49. Consider terminating all public visits.
50. Set materiel condition Yoke, main deck and below.
51. After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship’s interior by securing selected entrances from the inside.
52. Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically.
53. If two brows are rigged, remove one of them. Use only one gangway to access the ship.
54. Maintain capability to get under way on short notice or as specified by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.
55. Ensure .50-caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50-caliber machineguns will be maintained in the armory, pre-fire checks completed, and ready for use).
56. Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.
57. Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner to prevent hostile helicopters from landing.
58. Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylum-seeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures.
59. Monitor local communications (e.g., ship-to-ship, TV, radio, police scanners).
60. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.
61. Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases.
62. Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.
THREATCON Charlie. This condition is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations, vessels, or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel.
63. Maintain appropriate measures for THREATCONS Alpha and Bravo.
64. Cancel liberty. Execute emergency recall.
65. Be prepared to get under way on one hour’s notice or less. If conditions warrant, request permission to sortie.
66. Muster and arm Security Alert Team (SAT), Back-up Alert Force (BAF), and Reserve Force (RF). Position SAT and BAF at designated location(s). Deploy RF to protect command structure and augment posted security watches.
67. Place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best provide 360-degree coverage about the ship.
68. Establish .50- or .30-caliber machinegun positions.
69. If available, deploy stinger surface-to-surface air missiles in accordance with established ROE.
70. Energize radar and establish watch.
71. Energize radar and/or sonar, rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals, as needed to assist in deterring, detecting or thwarting an attack. Man passive sonar capable of detecting boats, swimmers, or underwater vehicles. Position any non-sonar equipped ships within the acoustic envelope of sonar-equipped ships.
72. Man one or more repair lockers. Establish communications with an extra watch in damage control central.
73. Deploy picket boat. Boats should be identifiable night and day from the ship (e.g., by lights or flags).
74. Coordinate with host nation, local port authority, or husbanding agent to establish small boat exclusion zone.
75. If feasible, deploy a helicopter as an observation or gun platform. The helicopter should be identifiable night and day from the ship.
76. If a threat of swimmer attack exists, activate an anti-swimmer watch.
77. Consider issuing weapons to selected officers and chief petty officers in the duty section (i.e., the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Department Heads).
78. If available, issue concussion grenades to topside rovers, forecastle and fantail sentries, and bridge watch.
79. Erect barriers and obstacles as required to control traffic flow.
80. Strictly enforce entry control procedures and searches—no exceptions.
81. Enforce boat exclusion zone.
82. Minimize all off-ship administrative trips.
83. Discontinue contract work.
84. Set material condition Zebra, second deck and below.
85. Secure from the inside all unguarded entry points to the interior of the ship.
86. Rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals.
87. Rig additional fire hoses. Charge the fire hoses when manned just prior to actual use.
88. Review individual actions in THREATCON Delta for implementation.
THREATCON Delta. This condition is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.
89. Maintain appropriate THREATCONs Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie measures.
90. Permit only necessary personnel topside.
91. Prepare to get under way and, if possible, cancel port visit and depart.
92. Arm selected personnel of the Ship’s Defense Force.
93. Deploy M-79 grenade launchers to cover approaches to the ship.
94. Employ all necessary weaponry to defend against attack.
NOTES
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1 Keenan, Patrick J., Commander, USN, Officer in Charge, Navy Ship Repair Unit Bahrain, Engineering Duty Newsletter, January 2001, 1, 18–20.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11
1 Perna, Frank, Chief Warrant Officer, USN, Officer in Charge, Detachment Alpha, Mobile Driving and Salvage Unit Two, Faceplate: The Official Newsletter for the Divers and Salvors of the United States Navy 5, no. 3 (March 2001), 7–8.
2 Keenan, Patrick J., Commander, USN, Officer in Charge, Navy Ship Repair Unit Bahrain, Engineering Duty Officer Newsletter (January 2001), 1, 18–20.
3 Ibid.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
1 Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, letter dated October 14, 2000, Ser 00/1082, Subj: Command Investigation into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen, On or About 12 October 2000.
2 Soufan, Ali H., with Daniel Freedman, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War against al-Qaeda (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 154–156.
3 Newman, Robert, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Defense Attaché to U.S. Embassy, Sana’a, Yemen, JAGMAN Investigation Statement, e-mail dated November 22, 2000.
4 Command Investigation into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen, On or About 12 October 2000, passim.
5 Command Investigation report, 60–66, 96–106.
6 Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, First Endorsement on Captain James W. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy, letter of November 27, 2000, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, 126–128.
7 Ibid., 128.
8 Ibid.
9 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Version, photo reprint (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2004), 191.
10 Soufan, The Black Banners, 157.
11 Ibid., 128–129.
12 Ricks, Thomas E., and Vernon Loeb, “Cole Security Lapses Found; Precautions Not Taken When Ship Was Hit by Bomb,” Washington Post, December 9, 2000, Section A, 14.
13 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Second Endorsement on Captain James W. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy, letter of November 27, 2000, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi
(Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, 136.
14 Ibid., 141.
15 Ibid., 139–140.
16 Ibid., 145.
17 Ibid., 146–150.
18 Ibid., 152.
19 Ibid., 153.
20 Ibid., 154.
21 Ibid., 153–154.
22 Ibid., 155.
23 Ibid., 157.
24 Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, et al., Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, January 19, 2001.
25 USS Cole Commission Report, Department of Defense, January 9, 2001, 1.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 2, 4–6.
28 Ibid., 7–8.
29 Ibid., 8.
30 Ibid., 9–10.
31 Danzig, Richard, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel (BSF) at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, January 18, 2001, 1–3.
32 Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (et al.), January 19, 2001.
33 Danzig Memorandum, 3.
34 Ibid., 4–5.
35 Ibid., 5.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 5–6.
38 Cohen, William S., Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, Subj: Assessment of Accountability Arising from the Attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) on 12 October 2000, 1.
39 Ibid., pg. 2.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Steven Strasser, ed., The 9/11 Investigations (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 111–112.
43 The 9/11 Commission Report, 191.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14
1 Foley, J. B., Commander, Naval Surfaces Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet memo to Chief of Naval Operations, December 19, 2000, Ser. N02L/1313, 1–3.
2 www.arlingtoncemetery.net/unidentified-091202.htm, accessed November 17, 2010.
NOTES TO EPILOGUE
1 Clarke, Richard A., Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 223.
2 Strasser, Steven, ed., The 9/11 Investigations (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 111–112.
3 Cohen, William S., et al., Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, Secretary of Defense, January 19, 2001.
4 Strasser, ed., The 9/11 Investigations, 111–112.
5 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 224.
6 Soufan, Ali H., with Daniel Freedman, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 218–220.
7 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Version, photo reprint (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2004), 153–159; and Soufan, Black Banners, 239, 294.
8 National Archives, Executive Orders 13492-13493, President Barack Obama, January 22, 2009, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/2009-obama.html
9 Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Precept Convening FY-03, Promotion Selection Boards to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active-Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Captain, January 7, 2002, A3.
10 Armed Service Committee Hearing, To receive testimony concerning the sinking of the USS INDIANAPOLIS and the subsequent court-martial of Rear Admiral Charles B. McVay, III, USN, September 14, 1999, statement of Senator John Warner (R-VA).
11 The White House Blog, Osama bin Laden Dead, May 2, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead
INDEX
Abell, Charles S.
Able Danger program
Abney, Paul
Abresch, Richard J.
Achille Lauro (Italian cruise ship), hijack of
Adams, John
Aden Container Terminal
Aegis combat system
Aegis weapon system
Aegis cruiser
Aegis destroyer
Aegis guided-missile cruiser
Aegis guided-missile destroyer
Afghanistan
AFIP. See Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
Al Qaeda
and Able Danger program
and bin Laden
and bin Laden, death of
and CIA
and FBI
and FBI/NCIS criminal investigation
operatives, capture and conviction of
operatives, detainment of
operatives, killing of
and small-boat threat
undeclared war
and USS Cole attack
Al Badawi, Jamal
Al Harithi, Abu Ali
Al-Khamri, Hassan Said Awad
Allen, Charles
Al Nashiri, Abd al Rahim Hussein Mohammed
charges against
Al Quso, Fahd Mohammed Ahmed
Al-Thawar, Ibrahim
Alton, Denise
Arlington National Cemetery
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP)
Atta, Mohammed
Baggett, Kenneth
Becker, Lyle
Berger, Samuel “Sandy,”
Bin Attash, Tawfiq (aka Khallad)
Bin Laden, Osama
and al Qaeda
and CIA
death of
and John Warner
and Obama, Barack
and the Taliban
and USS Cole attack
Black, Cofer
Bodine, Barbara
and follow-on attack, warning of
Bouffard French military hospital (Djibouti)
and French medical team
Brown, James A.
Buckley, John
Bush, George W.
and Lippold’s nomination for promotion
Bush (George W.) administration
and enemy combatants
and promotion nomination
and USS Cole attack, response to
and USS Cole investigations
Butler, Lewellyn “Sparky,”
Butler, Missy
Butte, Randall
Campbell, Tayinikia
Cardwell, Lee
Carrier Air Wing
Castellano, Frank
Cavanaugh, Thomas
CCATTs. See Critical Care Air Transport Teams
Chamberlain, Ann
and medical evacuation
and USS Cole tow to M/V Blue Marlin
Chemical warfare, and Iraq
Chinese government
CIA
and al Qaeda
and al Qaeda operatives, killing of
Clark, Vern
and Criminal Investigation Report
and Lippold’s nomination for promotion
Clarke, Richard A.
Clinton administration
and USS Cole attack, response to
and USS Cole investigations
Clinton, Bill
and Defense Authorization Act
and USS Cole attack, response to
and Veterans Day reception
Clodfelter, Kenneth
Cohen, William S.
and Command Investigation Report
and USS Cole attack, response to
and USS Cole investigations
and Veterans Day reception at White House
Cole, Darrell S.
Combat-readiness training program
weaknesses in
Command investigation (aka JAGMAN investigation; U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General command investigation)
of commanding officer
of crew members
and families, meeting with
and Lippold’s nomination for promotion
See also Command investigation; FBI/NCIS criminal investigation; USS Cole Commission investigation
Command Investigation Report
Clark’s endorsement of
as classified Secret-NOFORN
Cohen’s comments on
and commanding officer, accountability of
Danzig’s comments on
and the media
Moore’s endorsement of
Natter’s endorsement of
and recommendations for Navy and chain of command
release of
See also USS Cole Commission Report
Conroe, Mark
Copenhaver, Thomas
Cordle, John
Costelow, Richard D.
Courtney, Deborah “Debbie,”
and crew convalescent leave
and damage control efforts
and flooding
Cox, Sam
CRITIC report. See Critical Incident report
Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATTs)
Critical Incident (CRITIC) report
Crouch-Gehman Report.See USS Cole Commission
Crouch, George
Crouch, William W.
Crowe, Justin
and forensic evidence
and memorial ceremony service
Cullom, Phil
Currie, Betty
Dalton, John H.
Damage assessment, and USS Cole
completion of
and flooding
and Navy divers
Damage control drills
Damage control efforts, and USS Cole
and control experts
and Courtney
and Navy divers
and Peterschmidt
and small damage control parties
and staying afloat
and USS Donald Cook, contribution to
and USS Hawes, contribution to
Damage, to USS Cole
and alarm indicator systems
and battery backup system
to bilge keel
and blast hole
to chiefs’ mess
and communications equipment
and electrical fire
to engine room
and firefighting water pressure
and flooding
to fuel lab
and fuel leakage
to galley
to general workshop
and generators
to hull
to keel
to machinery room
to medical treatment area
to mess deck
and oil leakage
to reduction gear
to refer deck
to supply office and supply support
Front Burner Page 40