Ghost Patrol: A History of the Long Range Desert Group, 1940–1945

by Sadler, John

  Easonsmith made up for lost time, dashing over the firmer serir. It wasn’t until 10th September that they debouched from the western rim of the next belt of sand sea. The dunes end abruptly there, as if tidied up by a giant’s broom.18 The raiders crossed the ancient camel road from Jalo to Siwa, the timeless desert highway which had witnessed its fair share of invaders come and go over the centuries. After another 200 miles of changing terrain, moving from the stripped and scorched to the border of vegetation, spare and clinging to begin with, then thickening into a form of rough savannah. The two Arab irregulars were dropped off a few miles short of Barce to contact locals and bring back up-to-date intelligence.

  On 13th September, fifteen miles south of their objective, the patrols halted. Here, Easonsmith gave a detailed briefing and the men prepared for action: guns cleaned, ammo and vehicles checked. Under cover of the velvet, late summer darkness, balmy and alive with insect noise, they drove boldly towards their target. At one police post, a single native copper came out to challenge them and found himself an LRDG volunteer. Hamed, as he was called, would spend several months of cheerful servitude before being got safe home.19 As Hamed was being pressed into service there was movement from inside the roadside blockhouse. Only one Italian officer came out to investigate and was promptly shot. The rest of the gendarmerie left via the rear door. In the excitement two trucks banged into each other and both had to be dumped.

  When the patrols, still combined, got as close as the village of Sidi Selim, Dick Lawson was left there with T Patrol’s radio truck as rearguard and rally point. As the rest of the vehicles struck the main highway to Benghazi and breasted an escarpment five miles out of Barce, they encountered a pair of Italian light tanks. Easonsmith drove towards them unhesitatingly; no one was expecting raiders this far west. The tank crews received a most unexpected surprise when the LRDG opened up on them at point blank range. They caused no further trouble.20

  Just outside of town, at the principal crossroads, Easonsmith divided his forces. Nick Wilder, with T1, would attend to the airfield while Sergeant Dennis, leading the Guards after Timpson’s evacuation, would beat up the downtown zone and barracks. Wilder drove around the outskirts till he reached the aerodrome. Shooting up those light tanks earlier did not seem to have alerted anyone, and the raiders drove through the gates unopposed. Belatedly, the garrison woke up and several came running out. This became their final deployment.21

  As the Italians sprawled in the dust, tracer set a nearby petrol tanker ablaze, the most perfect illumination. Grenades were chucked into the airfield’s canteen, and the attackers, down to four 30-cwts and a lone jeep, hosed enemy aircraft in a storm of bullets. Those which survived the hail of incendiary rounds were each awarded an IED. Thirty-seven planes were attacked and at least a score of these were complete write-offs. By now, the surviving Italians had woken up and were blazing away at everything and nothing. Despite this enthusiasm the patrol came through without a single scratch.22

  Behind them, the airfield was wrecked and ablaze. Down the long straight to the station at the far end of town, Wilder’s trucks charged headlong. Two more light tanks barred the far end, their shot whistling up the road, happily firing too high. Wilder rammed the first tank with sufficient force to push this into the other. The Chevy was a write off but after a bunch of grenades had been deftly rolled beneath both armoured vehicles, so were they.

  Wilder and his crew, unharmed, jumped onto the jeep. The overladen Willys roared towards the station, Wilder on the Vickers firing bursts of tracer. Blinded by white light from the rounds, the jeep’s driver struck the kerb and the vehicle did a somersault, spilling its stunned passengers. Wilder was pinned and knocked unconscious. The following truck righted the jeep, which was still a runner, collected Wilder and drove on. Trooper Craw and his truck became separated at some point in the melee and lost.23

  Sergeant Dennis and the Guards were keeping up trade at the other end of town. As their trucks rolled past the hospital, two sentries challenged from the darkness: Dennis rolled a four-second grenade between them and turned them from sentries into patients.24 Next it was the barracks’ turn; two more sentries were disposed of, then the trucks drove around the site, bombing buildings, shooting up trenches and generally anything that moved. Dennis only finished the attack when he’d run clean out of bullets after playing dodgems with another pair of light tanks in the hospital grounds. Trooper ‘Jock’ Findlay’s truck was mislaid sometime during this mad career.

  As it later turned out, Findlay had missed the road out of town and had picked up a vengeful posse of Italians who chased his lone vehicle across the plain as dawn was breaking. Ahead of them, the escarpment rose dizzyingly, far too steep for any two-wheel drive vehicle, so they abandoned the truck and set it on fire. After a day of dodging their pursuers, Findlay found himself alone. He walked eastwards for three days before being picked up by friendly Bedouin. He wasn’t recovered until October: There he stood, surrounded by goats and sheep, a tall, bearded figure in Arab gear with a big, beaming smile on his face. ‘What took you so long?’ he said.25

  Jake Easonsmith was on his own where the patrols had split, as ever determined not to let others have all the fun. It probably isn’t a commander’s job to get too close to the action but the temptation was overwhelming. He first attacked some small bungalow type units which might have been officers’ quarters. Next he took on a further pair of light tanks before terrorizing a central piazza, scattering grenades amongst startled Italians. Next one up was an MT park containing a dozen vehicles; none of these would be going anywhere soon. By 04.00 hours both raiding parties were back at Sidi Selim; ten of the original twelve vehicles had come through, three jeeps and seven trucks in total. All they had to do now was to sweep up the two vehicles left earlier at Sidi Raui and be on their way.

  For once the Italian complement there proved capable of aggressive action, setting up a neat ambush in a narrow defile south of Sidi Selim. All hell suddenly broke loose. Three men were wounded and Dick Lawson’s car temporarily immobilised with a shot out tyre. Calmly, Sergeant Dennis backed up to shield the stricken vehicle with his own while the wheel was changed. This accomplished, everyone got clear and the two busted trucks were recovered under tow. Clearly it wasn’t possible to drag both of these all the way back so they had to be fixed and got going. This meant another halt and the posse caught up. Jake Easonsmith kept the Italians and their local Arab levies busily occupied in a bold flanking attack with only his own jeep until the column got moving again.

  It was all going rather well, too well in fact. Luck finally deserted them when G Patrol’s wireless truck broke down in, inevitably, a totally exposed location. Frantic efforts to get the vehicle under any kind of cover took just that bit too long and the fighters found them. Carrying out a beat up after a concealed approach march was one thing; getting away with it quite another. Stung by losses and humiliation, the enemy’s vengeance came roaring out of a shining sky. From late morning till sundown, the patrols were attacked relentlessly. By the time darkness brought relief, only a single truck and two jeeps remained serviceable. These would have to ferry thirty-three men back to Kufra. Worse, there were now several wounded. Nick Wilder had been hit in both legs and trooper Parker in the stomach. Dick Lawson performed prodigies, working unconcerned and incessantly during the strafing.

  Given the fury and duration of the bombardment, it could have been much worse. It did get rather worse just as darkness was falling. Jake Easonsmith had wisely unloaded all of the precious water and rations, dispersing them around. It seemed safe to load all of these onto one of the two surviving Chevys, but just as this essential cargo was being stacked, the fighters came back for a final pass and hit the lot.26 This was both galling and serious, but Easonsmith had foreseen this dire possibility and had earlier created an emergency dump located some sixty miles southeast of Barce at Bir Gerrari.

  As dusk fell on 14th September, the party set off. Dick Lawson had one jeep and o
ne 30-cwt, and with his group he took the six wounded men, plus driver, fitter and navigator. They had 700 miles to cover. Two marching detachments moved off at the same time, only a single jeep between them carrying supplies, or such as they still possessed. The ground was hard and unyielding. Lawson’s jeep gave out, the gas tank holed by a random round during the beat up. Next, the second jeep stalled; its sump fractured, though this was repairable. One man became lost in the darkness, probably having succumbed to exhaustion. He could not be found. They kept walking, dodging aerial sweeps. At last some good luck arrived as they came across a Bedouin encampment and bought some food and milk. More good fortune on the 16th – they discovered blessed water.

  Next day, as dawn broke, they heard vehicle engines with a reassuringly friendly beat. Easonsmith fired off several flares but to no avail. Barely an hour later, as they trailed on disconsolately, they stumbled upon John Olivey and his patrol – salvation! When they reached the stash at Bir Gerrari, Lawson had already passed through and deposited a note. This still left the second walking group unaccounted for. With Olivey’s Rhodesians, Easonsmith combed the area for the missing men; they’d been sighted by local Arabs. By the evening of 19th September the eight missing troopers were finally located, though two injured men, who’d been left behind, could not be traced.27 When the combined groups reached LG 125, they discovered Ken Lazarus with two of Dennis’ guardsmen who’d been left behind in the fracas; the wounded men had been taken off by the RAF.

  Two days later they had traversed the sand sea, and then on to Howard’s Cairn where Arnold with the supply section was waiting. By the 25th all were back at Kufra. The LRDG beat up of Barce was the only one of these September raids to succeed. The Axis had lost perhaps thirty planes and as many dead. That the raiders could strike so far behind the lines was a significant dent in Axis morale and a comparable boost to the Allies. LRDG had suffered none killed, half a dozen wounded, ten POWs and lost fourteen vehicles. One MC, two DSOs and three MMs were awarded;28 all in all, a very impressive undertaking.

  With so many vehicles trashed, LRDG had to accept a quantity of re-conditioned 30-cwts from RAOC. These came with bland assurances if no specific guarantees. Six of the Mack ten-tonners were swapped for ten Ford three-tonners; these admittedly performed better than the heavier vehicles over soft ground. David Lloyd Owen was temporarily invalided out after being injured during an Axis air raid on Kufra. Captain Spicer acted as his replacement. Meanwhile the ‘Big Push’ was brewing, the battle that would be, as Churchill memorably remarked, an end to the beginning. For the Axis, El Alamein would also be the beginning of the end.

  Notes

  1 Kennedy Shaw, p. 207.

  2 Wynter, p. 157.

  3 Ibid., p. 158.

  4 Ibid., p. 160.

  5 Lloyd Owen, p. 102.

  6 Wynter, p. 164.

  7 Ibid., p. 165.

  8 O.H., vol. IV, p. 20.

  9 Ibid.

  10 Force ‘A’–11th Royal Marines, detachments from RA, RE, R. Sigs., RAMC; Force ‘B’–D Squadron 1st SAS Regt., plus RS, RE, & R. Sigs., support; Force ‘C’–D Coy 1st A&SH, detachments of RNF, RA, RE, R. Sigs., RAMC (O.H, p. 21).

  11 Ibid., p. 21.

  12 Ibid.

  13 Ibid., p. 22.

  14 Ibid.

  15 Ibid., pp. 22–23.

  16 Ibid., p. 23.

  17 Moreman, pp. 49–50.

  18 Kennedy Shaw, p. 200.

  19 Ibid.

  20 Ibid., p. 201.

  21 Ibid.

  22 Ibid., p. 202.

  23 Ibid.

  24 Ibid.

  25 Morgan, p. 74.

  26 Kennedy Shaw, p. 205.

  27 Ibid., p. 206.

  28 Ibid.

  CHAPTER 6

  Out of Africa, 1942–1943

  Hail, soldier, huddled in the rain,

  Hail, soldier, squelching through the mud,

  Hail, soldier, sick of dirt and pain,

  The sight of death, the smell of blood,

  New mean, new weapons bear the brunt;

  New slogans gild the ancient game:

  The infantry are still in front,

  And mud and dust are much the same.

  Hail, humble footman, poised to fly

  Across the west, or any, Wall!

  Proud, plodding, peerless P.B.I. –

  The foulest, finest, job of all

  —A.P. Herbert: The Poor Bloody Infantry

  By early autumn 1942 Rommel, if depleted, was by no means impotent. The Fox knew that the hounds, at some stage, must be unleashed and he prepared to defend his ground. Defence in depth was a concept the German Army understood well and one which it had perfected during the Great War. Moreover, the Allied build-up gave the Axis time to strengthen their already formidable defences. The front was defined by coastline to the north and impassable desert to the south.

  El Alamein

  This line could not be outflanked; therefore it must be breached in a grinding battle of attrition. Rommel had provided a double mesh of mines all along the front. The belts were, at intervals, linked to form boxes. The defenders’ role in any sector was simple: to hold the line for long enough to allow the armour time to come up. Part of his difficulties lay in that he had insufficient German troops to form the static garrison, and he had proven doubts over some, if not the majority, of Italians. To stiffen the collective spine of his allies, Rommel mixed units along the line, down to battalion level, so that every Italian formation had intervening German troops to act as a brace.

  His armour he kept to the rear, 15th Panzer in the north, 21st to the south. Littorio Armoured division was attached to the former and Ariete deployed before the latter, thus splitting Italian XX Corps. Both 90th Light and Trieste Motorised Division were left in the north, westwards along the coastline. From the Mediterranean shore to Miteirya Ridge, the 164th Light and Trento Divisions held the line. Southwards, as far as Deir el Shein and Ruweisat Ridge, was the responsibility of Bologna Division. Southwards again, Brescia was deployed around Bab el Qattara. These two Italian formations were stiffened by dispersed battalions of Fallschirmjager drawn from Ramcke’s Brigade. Down to Qaret el Himeimat, Italian paratroopers from Folgore and infantry of Pavia Division manned the front.

  General Brian Horrocks, in the southern sector with 13 Corps, would ‘break into the enemy positions and operate with 7th Armoured Division with a view to drawing enemy armour in that direction. This would make it easier for 10 Corps to get out into the open in the north’ The Desert Rats were not to get drawn into a mauling or engage in attritional ‘dogfights’. They were to husband their strength for pursuit once the breakout was achieved. Monty allows himself full credit for the idea of delivering the main blow in the north and avoiding the tried tactic of the flanking attack from the south: ‘I planned to attack neither on my left flank nor on my right flank, but somewhere right of centre; having broken in, I could then direct my forces to the right or to the left as seemed most profitable’.

  Leese was to put four divisions into the attack. Nearest the coast Morshead’s 9th Australian would have the extreme right, breaking in eastwards from Tel el Eisa. Next, Wimberley’s 51st Highland division, charged with assaulting towards Kidney Ridge. Then Freyberg’s 2nd New Zealand Division would strike towards the western extremity of Miteiriya Ridge with, on the far left, Pienaar and 1st South African Division attacking the centre.

  The front stretched for four and a half miles with a depth, on the right, of five and a quarter, shrinking to two and three-quarter miles on the left. Horrocks was to launch his offensive, diversions aside, on a narrower front with Harding’s 7th Armoured and Hughes’ 44th Divisions striking out south of Ruweisat Ridge. In the main this was to convince the Axis that the main blow was indeed falling in the south, and to fix 21st Panzer’s full attention here. Secondary objectives included attacks on Himeimat and Taqa Plateau, but these were not to be pressed home in the face of strong opposition.

  An intense artill
ery barrage, the most potent since 1918, would begin the fight at 21.40 hrs on 23rd October. The guns would deluge German artillery with a weight of counter-battery fire before moving to plaster the forward defences. A rolling barrage would cosset the attacking infantry battalions, proceeding in ‘lifts’. With a sufficiency of anti-tank guns in theatre, the whole weight of field artillery could be brought to bear under a centralised fire plan. Early in October, Desert Air Force had taken advantage of wet weather to biff the Luftwaffe whilst much of its strength was grounded. The Axis aerodromes at Daba and Fuka were targeted and some thirty aircraft destroyed.

  On the 18th of the month, with just five days to go till the launch of ‘Lightfoot’, bombing raids began in earnest. Tobruk was further damaged. Next day Daba was bombed again together with troop concentrations, and road and rail traffic along the coast. Sidi Barrani, Tobruk, Daba and Fuka fields were repeatedly hit. During the night of 21st/22nd October Allied bombers ranged over installations on Crete. The overall strategy was for Desert Air Force to win hegemony in the air, then switch to close operational support. The bombers would fly in support of the opening bombardment, seeking out those guns still able to reply. Wellingtons, suitably equipped, would jam enemy radio signals, thus leaving the Axis ‘blind’ during those critical opening hours.

  Montgomery subsequently divided the fighting at El Alamein into three distinct phases.

  First, the break in, which he defined as a struggle for tactical advantage. He felt that this was successful, though the record might tend to question.

  Second, the crumbling or dogfight phase, aimed at ‘crippling the enemy’s strength’. This did succeed; a nasty, vicious attrition that told heavily in favour of the Allies. This was as much due to the fact Rommel squandered his precious resources in set piece counter-attacks in unfavourable conditions. Allied success was mainly due to Axis inability to learn from past mistakes and a propensity to fling men and vehicles into a maelstrom where the Allies held vital trumps in air and artillery superiority.