Countrymen

by Bo Lidegaard

  Best’s view was far from trivial. Regardless of whether he had anticipated, and perhaps even hoped, that a mass exodus would occur, or if he had sought to turn this to his advantage once under way, it was crucial that the occupation’s top representative in Denmark now plainly stated that the flight was serving a German goal. Best had nothing to gain by capturing and deporting thousands of Danish Jews, but he still had much to lose by doing so, as was illustrated later the same day when he received a communication from the head of the Danish navy, Vice Admiral Vedel, who was among the Danish servicemen now being released. Vedel said in so many words that it “was a disgrace for the servicemen of the Navy to be released at the expense of other Danish nationals.”5

  To Best the stakes were clear. The question was whether Berlin saw—or could be made to see—things from the same perspective.

  With the Politicians on the Tailgate

  Svenningsen must have talked to the politicians’ leading figure, former prime minister Vilhelm Buhl, immediately after the interview with Best, because that same day the politicians summoned the old inner circle plus a few ministers from the “dormant government.” It was by no means obvious for the politicians to meet at a point in time where their strategy was to refuse to take any responsibility and where the Germans were exercising pressure for them to come together and resume the cooperation they had discontinued on August 29. Judging from the scattered handwritten notes by Oluf Pedersen, the chairman of the small Retsforbundet, a minor political party, Buhl briefed his colleagues on the commitments Best had given to Svenningsen:

  Svenningsen is told only 100% Jews, excepting those who are married to “Aryans,” that is, mixed marriages. Also if there are mixed children from Jews whose spouses were Aryan. It was recognized that there had been mistakes—these would be redressed.

  From Best’s side, they would seek to limit it to this action.… There is some suggestion that “from here” the Germans will announce that this raid is now done.

  There was an approach by industry on Thursday … they were unanimous in saying that the Jews were part of the Danish population. They went to the Foreign Ministry to obtain an audience with Best, who would not receive them. They … put something down in writing, and it was delivered. The king also approached—and the Supreme Court sent a request. The Attorneys’ Council also …

  In addition, Sweden has sent a démarche which was very strong—it was said that it would provoke dramatic indignation. But all in all it has not helped anything. The bishops issued a pastoral letter. It was raised whether anything can be done?

  The permanent secretaries also made an approach through Svenningsen to Dr. Best. There have been discussions whether the permanent secretaries should stop work, from our side [that is, Buhl and thus the Social Democrats] we don’t believe it should happen. You could say we should do something? I think that can only make matters worse. It can only be a protest.

  Buhl obviously has a very clear picture of the situation, and he has discussed with Svenningsen both the possibility that the politicians approach Best, and the idea that the permanent secretaries stop working. Buhl dismissed both options to his colleagues. In that way the country’s leading politician also made it clear that while the implementation of an action against the Danish Jews would have been a breaking point for the government, he did not consider it should be one for the permanent secretaries. The situation was different.

  Knud Kristensen, leader of Venstre, the country’s second-largest party, then took the floor: “Since the action has now happened—will it mean that those who were hunted are still at risk?” Buhl said, “Yes. Following their usual practice, the Germans took what they were after—but not individual searches. And nothing has happened on subsequent nights. Some Jews who were taken indicated who had helped them—and these helpers have been taken.”

  The Conservative Ole Bjørn Kraft believed that politicians had to do something, “if some form can be found.” The politicians got lost for a while in the question of whether it was preferable to act on their own behalf or to let industry and other commercial interests run the protests. The prominent member of the Liberal Center Party Berthel Dahlgaard backed Buhl: “I do not think that any approach from the political side helps—however I am comfortable with the industries’ approach.”

  Before the former prime minister tried to close the discussion, he also addressed the permanent secretaries’ internment plans, which Svenningsen must have told him about: “There is talk of detention of those captured by the Germans, but we think it is dangerous. Svenningsen tried it. Could not, they had sailed away.”

  The Conservatives’ chairman, the former pastor Vilhelm Fibiger, spoke with more clarity and apparently even had direct input with the permanent secretaries: “I have advised against interning the Jews here, which we cannot be a part of. It was dangerous for the permanent secretaries to direct such a request—it had a political character.” Buhl interjected: “Svenningsen said it was for humanitarian reasons,” but Fibiger continued with the more fundamental point of view: “I feel that we, in certain circumstances, can give advice [to the permanent secretaries]. On the other hand, I do not like a request from us to the Germans. We cannot feel called upon to do that.”

  Kraft provoked the big question as to whether Denmark should take the opportunity to opt out completely and declare the state of war that seemed to be moving closer and closer. It was the “Norwegian conditions” that haunted: “I think that we have to make our position clear. If we are belligerents we must say so in Berlin. I expect many other actions, such as the imposition of forced labor.”

  Buhl drily intervened: “We will not be allowed to make a declaration of war,” a formulation that in itself reflects the deep contradictions in the whole situation. Usually a declaration of war is not something you ask your supposed adversary for permission to submit. Moreover, how does a government declare war if it refuses to work in the first place? And how does a country declare war against another that has already occupied it? Oluf Pedersen, who took the notes, interjected: “No one can present such an idea in Berlin.”

  Dahlgaard of the Liberal Center Party, the former coalition partner to the Social Democratic Party, returned to the main track of the discussion. Was there anything the politicians could and should do? “I do not understand whether, from the Parliament’s standpoint, we can do anything under the circumstances. One cannot refuse to take political responsibility—and still intervene. I imagine that the permanent secretary talks with various political circles, for example Buhl, privately.”

  Knud Kristensen was on the same page, and Buhl again tried to sum up: “Can I assume that if the permanent secretary asks us—that we do not believe that they should resign?” Oluf Pedersen records that it was “Yes, from all sides.”

  The question remained whether to approach Werner Best with the aim of limiting the action’s further implementation. Buhl asks if “there may be situations where we can express the people’s position?” But Dahlgaard insists: “I’m against it—at this point,” while the somewhat unreliable Kraft still doesn’t get it: “How about a request from the Conservative Party to Dr. Best?”

  That was the last thing the politicians wanted. Such isolated contact, particularly from the Conservatives, would give the Germans renewed hope that some sort of a constitutional government with the participation of a few elected Danish politicians could still be formed and thus establish precisely the division the Danish politicians wanted to avoid at all costs. Buhl cuts in quickly: “I don’t believe we can negotiate with Dr. Best.”

  Kraft explained: “Uncomfortable for me not to do anything,” but Oluf Pedersen supported Buhl: “When the king, the government, and parliament will not work, it must be consistent.” And Buhl follows: “I think Svenningsen has done what’s possible. It would be too risky for Kraft to personally contact Best—he will ask about the government. We must keep ourselves away from him.”6

  In the end, four days later, on October 8, five l
eading politicians, each representing one of the five democratic parties in the parliament, delivered an official—but confidential—protest to the German plenipotentiary. The politicians expressed “the deep sorrow, which these actions have caused in the Danish people”: “The Danish Jews are an integral part of the people, and therefore all the people are deeply affected by the measures taken, which are seen as a violation of the Danish sense of justice.”7

  The Last Resort

  At Rådhuspladsen in Copenhagen it was still extremely difficult to obtain an overview of the situation. A flood of information and rumors crossed, and it was impossible to know what to trust. Over the weekend thousands of people had disappeared from their homes and from public life. But had they been deported? Or had they fled? Or had they perhaps seized some desperate last resort? At Politiken Bergstrøm followed the stream of rumors: “Holton said there had been 15 Jewish suicides or suicide attempts overnight. Went to the newspaper. The weather was gray and sad. Nielsen came home with a bagful from police headquarters. [The director of the Tuborg breweries] Einar Dessau had committed suicide in Horserød camp. Could there be a mistake here? I already knew that Einar Dessau’s brother had killed himself. Barrister Leo Dannin is said to have shot himself, and Professor Kuhr had committed suicide one way or another. The most dismal story, however, occurred last night out in the Sound. A boat with Jews, including Supreme Court attorney Oppenheim, had been stopped by a German patrol boat. Mrs. Oppenheim and five Jews had jumped overboard and drowned.”8

  Almost all of Bergstrøm’s information was wrong. But the wild rumors reflected not only great anxiety and uncertainty; they also applied to the reality that one of the major causes of death among Danish Jews was suicide—second only to accidents in flight—predominantly by drowning. The cases of suicide reflect how those directly affected saw their situation. They had heard enough about the fate of the Jews in Germany to prefer the only other option they could see. It is estimated in the latest research that at least sixteen committed suicide during the German action against the Danish Jews. The individuals’ fates are very different and the circumstances, by their very nature, are often difficult to disentangle. The fact remains that individuals did seize this solution of last resort. Surely many more were considering the fatal option.9

  Numerous statements from both refugees and civil servants reveal a profound anxiety over the fate awaiting Jews who were deported to Germany. Concentration camps were well known, and one of the reasons for the politicians’ decision to discontinue cooperation with the Germans in August was the prospect that henceforth Danes would be deported to such camps in Germany. The very idea that Danes were now to be deported was shocking and provoked a strong reaction within the Danish and Swedish administrations. The Swedish government reinforced its efforts to get as many of the deportees as possible back to Scandinavia. On October 4 Richert, the Swedish minister to Berlin, followed up on his earlier démarche. The Swedes now proposed that all Jewish children from Denmark be sent to Sweden. The rationale was cunning. In the official reason for the exclusion from public life of the Danish Jews, the Germans had claimed that Jews “poisoned” the atmosphere in Denmark and were behind terrorism and sabotage. But this could certainly not apply to the children, the Swedes now pointed out. So they should be taken to Sweden, where they were welcome. The Germans’ enthusiasm for this “offer” was not overwhelming, and they simply chose to ignore it.

  The proposal also had an extra sting, since among the deportees were about forty young German Jews who in 1939 at the behest of the International Women’s League for Peace and Freedom had been given German exit visas to Denmark, where they were in agricultural training. The German visas were granted with the express condition that the youth not be returned to Germany. In that light, as the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also quick to point out, the deportation to Germany was a contradiction. All to no avail. Nazi ideology could not be ensnared by logic, and the so-called League children had to stay in Theresienstadt.10

  Calm After the Storm

  After Friday’s, Saturday’s, and Sunday’s violent events and dramatic decisions, it is as if Monday was the day when thousands of fleeing people licked their wounds and pondered their next move. Many had sought and found refuge in more or less safe hiding places. The question now arose of what would happen next? After the raid on Friday, few dared to have faith that they could ride out the storm hiding in Denmark, and interest focused on escape routes across the Sound to Sweden. The Swedish offer to accept all Danish Jews raised hopes and provided a goal and direction. But there was no organization, no precedent, and wild confusion around the crucial question: How to get there?

  Herbert Levysohn, who had sought refuge on a farm in Kongsted, just north of Dianalund, was a case in point. He was received kindly, and the woman of the farm, Mrs. Marbo, was able to calm the young man, whose nerves were frayed by uncertainty. She treated him to good food and cordial words, both about his immediate family’s destiny and what lay ahead. In his diary he muses over it all: “Uncertainty is the worst thing there is, and everything was uncertain. I wonder how Dad is? And poor mother and Kate? Will they come tomorrow? Or when? How many people knew I was in Kongsted? Would the Germans search for me here? And what would happen then? Who have the Germans taken? Were they in Denmark, the poor souls? No, they were probably on their way to Poland? This is how the cluttered thoughts bounced around in my head, while I felt miserable that I could not stand by my mother’s side in this situation.”

  Haunted by all these thoughts, Levysohn also felt suspicious of the other guests at the farm: “And then that half-witted young lady. She might be a Nazi. Tomorrow her boyfriend will even come and visit her, and what would he say when he gets back to Copenhagen? I wonder how things are in Copenhagen? Was the house in Klampenborg okay? Or had the Germans taken it? And what about the business?”11

  The assumption of both the fugitives and their helpers was that the German police would actively search for the refugees and seek to prevent their further flight, both on land and at sea. They had to assume that the Germans would quickly become aware of the Jews’ seeking passage to Sweden, and that determined efforts would be made to block the flight and detain the refugees. But that was not the case, and in Stockholm the impression quickly began to settle in “that the Germans in Copenhagen are unwilling to act vigorously against the Jews and to some extent are turning a blind eye as they flee to Sweden,” as the Swedish Foreign Ministry expressed it Monday.12

  In London the Danish minister, Eduard Reventlow, received a visit from a representative of the Jewish World Congress, “who asked for information about how the Conference could help their fellow believers out of Denmark. Advised him to send ciphered telegram through the Foreign Office via the legation in Stockholm to the Conference representative in Stockholm inviting him to explore the possibility of authorizing local representatives in Helsingborg and other Swedish cities on the Sound to provide help … by paying the fishermen for transport.”13

  Vilhelm Bergstrøm’s short diary note on Monday gives the impression of an observer who was in close contact with the Danish police: “Sergeant Godtfred Jensen arrived. He said there was a collection for the Jews. Some kind of federation had thus collected not less than 6,000 kroner. Jacob arrived and asked if it was hard to get across the Sound. I told him that the Germans were now on their guard, so the trip was not safe anymore.”14

  The helpers had only vague ideas about what might happen if they were caught in their work. Later attempts to reconstruct a realistic picture based on random, scattered material show only that nothing universal can be derived from it. Few had prior experience with underground work, let alone with active resistance. Most had probably been skeptical of armed resistance and sabotage, but now it seemed natural, even necessary, to help the fugitives. Many contributed passively by closing their eyes. But those who engaged actively by helping, who concealed the fugitives and sought to organize transport and cover, crossed the line to
active, though generally unarmed, resistance. Given the state of emergency and the increased repression, no one had any idea how the Gestapo would react if they seized the helpers in the act.15

  In Ruds Vedby Adolph Meyer was still considering his situation without knowing what had become of his children and the rest of the family: “I negotiated with Bülow on Monday the fourth of October, and Mary also gave him power of attorney. I asked him to cash in all my bonds and send me 100,000 kroner with a trustworthy man, Wednesday or Thursday. I called to allow Adam to move and store my furniture, Stavnsholm my wine, Munkegård my books, and let the girls remove the most valuable things. He did not seem inclined to do it, and I wonder if he has done it? He had no opportunity to send the 100,000 kroner. I asked him to give Honoré 1,000 kroner to stay at Nørager [a winter and summer vacation resort]. I allowed him to spend what he considered appropriate to help poor Jews to flee.… Despite my nervousness I did not sleep badly at night, with the help of 1 or 2 bromisoval pills. I did, however, feel eased prostate discomfort, and I was still thinking about the fate of the children.”

  A New Beginning

  Meanwhile in Ystad, the refugees’ perspective changed quickly. From the moment they set foot in Sweden, they were at once overwhelmed by and grateful for the warm welcome, and simultaneously very focused on getting on with their lives as soon as possible under their new conditions in exile. Naturally they were very eager to hear news about family and friends who were also on the run, and there were large and small injuries to be healed. All the troubles of life in exile had to be met and overcome. This weighs heavily in the diary entries from those first days in Sweden. At the same time they reflect something that characterized the refugees from beginning to end: their insistence on maintaining self-respect in these unfamiliar new circumstances, now coupled with a great impatience to set about building a new life. The refugees refused to see themselves as victims. If part of the goal of the Nazi persecution of the Jews was to break their self-respect and determination, it didn’t succeed with the Hannover and Marcus families.