The Last Days of Socrates

by Plato

  EUTHYPHRO: Far advanced for sure, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Then is the man who died at the hands of your father one of your household? I suppose it’s obvious; you wouldn’t have prosecuted him merely for the sake of an outsider – not for murder.

  EUTHYPHRO: It’s laughable, Socrates, that you think it makes some difference whether the dead man was an outsider or a relative, and not realize that it’s this alone which one must watch, whether or not the killer killed with justification. If so, let him be; otherwise proceed against him – even if the killer (c) shares your hearth and table. Your pollution is as great as his if you live with such a person in the knowledge of what he has done, and fail to purge both yourself and him by taking legal proceedings against him. As a matter of fact, the deceased was a hired hand of mine, and, when we were farming on Naxos,14 he was labouring there for us. Well, he got drunk, became angry with one of our servants, and slit his throat. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a fellow here to find out from the Interpreter15 what he should do. But in the meantime he took (d) no interest in the prisoner, and neglected him in the belief that he was a murderer and that it was no concern of his if he died – which is exactly what happened. What with starvation, exposure and confinement, he died before the messenger got back from the Interpreter. So both my father and my other relatives are all the more annoyed at this, because I am prosecuting my father for homicide on a murderer’s behalf. They claim that he didn’t kill him, or, even if he’d killed him outright, I still shouldn’t be concerned about that type of (e) person, because they think it’s unholy for a son to prosecute his father for homicide – badly mistaking the position of divine law on what’s holy and what’s unholy.

  Euthyphro is induced by ironic flattery to reveal to Socrates what he believes holiness really is. He offers his own (and similar) conduct as an example of holiness, supporting his statement with references to popular myths. Socrates expresses bewilderment at this kind of religious story, and repeats that he requires a general standard against which he may assess the holiness or otherwise of any given action.

  SOCRATES: My word, Euthyphro, does that mean that you think you understand religion so exactly, matters holy and unholy that is, that you have no misgivings about the circumstances you describe? Aren’t you afraid in taking your father to court that you too might turn out to be doing an unholy deed?

  EUTHYPHRO: No, I would be of no use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ at all from the common herd of men, if I 5(a) didn’t understand the details of all things of this sort.

  SOCRATES: Remarkable, Euthyphro! In that case it would be best for me to become your pupil; before I defend this prosecution against Meletus I could challenge him on this very point – I’d say that for my part I’d always, even in the past, considered it of great importance to know about religious matters, and that now, since he claims that I’m at fault in improvising and innovating on questions of religion, I have naturally become a pupil of yours – ‘And presuming, Meletus,’ I could say, ‘that you admit that Euthyphro is an authority in such matters,16 you (b) must accept that my beliefs are true too, and not bring me to court; if you don’t admit it, then bring a suit against that teacher of mine before you tackle me – for being the ruin of his elders, me by what he teaches me and his own father by the criticism and punishment that he metes out to him.’ And if he doesn’t do as I say, and either drop the suit or indict you instead of me, I’d better deliver this same challenge to him in the lawcourt.

  EUTHYPHRO: Goodness yes, Socrates, if he should try a prosecution on me, I’d discover where his weak spot is, and he’d (c) be on the defensive in court long before I was!

  SOCRATES: I realize that as well as you do, dear friend; that’s why I am anxious to become a pupil of yours. I know that Meletus here among others does not seem to notice you, whereas he observes me with such ease and such acuity that he’s indicted me for impiety. So for heaven’s sake tell me now what you were just then affirming you knew: what do you say piety and impiety are, be it in homicide or in other matters? (d) Or isn’t holiness the same in every sphere of activity, and unholiness too – the opposite of everything holy and the same as itself, so that everything to be called unholy has one standard17 which determines its unholiness?

  EUTHYPHRO: Completely so, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what is unholiness?

  EUTHYPHRO: Well, I say that holiness is what I am doing now, prosecuting a criminal18 either for murder or for sacrilegious theft or for some other such thing, regardless of whether that (e) person happens to be one’s father or one’s mother or anyone else at all, whereas not to prosecute is unholy. Take a look, Socrates, and I’ll show you clear evidence of divine law – the law that one must not let off the perpetrator of impiety whoever he should happen to be. I’ve already used it to show others that this would be the right way to proceed. You see, 6(a) people themselves do in fact acknowledge that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they admit that he imprisoned his own father because he had unjustly swallowed his sons; and the latter too had castrated his father for similar reasons.19 But in my case they are annoyed with me for prosecuting my father for his crime, and so they make contradictory assertions about the gods’ conduct and about mine.20

  SOCRATES: Could this be why I’m defending a prosecution, Euthyphro, that whenever somebody talks like this about the gods, I find it very difficult to accept? That would be a natural reason for somebody to claim I’m in error. So now, if their (b) view is shared even by you who understand such things, then evidently the rest of us are going to have to agree. What more could we say, when we admit for ourselves that we know nothing about them? But be a good fellow and tell me, do you really believe that these things happened like this?21

  EUTHYPHRO: These and still more wonderful things, Socrates, which ordinary people do not know.

  SOCRATES: Then do you think that there is really civil war among the gods, and fearful hostility and battles, and so on – (c) the kind of thing described by the poets22 and depicted by fine artists upon sacred artefacts, not least upon the Robe23 at the Great Panathenaea which is brought up to the Acropolis,24 covered in decorations of that kind? Are we to say that it’s all true, Euthyphro?

  EUTHYPHRO: Not merely that, Socrates, but (as I said just now) I’ll tell you much more about divine beings, if you like; I know you’ll be stunned by it.

  SOCRATES: I shouldn’t be surprised. But you shall tell me that another time when we have leisure. For the time being, try to answer more clearly what I asked you just now. You see, when (d) I asked you before what holiness is, you didn’t adequately explain it, but you said that what you are doing now, prosecuting your father for impiety, does happen to be holy.

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I was telling you the truth, Socrates.

  Socrates: Possibly. But look, Euthyphro, you do say that there are many other things too which are holy?

  EUTHYPHRO: And so there are.

  SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, that this wasn’t what I was asking you to give me – one or two examples from a multitude of holy things? I asked you for that special feature25 through which all holy things are holy. (e) For you were in agreement, surely, that it was by virtue of a single standard26 that all unholy things are unholy and all holy things holy. Or don’t you remember?

  EUTHYPHRO: I do.

  SOCRATES: So explain to me what this standard itself is, so that when I observe it and use it as a means of comparison,27 I may affirm that whatever actions are like it – yours or anybody else’s – are holy, while those not of that kind are not.

  EUTHYPHRO: Well, if that’s what you want, Socrates, that’s what I’ll give you.

  SOCRATES: Indeed, it is what I want.

  Euthyphro offers a universal definition of holiness, satisfying Socrates in form but not in content. To define holiness in terms of what the gods regard with favour seems difficult for those who accept traditional ta
les of disputes among the gods, for the same action will please one god and annoy another. Euthyphro retreats to a position that ‘the holy’ is that which all the gods approve of, only to be confronted with the problem that, since what is ‘divinely approved’ is determined by what the gods approve, while what the gods approve is determined by what is holy, what is ‘divinely approved’ cannot be identical in meaning with what is holy. (Where A determines B, and B determines C, A ≠ C.) This argument has beenmuch analysed, and is a powerful weapon against those who believe morality can be explained purely in terms of God’s will.

  7a EUTHYPHRO: Right then: what is agreeable to the gods is holy, and what is not agreeable is unholy.

  SOCRATES: Simply splendid, Euthyphro, you’ve now answered in just the way I asked you to. Admittedly I don’t yet know whether you’re correct or not,28 but obviously you’ll go on to demonstrate the truth of what you say.

  EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: Come then, let’s examine our thesis: for any action, or person, if it is ‘divinely approved’29 it is holy, and if it’s ‘divinely disapproved’ it is unholy; and they’re not the same, but exact opposites,30 the holy and the unholy. Is that it?

  EUTHYPHRO: That’s quite right.

  SOCRATES: (b)And does it seem well stated?

  EUTHYPHRO: I think so, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Haven’t we also said that the gods have quarrels, Euthyphro, and disputes with one another, and that there is enmity among them, one with another?

  EUTHYPHRO: We have.

  SOCRATES: And what is the subject, please, of those disputes which cause enmity and anger? Let’s look at it like this. (c)If you and I were in dispute about which of two numbers is greater, would our dispute about this turn us into enemies, and make us angry with each other? Or should we quickly settle our differences by resorting to arithmetic?

  EUTHYPHRO: Certainly we should.

  SOCRATES: And surely, if we were in dispute about the relative size of two things, we could quickly bring an end to our dispute by resorting to measurement?

  EUTHYPHRO: That is so.

  SOCRATES: And weighing, I imagine, would be the way for us to get a case of relative weight decided?

  EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Then over what might we dispute and fail to find some solution? What could we become enemies over and get angry about? (d) Perhaps you have no ready answer, but I’ll make a suggestion – consider whether it’s over what’s just and unjust, or fine and despicable, or good and bad. Aren’t these the things over which we quarrel and can’t come to an adequate means of resolution, leading us at times to make enemies of each other – you, me and everybody else?

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, it’s that sort of dispute, Socrates; those are the issues.

  SOCRATES: What of the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree at all, wouldn’t they disagree for just these reasons?

  EUTHYPHRO: Inevitably.

  SOCRATES: (e) Then among the gods too, my fine fellow, your account suggests that different parties think different things just – or fine or despicable or good or bad – because they would not, apparently, be quarrelling with one another unless they were in dispute about this. Right?

  EUTHYPHRO: That’s correct.

  SOCRATES: Surely those things which each party regards as just and good it also approves of, and they disapprove of the opposite kind.

  EUTHYPHRO: Quite.

  SOCRATES: 8(a) But then again, according to your claim, the same things are considered just by some, unjust by others – those matters of dispute about which they quarrel and make war on one another. Is that right?

  EUTHYPHRO: Right.

  SOCRATES: Then the same things, it’s likely, are both disapproved of and approved of by the gods, and the same things would be ‘divinely approved’ and ‘divinely disapproved’.

  EUTHYPHRO: Likely enough.

  SOCRATES: Then the same things would be both holy and unholy according to this account.

  EUTHYPHRO: I suppose so.

  SOCRATES: Then you’ve not answered my question, Euthyphro. I wasn’t asking what turns out to be equally holy and unholy – whatever is divinely approved is also divinely disapproved, apparently. (b) Consequently, my dear Euthyphro, it would be no surprise if, in trying to punish your father as you do now, you did something approved by Zeus and offensive to Kronos31 and Uranus, or approved by Hephaestus and offensive to Hera;32 and so on for any one of the gods who disagrees with any other on the subject.

  EUTHYPHRO: Well it’s my belief, Socrates, that not one of the gods disputes with another on this; that whoever kills someone unjustly should pay the penalty.

  SOCRATES: (c)What about men? Have you ever yet heard any human disputing the claim that a person who killed unjustly – or did anything else unjustly – should pay the penalty?

  EUTHYPHRO: There’s no way they ever stop disputing these things, particularly in the courts; though they’ve committed a host of crimes there’s nothing they won’t do or say in their efforts to escape the penalty.

  SOCRATES: And do they also admit they’ve done wrong, Euthyphro, and in spite of their admission still claim that they should not pay the penalty?

  EUTHYPHRO: There’s no way they do that!

  SOCRATES: (d)Then they don’t do or say everything; for I don’t think they have the nerve to argue that they should not pay the penalty even supposing they’ve done wrong. I think they deny they’ve done wrong. Is it so?

  EUTHYPHRO: That’s true.

  SOCRATES: So at least they’re not disputing whether the wrongdoer must pay the penalty; but perhaps what they dispute is who the wrongdoer is, or what he did, or when.

  EUTHYPHRO: True.

  SOCRATES: (e)Then don’t the gods go through the same experience, if they really do quarrel about what’s just and unjust as you say, and some of them say others are in the wrong, while those others deny it? But even so, my friend, surely no one, neither god nor man, has the nerve to say that the actual wrongdoer should not pay the penalty.33

  EUTHYPHRO: Yes, what you’re saying is true, Socrates, in principle at least.

  SOCRATES: But in each case, Euthyphro, I think the disputants – both men and gods, if gods really dispute things – are disputing what has been done; they quarrel about some deed, and one party says it’s been done justly, the other unjustly. Right?

  EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.

  SOCRATES: Come now, Euthyphro, my friend, teach me too – ya make me wiser. What proof have you got that all gods regard as unjust the death of that man who, as a hired hand, was responsible for somebody’s death; was bound by the master of the man who was killed; and died from the conditions of his imprisonment before his imprisoner heard what he should do from the Interpreter? What proof have you that it is correct for a son to bring a prosecution on behalf of this kind of person, and to denounce his own father for homicide? (b)Come, try and show me some clear proof that this action, beyond a doubt, is thought by all gods to be correct. And if you show me to my satisfaction, I shall never stop acclaiming your wisdom.

  EUTHYPHRO: Well, it’s no small task probably, Socrates: though I could show you perfectly clearly.

  SOCRATES: I understand: you think I’m a slower learner than the jurymen,34 because you’ll obviously give them a demonstration that it was unjust and that all the gods disapprove of such things.

  EUTHYPHRO: With absolute clarity, Socrates, as long as they listen to what I say.

  SOCRATES: (c)They’ll listen, as long as they think you’re making sense. But here’s a question which I thought of while you were speaking. I ask myself: ‘However well Euthyphro were to teach me that all the gods in unison think that such a killing is unjust, what more have I learnt from him about what the holy and the unholy are?’ All right, so this action would apparently be ‘divinely disapproved’, but you see, it appeared just now that what was holy and what was not were not distinguished in this way – for what was ‘divinely disapproved’ also appeared to be ‘divinely approved’. So I
’ll let you off this, Euthyphro: if you like, let all the gods think it unjust and let them all disapprove of it. (d) But what about this correction that we are making to our account – to the effect that what all the gods disapprove of is unholy, what all approve of is holy, and what some approve of and others disapprove of is neither or both – is this how you would like our definition to run concerning the holy and the unholy?

  EUTHYPHRO: What is there to prevent it, Socrates?

  SOCRATES: Nothing to prevent me, Euthyphro, but you look at your own position, and ask yourself whether, on the basis of this assumption, you will most easily teach me what you promised.

  (e) EUTHYPHRO: Well, I should certainly say that what’s holy is whatever all the gods approve of, and that its opposite, what all the gods disapprove of, is unholy.

  SOCRATES: Are we to investigate further, Euthyphro, and see if it’s well stated, or are we to let it be and to accept something from ourselves or from another, agreeing that it is so if somebody merely states that this is the position? Or should we examine what the speaker means?

  EUTHYPHRO: Examine it. But I myself think that this has now been excellently stated.

  10(a) SOCRATES: We’ll soon be in a better position to judge, my good chap. Consider the following point: is the holy approved by the gods because it’s holy, or is it holy because it’s approved?35

  EUTHYPHRO: I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Well, I’ll try to put it more clearly. We speak of a thing ‘being carried’ or ‘carrying’, ‘being led’ or ‘leading’, ‘being seen’ or ‘seeing’ – and you understand that all such pairs are different from each other, and how they are different.

  EUTHYPHRO: (b)I certainly think I understand.

  SOCRATES: Is there not also something which is ‘approved’, while that which is ‘approving’ is different from it?

  EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Then tell me, is what’s carried being carried because it gets carried,36 or for some other reason?

  EUTHYPHRO: No, for this reason.