatic game, the Swedish government also figured that the end of the war was in sight, and that Germany was losing. Building the relationship to the victorious powers was now crucial. By August 1943 the transit agreement with Germany was discontinued and, under growing pressure from the Allies, Sweden now also sought to limit its exports, particularly of iron ore. Sweden was fully aware that the slightest hesitation in regard to the Danish Jews would be judged badly, particularly in Western Allied capitals. At the same time the German assault on civil society in Denmark provoked a violent feeling of injustice deep in a majority of the Swedish public, much the same way as it did in Denmark.

  Thus, on Saturday, October 2, the Swedish Foreign Ministry, contrary to all diplomatic convention, decided to publish the contents of the démarche that the Swedish legation in Berlin had handed the German Foreign Ministry the day before. The head of the Foreign Ministry’s press office argued for publication, which he felt in relation to the expected media frenzy could help to lift the newspapers’ comments to “a higher level” and give them “a firmer basis.” Foreign Minister Günther agreed, and the chief press officer held an international press conference on the afternoon of October 2 at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm. That evening at 7 p.m., the declaration was read aloud on the Swedish radio—in a version that was a little stronger than the one the Swedes had given directly to Germany: “For several days information had been provided to Sweden that actions against the Jews in Denmark were being prepared, of a similar nature previously implemented in Norway and other occupied countries. Upon instructions, Sweden’s minister in Berlin, on October 1, has highlighted to the German authorities the serious consequences such actions would provoke in Sweden. In this context the minister made an offer from the Swedish government to receive all Danish Jews in Sweden.”12

  The journalists at the Grand Hotel asked pointed questions about the implications of “serious consequences,” but the press officer responded circumspectly. He knew as well as anyone that Sweden could not or would not do anything to block the actual deportations. But Sweden was mobilizing its capacity to act as a safe haven ready to receive those who might miraculously be able to escape from Denmark to Sweden. This turned out to give major encouragement to the many Jews now hiding in Denmark, where Swedish radio broadcasts were easily heard (as noted also by Dr. Meyer). The Swedish declaration nourished a new hope—even if no one at this point imagined that the number of Danish refugees would be counted not in the hundreds but in the thousands.

  “Half Jews” and “Full Jews”

  In Copenhagen the permanent secretaries met at noon. It is tersely noted in the minutes from their meeting that their colleague Einar Cohn “was unable to be present.” He was on the run. But a nephew of his, Bernhard Cohn, had until the same morning been of two minds about the rumors. On one hand he was determined not to let the Germans take him alive, on the other he didn’t really believe they were coming after him. He had moved in with his friends Bjørn and Laila for a couple of days, and he took the fuss fairly calmly, at least if his own handwritten notes from those days are to be trusted. He drank some cognac with his friends, and he read the announcement that Sweden was ready to accept the displaced Danish Jews as an indication that the operation would be suspended. On Friday he had also sought out friends who were preparing for flight, encouraging them to stay. It was, he wrote, “silly to go” when one is “only a half Jew.”

  By Saturday morning the seriousness of the situation became apparent even to Bernhard, who had slept well overnight:

  The next morning there was nothing noticeable. Bjørn got hold of the newspaper, big headlines declared that the detained soldiers would be released. I called Thomsen [his landlord]. I only reached Mrs. Thomsen. When I asked her if there had been anything, she confirmed that the Germans had been there. As Laila and I looked more closely at the newspaper, we discovered something quite different. In the article on the released military, it was noted that the soldiers were freed because Denmark had now rid itself of the Jews, who were behind both the physical and moral acts of sabotage and other such lies.

  Laila bicycled out … to hear what had happened, and she learned that they had driven around all night with human cargo. She was completely shocked and offered that I stay with them. To test Laila’s strength, I asked her what she would do if it was made a capital crime to hou
se Jews? “I don’t care” was Laila’s response.—I neither could nor would stay. I had previously heard from a chauffeur that a fisherman in Rørvig [a harbor some sixty kilometers northwest of Copenhagen] might be able to sail me over to Sweden. I intended to ride up there on my bike. When I came to Harry’s summer home, I went in. Only Jeanette was at home. She said that Harry had gone to the dentist! She had heard nothing. I asked her to run down to the Fønns’. After half an hour she came back and told me that the Germans had taken Mama.13

  Bernhard’s mother was the sister of the head of the Foreign Ministry’s statistical department, Einar Cohn, who had now made himself invisible. While he and his nephew struggled to find passage to Sweden, the permanent secretaries tried at their meeting to get a grip on the rapidly evolving situation.

  Nils Svenningsen told his colleagues of his conversation with Best late the previous evening, including Best’s assurances that the deportees would not be sent to Poland but to Bohemia, where they “would not have to suffer.” (The notion that the intention for the Danish Jews was permanent detainment in Theresienstadt already seems to have taken root.) Svenningsen reported that, faced with the imminent German action, he had presented the proposal for a Danish internment; he also reported Best’s lukewarm reaction to the Danish proposal. He transmitted Best’s statement that the action concerned only the “full Jews, and even these were immune if they were married to an Aryan. There was no provision for the confiscation of Jewish property.” Svenningsen also conveyed Kanstein’s impression “that there were relatively few Jews who had been taken,” and quoted his assurance that “it was ruled out that a new action would be launched.”

  With no way of knowing whether this would hold true, and without means to halt the deportations, the permanent secretaries began to focus their attention on the possibilities for mitigating the consequences for those directly affected. This was achieved partly by doing everything within their power to keep a line open to those who had fallen into German hands. As a first measure the Foreign Ministry insisted on involving itself in the efforts to avoid the deportation of “half Jews” and Jews married to Aryans, as opposed to “full Jews,” while in parallel a special effort was made for those who were actually deported.14 Svenningsen and his colleagues were about to change course to catch up with the situation now at hand. In London, the Danish minister, Reventlow, who was Director Svenningsen’s predecessor at the Foreign Ministry, noted in his diary on October 2 upon the news of events in Denmark: “Poor Svenningsen. I think a lot of him, the best man of our foreign service.”15

  The authorities also decided to take care of the homes and belongings of those who disappeared, regardless of whether their owners had fled or been deported. Permanent Secretary Hans Henrik Koch of the Ministry of Social Affairs announced to his colleagues “that he had directed the Copenhagen Social Services, in cooperation with the police, to ensure a degree of supervision of the Jews’ apartments, to the extent they had been abandoned without caretakers,” and Svenningsen thought “that we should appoint a legal guardian for each case.” It was the Foreign Ministry that got the Social Affairs Ministry started, but Koch was instrumental and from the outset involved the municipality of Copenhagen, which was home to the vast majority of Danish Jews. Initially the problem was that the Danish authorities simply did not have names and addresses of those affected, as no register existed of Danes of Jewish origin. The task was entrusted to a special entity, the “Social Service,” which took care of various inquiries from caretakers, individuals, or the tax authorities. When there was a presumption that the issue related to the property of a refugee or a deported person, special staff from the Social Service went out to inspect the apartment and register the household possessions. Staff often called for assistance from various volunteer corps or staff who took care of cleaning up, housekeeping, and removing spoiled food that had been left in haste. Edible food was donated to charity. Valuables, bankbooks, or cash found at the apartments or houses were taken into custody, to be returned later to the rightful owner. This is not the place to describe in detail this vast operation pursued jointly by authorities and neighbors. Suffice it to note that the vast majority of refugees who returned after the war found their homes taken care of and their valuables protected, although obviously there are exceptions to this general picture.16

  In his book Golden Harvest (2011) the Polish American historian Jan Gross described the greed that helped to drive the genocide of Europe’s Jews, citing the Israeli historian Saul Friedländer: “The catastrophe of European Jewry came about because genocide, which in time became the cornerstone of Nazi occupation policies, was given a kind of consent, manifested in a variety of ways, by many societies, in countries that had been conquered. As Saul Friedländer has put it: ‘Not one social group, not one religious community, not one scholarly institution or professional association in Germany and throughout Europe declared its solidarity with the Jews (some of the Christian churches declared that converted Jews were part of the flock, up to a point); to the contrary, many social constituencies, many power groups were directly involved in the expropriation of the Jews and eager, be it out of greed, for their wholesale disappearance. Thus Nazi and related anti-Jewish policies could unfold to their most extreme levels without the interference of any major countervailing interests’ ”17 (italics added).

  The plunder of Jewish property was a common experience in most German-occupied territories, that is to say: it was a rule which knew such exceptions as Italy and Bulgaria. And although this resistance only spurred the leading Nazis in Berlin to put even more emphasis on the extermination of Jews and on engaging the occupied territories actively in the genocide, this strategy did not work everywhere. Once the deportations were initiated, their scope depended, as the German historian Peter Longerich has pointed out, to a significant extent on the practical cooperation of the occupied country or territory. This meant that the deportations in a number of countries did not reach the desired volume.

  In the spring of 1943 the German desire for mass deportations met a growing, if not open, opposition, even in Slovakia, where many were already deported. The image in each region and in each country is different, and the specific circumstances of each place are hard to compare. What is important is that local involvement in mass deportations was not a given in 1943. Rather, this involvement in each of the occupied countries was a key factor in their delicate and evolving relations with Berlin.18

  A reflection of this diversity is also found in the Holocaust statistics collected by the Yad Vashem museum in Jerusalem. Large differences appear in the proportion of the Jewish population of each country that became victims of the genocide. While up to 70–90 percent of the Jews in Hungary, the Netherlands, Latvia, Greece, Lithuania, and Poland perished, the corresponding percentages in Estonia, Belgium, Norway, and Romania were 40–50, and around 20 in Italy and France. In Bulgaria and Denmark fewer than 1 percent of the Jews were killed.

  The story of the rescue of the some fifty thousand Jews living in Bulgaria was only fully told after the end of the cold war. After Bulgaria’s accession to the Axis powers, in March 1941, Jews were deprived of all civic rights. When in 1943 it became known that the Bulgarian government of the annexed territories Thrace and Macedonia was preparing deportations, parliament members, church leaders, and other public persons in Bulgaria proper immediately started to put pressure on the king and his government. The plan to deport 48,000 Bulgarian Jews was never executed.19

  Denmark and Bulgaria are small but significant exceptions to the general picture outlined by Gross and Friedländer of the involvement in the genocide from all parts of the society in the occupied countries. These exceptions are important reminders that history does not run in an inevitable pattern. Denmark is a case in point. Here, each of the groups cited by Friedländer—and many more—manifested their support of the Jews, and after their escape or deportation, citizens generally made a determined effort to protect the property and interests of those
who had been driven away. This counterpart to the overall picture is not unimportant, even if it concerns only a few of the Nazis’ many victims. It demonstrates that public involvement in the atrocities was not a given but depended on many factors, including the policies pursued in the individual countries. The Danish exception shows that the mobilization of civil society’s humanism and protective engagement is not only a theoretical possibility: It can be done. We know because it happened.

  Blind Alleys

  At Frey’s Hotel in Stubbekøbing the two fleeing families now joined forces with the other refugees at the hotel. Poul Hannover is especially relieved about the two young members of the Goldstein family, who are energetic and hands-on: “Goldstein and his brother filled me in on the situation. There were various options—and they were in the process of investigating them all. There was one fisherman in particular—the one Talleruphuus had recently sought—but not taken—he did not seem to be unwilling—now it was just a question of whether his wife would let him go. I hardly know what other options there were—one was on Bogø—a third was a Swedish steamer that was said to be in the harbor. Erik, who was able to move around without great risk, took off—so really there was nothing for us to do. I had anything but happy thoughts. I was aware that if we did not get going, I had to try to get over to Herbert’s place—I just wished I had followed my original instinct and gone to Rødvig. Our present situation, however, entailed one advantage. We were not alone. I was quite aware that the money would come to play a certain role—and obviously we were better off being 17 than if we were only 8.”

  Hannover’s view was simple and undeniable: In the end the escape depended on whether a fisherman or boatman was willing to put his boat, and maybe his life, on the line to sail them over. Seventeen passengers could pay more than eight, thus increasing the likelihood that someone could be persuaded by the prospect of a large financial gain. Hannover continues: “Goldstein almost betrayed this morning’s news to Gunnar—by the skin of his teeth—but it was avoided—I hauled him out of the room before anything happened. The main advantage that we got the message was that I, for my part, was quite sure that we had to leave … and Inger, who had been unable to free herself of the idea that maybe it was unnecessary to go, was now quite aware that it was the only way.”