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by Kirk S. Lippold


  49. Consider terminating all public visits.

  50. Set materiel condition Yoke, main deck and below.

  51. After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship’s interior by securing selected entrances from the inside.

  52. Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically.

  53. If two brows are rigged, remove one of them. Use only one gangway to access the ship.

  54. Maintain capability to get under way on short notice or as specified by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.

  55. Ensure .50-caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50-caliber machineguns will be maintained in the armory, pre-fire checks completed, and ready for use).

  56. Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.

  57. Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner to prevent hostile helicopters from landing.

  58. Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylum-seeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures.

  59. Monitor local communications (e.g., ship-to-ship, TV, radio, police scanners).

  60. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

  61. Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases.

  62. Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.

  THREATCON Charlie. This condition is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations, vessels, or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel.

  63. Maintain appropriate measures for THREATCONS Alpha and Bravo.

  64. Cancel liberty. Execute emergency recall.

  65. Be prepared to get under way on one hour’s notice or less. If conditions warrant, request permission to sortie.

  66. Muster and arm Security Alert Team (SAT), Back-up Alert Force (BAF), and Reserve Force (RF). Position SAT and BAF at designated location(s). Deploy RF to protect command structure and augment posted security watches.

  67. Place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best provide 360-degree coverage about the ship.

  68. Establish .50- or .30-caliber machinegun positions.

  69. If available, deploy stinger surface-to-surface air missiles in accordance with established ROE.

  70. Energize radar and establish watch.

  71. Energize radar and/or sonar, rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals, as needed to assist in deterring, detecting or thwarting an attack. Man passive sonar capable of detecting boats, swimmers, or underwater vehicles. Position any non-sonar equipped ships within the acoustic envelope of sonar-equipped ships.

  72. Man one or more repair lockers. Establish communications with an extra watch in damage control central.

  73. Deploy picket boat. Boats should be identifiable night and day from the ship (e.g., by lights or flags).

  74. Coordinate with host nation, local port authority, or husbanding agent to establish small boat exclusion zone.

  75. If feasible, deploy a helicopter as an observation or gun platform. The helicopter should be identifiable night and day from the ship.

  76. If a threat of swimmer attack exists, activate an anti-swimmer watch.

  77. Consider issuing weapons to selected officers and chief petty officers in the duty section (i.e., the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Department Heads).

  78. If available, issue concussion grenades to topside rovers, forecastle and fantail sentries, and bridge watch.

  79. Erect barriers and obstacles as required to control traffic flow.

  80. Strictly enforce entry control procedures and searches—no exceptions.

  81. Enforce boat exclusion zone.

  82. Minimize all off-ship administrative trips.

  83. Discontinue contract work.

  84. Set material condition Zebra, second deck and below.

  85. Secure from the inside all unguarded entry points to the interior of the ship.

  86. Rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals.

  87. Rig additional fire hoses. Charge the fire hoses when manned just prior to actual use.

  88. Review individual actions in THREATCON Delta for implementation.

  THREATCON Delta. This condition is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

  89. Maintain appropriate THREATCONs Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie measures.

  90. Permit only necessary personnel topside.

  91. Prepare to get under way and, if possible, cancel port visit and depart.

  92. Arm selected personnel of the Ship’s Defense Force.

  93. Deploy M-79 grenade launchers to cover approaches to the ship.

  94. Employ all necessary weaponry to defend against attack.

  NOTES

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

  1 Keenan, Patrick J., Commander, USN, Officer in Charge, Navy Ship Repair Unit Bahrain, Engineering Duty Newsletter, January 2001, 1, 18–20.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

  1 Perna, Frank, Chief Warrant Officer, USN, Officer in Charge, Detachment Alpha, Mobile Driving and Salvage Unit Two, Faceplate: The Official Newsletter for the Divers and Salvors of the United States Navy 5, no. 3 (March 2001), 7–8.

  2 Keenan, Patrick J., Commander, USN, Officer in Charge, Navy Ship Repair Unit Bahrain, Engineering Duty Officer Newsletter (January 2001), 1, 18–20.

  3 Ibid.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 13

  1 Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, letter dated October 14, 2000, Ser 00/1082, Subj: Command Investigation into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen, On or About 12 October 2000.

  2 Soufan, Ali H., with Daniel Freedman, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War against al-Qaeda (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 154–156.

  3 Newman, Robert, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Defense Attaché to U.S. Embassy, Sana’a, Yemen, JAGMAN Investigation Statement, e-mail dated November 22, 2000.

  4 Command Investigation into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen, On or About 12 October 2000, passim.

  5 Command Investigation report, 60–66, 96–106.

  6 Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, First Endorsement on Captain James W. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy, letter of November 27, 2000, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, 126–128.

  7 Ibid., 128.

  8 Ibid.

  9 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Version, photo reprint (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2004), 191.

  10 Soufan, The Black Banners, 157.

  11 Ibid., 128–129.

  12 Ricks, Thomas E., and Vernon Loeb, “Cole Security Lapses Found; Precautions Not Taken When Ship Was Hit by Bomb,” Washington Post, December 9, 2000, Section A, 14.

  13 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Second Endorsement on Captain James W. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy, letter of November 27, 2000, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar at Tawahi
(Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, 136.

  14 Ibid., 141.

  15 Ibid., 139–140.

  16 Ibid., 145.

  17 Ibid., 146–150.

  18 Ibid., 152.

  19 Ibid., 153.

  20 Ibid., 154.

  21 Ibid., 153–154.

  22 Ibid., 155.

  23 Ibid., 157.

  24 Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, et al., Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, January 19, 2001.

  25 USS Cole Commission Report, Department of Defense, January 9, 2001, 1.

  26 Ibid.

  27 Ibid., 2, 4–6.

  28 Ibid., 7–8.

  29 Ibid., 8.

  30 Ibid., 9–10.

  31 Danzig, Richard, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subj: Investigation to Inquire into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in Preparing for and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel (BSF) at Bandar at Tawahi (Aden Harbor) Aden, Yemen On or About 12 October 2000, January 18, 2001, 1–3.

  32 Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (et al.), January 19, 2001.

  33 Danzig Memorandum, 3.

  34 Ibid., 4–5.

  35 Ibid., 5.

  36 Ibid.

  37 Ibid., 5–6.

  38 Cohen, William S., Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, Subj: Assessment of Accountability Arising from the Attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) on 12 October 2000, 1.

  39 Ibid., pg. 2.

  40 Ibid.

  41 Ibid.

  42 Steven Strasser, ed., The 9/11 Investigations (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 111–112.

  43 The 9/11 Commission Report, 191.

  NOTES TO CHAPTER 14

  1 Foley, J. B., Commander, Naval Surfaces Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet memo to Chief of Naval Operations, December 19, 2000, Ser. N02L/1313, 1–3.

  2 www.arlingtoncemetery.net/unidentified-091202.htm, accessed November 17, 2010.

  NOTES TO EPILOGUE

  1 Clarke, Richard A., Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 223.

  2 Strasser, Steven, ed., The 9/11 Investigations (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 111–112.

  3 Cohen, William S., et al., Department of Defense Transcript, USS Cole Briefing, Secretary of Defense, January 19, 2001.

  4 Strasser, ed., The 9/11 Investigations, 111–112.

  5 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 224.

  6 Soufan, Ali H., with Daniel Freedman, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 218–220.

  7 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Version, photo reprint (Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2004), 153–159; and Soufan, Black Banners, 239, 294.

  8 National Archives, Executive Orders 13492-13493, President Barack Obama, January 22, 2009, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/2009-obama.html

  9 Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Precept Convening FY-03, Promotion Selection Boards to Consider Officers in the Line on the Active-Duty List of the Navy for Promotion to the Permanent Grade of Captain, January 7, 2002, A3.

  10 Armed Service Committee Hearing, To receive testimony concerning the sinking of the USS INDIANAPOLIS and the subsequent court-martial of Rear Admiral Charles B. McVay, III, USN, September 14, 1999, statement of Senator John Warner (R-VA).

  11 The White House Blog, Osama bin Laden Dead, May 2, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead

  INDEX

  Abell, Charles S.

  Able Danger program

  Abney, Paul

  Abresch, Richard J.

  Achille Lauro (Italian cruise ship), hijack of

  Adams, John

  Aden Container Terminal

  Aegis combat system

  Aegis weapon system

  Aegis cruiser

  Aegis destroyer

  Aegis guided-missile cruiser

  Aegis guided-missile destroyer

  Afghanistan

  AFIP. See Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

  Al Qaeda

  and Able Danger program

  and bin Laden

  and bin Laden, death of

  and CIA

  and FBI

  and FBI/NCIS criminal investigation

  operatives, capture and conviction of

  operatives, detainment of

  operatives, killing of

  and small-boat threat

  undeclared war

  and USS Cole attack

  Al Badawi, Jamal

  Al Harithi, Abu Ali

  Al-Khamri, Hassan Said Awad

  Allen, Charles

  Al Nashiri, Abd al Rahim Hussein Mohammed

  charges against

  Al Quso, Fahd Mohammed Ahmed

  Al-Thawar, Ibrahim

  Alton, Denise

  Arlington National Cemetery

  Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP)

  Atta, Mohammed

  Baggett, Kenneth

  Becker, Lyle

  Berger, Samuel “Sandy,”

  Bin Attash, Tawfiq (aka Khallad)

  Bin Laden, Osama

  and al Qaeda

  and CIA

  death of

  and John Warner

  and Obama, Barack

  and the Taliban

  and USS Cole attack

  Black, Cofer

  Bodine, Barbara

  and follow-on attack, warning of

  Bouffard French military hospital (Djibouti)

  and French medical team

  Brown, James A.

  Buckley, John

  Bush, George W.

  and Lippold’s nomination for promotion

  Bush (George W.) administration

  and enemy combatants

  and promotion nomination

  and USS Cole attack, response to

  and USS Cole investigations

  Butler, Lewellyn “Sparky,”

  Butler, Missy

  Butte, Randall

  Campbell, Tayinikia

  Cardwell, Lee

  Carrier Air Wing

  Castellano, Frank

  Cavanaugh, Thomas

  CCATTs. See Critical Care Air Transport Teams

  Chamberlain, Ann

  and medical evacuation

  and USS Cole tow to M/V Blue Marlin

  Chemical warfare, and Iraq

  Chinese government

  CIA

  and al Qaeda

  and al Qaeda operatives, killing of

  Clark, Vern

  and Criminal Investigation Report

  and Lippold’s nomination for promotion

  Clarke, Richard A.

  Clinton administration

  and USS Cole attack, response to

  and USS Cole investigations

  Clinton, Bill

  and Defense Authorization Act

  and USS Cole attack, response to

  and Veterans Day reception

  Clodfelter, Kenneth

  Cohen, William S.

  and Command Investigation Report

  and USS Cole attack, response to

  and USS Cole investigations

  and Veterans Day reception at White House

  Cole, Darrell S.

  Combat-readiness training program

  weaknesses in

  Command investigation (aka JAGMAN investigation; U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General command investigation)

  of commanding officer

  of crew members

  and families, meeting with

  and Lippold’s nomination for promotion

  See also Command investigation; FBI/NCIS criminal investigation; USS Cole Commission investigation

  Command Investigation Report

  Clark’s endorsement of

  as classified Secret-NOFORN

 
Cohen’s comments on

  and commanding officer, accountability of

  Danzig’s comments on

  and the media

  Moore’s endorsement of

  Natter’s endorsement of

  and recommendations for Navy and chain of command

  release of

  See also USS Cole Commission Report

  Conroe, Mark

  Copenhaver, Thomas

  Cordle, John

  Costelow, Richard D.

  Courtney, Deborah “Debbie,”

  and crew convalescent leave

  and damage control efforts

  and flooding

  Cox, Sam

  CRITIC report. See Critical Incident report

  Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATTs)

  Critical Incident (CRITIC) report

  Crouch-Gehman Report.See USS Cole Commission

  Crouch, George

  Crouch, William W.

  Crowe, Justin

  and forensic evidence

  and memorial ceremony service

  Cullom, Phil

  Currie, Betty

  Dalton, John H.

  Damage assessment, and USS Cole

  completion of

  and flooding

  and Navy divers

  Damage control drills

  Damage control efforts, and USS Cole

  and control experts

  and Courtney

  and Navy divers

  and Peterschmidt

  and small damage control parties

  and staying afloat

  and USS Donald Cook, contribution to

  and USS Hawes, contribution to

  Damage, to USS Cole

  and alarm indicator systems

  and battery backup system

  to bilge keel

  and blast hole

  to chiefs’ mess

  and communications equipment

  and electrical fire

  to engine room

  and firefighting water pressure

  and flooding

  to fuel lab

  and fuel leakage

  to galley

  to general workshop

  and generators

  to hull

  to keel

  to machinery room

  to medical treatment area

  to mess deck

  and oil leakage

  to reduction gear

  to refer deck

  to supply office and supply support

 

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