India's biggest cover-up

by Anuj Dhar

  SA Ayer, also spelt as Iyer, had just finished his assignment as director of publicity with the Government of Bombay and was taking a break before joining the Central Board of Censor. It was going to be his second trip to Japan. Earlier, Ayer had arrived here on 22 August 1945 as information minister of the Azad Hind Government. The task that he had carried out then was to draft the news of Subhas Bose’s death to be circulated worldwide. On 7 September 1945 at around noon Ayer had attended a brief ceremony at the entrance to the Imperial Military Headquarters. Here he had been handed over a small box said to be containing Bose’s ashes. A big box was passed on to Munga Ramamurti, or Ram Murthy, the Tokyo head of Indian Independence League, who had accompanied Ayer.

  Ayer and Murti disposed of the ashes ceremoniously, enshrining them in suburban Tokyo’s Renkoji temple. And what the duo did with the big box gave birth to another mystery, which while occasionally hitting the headlines in Japan, never tickled the fancy of any Indian journalist. No one ever knew what all was there in the official files about the big box.

  The Japanese officer who formally handed over “three” boxes to Ayer and Ramamurti, Lt Col Morio Takakura, was told by his fellow officers that two of them contained “gold bars and diamonds”. [1] Vouching for a non-existent air crash, the Japanese government later said there were two boxes only. The big one was sealed. In it was an 18-litre petroleum can filled with the charred jewellery and suchlike items collected from Taipei. This is what the air crash had reduced the INA treasure to.

  Takakura wished the HQ had kept some material evidence of the transfer of the boxes by way of receipts or photographs. “We thought we had taken best possible measures as in our power in those turbulent days…but since things have now turned out like this, it may be said that we should have been more careful.” [2] His post-war dismay was result of the malicious threats Ramamurti had administered to him over and again. “Keep silent about the treasure.” Takakura endured for a decade or so, “out of fear of war crimes prosecution”, [3] and then bared his heart before the Japanese media.

  Meanwhile, Ramamurti and his younger brother J Murti had caught the eyes of local Indians. According to a Japanese media report, the brothers “bought two sedans and were seen riding about in them, seemingly leading quite a luxurious life” at a time when even the affluent Japanese were reeling under the financial miseries brought about by the world war their country had lost. “Later they were caught for illegal dealings in US dollars,” [4] the report said of the brothers. J Murti often spotted his big brother in the company of Col John Figges—the Military Attaché at the British embassy, who many learned writers of today think had the last word on Subhas Bose’s reported death in Taipei.

  The Indian mission knew it all. A complaint by the local Indians had reached its first head back in 1947. Sir Benegal Rama Rau, later the longest-serving Reserve Bank of India Governor, and his successor Bahadur Singh repeatedly enquired from Ramamurti, who flatly denied possessing any INA treasure or a trace of it. Rau informed New Delhi about the treasure scam—free India’s first—on 4 December 1947, but received no encouraging reply.

  When Ayer returned to Japan as Ramamurti’s guest in 1951, the process of ending the state of war between Japan and the Allied nations, including India, had reached its penultimate stage. In Ayer’s own words, what had brought him back was to make sure that both the gold and the ashes were intact. While his entire mission was surreptitious—no one in India except some top officials knew anything about it—all the more secretive was his self-proclaimed intention to get the Indian mission take charge of the gold, “so that Mr Ramamurti can be relieved of his duties”. [5]

  The first obstacle in lending credence to Ayer’s claim was that the mission head had no clue why he was coming to Japan. On 21 May 1951 Chettur wrote to BN Chakravarty, Secretary Commonwealth Relations, in New Delhi that he had reasons to feel perplexed.

  I was at a loss to understand why we should have been rushed in this fashion, unless of course Government were particularly interested in the visit, which however seemed unlikely as it had been clearly stated in the telegram that he was coming here for a holiday. We have also had a cable from the passport officer, Bombay, in this connection. This sudden hurry over what is purported to be a holiday trip and the fact that he is visiting this country as Ramamurti’s guest makes one wonder if there may not be more in it than meets the eye.

  There was. Chettur elaborated to Chakravarty, who had served in the mission earlier:

  As you are no doubt aware, there have been serious allegations against Ramamurti with regard to the misappropriation of the funds of the late Indian Independence League, as also the personal property of the late Subhas Chandra Bose, consisting of considerable quantities of diamonds, jewellery, gold and other valuable articles. Rightly or wrongly, Ayer’s name has also been associated with these charges.

  There was no reaction from either the ministry or Chakravarty to Chettur’s letter.

  On May 29 Ayer arrived in Tokyo and met Chettur. He told Chettur—who was not amused on hearing this—that he had been entrusted by the Government of India to verify the authenticity of Bose’s assumed ashes and recover the gold and jewellery salvaged in Taiwan.

  Ayer told me that he had received a letter on the subject from you and that he had left it behind at Bombay to avoid its contents being revealed during the journey or in any customs examinations and that this precaution was taken at your instance. You will no doubt be in a position to verify his statements. All that I can say is that I cannot quite see why you should have left me in the dark with regard to this matter. I should have thought that in the circumstances it was most essential that I should be kept in touch with what was happening, particularly in view of Ayer’s past history, his relationship with Ramamurti and the scandal connected with the disappearance of Netaji’s collections.

  Chettur could hardly digest it when Ayer told him that “he had been trying to return to Japan for the last four years to pay his respects to Netaji’s ashes”. That very evening he apprised Chakravarty of his forthright views:

  Ayer’s unexpected return here as Ramamurti’s guest has, I may add, given rise to considerable, speculation however and that many of the local Indians are now seething with indignation at the manner of his return and his renewed association with those two brothers. Not that I personally see any reason why Ayer’s choice of his friends should be anybody’s business except his own, but the fact that both Ramamurti and Ayer were alleged to have had something to do with the mysterious disappearance of the gold and jewellery collected by Netaji should, I think, have deterred us from encouraging him in his visit to this country or in giving his visit an official backing.

  During his meeting with Ayer, Chettur confronted him with what was being said about the INA treasure. “Indeed he had a hearty laugh when I told him that local rumours have estimated the value of that property at some millions of rupees.” Ayer admitted that “some part of Netaji's collections had been saved” but it largely comprised “fused and melted gold ornaments” worth “about a lakh of rupees of so”.

  This was for the first time the mission was getting a confirmation that some INA treasure existed. But Ayer “completely pooh-poohed the story that some crore worth of jewels and gold had been saved”.

  It does seem odd that he should now be so anxious to divulge the existence of this gold, stranger still, if rumours speak correctly, that Ramamurthi should have blossomed overnight into comparative affluence in 1946 when his compatriots were on the verge of starvation and misery. As you are aware, as well as I am, of the past history of the case, I am desisting from further comment, but I shall be grateful for your very clear instruction as to how I should further proceed in this matter.

  There was still no response from New Delhi. On 5 June 1951 Chettur sent a Top Secret telegram to New Delhi seeking “immediate instructions as Ayer [was] leaving on the 8th”. This evoked an answer the next day. Chettur’s letter had been shown to the PM, who issue
d the following instruction through the return “Top Secret” “Personal for Chettur” telegram:

  Ayer’s visit to Japan is in no sense official. If he gives you paper giving details of Subhas Bose’s collections you should examine and keep it in safe custody without commitment as to its disposal and await further instructions from Government. Disposal may be considered later on.

  Chakravarty followed it up with an explanatory Top Secret on June 7. He repeated that “Ayer's visit to Japan is by no means official or even officially sponsored”. He wrote— it sounds unbelievable—that “Ayer had approached the Deputy Minister through somebody for obtaining the SCAP clearance and a telegram was sent to you under instructions of the Deputy Minister”.

  We wondered what the nature of his business was in Japan and we did not know what he was up to. After some consideration we decided to not to ask him point blank what he was going to do in Japan. We suspected that while in Japan he might be doing something about Netaji’s ashes. I therefore rang up the Chief Secretary of the Government of Bombay and requested him to tell Ayer that if he visits Japan and if he can find any authentic information about Netaji's ashes he might pass on that information to you and to us.

  Chakravarty stated that there was “no truth in the other stories” Ayer had told Chettur.

  The statement that he had left behind in Bombay a letter which I am supposed to have written to him to avoid its contents being revealed during the journey or in any customs examinations and that his precaution was taken at my instance reads too much like a six-penny novel. In fact I have never written to him.

  This version was reliable, though Ayer was to introduce a technicality in his deposition before the Khosla Commission on 20 January 1971. He produced what he claimed was the text of the letter written to him by the Bombay Chief Secretary, directing him to convey his findings about the ashes and treasure to Chakravarty. Khosla made this copy an exhibit, but since most of his exhibits have vanished from high-security government record rooms, there is no way to trace it now.

  Significantly, Chakravarty—a state governor in the 1960s—admitted that when he was in Japan, he had “also heard about Ramamurti misappropriating the funds of the Indian Independence League as also the personal property of the late Subhas Chandra Bose. Ayer’s name was also mixed up with this”. But

  Ramamurti in fact denied all knowledge of gold and jewellery. It is therefore interesting to know that Ayer is now able to produce some part of Netaji’s collections.

  He further clarified the PM’s position:

  The Prime Minister thought that there is no point in refusing to accept the gold if that is made over to you by Ayer for safe custody. It is realised that it may not be possible to bring this gold out of Japan, but that it is a matter which can be considered later. Similarly, if he wanted to show you the papers giving details of what was left there is no objection to your receiving these papers and examining them.

  At this, displaying remarkable courage, Chettur almost accused New Delhi of neglect in the matter. He did not hide his annoyance in his letter dated 11 June 1951, even though he had known that the Prime Minister was in the loop. Chettur had been enraged by an article in the Nippon Times on Ayer’s visit and the interest it had aroused among the Indian expats.

  I have heard the most scandalous reports about the Ayer-Ramamurti link and I have no reason whatsoever to doubt their authenticity. But in view of lack of interest evinced by Government in this matter in the past, I have refrained from pursuing it. In any case, I believe that you know as much about the case as I do and my comments on the subjects might seem superfluous.

  Chettur informed New Delhi that Ayer had not been forthright and holding back things from him.

  He called at my office on the 5th to bid me good-bye and to tell me that the BOAC had confirmed his booking and that he was definitely leaving on the morning of the 8th. I understand, however, that he is still in Tokyo, though he has made no attempt to contact me or to apprise me of the reasons which have led to the extension of his stay in Tokyo—which incidentally has prevented me from passing on to him the gist of your cable of the 6th June.

  New Delhi did not respond. On June 22 Chettur sent more Top Secret information:

  I now understand that Ayer left by BOAC on the 11th for Calcutta, though I have not been able to verify the earlier report that he had gone to Hokkaido, as subsequent reports indicated that his ostensible visit to this island was designed with a view to covering his tracks. One such report alleged that he did not in fact visit Hokkaido, but had gone to Sendai, about 300 miles north of Tokyo, to contact an old Japanese colleague who was also closely connected with Ayer and Ramamurti and the Netaji collections.

  The last I saw him was on the 5th when he called on me to say that he was definitely leaving on the 8th and to enquire whether any instructions had been received from you regarding his proposal to dispose of the Netaji collections. …As he was very anxious to ascertain your reaction before his departure, I sent you, at his request, a most immediate cable on the 5th and assured him that a reply would be received by the 7th at the latest. That he did not bother to see me again, much less hand over the gold as previously promised, or even make an attempt to find out whether any reply had been received from you to the cable despatched at his instance, has added to my suspicions regarding the motives behind his holiday visit to this country. His extraordinary statement that he had received a letter on behalf of the Government of India, is also a point worth investigating.

  The last paragraph in Chettur’s letter was going to make Chakravarty feel nervous.

  Chakravarty consulted the Prime Minister who said he “did not quite think” why Chettur “should think that there is a lack of interest evinced by Government in this matter”. When Chakravarty referred to Ram Rau’s complaint and the inadequate response sent by Harishwar Dayal, still serving the MEA as a Joint Secretary, the “PM thought that that letter was issued without his being informed about it”. On his instruction, Chakravarty sent the following telegram to Chettur on June 23:

  You are wrong in thinking that Government are NOT interested in this matter. Government are greatly interested in recovering all gold or other forms of treasures belonging to the Indian Independence League or INA. …You should endeavour to get possession of all the treasure on behalf of Government and keep it in safe custody pending further instructions.

  Chettur’s bold rejoinder, which isn’t there on the relevant file in original, was that

  all the treasure, if it existed, save the two boxes now promised by Ayer which are I understand in Ramamurti’s possession now, must have long been converted into hard cash, commodities and landed property. The proceeds must also have been distributed between the parties concerned.

  He named the “three members of this gang”: Ramamurti, Capt Thairatatte and Col JG Figges.

  He said it was too late to “undertake a treasure hunt” and repeated that if undertaken it would involve “a degree of publicity which might well prove embarrassing not only to the mission but also to the Government of India”. In reply, Mr Chakravarty explained that he did not think it necessary for the mission to start an actual search for the treasure “but that they should ask Ramamurti to hand over the gold which was with him”.

  Chakaravarty consulted the PM and wrote to Chettur on 25 June 1951 that “now that PM desires that we must take interest in this matter, I would request you to make a confidential inquiry and try to ascertain the facts. Every Indian in Japan says that Ramamurti became rich almost overnight and probably there is some truth in their allegation”. On July 2, he sent another:

  I do not quite understand why Ayer did not hand over the treasure to you as previously promised. You might enquire from Ramamurti what happened. If Ayer contacts us on his return here we will also tackle him. As I told you in my last letter we were anxious to know all about the gold and the treasure and we had asked you to make necessary inquiries. We had in view only some confidential inquiries and we nev
er thought that this might lead to any embarrassment. We will naturally have to reconsider the matter if the inquiry involves a degree of publicity which may prove embarrassing not only the mission but also to the Government. Before we can consider the matter further I shall be grateful if you can let us know why you think that the inquiry may be embarrassing.

  Either Chettur did not respond to this, or his responses were removed from the file. Maybe he wanted clear instruction from the Prime Minister, also the External Affairs Minister. On 12 July 1951 Chakravarty wrote:

  I myself feel that the guilty persons should be exposed. If that cannot be done by confidential inquiries without causing any embarrassment to the mission, I suppose we will have to give up the idea altogether. I have not been able to show your latest letter to the Prime Minister. When he comes back from Bangalore I will mention the case again to him and obtain his orders as to whether he would like the matter to be investigated further. I will let you know his decision in due course.

  Six days later Chettur was informed that the

  Prime Minister does not want any open investigation and to the Government. If any confidential inquiries are possible without causing any embarrassment to the mission you will no doubt make such inquiries.

  Chakravarty stated that Chettur should “try to take possession of the gold from Ramamurti”. But Chettur was waiting for clear orders. On August 23 Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt issued the orders through a Top Secret telegram:

  Prime Minister desires that you should, without further delay, take over from Ramamurti all INA treasure in his possession and keep it in the Mission until further instructions.