Front Burner

Home > Other > Front Burner > Page 39
Front Burner Page 39

by Kirk S. Lippold


  For the next twenty minutes, we went back and forth discussing his immovable stance that should my nomination be forwarded, he would hold a public hearing into my suitability for promotion. Several times, I reiterated that if he continued to threaten the Navy with that condition, they would not forward my nomination; he pointed out that such a decision was the purview of the Executive Branch, over which he had no control. Couching his language very artfully, he obfuscated the point with the claim that the senate had not seen my name submitted for promotion since 2002, and until such a time that it was submitted, there was no action he or the SASC could take on it. It was a clever political stance—threaten the Navy with retribution and a hearing if my promotion was forwarded, and then deny he had anything to do with my nomination not being submitted. Once again the art of hardball politics in Washington reared its ugly head.

  At one point, the senator emphatically stressed, “There is no way I can, as a member of the Legislative Branch, force the Executive Branch to take that action [submitting my promotion for advice and consent of the Senate], which starts the process.” In reply, I agreed and then specifically addressed his concern about accountability, “Yes, sir. They have to do that on their own and I can go back and try and re-engage with them but the issue of holding hearings, when you look across the breadth and scope of history, what makes my nomination so unique that it would cause one officer to be singled out to have hearings held on this issue? Given some of the other tremendous issues of people involved, whether it has been World War II to as recently as September 11, where when you look at the accountability factor there, no one stood up and said they were accountable for what happened on September 11. And yet, I stand up as a good commanding officer should, and say, I was the accountable officer on that ship. Seventeen lives were lost on my watch but we had neither the intelligence, the training, or rules of engagement that would have adequately allowed me to defend my ship. I’ll be honest with you, Senator. Not a day goes by—just walking into the Pentagon today, I get stopped by people who say, ‘What’s going on?’ And it’s all services. A one-star Army general, three-star Navy admirals. They tell me what is happening to you is flat wrong because you are being unfairly singled out because of the nature of what happened and it’s just wrong. Commanders today, when given the intelligence, the training and the rules of engagement, cannot stop terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. While life may not be fair, I’ve never bought into that because I look at it and say, one of the greatest things about our country is the fact that when we, as Americans, recognize something is not fair, we do something about it.”

  “I subscribe to that theory,” the senator replied before I finished my statement.

  “But too many people in this case have chosen to take a path of political expediency rather than doing what is right, and I, subsequently, have to be the one that is left to just be told, ‘walk away from it,’” I concluded.

  By the end of the meeting, it was clear the senator remained unmoved and unwavering in his threat to hold a hearing should my nomination be resubmitted for the Senate’s consideration. It was a disappointing conclusion to a years-long journey. I walked out of the Russell Senate office building and into the hot, humid air of a summer day in Washington. It was time to go home, have a glass of wine, and assess my future.

  Seven days later, the political fallout of my meeting with Senator Warner reached its culmination. Admiral Mullen submitted a letter to Secretary Winter recommending my name be removed from the FY03 Active Captain Line Promotion List. Six days later, the secretary concurred, and my name was permanently removed, never again to be submitted for Senate consideration. In an odd abdication of his role as the senior civilian official overseeing the Department of the Navy, Secretary Winter did not advise me of my removal from his promotion list but instead abandoned that task to the CNO. Having worked for two secretaries of the Navy, I was struck by the fact that it was not the CNO’s role to advise me of my removal from the promotion list. In the end, it appeared that Senator Warner had finally arranged to have a long lingering problem eliminated and Admiral Mullen’s future would be richly rewarded for his loyalty.

  Immediately following the meeting with the CNO, Admiral Morgan summoned me to his office. We had not spoken about the issue of my promotion since our heated meeting several months earlier. As he motioned me to sit down across from his desk, he sat back and said, “Kirk, I just don’t know what to say. I am as shocked by this development as anyone. Is there anything I can do for you?” My reply was clipped, “No, sir.” He then asked, “What are your plans?” clearly trying to infer what my reaction was going to be. I was done dealing with the political niceties of the Navy’s leadership, and respectfully and politely replied, “Admiral, thank you, but I think I’ll keep my own counsel when it comes to my plans for the future.”

  A tense silence filled the air for a few seconds before he extended what I felt was a heartfelt offer from a friend, “Kirk, if you need anything, please let me know.” The meeting quietly ended, I rose from my chair and thanked him, leaving his office to go back to work; the nation was still at war.

  Nine months later, on a brilliantly sunny day, May 24, 2007, I retired after twenty-six years of service to the Navy and nation. Over 150 people, including a dozen flag and general officers, attended the ceremony, held publicly in the outside courtyard of the Navy Memorial in downtown Washington. A long-time friend and former Executive Officer on Arleigh Burke, Admiral Ray Spicer, honored me as the guest speaker with my chaplain, “Chaps” Thornton giving the invocation for the ceremony. I was also honored with the presence of someone from every at-sea and shore assignment I had in the Navy; from my roommate at the Naval Academy, Commander Bill Lewis, to Lieutenant Matt Fleisher, who worked for me in the Navy’s International Strategy division and organized the ceremony. I was even blessed to recognize in my remarks a special attendee and the parent of one of my sailors—Tom Wibberley, whose son Craig was killed in the attack. Several of my crew from Cole also attended, including a few who had been wounded in the attack. After the conclusion of the ceremony, all of my former chief petty officers surprised me by presenting a bronze CPO statue. Once again, the chiefs proved themselves the backbone of our Navy. Just as Cole had left Aden harbor, I left the Navy proud and undeterred. I knew what the crew and I had accomplished and nothing that happened to me in the intervening years could ever take that pride away from me.

  Four years later, more than ten years after the attack on Cole, I sat in my living room in Nevada on a quiet Sunday evening, watching nothing in particular on TV. The first day of May 2011 had been quiet and filled with the mundane routine of household chores—laundry, grocery shopping, and preparing for the upcoming busy workweek. Suddenly, the local station announced that the President was going to address the nation at 2230. Immediately, I sensed trouble. For the President to address the nation on a Sunday evening that late at night, it could only mean one thing—tragedy or disaster. Without warning, text messages began to inundate my phone as speculation ran rampant.

  Within minutes, the word was out—Osama bin Laden was dead. It was no tragedy but rather long-overdue justice and miraculously good news. As the President’s news conference was continually delayed, the minutes seemed to creep by. Finally, the President strode up to the podium and made his announcement:It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history. The images of nine-eleven are seared into our national memory—hijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction....

  For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effo
rt to defeat al Qaeda.

  Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must—and we will—remain vigilant at home and abroad....

  So Americans understand the costs of war. Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done.11

  While there was no mention, once again, of the attack on Cole, I knew we had been avenged. I watched as the scenes of revelers flooded into the streets of downtown New York near Ground Zero and many more celebrated on Pennsylvania Avenue along the fence surrounding the White House. While I wanted to immerse myself in the joy of the moment, instead I got up out of my chair, turned off the television, and walked outside. The night was quiet as the stars brilliantly shone in the crystal clear Nevada sky. Out there, in homes across the country, I prayed that the families of the sailors killed in the attack on Cole and those who had survived and continued to rebuild their lives, as well as the entire nation, would hopefully sleep a little easier this night.

  There was no feeling of happiness or celebration, only a deep sense of vindication and satisfaction. It was almost too surreal to comprehend that finally we had achieved this elusive victory. Before I left the still night air, I paused to remember those dark days in Aden and a crew that had reached into the deepest recesses of their souls to fight for their ship and shipmates. We lived up to the motto of USS Cole and its namesake, Sergeant Darrell S. Cole, USMC—Gloria Merces Virtutis—Glory is the Reward of Valor.

  APPENDIX

  COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99–01

  Force Protection

  Tab B to Appendix 1 of Annex M

  Threat Condition (THREATCON) Measures

  THREATCON Alpha. This condition is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON Bravo as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

  1.Brief crew on the port specific threat, the Security/Force Protection Plan, and security precautions to be taken ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures. Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the Officer of the Deck.

  2.Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.

  3.Review security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.

  4.Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use.

  5.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), post qualified armed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry.

  6.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, post qualified armed pier sentry and pier entrance sentry.

  7.Ensure sentries, roving patrols, response force and the quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate. If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light).

  8.If available, issue night vision devices to selected posted security personnel.

  9.Review pier and shipboard access control procedures.

  10.Coordinate pier and fleet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment) and define methods of activation and communication.

  11.Tighten shipboard and pier access control procedures. Positively identify all personnel entering pier and fleet landing area—no exceptions.

  12.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish unloading zone(s) on the pier away from the ship.

  13.Deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship. Barriers may be ship’s vehicles, equipment, port provided barrier systems, marine containers, or items available locally. Consistent with local conditions, 400-foot standoff from the ship is preferred.

  14.Request husbanding agent arrange and deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from ship (400-foot standoff from the ship preferred).

  15.Inspect all vehicles entering pier and check for unauthorized personnel, weapons, and/or explosives.

  16.Inspect all personnel, hand carried items, and packages before allowing them on board. Where available, use baggage scanners and walk through or hand held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship.

  17.Direct departing and arriving liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship and give special attention to the waterline and hull. Boats must be identifiable night and day to ship’s personnel.

  18.Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists. Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship; authorized craft should be carefully controlled, surveilled, and covered. Inspect authorized watercraft daily.

  19.Identify and inspect workboats.

  20.Secure spaces not in use.

  21.Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment. Lighting should include illumination of the waterline.

  22.Rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.

  23.Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, Jacob ladders, etc., when not in use. Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines.

  24.Conduct security drills to include bomb threat and repel boarders exercises.

  25.Review individual actions in THREATCON Bravo for possible implementation.

  THREATCON Bravo. This condition is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with local authorities.

  26. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha measures.

  27. Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship and crew.

  28. Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade to determine the status of on-board personnel and to disseminate information.

  29. Ensure that an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for the area of operations is readily available. Ensure the warning tape in the pilot house and/or quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English.

  30. Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check them before entering.

  31. Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with M16 rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades.

  32. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish armed brow watch on pier to check identification and inspect baggage before personnel board ship.

  33. Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreement, establish unloading zones(s) and move all containers as far away from ship as possible (400-foot standoff distance preferred).

  34. Man signal bridge or pilot house and ensure flares are availab
le to ward off approaching craft.

  35. After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.

  36. If not already armed, arm all members of the quarterdeck watch and Security Alert Team (SAT). In the absence of a SAT, arm two member of the Ship’s Defense Force (SDF).

  37. Provide shotgun and ammunition to quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the quarterdeck can be covered.

  38. Issue arms to selected qualified officers to include Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Assistant Command Duty Officer (ACDO).

  39. Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized craft should be carefully controlled. Coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.

  40. If not already armed, arm Sounding and Security patrol.

  41. Muster and brief ammunition bearers or messengers.

  42. Implement procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition from small arms locker (SAL). Ensure a set of SAL keys are readily available and in the possession of an officer designated for this duty by the Commanding Officer.

  43. Inform local authorities of action taken as the THREATCON increases.

  44. Test internal communications, communications with local authorities, and communications with other U.S. naval ships in port.

  45. Instruct watches to conduct frequent random searches under piers, with emphasis on potential hiding places, pier pilings, and floating debris.

  46. Conduct searches of the ship’s hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea.

  47. Move cars and objects such as crates and trash containers as far from the ship as possible.

  48. Hoist boats aboard when not in use.

 

‹ Prev